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Studying historical trading societies helps us to identify the institutions (e.g. rules)
and characteristics that lead to their success or failure. Historically, long-distance
trading societies, as a more particular example of trading societies, have been es-
tablished in various parts of the world. Many of these societies were successful
in certain aspects, and interestingly, a number of these societies were success-
ful, despite having different characteristics and institutions. This thesis aims
to identify some of the institutions and characteristics that contributed to their
success.
We use an agent-based simulation model to identify the key characteristics that
impacted the success of two long-distance trading societies. The objective of this
study is to develop suitable models of these societies that can be used for system-
atic studies of their characteristics. Two long-distance trading societies studied
in this thesis are the British East India Company and the Armenian traders of
New-Julfa, both of which flourished during the 17th and 18th centuries. In this
thesis, we conduct a comparative study of the two societies, based on historical
evidence and contemporary literature that provide empirical support.
Based on the comparative study, we have identified three overarching themes
that distinguish these societies: 1) the contractual schemes used and their en-
vironmental characteristics; 2) the apprenticeship programmes and vocational
schools used; and 3) the institutional mechanisms used. This thesis presents
three models developed corresponding to the three themes, based on the pre-
sented comparative study of the societies.
The first model developed was based on game theory and simulates the impact
of contractual schemes and environmental circumstances on the two trading so-
cieties’ success. In the contractual scheme, we assessed the impact of payment
ii
schemes (e.g. profit-sharing), penalties (e.g. dismissal for wrongdoing), and hir-
ing and firing schemes, in the context of open and closed societies, on the success
of the society. As a metric of societal success, we considered rule conformity,
sustainability, profitability, and improving societal skills.
As a next step, we model the impact of apprenticeship programmes and vo-
cational schools on the societal success (i.e. maintaining societal skill levels,
programme completion rate, and increasing societal income). In this model, we
consider the impact of different trader and trainer types (e.g. artisans), along
with various policies for managing recruits (e.g. training societal members and
hiring from other societies).
In our last model, we extend the beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) mental archi-
tecture to model the impact of institutional mechanisms (e.g. fairness) on the
success of these societies.
Beyond creating models (methodological contribution) of these societies to dem-
onstrate the influence of characteristics on the success of the societies, our work
provides practical contributions, such as a) insights into the positive impact of
profit-sharing on a company’s profitability; b) the aspects that should be consid-
ered to have successful apprenticeship programmes; and c) insights into design-
ing societal rules to deal with societies’ lack of transparency.
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The question why some societies are more successful than others has intrigued researchers.
Social scientists have noted that underlying institutional mechanisms (e.g. rules) impact this
success (Hall & Jones, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Rodrı́guez-Pose, 2013). This
formed the motivation for this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In the investigation of mechanisms to improve economic outcomes of a society, it is im-
portant to take into account the characteristics of both the impact of individuals (agents) in
terms of their capabilities and roles, as well as organisations (i.e. their policies and strategies).
Economies and their underlying mechanisms concern transactions (e.g. a person buys or sells
items), and decontextualising them from social factors (e.g. political and historical phenom-
ena) is impossible (efforts for contextualisation of economics sometimes called heterodox
economics, Brown & Spencer, 2014). To contextualise the economy, we need to choose
certain societies and study their mechanisms and characteristics to identify the impacts of
those on the economic theory (Colvin & Wagenaar, 2018). In this study, we investigate the
institutions (e.g. rules) and characteristics of two historical long-distance trading societies.
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Contrasting these societies helps us to answer the how and what questions. These questions
(e.g. what institutions have they utilised?) help us to learn from history in order to improve
our understanding of the present and to make better decisions in the future.
The two historical trading societies under study are the British East India Company (EIC,
17th-19th centuries) and Armenian traders of New-Julfa (Julfa, 17th-18th centuries). We
choose these two societies because Julfa had similarities with Genoese, Maghribis, and Vene-
tians (all historical long-distance trading societies that used Commenda contracts). Also, the
EIC is similar to the Dutch East Indies, and the French East India Company (they monop-
olised trade between their own country and Asia). Furthermore, in comparison with other
societies, we have more data about the EIC and Julfa. The fundamental problems that both
societies dealt with involved a) improving profitability and b) the agency problem known as
the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem concerns the dilemma where the
self-interested decisions of a party (agent) impact the benefits of the other person on whose
behalf these decisions are made (principal). S. A. Ross (1973) was the first to study the
problem with a focus on economic aspects of the problem (e.g. impact of payoff). Around
the same time, Mitnick (1973) addressed the same topic from the institutional point of view
(e.g. rules, see, Mitnick, 2011, for more discussions). Long-distance trade, especially in the
historical context, is an example of the principal-agent problem. In the long-distance trading
societies, the agents’ actions and decisions are not visible to the principals (since they are far
away), and self-interested actions of an agent decrease the principal’s profits.
The societies studied here have different characteristics (e.g. open versus closed). Also,
some of their institutions are different. Some institutions of these two societies help us to
identify a better approach for resolving the principal-agent problem; however, other insti-
tutions (e.g. the apprenticeship programme) help us to identify some means for improving
a system’s profitability. These findings can contribute to success in engineering rules and
characteristics when designing new societal rules. For this purpose, we use an agent-based
modelling approach. The uniqueness of agents helps us to take account of behavioural eco-
nomics concepts that contradict classical economics assumptions and predictions. In the next
section, we state the research questions we address in this thesis.
1.2 Research questions and contributions
As already mentioned, the ideas of this thesis are inspired by two historical long-distance
trading societies, namely the EIC and Julfa. The questions inspired by the EIC and Julfa are
suitable for trading societies facing information opacity (e.g. long-distance traders) where
2
an agent’s self-interested decisions (e.g. embezzlement) are not visible to the principal. The
higher level question addressed by this thesis is the following:
• What mechanisms facilitated the success of these long-distance trading societies?
To address the question stated above, we investigate different mechanisms and characteristics
of the societies using the following three research questions (RQs):
RQ 1) How do different contractual schemes and differing environmental circumstances
impact the success of these societies?
RQ 2) How do successful societies maintain skill levels over time? What are the im-
pacts of employing different mechanisms, including apprenticeship programmes
and vocational schools, on the success of skill development?
RQ 3) How do the characteristics of institutional mechanisms (e.g. fairness) impact
the success of these societies?
To be more precise, we are interested in identifying the mechanisms that helped long-
distance traders to be successful from various viewpoints. For this purpose, we have devel-
oped general models for trading societies. Then we utilised the specific parameters which
can be set for the EIC and Julfan historical traders. Overall, success metrics that we mea-
sured here include sustainability of the society, skill levels of agents, rule conformance, and
profitability. The three research questions listed above are addressed in Chapters 4–7. More
specifically, RQ 1 is covered in Chapter 4. Then Chapter 5 investigates RQ 2. Chapters 6
and 7 extend a mental architecture model and a simulation model, respectively, to address
RQ 3.
In what follows, we explain how the different chapters answer the research questions
mentioned above. Also, we state what aspects of success are measured in each chapter. Table
1.1 provides an overview of the input parameters (column 2) and the success metrics (column
3) for each of these research questions. It also provides details about what chapters these
research questions are associated with (column 4). Below, we provide a brief description of
the three models that were developed to answer the three RQs.
First, we model the impact of contractual schemes (including contract management) in
both societies and the variation of environmental circumstances (i.e. mortality rates) on the
success of the societies. The aspects of contract that are addressed to answer RQ 1 concern
payment and hiring schemes, and the methods utilised for contract management.
We use these to measure their impacts on the different success metrics of a society. In
this question (i.e. RQ 1), we assess the impacts of these characteristics on different success
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Table 1.1: The characteristics each research question addresses and the success metrics mea-





































Chapters 6 and 7
metrics, including sustainability, profitability, rule conformance, and increasing skill levels.
Note that the characteristics and success criteria will be elaborated in detail in Chapter 4.
Second, we model different apprenticeship schemes to identify the impact of these on
the success of societies. We have considered the impact of characteristics regarding trade
type (e.g. potters or engineers), trainer type (e.g. potential employer), recruiting schemes
(e.g. using guilds or unions), and the engagement of schools.
To address RQ 2, we use these characteristics to investigate their impacts on the trainees’
programme completion rates, their ability to maintain high skill levels, and their impact on
increasing societal income.
Finally, we model the impact of institutional mechanisms on the success of these soci-
eties. For this purpose, we use a modified cognitive architecture to answer RQ 3. We consider
the fairness of institutions, agent’s mobility (i.e. moving from one place to another), environ-
mental circumstances, and apprenticeship programmes. The impact of these characteristics
on the system is measured through the following outcomes: societal rule conformance, prof-
itability of the organisation, changes made to the rules, and system monitoring strength.
To answer these three research questions, we have developed three models that form the
methodological contributions of this thesis. Also, using the simulation, we infer insights that
improve our understanding of these societies, which can then be used to engineer modern
societies. For instance, the model developed in Chapter 5 can be used to decide about ap-
4
propriate apprenticeship programmes based on their societal and organisational attributes.
Furthermore, modellers can benefit from the cognitive architecture of Chapter 6 to simulate
the interaction of agents in a given context. Such applications are elaborated in the following
section.
1.3 Thesis approach and audience
To answer the stated questions, and to visualise the models, we have used a simulation ap-
proach. This research relies on the qualitative data in the form of letters, narrated story, the
performance comparison of different societies. As such, the validation of models is per-
formed by using the same information, by comparing the patterns observed in simulations
against those observed by historians. As presented in the following chapters, the results from
the simulation models aligned with historical data and contemporary evidence from societies
chosen in this study. Also, empirical studies conducted by researchers from other fields (e.g.
economics) verify the assumptions of the models.
In the simulation and validation procedure, we investigate various characteristics and
success metrics shown in Table 1.1. Furthermore, it should be noted that all the models have
parameters which are made concrete (i.e. instantiated) which lend themselves for concrete
empirical results. Using various methods, such as benefiting from empirical studies, using
available historical data, and sensitivity analysis, we find the parameters that correspond to
the situation in the EIC and Julfa. To make sure our simulation model mirrors real-world
situations reported by historians (i.e. it is valid), we compare our simulation results with
reported numbers and patterns.
It should be noted that this thesis work has a trans-disciplinary nature because of inves-
tigating historical long-distance trading societies and using social science (e.g. economics
and folk-sociology) and psychology to build the models. Based on the extent to which these
disciplines have been employed, the following audience may benefit from this work:
• Information scientists: the audience with a knowledge of agent-based simulation, the
tools used to build the artificial societies can benefit from the employed methods of
this study.
• Social scientists: in particular economists interested in the supply chain management
field. This thesis studies two successful long-distance trading societies, as historical
examples of supply chains. Although each problem has unique attributes that make
it specific in some aspects, the developed models and the findings of Chapters 4 and
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7 can help supply chain managers. Also, social scientists interested in studying the
impact of institutional mechanisms, such as apprenticeship programmes, guilds, and
unions on the society, may benefit from the findings of Chapter 5.
• Historians: Audience interested in comparative studies of historical long-distance trad-
ing societies in the early modern era can benefit from built models. This thesis work
used information from earlier historical studies to build the models. Also, we have
used empirical studies from other disciplines (e.g. sociopsychology) to test some of
the historians’ beliefs.
• Computer scientists: Computer scientists can use the conceptual cognitive architecture
presented in Chapter 6 to model interactions of agents in other contexts.
Finally, it is worth noting that interested researchers can use these models to study other
societies, including modern instances, as exemplified in Chapter 5. Furthermore, modellers
can use the approach employed in Chapter 4 for other historical long-distance trading soci-
eties with similar features (e.g. societies that use commenda contracts),1 by modifying values
of employed parameters, such as the share of profits. Also, researchers can adjust parameter
values of Chapter 7 (e.g. costs of conducting apprenticeship programmes) to model mod-
ern examples, and they can modify the organisational structure based on the case at hand.
The usage of empirical studies in the modelling facilitates exploring examples beyond the
historical cases.
1.3.1 Refereed publications
The following have resulted from this thesis, respectively:
1The contract is a profit-sharing scheme (we describe it in Section 2.2.3). This contract was used during
the Middle Ages in Western Europe (see Udovitch, 1962, for a brief review). Studies indicate that it probably
originated from the Arabian Peninsula. Note that the origin of this contract is before the 6th century when the
Muslims’ leader (i.e. Muhammad) worked as a commenda agent in his youth (see Udovitch, 1970, p. 172).
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Afshar Sedigh A. H., Frantz C. K., Savarimuthu B. T. R., Purvis M. K., Purvis
M. A. (2019) A Comparison of Two Historical Trader Societies — An Agent-
Based Simulation Study of English East India Company and New-Julfa. In:
Davidsson P., Verhagen H. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XIX (pp. 17-
31). MABS 2018. Springer, Cham.
Afshar Sedigh A. H., Purvis M. K., Savarimuthu B. T. R., Frantz C. K., Purvis
M. A. (Under review) An Agent-Based Simulation Study of Different Appren-
ticeship Societies. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.
Having stated the research questions, in the next section, we provide an overview of
structure of the rest of this thesis.
1.4 Thesis structure
This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides the historical background related to the
two long-distance trading societies, along with a comparison of their institutions and char-
acteristics. Chapter 3 provides the necessary background for understanding the rest of the
chapters, including the relevant concepts, foundations, technology, and background.
Chapter 4 simulates the two historical societies in question, using a model developed
based on game theory concepts. This chapter investigates the impact of contractual scheme
and environmental circumstances on the success of these trading societies. This chapter also
points to some shortcomings of this model that are addressed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Chapter 5 establishes a model for maintaining skill levels over time in a society. This
chapter also investigates societies other than the long-distance trading societies to evaluate
the success of the apprenticeship programmes in societies.
Chapter 6 widens the usual simplified utilitarian agent cognitive architecture by consider-
ing certain personal and sociopsychological aspects of humans. The goal of this chapter is to
relax the restraints regarding materialistic modelling of agents (i.e. considering only tangible
profits/costs in the utility function). The chapter also investigates how this architecture can
be used for modelling systems using the two historical trading societies.
Chapter 7 utilises the model developed in Chapter 6 to present results of the impact of
institutions on agents’ behaviour. It also shows how this relates to the success metrics used.
Here we relax some assumptions made in Chapter 4 and reassess their results.
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary of findings, contributions, and limitations of this
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thesis. This chapter also discusses future extensions.
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2
An overview of the two historical
long-distance trading societies
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the two historical long-distance trading societies
that we explore in the thesis. We use these two contemporaneous societies to explore some
important historical institutions (e.g. rules) and societal characteristics (i.e. other aspects)
that influenced their performance.
Both societies were active in the 17th and 18th centuries. The long-distance trading
societies in question include the British East India Company (1600–1874) — a chartered
company (i.e. an association granted exclusive rights of trade by government) — and the
Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (1600–1747) — a closed society of traders. Both of them
were successful in trade though with significantly different characteristics and institutions.
The differences that motivated us for exploring these societies are stated in the rest of this
chapter. Given our research questions (see Chapter 1), this chapter aims to provide a compar-
ative background of the two societies with an emphasis on the characteristics and institutions
of these societies that are relevant to their economics, especially their contracts and appren-
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ticeship programmes.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide an overview
of Julfa and the EIC, respectively. Both of these sections have relatively the same structure.
First, we concisely describe the formation of each society (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1, re-
spectively). Afterwards, we describe their important societal characteristics, including their
demography (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2, respectively). We continue the description of these
societies by investigating their economic institutions, including their contract and payment
schemes (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3, respectively). For the importance of skills in the trading
societies, we devote a section to investigate the training scheme employed in each society
(Sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.4, respectively). We also review the reasons for the decline of each
society to complete the narrative (Sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.5, respectively). Finally, in Section
2.4, we compare the characteristics of these two trading societies to form a bigger picture for
the comparative models provided in the subsequent chapters.
2.2 Armenian merchants of New-Julfa
The Armenian traders of New-Julfa (Julfa) were originally from Julfa, Armenia. They moved
into the central parts of Persia (Iran) through a forced displacement by Shah Abbas I (who
reigned between 1588 and 1629), a Safavid king (the Safavid dynasty ruled from 1501 to
1736). They formed one of the most successful trading societies in their era that impressed
traders of other countries. Their trading society resembles Maghribi traders1 of the 10th to
11th centuries, in terms of being a religious minority (Christians in a Muslim country), using
commenda contracts, having a closed society, and being engaged in long-distance trades.
In the following subsections, we state their background, the formation of New-Julfa, their
institutions, and the reasons for the decline of this trading society.2
2.2.1 Displacement of Julfans and the formation of New-Julfa
The displacement of Julfan Armenians was initiated by the Ottoman-Safavid wars of 1603–
1618, through which Shah Abbas I aimed to recapture the northern parts of Iran, including
Armenia. During this war, the Safavid army faced attacks by the Ottomans (the Ottomans
reigned between 1299 and 1922) and understood that they were unable to keep the lands.
1Maghribis were a Jewish minority of long-distance traders who operated in a Muslim country. They
formed a closed society and operated between the 10th and 11th centuries (see Greif, 1989, for a brief history).
2Note that the main resources for the historical account of Julfa are from two theses, namely Herzig (1991)
and Aslanian (2007). We also used two Farsi resources, namely Arabihashemi (2016) and Baibourtian (1996).
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Consequently, Shah Abbas I used a scorched-earth policy3 and displaced the residents of
those places, including Armenians, to Iran. The displacement caused a dramatic loss of lives
and initiated different debates on the intentions of the Shah (i.e. king).4
Although displaced people were settled in different places, the people of interest (i.e. Jul-
fans), were first settled in Isfahan (Iran). However, due to some conflicts with locals, Shah
Abbas I granted them a land in the south of Zayanderud (a river passing Isfahan) to build their
neighbourhood. The unsuccessful attempts of the Shah for silk trade also helped Julfans to
gain an informal monopoly of trade.5 The informal monopoly meant that even though the
East India Company (EIC), the Dutch East India Company (VOC),6 and Muslim merchants
were permitted to be engaged in trade, they could not use this right for different reasons.7
The mentioned privileges (e.g. granting them a land and informal monopoly) were ac-
companied by granting Julfans permission to practise their religion and also rule over their
neighbourhood (e.g. bulding churches and using their courts). These privileges and permis-
sions are some of the reasons for the formation of New-Julfa. In the next subsection, we
investigate some of the societal characteristics of Julfa.
2.2.2 Societal characteristics
In this section, we describe the institutions and societal characteristics of the Julfans. These
institutions and characteristics helped them to form and maintain a trading society. The
main aspects that are covered in this section include Julfan’s family firms, their societal
demographic characteristics, and the impact of churches and community on governing the
3“The act of an army destroying everything in an area such as food, buildings, or equipment that could be
useful to an enemy” (Cambridge online dictionary, 2019).
4An overview of these debates is presented in Herzig (1991). Also, some information about the old-Julfa
can be found in Baibourtian (1996). For a better understanding of Julfans’ incentives to stay in Iran, such as
their shared religious background and common epic stories, refer to J. R. Russell (1987) and Arakelova (1998),
respectively. For information regarding Safavid politics and economics that also impacted Julfan traders refer
to Matthee (1999) and Bastani Parizi (2013).
5Shah Abbas I also gave Julfans interest free loans in the early years of their trade in Isfahan (Herzig,
1991).
6VOC stands for Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie which can be translated as unified East-Indian com-
pany.
7Muslims had problems due to their unfavourable religion in Western Europe (i.e. they were not welcome
to trade there). Furthermore, after the Ottomans’ conflicts with Safavids became worse, the Ottomans did not
let Muslims from Iran (i.e. Shia Muslims) use their routes. The EIC had permissions for purchasing royal silks,
but the trade was liberalised in 1629 by Shah Safi I (who reigned from 1629 to 1642). The VOC also had
problems because of a lack of continuous contact with Iranian markets (Baibourtian, 1996, pp. 45–46).
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society. What follows provides an overview of the aforementioned information (for more
detailed information see Herzig (1991) and Aslanian (2007)).
2.2.2.1 Family and family firm8
“Their families are very great; for, both sons, nephews, and nieces do dwell
under one roof, having all their substance in common: And when the father
dieth [sic], the eldest son doth [sic] govern the rest; all submitting themselves
under his regiment. [...] In their diet and cloathing [sic], they are all fed and
cloathed [sic] alike, living in all peace and they tranquility [sic], grounded on
true love and honest simplicity.” (Cartwright, 1767, p. 720)
The families played a crucial role in the society. Overall, two factors kept the family firm
alive. These include the inheritance rules and intermarriage. Lawbook of the Astrakhan (the
Lawbook, written in the mid 18th century) helps us to understand their rules (e.g. inheritance
rules, Herzig, 2007, provides a summary of the commercial laws stated in the book). Based
on the Lawbook, the head of family (i.e. father or elder brother) managed all the properties
and assets. Also, the inheritance of a person was passed down for six generations (see Figure
2.1). Figure 2.1 schematically shows how the heritage should be equally split among male
heirs (the survivors are underlined and are in bold).9 An heir should ask for independence
to control his assets independently. Independence had consequences such as losing all the
connections with the family (i.e. the person would lose the permission to use the family
reputation in trade and also the possibility of inheriting from other family members). Such
rules made a family like a firm where the elder member is its manager (Hakob in Figure 2.1).
These rules, along with intermarriages (marrying cousins), strengthened family bonds
and also facilitated the concentration of capital. Note that members of the family could ask
for loans but they should pay interests. Other members of the family worked for the firm
as commenda agents, and a family firm could be dissolved by declaration of independence
of all its members. Thus as stated briefly, Julfa rules led to the formation of family firms
by concentration of wealth. In the next subsection, we briefly state how the community and
churches contributed to the trading aspects of Julfans.
8The descriptions in this section are adapted from Herzig (1991), unless otherwise mentioned.
9The daughters received nothing or a small share (e.g. one eighth). Also, if there are two sons or more in a
branch, the same sharing scheme as Figure 2.1 may apply there. For instance, in Figure 2.1 if Nathan had two
sons, his share of the inheritance was divided equally between his sons.
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Abraham















Figure 2.1: A schematic representation of sharing the inheritance of Abraham among his
living heirs names in bold and underlined (see Herzig, 1991, p. 161, for more information).
2.2.2.2 Community and church10
As stated earlier, Shah Abbas I granted Julfans autonomy to govern their neighbourhood
(we address Julfa/New-Julfa as a city). In this section, we describe how Julfans governed
their city. The lower level of governors were called Katkhudas (i.e. governors of streets),
who were head of the prominent families of the street. The upper level of governors were
called Kalantars (mayors) and were chosen by citizens (they functioned like a mayor). He
had responsibilities, such as collecting taxes and indicating each household’s share in taxes.
We describe more functions of these roles later in this section.
Another permission that helped Julfans to govern their network included autonomies
granted by governments in the Asian continent. These helped Julfans to establish and enforce
their own rules across their trading network.11 Additionally, Julfans used New-Julfa as a
source of information sharing and as the final source for resolving disputes. All these
autonomies and the aforementioned governing levels (i.e. Katkhudas and Kalantar) were
10The descriptions of this section are adapted from Aslanian (2007), unless otherwise mentioned.
11The EIC in India, Russian governors, and Spanish governors in Manila granted them some rights similar
to the ones granted by Shah Abbas I (see Aslanian, 2007, for more information). The importance of this
autonomy lies in the fact that regional courts’ decisions were mostly based on that region’s rules, not Julfans’
(e.g. once in Tibet the regional court resolved Julfans’ dispute by rolling dice, Aslanian, 2007, p. 268).
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employed to establish social administrative means. Aslanian (2007) points to three legal
administrative means utilised by Julfans as follows:
• Assembly of merchants: It aimed to resolve commercial disputes inside New-Julfa.
The assembly was comprised of at least 20 members, including the Kalantar, more
than nine Katkhudas, and at least three merchants.
• The portable courts (Jumiat): It aimed to resolve commercial disputes in distant
places. It was formed in one of the following ways:
– If they could find a sufficient number of Julfans, the court only involved Julfans
(e.g. four Julfans).
– If the number of Julfans was insufficient, the court also involved additional in-
vited foreign merchants.
• Legal assembly: It aimed to ratify legal papers, to delegate authorities to the attorney,
and to approve wills. It involved Katkhudas, Kalantar, and the archbishop of Julfa.
Finally, Julfans could have employed the services of royal police (darogha),12 for punish-
ing and imprisoning criminals. However, the efficiency of this administrative depended on
the Shah’s relations with the Julfans. In the next subsection, we state the information-sharing
mechanisms of Julfans that made the courts effective by providing evidence.
2.2.2.3 Information-sharing mechanisms
The information-sharing mechanisms in Julfa were diverse. The following are the most
important information sharing mechanisms:
• Churches: The roles of churches went beyond a worshipping place. They were also
places to informally share information.13 Furthermore, All Savior’s Monastery (i.e. the
main church of Julfa) was a place for keeping records of contracts and blacklisted
Julfans (e.g. persons who were deprived of future trades).
12The words dārūḡa, dārūḡa-ūšāgerd, dārūḡaūčī are other pronunciations of the same word. It is a borrowed
word from Mongols. They had various roles in different times, from mayors to police. At the time and place in
question (i.e. Isfahan as the capital city of the Safavids dynasty), they had a role like the police (see Lambton,
1991, for more information).
13When the population of Julfans increased in a city, they established their own churches there (Aslanian,
2007).
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• Letters and qasid (means messenger or runner): By using letters, Julfans shared
information between different network nodes. Couriers (Qasids) were utilised to share
urgent information (e.g. sudden changes in business risk). Types of shared information
through correspondence are listed below:
– Information regarding political or social news, along with their impact on busi-
ness (e.g. change of the ruler in a place).
– Information related to other merchants and their reputation. This helped the mas-
ter to find reliable partners and also avoid notorious agents.
– Information regarding commerce-related issues. This class of information in-
cludes the following:
* A detailed list indicating the current prices of commodities;
* Current exchange rates, custom duties and road-guard fares.
* Prices of the items in different places that were an advantage in comparison
to other trading societies (e.g. the EIC and the VOC merchants).
– Up-to-date information regarding business transactions and investments. This
class of information was utilised to update the firm’s accounts. We can guess
this could be used in the same way it was utilised by European merchants in late
medieval times (i.e. as valid evidence in court, Aslanian, 2007).
• The assembly of merchants collected information from different parties, and portable
courts in other nodes to inform other merchants about cheaters.
Note that for secure communication of commercial information, Julfans used their own
dialect rather than Farsi or Armenian (note that Farsi was understood by Julfans; however, it
was also understood by Indian and Iranian merchants). Using a particular dialect for com-
munication shows that an agent who wanted to work in Julfa needed to understand, read,
and write the Julfan dialect. Because of these limitations and closedness of their society, we
explore Julfa’s demography in the next subsection.
2.2.2.4 Julfa’s demography
As stated earlier, Julfa was a closed society. The closedness of the society had two parts:
• The families formed a closed community of traders (family firm).
• All Julfans used their dialect for business affairs, which other Armenians could not
understand.
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Table 2.1: Estimated population of Julfa in different periods by different travellers (see






Iskender Beg 3,000 households 15
Carmelites 2,000 households 10
1626 Thomas Herbert 10





1660s Chardin∗ 3500 houses 17
1677 John Fryer 6,000 families 30
1712 Kaempfer 30
∗ Chardin referred to it as “the greatest suburb in the world”;
Tavernier compared it to a real city.
The aforementioned information indicates the importance of exploring the stability of
Julfa’s demography for modelling their society. Herzig (1991) compared different reports
about Julfa’s population during different periods. A summary of those numbers are presented
in Table 2.1. Also, Table 2.2 summarises Herzig’s (1991) estimation of Julfa population in
different periods. As can be seen, the table indicates a steady growth in population that
indicates the prosperity and sustainability of the society.





Based on the demographics’ characteristics∗.
5–10
1625–1650 10–15
1650s Abbas II expansion 20
End of 1600s 30
∗Number of households or houses.
In the next subsection, we provide an overview of the economic institutions of New Julfa.
2.2.3 Economic institutions of Julfa
To study the success of any trading society, we should take account of their economic insti-
tutions’ aspects (e.g. contracts). In this section, we describe the popular contracts in Julfa
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(i.e. commenda contracts); however, Julfans in limited cases used other types of contracts,14
such as true partnerships (i.e. partnerships with other firms) and commission-based con-
tracts.15
Although Julfans used muzarba16 (i.e. their pronunciation of mudaraba) for commenda
contracts, we employ the more familiar term. First, we describe commenda contracts, and
afterwards, we include more descriptions specific to the Julfans’ contractual rules.
Overall, commenda contracts are profit-sharing contracts where the investor bears the
risks of trade, as long as the trading agent does not breach the contract (see Figure 2.2). In
the unilateral form of commenda, the agent has a share in the profit, but the investor bears
the tangible losses, while the agent loses the time and skill invested (Figure 2.2, disregarding
the red dashed lines). The idea of this contract is investing capital by one party, and skills


















Figure 2.2: A schema of commenda contracts adapted from Jamaldeen (2012, p. 149, Figure
10-1). The red dashed lines belong to the bilateral contract.
Commenda contracts are suitable for combining the skills and labour of an agent with the
capital of an investor. In long-distance trades, investors usually used them for reasons such
14For more information regarding Julfans economic institutions (see Herzig, 1991, Chapters 4 and 5).
15Lane (1963) suggests that a shift from commenda or colleganza to commission agency formed in the 14th
century in Venice. He continues that the main difference between commission and commenda contract was in
the way that the agent was paid. In the newer version, the agent was paid based on the turnover. Turnover
is defined as “the amount of business that a company does in a period of time” (Cambridge online dictionary,
2019), and it can only be a predictor of profit (i.e. it is not the same as profit, Fairfield & Yohn, 2001).
16Note that qirad, muqaradah, mudarabah, mudaraba, and mudharabah are synonymous — the last three are
different spellings of the same word (Islamic Banking and Takaful Department, 2012, part B, p. 4, footnote 2).
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as avoiding risks of long-distance travels or doing simultaneous trades (i.e. several trades in
different places about the same time). The contract is defined in the Lawbook as follows:
“when someone gives money to another to work, the capital and two out of three
[emphasis added] parts of the profits go to him, and the third part [emphasis
added] goes to the worker. Or according to some other arrangement which may
be agreed between them.” (Herzig, 1991, p. 214, from the Lawbook)
Note that commenda contracts were written contracts that were witnessed by others. Two
forms of these contracts are listed below:
• Unilateral — Here the investor provided the whole capital, and the agent did not in-
vest any money and only performed the tasks (Figure 2.2, disregarding the red dashed
lines).
• Bilateral — Here the agent invested his capital as well as his skills (Figure 2.2, includ-
ing the red dashed lines).
The following lists a summary of the rules mentioned in the Lawbook (note that the master
is the investor):
• The agent must follow the instructions of his master, unless otherwise stated (e.g. the
master permits the agent to decide on his behalf).
• The agent must provide the account book; otherwise, he may be imprisoned for up
to one year. On return, the agent must present all of his belongings (including his
luggage) to his master.
• The agent must not conduct trade, except for his master, unless otherwise stated.
• The master should declare the selling/buying prices and the agent must follow them.
Aslanian (2007, p. 269) argues that if courts ruled in favour of one party, the defendant,
his family, or his relatives had to pay back the money and accumulated interests. That shows
more severe punishments than a simple boycotting for the defendant. In the next subsection,
we state how masters attempted to decrease their investment risks by investing in increasing
the skill level of agents using an apprenticeship programme.
2.2.4 Apprenticeship
The ideal form of the apprenticeship programme in Julfa had two stages, namely school-
based training and work-based training. First, we investigate the evidence regarding school-
based training. Then we state available evidence regarding work-based training in Julfa.
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Note that school-based training is more than just conveying declarative knowledge in the
network by means such as printed manuals (e.g. Aslanian, 2007, pp. 179–180, points to one
manual in Julfa).
Julfans employed schools to teach recruits commercial skills, such as formal writing and
solving arithmetic problems. The following passage points to an observation regarding the
quality of gained skills in the schools:
“Hovhannes, son of the priest David [...] was well conversant with the systems
of measures and weights in practice in various countries, the different monetary
units and the weight of gold and silver each of them contained. He unerringly
solved complicated arithmetical problems relating to the sale of various goods,
bank and money transactions, at times quite involved [emphasis added]. The
entries in the ledger abide by accepted principles in book-keeping; the right-
hand margins of leaves display expenditures noted after each credit item, while
the left hand is taken up by incomes.” (Khachikian, 1966, p. 156)
Based on the remaining teaching manuals, the important subjects addressed in their
school are as follows:
• Introduction to commerce, including a dialectical discussion, along with some details
about the importance of honesty and warnings about trusting strangers;
• Trade routes, important nodes, currencies, and employed units associated with them,
exchange rates, and the items one should buy or avoid buying in each node;
• Solving practical and complicated mathematical examples;
• Account-keeping and orderly updating of the general journal.17
The work-based training was mostly conducted by families for reasons such as increas-
ing the profitability of the family firm or future-proofing their children. An instance of par-
ents’ future-proofing their children is exemplified by a father who took his two sons to work
together as commenda agents. The share of profit for the three merchants altogether de-
creased from 33% to 25%, which indicates some costs for the trainer, regardless of paid
wages (i.e. the father, see Herzig, 1991, p. 215).
The other evidence of work-based training is more informal. For instance, Fryer provides
information on how masters and wealthy members of society (Khajes) trained their children.
See the following passage as an example:
17Unlike Aslanian (2007) who used daily financial ledger as a translation for ruznama we proffer to use
the word general journal like accountants do. Note that nowadays, in Iran accountants call a general journal,
daftar-e ruznama.
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“[T]hey train their Children under the safe Conduct of Experienced Tutors [sic],
who instruct them first to Labour [sic] for a Livelihood [sic], before they are
permitted to Expend [sic].” (Fryer, 1698, p. 268)
Another instance of work-based training by family members concerns Nikoghos who trained
his seventeen-year-old cousin, Zakaria (see Aslanian, 2007, p. 303). The work-based training
by family members seems to have been a tradition in Julfa as in the whole Asian continent
(Aslanian, 2007, p. 304).
As stated earlier, the apprenticeship programme included both work-based and school-
based training. It is rational to assume that in the work-based training provided by the family,
apprentices learned some skills, such as pricing the items18 and negotiation. In the school-
based training, they were taught declarative knowledge about the routes and units, as well
as academic skills such as solving mathematical problems. In other words, big family firms
in Julfa benefited from work-based and school-based training. After stating some reasons
for Julfan’s success, in the next subsection, we provide some information on the reason for
decline of this society.
2.2.5 Decline of New-Julfa
The reason for the decline of Julfa is the subject of debates.19 Overall, the issues Julfans
faced can be summarised as economic issues inside Iran, shahs’ corrupted officials ask-
ing for bribes leading to the unpredictability of travel costs, and the Afghans’ war with
Safavids that led to the extinction of their dynasty (note that it was caused by a “small band
of Afghan tribesmen”, Matthee, 2015). Also, frequent changes of kings after the extinction
of the Safavids led to the demand for more taxes (sometimes twice in a year), and famine.
Note that Aslanian (2007) and Herzig (1991) suggest that the violence of Nadir Shah Afshar
against Julfans was the main reason for the decline of the central node of Julfan’s trading
network (i.e. Julfa).
In other words, it was not their economic institutions that caused the decline of the soci-
ety. At first glance, the reason for the decline might be attributed to not having an indepen-
dent military to defend the Julfans. However, given their small population size in comparison
to Iran, and the costs of maintaining a military, it is difficult to say whether or not having
military could have helped.
18Armenian families traded gems, diamond, textiles, jewellery, etc. that even nowadays pricing them is not
easy.
19For such debates and potential reasons for the Julfa decline, see Herzig (1991, pp. 102–108) and Aslanian
(2007, pp. 355–369).
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Before investigating the next historical long-distance trading society, we wish to sum-
marise information regarding Julfan’s institutions by pointing out that the institutions of the
Julfa mostly aimed to satisfy their people. The main instances include sharing a significant
proportion of profit and utilising adjudication processes to resolve the disputes (courts). Fur-
thermore, they elected the mayor (i.e. Kalantar) democratically (see Aslanian, 2007). These
characteristics convince us to assume that Julfans were mostly concerned about the fairness
of institutions to control their closed trading society, and to decentralise the governance of
the society. The next section explores another long-distance trading society with different
characteristics and institutions.
2.3 The British East India Company (EIC)
The British East India company (EIC) was established in the last days of 1600 as a Royal
Chartered Company (i.e. the Crown granted the company the privilege of the monopoly of
trade). Despite its unique characteristics, such as being the first joint-stock multinational
company (Seth, 2018), the EIC shared most of its characteristics with other European char-
tered companies (e.g. monopolising Asian trade). In the 1600s, the Dutch East India Com-
pany (VOC) and the French East India Company20 were also active in India. However, we
choose the EIC because we have access to more authoritative English resources and evidence
about it. Furthermore, we are interested in this society because the company also coexisted
and cooperated with Julfans.21 It had some contracts with Julfans that permitted them to use
the EIC nodes, and also they purchased silk from the Julfan traders. An overview of the EIC’s
background, its formation, its societal characteristics, economic institutions (e.g. contracts),
and reasons for its decline are provided in the following subsections.22 Note that the EIC’s
period overlapped with several historical events, such as the Anglo-French War (1778–1783)
and the English Civil War (1642–1651). In the following, we investigate the events that had
a significant impact on the company’s rules or profitability.
20It was originally called Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes orientales translated as French
Company for East India Trade. It was formed by merging three French long-distance trading companies
(Wikipedia contributors, 2018).
21Note that Sir Jean Chardin and John Fryer who described Persia and Julfans were the EIC’s agents.
22The information of this section are mainly from the following resources: Hejeebu (1998), Chaudhuri
(1965), Chaudhuri (1978), Marshall (1976), and Erikson (2014).
21
2.3.1 Formation of the EIC
In 1599, the founders collected the capital to establish the company, and also Shah Abbas I
granted British traders permission to trade in Iran. However, the EIC started its trades in the
1600s when Queen Elizabeth I (1558-1603) granted them the royal charter. However, the
EIC faced issues, such as rivalry and battles with other European chartered companies and
battles with local governors. The following sections concentrate on the economics aspects
of this company (i.e. we disregard its wars and battles). The only war we investigate here is
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Figure 2.3: A schema of the organisational structure of the VOC, the EIC, and Julfa, and
their interconnections.
A society’s institutions and characteristics influence its economic performance, and in
the EIC certain characteristics led to changes in its institutions and hindered managers in
their efforts to control agents’ behaviour. Parts of these characteristics were forced by nature
(e.g. high mortality rate) and some were consequences of the managerial decisions (e.g. low
23This was a fight between supporters of the King and parliament and took place between 1642–51 (although
some unrest had been going on in Scotland and Ireland since 1639) (Ohlmeyer, 2019).
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wages). The following subsection investigates these institutions and characteristics. In this
subsection, we also present some characteristics of the VOC to describe an alternative char-
tered organisation that was contemporaneous with the EIC.
2.3.2.1 EIC’s characteristics and structure
The EIC monopoly had always been at stake by parliament’s or the Crown’s decisions. Also,
the structure of the company provided incentives and ability for agents to hide valuable
information from the company (information rent).24 Here we compare the EIC structure
with two other trading societies, namely the VOC and Julfa. Figure 2.3 represents a schema
of the organisational structure for the three long-distance trading societies (i.e. the VOC, the
EIC, and Julfa). In this figure, the solid lines show the formal relationships, and the dashed-
lines shows potential relationships, and the dot-lines are trade relationships. The following
compares the structure of these societies in different levels.
• Regulators (the green circles): The VOC had concerns regarding the local interests
of the regents.25 These interests sometimes took the place of the company’s interests.
The EIC faced some additional risks such as a change of rules by the British governors
(the Crown and parliament). Julfa had a distributed management (i.e. family firms
were ruled by their owners, not by a central director); however, the king’s decisions
impacted them.
• The managers (the red circles): The VOC and the EIC were companies with a cen-
tralised management (i.e. board of directors). However, Julfa had a decentralised man-
agement of trade because there were several family firms at the same time (i.e. more
than one family could trade silk). Furthermore, the EIC was exposed to the trading
decisions made by non-partners (i.e. parliament). Note that the Crown had invested in
the EIC and could be considered as a partner with some profits. However, the Crown
might have permitted the formation of new companies. For instance, in 1635, King
24The structure of the EIC comprised of agents who stayed at the same place for a long time. This has
provided the information rent on part of agents who stayed at the same place. The incentives of agents is a
consequence of a combination of agents’ access to the valuable company resources and low payment along
with the opportunity of benefiting from such information rents.
25For instance, as “the colonial system got underway and state-sponsored corporate bodies like the chartered
companies took off, the relationship among metropolitan principals became more adversarial. The VOC, in
particular, could act as a state within state-so various Dutch regents complained, or exulted, depending on
whether they controlled one of the coveted directorships. But the Seventeen Gentlemen were also the principals
of the Dutch East Indies Company, and in that role they confronted the intractable independence of their own
colonial agents” (J. Adams, 1996, p. 17).
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Charles I did permit the establishment of a new trading company called the Courteen
Association (Bogart, 2015).
• Market (the blue oval, the pink oval, and the yellow circle): As can be seen, the
three companies were engaged in the colonial markets (i.e. places where the EIC and
VOC had a duopoly, the blue oval). Also, each company was active in their home
countries/nodes (the pink oval). However, Julfans were also engaged in other markets
(e.g. French and Italian markets, shown using a yellow circle).
• Settlements and mercantile agents (orange circles): The EIC and the VOC had built
places called factories for the long-term stay of their mercantile agents (i.e. employees
who performed merchandising). A difference between the two is that the VOC had
used a managerial centre (Batavia).26 However, Julfan mercantile agents had moved
from one place to another to buy and sell items.
• Collaboration (dashed-lines and dot-lines): The mercantile agents of these com-
panies had some formal (i.e. collaboration with companies’ explicit permission) or
informal collaborations (i.e. performing illegal trades for self-interests or trades on the
company’s behalf without explicit permissions). This collaboration is indicated in the
lower part of Figure 2.3. However, in Jufla, as stated earlier, family firms could start a
partnership and also they could have hired each other’s mercantile agents (dashed-lines
in the upper levels of Julfa).
As can be seen, the EIC had a different organisational structure to Julfa. Now we in-
vestigate the issues associated with the adjudication processes in the EIC. The adjudication
process in the EIC was ineffective because of the weak monitoring and difficulties with
prosecution. For instance, the following passage indicates how some of the Surat council
members (i.e. EIC managers in Surat) defended the private traders (i.e. cheaters) in 1620:
“if some tolleration [sic] for private trade be not permitted none but desperate
men will sail our ships.” (Factory Records: Miscellaneous, I, 26, 18, February
1620, as cited in Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
Furthermore, company owners could not control and monitor agents’ behaviour for the
following reasons:
• Mercantile agents could hide their illegal income by spending it inside India.
26Batavia was the name of Jakarta, Indonesia, until 1949 (Waworoentoe, 2018). Batavia aimed to control
information rent by accumulating information in one place; however, this policy only transferred accumulated
information to Batavia (J. Adams, 1996).
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• Mercantile agents could remit their money with the help of other companies. For
instance, Gaastra (1994) stated that in 1765–1795 around 13% of remittances through
the VOC belonged to British agents.27
On the other hand, the efficacy of prosecution was low. In other words, in 100 years
between 2% and 4% of employees were prosecuted in courts (i.e. about 0.000428 of agents
per year, Hejeebu, 2005). Furthermore, when company became suspicious of an agent, it
took years to investigate and reach a final decision.29 For this reason, the real punishment
given by the EIC was the dismissal of agents for their suspicious behaviour. Indeed, 13.2%
of the EIC employees who were hired between 1700 and 1756 in Bengal were dismissed
(i.e. about 0.003 per annum; see Hejeebu, 2005, p. 514). For instance, Hugh Barker, an
employee with 25 years experience, was fired for the reasons stated in the following passage:
“We cannot pass by the extravagant price of the raw silk at Casimbazar [sic]
and the exceeding badness of the taffetys [sic] from thence. Therefore we may
let our servants see that we can distinguish betwixt [sic] them who serve us
faithfully and well and those who only pretend to do so we do dismiss the said
Hugh Barker from our service.” (Hejeebu, 2005, p. 514)
Finally, a counter-intuitive observation concerns a higher number of dismissals for more
experienced agents (Hejeebu, 2005). In other words, we can infer that employees in the EIC
cheated more as they became more experienced and had more access to company resources.
All of these indicate that: a) managers did not have an adequate cooperation with the mer-
cantile agents to monitor their behaviour and b) the EIC owners distrusted their agents and
managers.30 The next subsection provides an overview of the EIC’s demography. This helps
us to understand one of the reasons for certain policies employed by the company.
2712 million guilders (ƒ) out of ƒ90,000,000 that equals 13.3%.
28For x% in y years, it is calculated as (1− y
√
(1− (x/100))).
29According to Hejeebu (2005), sometimes the agent died before the final decision. For instance, for a
person called Spencer, “the company attempted to revive a complaint nearly two decades after the original
incident.”
30“One of the reasons for that distrust of the factors [i.e mercantile agents] which seems to have been
habitual with the Court of Committees was the feeling that they had no means of arriving at the true state
of affairs in the Indies unless other factors chose to give information against the delinquent ones [i.e. factors].
Sometimes, one factor more honest than the others would report on the behaviour Of those guilty of too flagrant
abuses [emphasis added].”(Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
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2.3.2.2 The EIC’s demography
A main concern of the EIC and other European Chartered companies was the high mortality
rate of their agents in India. For instance, Marshall (1976) states that around 60% of em-
ployees could not make it back to England, and the survivors looked far older than their real
ages. Hejeebu (1998) studied the life expectancy of the EIC’s agents between 1700 and 1774
(see Figure 2.4). Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of agents who stayed in the company
considering their years of service. Note that the main reason for not working in the next
period (five years) was dying and around 85% of agents who were not available in the next


























1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 Average
Figure 2.4: Years at service for agents before leaving the company, the x-axis presents years
of service, and the y-axis presents the percentage of agents who stayed at the beginning of
the period (based on Hejeebu (1998, pp. 90–91, Table 10))
Figure 2.4 does not include the number of agents who died during maritime travel (Hejeebu,
1998, did not include that number). Overall, residual effects of maritime diseases such as
scurvy, along with heavy drinking behaviour were some of the reasons for this high mortality
rate (Hejeebu, 1998; Marshall, 1997).
To overcome these issues, in 1669 the EIC changed its policy from hiring mature mer-
chants to employing young agents, based on the director’s recommendations (O’Malley,
1931, Chapter 10, p. 228). The hired agents were mostly aged between 15 and 19 years
(Hejeebu, 1998). Note that when we study the EIC institutions and characteristics (e.g. their
apprenticeship programmes), we should also consider such environmental circumstances.
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For instance, an incentive for European companies’ policies regarding building settlements
in their destination could have been to reduce merchants’ mortality because of maritime
travels. Note that scurvy, that is caused by deficiency of Vitamin C, was first systematically
studied by James Lind and his findings were published in 1748. He stated that “I shall here
only observe that the results of all my experiments was [sic], that oranges and lemons were
the most effectual remedies for this distemper at sea” (Price, 2017, quoted from “A Treatise
of the Scurvy”, by Lind). The next subsection explores the economic institutions of the EIC.
2.3.3 Economic institution
First, we wish to remind the readers that the values stated in this subsection belong to cen-
turies ago (i.e. we should consider the impact of factors such as inflation). The following pro-
vides the current relative value of £1 in 1700, using two metrics (see Officer & Williamson,
2019, for more information):
• Real price — £147.5. This number indicates the current equivalent purchasing power
of £1 for a fixed bundle of goods (i.e. a bundle of goods worth £1 in 1700 is now worth
£147.5).
• Labour earnings — £2181. This number ‘measures an amount of income or wealth
relative to the wage of the average worker.’ In other words, a person who was paid £1
to perform a task in 1700, is paid £2181 to do the same job.
As can be seen, the value of £1 changes, based on time and other factors (purchasing power
versus labour earnings). We mentioned this as a gauge for readers to know that when we
say a merchant could transfer about £2,000 from India, it means that with the same money,
he could buy a car worth about £295,000 now. However, considering the average wages, his
income was equal to about £4,362,000 now.
The following provide an overview of the main economic institutions that impacted the
company:
• The monopoly of trade: As stated earlier, the company was formed through a monopoly
privilege. However, for the structure of the company, this privilege was at stake
through decisions of parliament or new partnerships formed by the Crown.
• Contracts: The contracts indicate the economic institutions that were employed by
the company to manage the mercantile agents. In the following details, we investigate
how the contractual scheme of the company evolved over time.
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Flexible commissioning (1600–1609): First, agents worked as commission agents —
the commission rate was between 2.5% and 4% (see Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 75). They also had
permissions for private trade for a maximum of £25 for certain items or they had a share in
the company profit.31
Fixed wages (1610–1640): The most popular method for paying wages to agents who
lived in India was 33% in cash, and the rest, or most of it, was credited as company shares.32
Table 2.3 provides some evidence of the wages during this period. Note that factors function
the same as the mercantile agents. Also, there is evidence that indicates masters failed to
control the agents’ behaviour during this time. These difficulties were twofold and they are
ascribed below:
• Agents did not follow the provided commands from managers about the company’s
desires. For instance, in 1628, some agents postponed maritime travel using excuses
regarding dangers from the Portuguese fleets. This frustrated the managers and they
clarified that this kind of behaviour should not be repeated.33
• The agents had extravagantly spent company funds. For example, in one case, the
managers were frustrated because the agents sent a mission to the Court of Golconda to
secure the company’s concessions at a cost of about £4,000 (Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87).34
Overall, it is believed that agents had formed a coalition to cover their frauds and only ex-
tremely harsh violations might have been reported (Marshall, 1976).
Transition period (1660–1700): In the 1660s, the company granted permission for pri-
vate trade to the agents. The reasons for granting such a permission were twofold, a) an
31The differences between commission and commenda contracts are stated in footnote 15.
32Note that in commenda contracts the agent has a share in profits made by his skills. However, this policy
means that the agent bore the risks of mistakes and fraudulent behaviour of other agents.
33The directors’ reaction was as follows:
“[T]he factors put not the fault in cowards why that ship comes not home this year, for they
themselves either will not understand or will not follow their commission, ... in one particular
point of advice from hence to Surat wherein direction is given to dispeed [sic] away one or more
ships in November and not to stay to come in fleets unless the second ship may be ready within
14 days.” (Court Book, X, 219-20, 15 January 1628, as cited in Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 86)
34The directors’ response was as follows:
“You have to the life expressed your own vanity, folly, and riot unto those people, and wasted so
much of our estate in such a lavish manner as if we sent our ships and monies hither for you to
make shows and pagents [sic] for those people to scorn at.” (Letter Book, I, 127, 27 October 1636,
as cited in Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
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Table 2.3: The early evidences for wages in the EIC based on Chaudhuri’s (1965, p. 84)
discussions
Rank Wage Comment
Low-skilled £10 Nathaniel Courthope
Junior factor £40
In 1614, for instance, Hugh Fraine, a Spanish agent, was paid £20. His
wage increased by £20 a year and reached £100 after 5 years.
In another case, William Kent was hired with a wage of £50. His wage
rose to £100 for the rest of his service.
Senior factor £150–£200
President £500 In 1633 Methwold was paid this much.
idealogical shift took place in Britain,35 and b) after the English Civil War (1642-1651)
some of the company’s agents were added to its board of directors. This addition caused
an injection of new attitudes and led to granting permissions for private trade. Figure 2.5
presents the total value of items imported from the Asian continent between 1664 and 1760.
The immediate effects of granting permissions for private trade are identified through a drop
in the EIC’s imports from India to about 0. Furthermore, in 1691, parliament granted per-
mission to some traders to form a rival company called the New East India Company.36 The
formation of this rival company also led to a decrease in the imports of the EIC (see Figure
2.5).
New contracts (1700–1750): Hejeebu (2005) conducted a study on the EIC’s contracts
between 1700 and 1750. Based on the available information, granting permissions for private
trade was used by the company to reduce the company’s costs (i.e. wages). The third row
of Table 2.4, indicates the new wages. The new wages decreased drastically. For instance,
before the 1660s, a junior factor was paid £40; however, based on the new contract, a senior
merchant was paid £40 (see wages in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). In other words, the new
contract changed the main source of the agents’ income from paid wages to private trade and
cheating. Table 2.4 compares the wages (the third row), and the average remittances (money
sent) in the EIC (the fourth row).
Based on the available evidence, to penalise agents, the company had access to remit-
tances and also had the signed bonds. However, as stated earlier, agents could use other
companies like the VOC to transfer their money if they felt unsecure about the company’s
35According to Erikson (2014), “[m]any contemporaries of the Company argued that monopoly privileges
were in violation of the common law and [the] Magna Carta.”
36The company was officially called the English Company Trading to the East Indies (Bohun, 2008). For





























Figure 2.5: Total value of imported items from Asia (i.e. India, China, and South-East Asia,
based on Chaudhuri (1978, pp. 508–510, Table C.2)). Labels — i.e. (x,y) — show the year
and the value of imports, respectively.
Table 2.4: Remittance from India by the EIC’s agents and their wages (see Hejeebu, 2005,
p. 502 and p. 519)
Experience 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20
Title∗ Writer Factor Junior merchant Senior merchant
Annual payment £5 £15 £30 £40
Remittance per
year∗∗
£139 £406 £1416 £2297
∗The titles change, based on experience and factors are low experienced mercantile agents.
∗∗ Note that this includes income from private trade and cheating, less expenditures in India.
future actions based on their observations. Also, although the value of signed bonds was
significant (e.g. £500 for a writer), in several years before the EIC dissolution, some agents
could pay some sureties to sign their bonds, thereby, getting around the purpose for which
the bond was originally created.37 More importantly, there is no evidence of using these
37Hejeebu (2005, footnote 43) explains that a market of guarantors was formed behind the EIC office. In
one case, the same person signed 50 bonds for different agents during 15 years (see Hejeebu, 2005, p. 506,
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bonds to punish the cheaters. The next subsection investigates the methods employed by the
company to improve the skills of its agents.
2.3.4 Training
In this subsection, we investigate both aspects of the apprenticeship programmes in the EIC,
namely school-based training and work-based training. As stated earlier, in the early years
of its establishment, the company only hired experienced agents. At the end of 1660s the
company changed its policy to hiring young agents and sending them to India. The first
group of young people were from a particular school that was known for having commercial
courses in its regular programme.38 This policy did not persist, and after 1694, the company
officially started to hire writers (i.e. agents with some information on keeping accounts).39
The writers learnt the local dialect in tutelage provided by a company tutor. However, in
practice, the educational skills of the agents were not taken seriously, as explained in the
following passage:
“Even after the duties of the Company’s servants had ceased to be purely com-
mercial [i.e. after 1682], the only educational qualification required for admis-
sion to the Service was a rudimentary commercial training: a certificate that
the applicant for a nomination had gone through a regular set of merchants’
accounts [emphasis added] was the only test.” (O’Malley, 1931, p. 230)
Note that in the last years of the company’s life (i.e. 1800), a specialised course was proposed
by Wellesley to address the concern about “administering an empire”.40 However, the course
was not approved by the board for being too costly.41
footnote 43).
38The school’s name was Christ’s Hospital; O’Malley (1931, p. 228) said “[agents] were mostly obtained
from Christ’s Hospital, the well-known blue-coat boys’ school, which had the advantage of giving its scholars
some commercial training.”
39In 1682, a rule was passed in the EIC that only the ones who could keep the accounts were eligible to be
hired.
40The course was supposed to cover philosophical and general topics about ethics, civil and international
law, and history, along with the Indian language, history, customs, habits, Hindu and Islamic laws, and religion.
Note that based on the topics, this course was not designed for commercial purposes, but was designed to
control, manipulate, and govern Indian society for the benefits of the empire. This ambition ironically led to
the EIC’s dissolution in 1874 and after that the Crown formally became the ruler of India in 1854 (Kaul, 2011;
Sahni, 2013).
41The EIC board accepted that colleges can be used for teaching languages, and after 1854 when Britain
governed India, the college was employed for the same purpose. However, the evidence suggests that even
learning languages was not practised well (O’Malley, 1931, p. 234).
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Overall, as stated above, the commercial skills were not taken seriously. In other words,
after the 1660s, the agents were trained by experienced merchants inside India during work in
the first five years (i.e. the duration of this organisational role).42 Furthermore, the incentives
of trainers in the EIC were not the same as Julfans’. In the EIC, the tutors were forced to
train other agents, while in the Julfa, family members trained their relatives for their firm’s
profits.
As stated in this subsection, there is no convincing evidence that agents had adequate
school-based training (except for employees of the end of the 1660s). In other words, there is
only evidence for a work-based training that was not effective. This influenced the company
when they changed their policy from hiring experienced merchants to young and inexperi-
enced recruits (i.e. after 1660s). The next subsection provides an overview of the reasons for
the decline of the EIC.
2.3.5 Decline of the EIC
Hejeebu (2016) divides the life-cycle of the company into four periods to investigate the
transformation of the EIC. These periods include 1600–1660, 1660–1745, 1745, and 1745–
1784. Note that after 1784, the company was gradually dissolved by parliament by limit-
ing its directors’ powers and empowering militaries. The first period is 1600–1660, during
which, the company decided to establish residencies in India. The second period is 1660–
1745. During this period, the company faced crises for different reasons, such as its defeats
in battles with Aurangzeb (Indian Mughal king) and the emergence of a rival company in
Britain (the New East India Company). The third period is during 1745, when the EIC had
an unwanted war with its French counterpart because of the Britain-France opposition. The
last period is 1745–1784. In this period, the army had conflicts with merchants and also
merchants did not obey the orders of the board of directors. These conflicts caused parlia-
ment’s involvement in company’s decisions (i.e. conflicts between managers, the board, and
parliament), and finally, the company was dissolved in 1854.43
However, an aspect that is not addressed by Hejeebu (2016) is the gradual decline of the
EIC’s monopoly power. This decline was caused by a) granting permissions for private trade
to employees and b) its integration with the New East India Company (i.e. two companies
42Note that five years is a too optimistic estimation because they had to do their tasks, such as writing some
copies of letters and learning the language of locals. Furthermore, the main task of trainers was merchandising
(i.e. in practice, the training time was much less than five years).
43There is some debate that before 1854, the EIC no longer existed. For instance Marx (1853) says “So far,
the East India Company has, since 1833, no longer existed but in name and on sufferance.”
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worked as a whole). The latter led to an increase in the supply of items in the British mar-
ket that made the monopoly of trade useless. Figure 2.644 indicates that after integration
(i.e. 1709), although the company had an increasing trend of imports, it faced occasional
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Figure 2.6: A comparison between the EIC imports and profits (based on Chaudhuri, 1978,
pp. 508–510 and 440, Table C.2 and Table A.26)).
In the next section, we provide a summary of the two trading societies’ institutions and
characteristics.
2.4 Comparison of the two trading societies
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, we aim to compare two successful trading com-
panies to explore reasons for their success. The EIC was successful mostly because of its
monopoly, and Julfa was successful even in a competitive environment.
Table 2.5 presents some of the differences between the EIC and Julfa. Columns “EIC”
and “Julfa” indicate whether a characteristic/institution was available in the society. The
44Chaudhuri (1978) provided information on the EIC profits for 1710–1745. Because after 1709 the account
books were more organised.
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Table 2.5: A comparison between characteristics and institutions of the EIC and Julfa
Characteristics/institution EIC Julfa Studied Chapter
Apprenticeship Weak Strong Yes 5 and 7
Mortality rate High Low Yes 4, 6, and 7
Closed No Yes Yes 4
Adjudication Not in effect Yes Yes 4, 6, and 7
Profit-sharing No Yes Yes 4, 6, and 7
Societal collaboration in monitoring No Yes Yes 4, 6, and 7
Mobile agents No Yes Yes 6 and 7
Risk-sharing No Yes No -
Improving social network by marriage No Yes No -
column “Studied” indicates whether the identified attribute was considered in this study.
Finally, column “Chapter” indicates the number of the chapter that addresses the attribute.
Note that all of these characteristics do not have the same weight in impacting the success of
these societies. The following provides a summary of the two societies’ characteristics and
institutions, starting with Julfa.
The Julfans were a closed society of traders with rules that helped the concentration of
wealth in a family (i.e. their inheritance law). They also used intermarriage to strengthen
their family bonds and sometimes used marriage to improve their social networks. They
used commenda contracts45 to manage their trades. They shared a significant amount of
profit, and the master bore most of the trade’s risks. Because in Julfa agents were responsible
for buying and selling items, they did not stay in one place for a long time. Moving in their
networks and profit-sharing incentivised them to search for new opportunities. To manage
their contracts they had two types of courts, namely an assembly of merchants and portable
courts. The portable courts were formed in distant places to accelerate dispute resolution.
Julfa’s population growth convinces us of their prosperity. Also, it can be understood that
they did not face a high mortality rate. The low mortality rate of the company, and also the
fact that the investor bore risks of losses, convinced Julfans to invest in maintaining a high
societal skill level by conducting apprenticeship programmes. Also, certain characteristics
(e.g. family firms) convinced Julfans to collaborate in monitoring and reporting suspicious
behaviours of merchants. This monitoring and reports were completed by other means of
information sharing, such as archiving the name of blacklisted agents in the Churches.
The main issue that the EIC faced from the beginning was a high mortality rate. This
made the managers use an open scheme for recruiting merchants. Also, to control the mortal-
45In this study when we say commenda contracts, we refer to bilateral commenda contracts.
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ity rate of the maritime travels and for better access to the market, they established factories
(warehouses) in their trading nodes. These establishments were the places where their agents
stayed for a long time. Although their contracts evolved over time, their agents never had
a share in the profit made for the company (the agent did not even know about the amount
of profit made). Another issue that the EIC was involved with was regarding monitoring
their agents and enforcing the rules. In fact, sometimes managers defended cheaters against
the board of directors. Finally, the high mortality rate and profit that was guaranteed by
monopoly deterred the company owners from investing in apprenticeship programmes.
Having presented the background of the two long-distance trading societies, in the next




Background, foundations, concepts, and
employed technology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the concepts, foundations, and technologies em-
ployed in this thesis to model the trading societies described in the earlier chapter. We
underline the infrastructures of the models that are the main contribution of this thesis. We
present concepts underlying agent-based modelling and simulation, fuzzy sets, social insti-
tutions, and psychological and sociopsychological mechanisms and theories. We use these
concepts in the context of the two historical long-distance traders. The rest of the chapter is
organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the technologies and tools used to model different
aspects of these societies. These are used to develop models of agent interactions. Section
3.3 presents relevant concepts with respect to the domain of this study (i.e. managing long-
distance traders) concerning social institutions (i.e. the rules of the game) and economics.
Section 3.4 provides a review of another aspect of humans (i.e. psychology and sociopsy-
chology) that we make use of in this thesis. Finally, Section 3.5 provides a summary and an
overview of the relevance of those concepts to this thesis.
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3.2 Technologies and modelling approaches
In this section, we state the technologies and modelling approaches employed in the follow-
ing chapters. The technological concepts include agent-based social simulation and fuzzy
sets. The modelling approaches focus on methods associated with agency and include the
belief-desire-intention (BDI) model, game theory, and CKSW (Purvis et al., 2014)1 frame-
works.
3.2.1 Agent-based social simulation
To model complex systems, we usually divide the system into agents — i.e. its components
such “that each of them produces a particular effect by its action” (Cambridge online dictio-
nary, 2019). When we use such an idea to simulate social interaction, it is called Agent-Based
Social Simulation (ABSS). In other words, ABSS concerns the interaction of three fields of
research, namely social science, agent-based computing, and computer simulation. ABSS
can be defined as “the use of agent technology for simulating social phenomena on a com-
puter” (Davidsson, 2002).
In what follows, we concentrate on the aspects related to the agent-based simulations
(ABS), and we investigate social aspects in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.4.
First, we should clarify what we mean by agents in this context. Agents are autonomous,
self-contained, and social entities (Macal & North, 2009). In other words, agents are au-
tonomous entities that interact with one another and their environment. According to Macal
and North (2005), agents possess the following characteristics which make them suitable
candidates for simulation of the human decision-making processes.
• They are defined such that one can distinguish them based on their characteristics or
set of rules.
• They can interact with one another or the environment.
• They have some objectives or goals and make decisions according to them.
• They are autonomous and can make independent decisions.
• They are flexible and can modify their behaviour by learning.
According to Banks et al. (2010), in general, there exist two reasons for discrete-event
system simulation. The first reason is imitating a system behaviour based on the historical
data to investigate “what if” scenarios about the real-world system. The second reason is to
1CKSW stands for Commander-Knowledge-Skill-Worker. It is described in Section 3.2.5.
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predict the system’s performance while designing it. Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) suggested
some additional reasons for social simulation, such as a better understanding of the system,
prediction, substituting certain capabilities of humans, training, and formalisation. In social
science, formalisation, prediction, and an understanding of the system are the benefits of
simulation, and also simulation is a suitable alternative for expensive experiments of policies
on society.
However, one should note that as Davidsson (2002) suggested, simulation of social phe-
nomena may require estimations of many parameters that may be difficult to estimate, but
when done well, it helps to understand the consequences of a new policy.
3.2.2 The BDI mental architecture
As stated earlier, we use agents to divide a complex system into smaller action components.
Also, an agent impacts the system by its decisions. A challenge in agent-based simulation
is modelling the agents’ decision-making process (i.e action deliberation, Balke & Gilbert,
2014). A class of studies that investigates such a challenge employs the beliefs-desires-
intentions (BDI) cognitive architecture. The BDI is an agent cognitive architecture that is
developed, based on the concepts stated by Bratman (1987).2 Bratman et al. (1988) employed
the idea to model resource-bounded agents’ reasoning. This model and its extensions became
popular in the community in a decade (Georgeff et al., 1999). Figure 3.1 presents a simple
BDI cognitive architecture. Below, we provide a brief definition of beliefs, desires, and
intentions based on Bordini et al. (2007) and Bratman et al. (1988):
• Beliefs: This set contains an agent’s information about the world. It also indicates the
attitude of the agent towards the usefulness of the actions.
• Desires: This set indicates what an agent possibly would like to do. As a result, desires
potentially influence an agent’s actions.
• Intentions: This set indicates an agent’s decision on committing to a possible course of
action. Note that Bratman considers intentions as practical attitudes with commitments
to act. In other words, intention goes beyond desires by embarking upon doing certain
actions. He suggested that the idea regarding intentions should be taken seriously “on
its own terms, without trying somehow to reduce it to ordinary desires and beliefs.” 3
2Zimmerman and Bratman (1989) provide a brief review of Bratman’s (1987) definition of intention and
its correlation with plans and practical reason.
















Figure 3.1: The BDI cognitive architecture.
In Figure 3.1 plans are “intentions writ large”. Plans update the intentions through providing
the next alternatives or a change in the bigger picture. Also, a change in intentions impacts
the plans. For instance, suppose we intend to travel to city A. In addition, suppose that we
consider two forms of travel, namely air travel and a road trip. Note that each form needs a
different plan (i.e. sequence of actions), such as buying a ticket or checking the car. Suppose
we decide to book a flight because we do not like driving. Afterwards, we do not consider
the sequence of actions (plan) related to booking a flight.
Now we explain the impact of the beliefs and desires using the former example. In
that example, our desire impacted our reasoning by reducing the associated weight to the
road trip. Also, we took a decision, based on a set of plans that we believed that we can
successfully use to travel to city A (e.g. we did not consider walking). Bratman et al. (1988)
noted that although it is possible for us to change our plans based on changes in our beliefs,
plans “should be relatively resistant to reconsideration and abandonment.”
Several researchers have employed the BDI cognitive architecture for modelling agents
(Caillou et al., 2017; Jo et al., 2004; Taillandier et al., 2012). Two well-known extensions of
the BDI cognitive architecture include the EBDI and the BRIDGE. Pereira et al. (2008) and
Jiang et al. (2007), presented the EBDI (eBDI) architecture, based on the idea of Pereira et al.
(2006) who took account of the impact of emotions. Dignum et al. (2009) proposed a beliefs-
response-intentions-desires-goals-ego (BRIDGE) model for policy making. However, in this
model, agents are not bound to be rational; for instance, Dignum et al. (2009) argued that
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“preferences for rational versus rule following procedures differ across cultures” (Dignum et
al., 2009, p. 147). This model has a notion of “law of nature” that overrules agents’ decisions
that makes it hard to extend the results of a simulation to other cases. Criado et al. (2010,
2011) also presented a formalisation of BDI (n-BDI) to take consideration of norms and
their internalisations. The strength of these works lies in modelling and formalising agents’
decisions on following norms.
In Chapters 6 and 7, we present an extension of the BDI cognitive architecture, con-
sidering the impact of personality, and also we consider the dynamics of beliefs associated
with agents in the model. In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we describe the additional psycho-
logical and sociopsychological foundations we have employed to extend the BDI cognitive
architecture.
3.2.3 Fuzzy sets
As stated in the earlier subsection, an agent’s actions are impacted by its beliefs. Sometimes
these beliefs involve some uncertainties that can be modelled using the notion of fuzzy sets.
Zadeh (1965) presented the idea of fuzzy sets as a class of objects with a degree of mem-
bership ranging between zero to one. The degree of membership of X in set A indicates
the possibility of X to be a part of A (see, Figure 3.2). As suggested by Zadeh (1965), the
idea is suitable in cases where there are ambiguities. These can be exemplified using the
example of a ‘class of tall men’, as opposed to a ‘class of men’ and a ‘class of men taller
than 180 cm’ — note that in the example of a ‘class of tall men’, the adjective tall is a source
of ambiguity. This idea of fuzzy sets that accommodates ambiguities contributed to different
scientific areas, such as engineering, mathematics, and operations research (Dubois & Prade,
2015). Zadeh (1978) developed this idea to represent possibilities as opposed to probability.
Overall, linguistic uncertainties are possibilistic, not probabilistic.
To distinguish possibility from probability, one should note that in probabilistic instances,
when an observation is made, uncertainty disappears. In other words, the statement is clear
and the sequence of events makes the outcome uncertain. For instance, say we bet on a
pocket of a roulette wheel4. The uncertainty of whether we are lucky is resolved after the
ball stops spinning. However, in the example of a ‘class of tall men’, visiting a person
4Note that the word ‘possibility’ is also used to refer to epistemic probabilities such as Dempster–Shafer’s
theory. Such theories do not represent the vagueness of words, but represent how far an agent believes the
proposition holds given the available evidence. Such possibilities represent probabilities estimated based on
rough evidence and do not model difficulties associated with the vagueness of words (e.g. one may have an
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Figure 3.2: An example of granules and fuzzy numbers.
does not remove the source of uncertainty. For instance, Figure 3.2 shows an example that
we have met a person who is X meters tall, and we are not sure if he is short or medium.
Zadeh (1978) stated that the possibility concerns the “meaning” of information in lieu of its
measure. An application of using possibility and meanings is in fuzzy reasoning (e.g. in rule-
based systems with if-then rules, Izquierdo & Izquierdo, 2018; Karaboga & Kaya, 2019).
Zadeh (1979, 1999) presented ideas about information granularity and computing with
words. Information granularity concerns the uncertainty of information for reasons such
as linguistic approximation (e.g. tall men). “Computing with words” addresses using these
approximations for doing some computations (e.g. number of tall men in a class). The fuzzy
set is a candidate for modelling such situations. We use the example of a ‘class of tall men’ to
explain granularity and computing with words. Note that for the uncertainty associated with
the definition of tall (i.e. the label used to identify the granule), the number of tall men is also
a fuzzy number. In other words, we might be sure that at least five persons are tall. However,
also, we might think that three others are possibly tall. A fuzzy set is a good candidate to
model certain rules that have ambiguous terms (e.g. minor offences) in their guidelines5 and
5An instance is the following from The Code for Crown Prosecutors of England. “The majority of cases
prosecuted by the CPS [i.e. Crown Prosecution Service] are charged by the police, and many of these will
include minor offences. When reviewing police-charged cases, prosecutors should consider whether a pros-
ecution is the most appropriate disposal. Where a prosecutor decides that a charged offence should be dealt
with by way of a caution or conditional caution (or any other OOCD [i.e. Out-Of-Court Disposal]), the police
should be advised and [...] the proceedings should be terminated” (Director of Public Prosecutions, 2017).
What follows defines a minor offence. “In many cases of minor offending the loss or harm is minor, and the
seriousness and consequence of the offending is [sic] low-level” (Director of Public Prosecutions, 2017). Also,
Ostrom’s (1990, p. 90, Table 3.1) fifth principle concerns “graduated sanctions” where these sanctions depend
on “the seriousness and context of the offense.”
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also observations that suggest people sometimes do not label a violence as a crime (Brennan,
2015).
We also state fuzzy concepts regarding the utilisation of granules for grading data. Again,
we use height of people as an example. Say we want to classify people into short, medium,
and tall. For doing so, we assume that a man taller than 1.9m is tall, and a man shorter than
1.65m is short. Using fuzzy terms, the degree of membership of height 1.65m to label short
is 1 — i.e. without a doubt such a man is short (see Figure 3.2). We also assume that a man
who is 1.75 m is of medium height. Suppose one asks us whether a man who is 1.7 m, is
short, medium, or tall. The fuzzy set models such phenomena. Here we have three granules
(short, medium, and tall) and different heights. The possibility of a certain height to be a
member of a granule is presented in Figure 3.2. Given former assumptions, we think person
X who is 1.68 m might be short or medium, but we are sure he is not tall. Furthermore, we
think that the possibility of being short is more than X being medium (see Figure 3.2). To
be more precise, the degree of memberships of 1.7 in short and medium sets are 0.7 and 0.3,
respectively (see Figure 3.2).
We can use these concepts to model the ambiguity associated with real-world phenom-
ena, such as the severity of an action taken, the seriousness of a violation, the dirtiness of
clothes, or the warmness of the weather. In Chapters 6 and 7, we use the idea to model
mapping of a violation to an agent’s understanding of its seriousness.
3.2.4 Game theory
Cudd (1993) suggests that game theory, as a subset of studies addressing rational choices by
rational agents, is inspired by developments of three ideas listed below:
• Rationality equals utility maximisation.
• Probability theory can express rational beliefs/expectations.
• Rational agents employ a strategy for interaction.
The philosophy of some of these ideas dates back to Aristotle (e.g. utilitarian decisions).
However, the game theory as a mathematically formalised method of decision-making was
presented by von Neumann (1928) and then elaborated in the book “Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior” (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953).6 Because of the contributions of
Nash (1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953) — that made it possible to find a stable solution (i.e. Nash
6Note that apparently Zermelo (1913) investigated the first instance of a two-players game (using a chess
example) to find the time it takes a player to win when s/he is in a winning position (See Schwalbe & Walker,
2001, for more discussions).
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equilibrium) — and other scientists (e.g. Aumann), this field of study became popular (see
Gambarelli & Owen, 2004, for more discussions). Several researchers employed this method
in conjunction with agent-based simulation (Adami et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2004; Luo et al.,
2016).
There are several types of games considered by game theorists, such as infinitely long,
continuous, non-cooperative, asymmetric, sequential, and imperfect information games. We
only state the main concepts that we use in this thesis. To do so, we consistently use two
games. The first one is the Stag Hunt game inspired by a story told by Rousseau7 on hunting
a deer (Skyrms, 2001). The second game is the Ultimatum game presented by Güth et al.
(1982). Figure 3.3 shows payoff matrices of the Stag Hunt game and the Ultimatum game.
In the Stag Hunt game, two players decide on cooperation to hunt a ‘Stag’, and one may
leave one’s post to hunt a ‘Hare’ so that the payoff for both players decreases (i.e. it is
rational to cooperate). In the Ultimatum game, a player (proposer) is endowed with a total
amount of money (T , $6 in our example). He proposes a share of that money (P ) to another
player (responder). The responder either accepts or rejects the offer. The utility functions
associated with proposals are presented in Figure 3.3. For simplicity, we considered two
policies, namely fair ($3) and unfair offers ($1) — i.e. we changed the continuous policy
into discrete.
A numerical example of a
Stag Hunt game
A discrete instance
of an Ultimatum game
Hunter 1 Responder






















(PU , T − PU )
($5, $1)
($0, $0)
Figure 3.3: The Stag Hunt and the Ultimatum games’ payoffs and policies
First, we describe the Stag Hunt game. Figure 3.3 (left) models the game. In this game,
if both hunters abide at their posts, each has a payoff of $3. However, if only one hunter
7The game is explained by Rousseau (1993, first published in 1755). He says: “If a deer was to be taken,
every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come
within the reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having
seized his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to miss theirs.”
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leaves his post and hunts a hare, he has a payoff of $2 and the other hunter earns nothing. If
both hunters leave their posts and hunt hares, the payoff for each of them decreases to $1.
Now we describe the Ultimatum game presented in Figure 3.3 (right). Assume we en-
dow Patrick (the proposer) with $6 (i.e. T ). He should propose a share of $6 to Robin
(the responder). Suppose Patrick considers a proposal of $5 (i.e. sharing 50%) is a fair
proposal — i.e. (PF , T − PF ) = (3, 3). He also can propose $1 as an unfair amount —
i.e. (PU , T − PU) = (5, 1). On the other hand, Robin may have a different understanding of
a fair proposal (e.g. 60/40). If Patrick proposes $1 and Robin wants to punish him for such
an unfair proposal, he rejects it and both will gain nothing — i.e. (0, 0). However, Patrick
may propose $2, and Robin may find it better than nothing and hence, may accept the offer.
In that case, the payoffs would be $4 for Patrick and $2 for Robin. In what follows, we state
some types of games.
Incomplete information games are the games where players do not have complete infor-
mation about each other’s positions, strategies, or an estimation of the chances of choosing
such strategies. The Stag Hunt game is studied under both complete/incomplete information
— e.g. payoffs can be randomly generated (Xue, 2003). In the Ultimatum game, the pro-
poser knows his proposal but not the other players’ policy (i.e. the responder policy). In such
situations, uncertainty in the game and new information (e.g. the responder is sensitive to the
fairness of proposal) may change the strategy from a fair to an unfair proposal (or otherwise).
Zero-sum games are the games in which winners’ gains are equal to the loss of losers. In
the Stag Hunt game both of the hunters can increase their payoffs by cooperation (i.e. both
gain). In the Ultimatum game, when the responder rejects, both lose. However, in most
gambling games, the winner gains his bet along with others’ bets — i.e. they are zero sum —
(the winner’s gain equals the losses of the rest). Another example of a non-zero-sum game
is accepting bribes and manipulating company prices. In such a situation, the loss of the
company exceeds the gains of its employee.
Non-cooperative games are the games in which individuals compete to improve their
payoffs. In such cases, to enforce the commitments, there should be some punishments. The
Stag Hunt game is a cooperative game. The Ultimatum game is a non-cooperative game,
because increasing the payoff of a player means the loss for the other.
Asymmetric games are the games in which two players have a different set of actions
or payoffs. In other words, if ui and ai are utility function, and the action for player i,
respectively, u1(a1, a2) 6= u2(a2, a1) for at least a pair of actions (a1, a2) (Osborne, 2003).
The Stag Hunt game is a symmetric game. However, the Ultimatum game is an asymmetric
game because two players may have different expectations (e.g. the proposer may think a $2
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proposal would be accepted, while the responder rejects such a proposal). Such an idea was
the topic of Kagel et al. (1996).
Sequential games are the games where players do not take actions simultaneously (e.g. chess).
The Stag Hunt game is a non-sequential game in which all hunters can simultaneously leave
their positions. The Ultimatum game is a sequential game where players’ positions in the
game impact their sequence (i.e. being responder or proposer).
In conventional employments of game theory by economists, agents only consider dollars
in their utility functions (Gintis, 2009; Gintis et al., 2005). For instance, Greif (1993) investi-
gated the impact of Commenda contracts for Maghribi traders using a complete-information
game. Also, Greif (2008) believed that Maghribi traders did not use any courts for dispute
resolution. These ideas are revised and tested in Chapters 4 and 7.
However, we can include other costs/rewards in the utility function (e.g. feeling bad for
an instance of immoral conduct). In Chapter 4, the utility function of agents is comprised of
dollars. However, in Chapters 6 and 7, we extend the utility function of agents to go beyond
material utility consideration and include some mental and social costs for violating rules.
3.2.5 The CKSW framework for simulation
Agents’ roles impact organisational performance. For example, some top-level managers
assign a human resource (HR) management department to manage employees and assign
appropriate roles to them. However, HR managers categorise roles based on the company’s
field of activity (e.g. engineering) and responsibilities of an agent (e.g. industrial design),
along with the agent responsibility in the organisation hierarchy (e.g. manager). This kind of
modelling increases the number of agent types. For instance, Ghorbani et al. (2013) used the
same concept to categorise agents in a computer recycling system based on their roles in the
society and their activities (worker, government representative, dealer, and professional re-
cycling company). This kind of detailed role modelling increases the model complexity that
may not assist with obtaining a more clear bigger picture of the organisation. For this pur-
pose (i.e. making a more clear bigger picture), we should study methods of ruling, acquiring,
and sustaining knowledge and skills in societies (i.e. their key meta-roles).
CKSW (Commander-Knowledge-Skills-Worker) is a meta-model that helps modellers to
decompose agents in a society based on their key meta-role characteristics (Purvis et al.,
2014). These meta-roles are stated below:
• Commander (C): It addresses all participants that are empowered with ultimate au-
thority and have an impact on society by policymaking.
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• Knowledge (K): This category deals with the impact of knowledge and information
on the system. Therefore it involves all agents who hold, transmit, or manage informa-
tion. One should note that a key attribute of knowledge is its communicability through
language (know-what).
• Skills (S): This category is used to represent agents who are known for their skills in
society (e.g. artisans who make jewellery and pottery). Note that unlike knowledge the
skills are difficult to communicate and much more so to apply (know-how). Because of
this, a relatively long-term master-pupil engagement in the form of an apprenticeship
is necessary to transfer the skill.
• Workers (W): This category represents members of the society who are not rich in
skills and information. They too are not empowered with authority, and they use
different processes such as training or education to become a person of other types
(Commander, Knowledge, or Skill). Note that these agents may possess certain skills,
but those skills are not of use in the community (e.g. making potteries in a garrison).
The CKSW model has been used in social simulation (Jahanbazi et al., 2015, 2016). In this
thesis, we utilise the CKSW meta-roles in our simulation. In Chapter 4, we model interac-
tions between Commanders and Skilled agents, and we consider the impact of Knowledge in
the system. In Chapter 5, we model apprenticeship programmes as an institutional mecha-
nism for skill transfer to turn Workers into Skilled agents. In that chapter, we also investigate
the impact of Knowledge and additional institutional mechanisms (e.g. interventions of the
Commander), on the performance of apprenticeship programmes. In Chapters 6 and 7, we
use the same meta-roles to model and simulate rule-following in the system.
3.3 General social modelling
Here we state concepts relevant to this study, namely social institutions and economic con-
cepts. These concepts are important to investigate because they indicate decision-making
logics of different agents, given their meta-roles in the society.
3.3.1 Social institutions
To clarify what we mean by social institutions and their importance, we use North’s (1990)
definition:
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“Institutions are the rules of the game [emphasis added] in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, so-
cial, or economic.” (North, 1990, p. 3)
Note that these interventions have different formality levels. North (1991) clarified the
aforementioned concern by categorising institutions as formal (e.g. laws and constitutions)
and informal (e.g. sanctions and traditions). Institutions are critical components of society
due to their influences on the incentives of “players”. Scholars also present other definitions;
however, we use North’s (1990, 1991) definition of institutions. Acemoglu (2006) mod-
elled emergence and persistence of “non-growth enhancing” institutions. Also, North (1990)
suggested that stability is the main role of institutions:
“The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty [emphasis
added] by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) [emphasis added]
structure to human interaction.” (North, 1990, p. 6)
Institutions is the topic of several investigations. As a popular instance, Crawford and
Ostrom (1995) provided a “grammar of institutions” to classify rules, norms, and shared
strategies. Ostrom (2009) also categorised word guidelines8 as presented below (See, Figure
3.4):
• Shared strategies (conventions) are defined as instructional guidelines.
• Norms are morals, values, and guidelines prescribed by the community’s culture.
• Rules are enforced guidelines regarding prohibitions, permissions, and requirements.
• Physical laws are principles that can be tested such as Newton’s first law about inertia.
To clarify the difference between the concepts stated above, we employ the suggested
syntax of grammar (ADICO) proposed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995) that has five com-
ponents as follows:
• Attributes (A): This indicates whom that institutional statement addresses (e.g. a group
of people or organisations).
• Deontic (D): This is the modal verb indicator that distinguishes prohibition, permis-
sion, and obligation.
8Note that Ostrom (2009) starts with some discussions about Max Black’s categorisation of rules and uses
the term rule in her classification as a general concept representing rules, norms, physical law, and convention.








Strictness (e.g. punishment or possibility of violation)
Figure 3.4: Institutions and their strictness.
• Aim (I): It indicates the outcome or action associated with the Deontic component.
• Condition (C): This indicates the conditions under which the Deontic component ap-
plies (when or where).
• Or else (O): It indicates the consequences of breaking the institutional statement.
Conventions/shared strategies include Attributes, Aims, and Conditions (AIC). Norms
have an addition of the Deontic component to strategies (ADIC). The rules are the com-
plete statement that clarify the consequences of not following them (ADICO). The following
presents example statements representing the aforementioned concepts:
• Convention: A person (A) uses his right hand (I) when he shakes hands (C).
• Norm: A person (A) must (D) be fair (I) when he trades (C).
• Rule: A witness (A) must not (D) lie (I) when he testifies under oath (C) or else the
witness will be charged for the crime of perjury (O).
As can be seen, the norms and rules differ in terms of the certainty of punishment. As
Ostrom (2009) suggested, the consequences should have three qualifications, namely: a)
it should be supported collectively, b) the exemptions should be addressed by other rules
or norms, and c) there should be an efficient monitoring system to punish or report the
actions. Note that Ostrom (2009) suggested that rules do not necessarily need government
intervention.9
Sproule-Jones (1993) divided “rules into the two categories of rules-in-use and rules-in-
form.” The point made is that rules-in-use (followed rules) in some provinces might be rules-
in-forms (unfollowed rules that do not have any effect on behaviour) in others.10 There exist
9Julfa is an example of such systems, as stated in Chapter 2.
10He also states that rules can “possess both an instrumental and an intrinsic value” (see Ostrom, 1995, for
a review of the book).
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some obstacles in the path of a law in becoming a rule-in-use (Cole, 2017). Some instances
of these obstacles include laws contradicting with strong norms or activities of monitoring
agents who filter the rules based on their interpretations. The latter issue can lead to a change
in institutions so that the law is interpreted or mediated differently or even neutralised. Cole
(2017) also suggested that when a law does not become a rule-in-use, it neither means that
the conflicting norms are superior, nor that the law is faulty. For instance, the 14th and 15th
Amendments of the US Constitution that aimed to provide the same rights for former slaves
were not fully enforced until 1954 (Patterson, 2005). Cole (2017) stated that the hardships
of enforcing such a law were because of the norms backing racism. In other words, although
there are reasons racism is not justified (i.e. it deprives a minority from their rights), it was
strong enough to revoke the superior Constitution.
In the following chapters, we address the impact of institutions (e.g. rules) on societies.
Also, in Chapter 4, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7, we address the impact of monitoring. Chapter
7 investigates circumstances under which a law becomes a ‘rule-in-use’ or a ‘rule-in-form’
by permitting monitoring agents to interpret the law differently.
3.3.2 Economics and behavioural economics
The definition of economics is both simple and impossible. It is simple if we agree with
certain definitions (e.g. “an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations,”
Smith, 1904), and it is relatively impossible if we want to use a definition that addresses
critics concerns. Finley (1999) stated that when Hutcheson, a teacher of Adam Smith, wrote
a “Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy;” he did not discuss matters such as property
and contracts as a part of ‘oeconomicus’ (i.e. economics). Instead, he stated the duties
of family members and servant and masters, since, based on its origin, economics meant
organising households. However, Thomas Carlyle defines it as the dismal science, and a
non-abusive definition would be studying the ways that society utilises its scarce resources
(Bishop, 2004).
However, economics might be abusive. The abusive part of economics lies in the prin-
ciples, the ways and methods which are suggested to handle the system, and scarcity itself.
For instance, a criticism of economy concerns some ideas of Adam Smith (i.e. the father of
modern economics). In Invisible Hands, he suggested that the efficiency of resource utilisa-
tion is improved by adopting self-interest in a free market (Bishop, 2004). Different studies
address the inferred selfishness of this argument and the matter of scarcity (i.e. economists
plan to manage the scarcity or sometimes augment it).
For instance, Ruggiero (2013) addressed some statements such as the following passage:
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“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest [emphasis
added]. We address ourselves not to their humanity [emphasis added] but to their
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages”
(Smith, 1904, p. 14)
Ruggiero (2013) claimed this suggests that “the selfishness should be the pivotal vari-
able orienting our action, irrespective of how destructive this might be.” Then he continues,
although it is unclear whether or not Adam Smith meant to justify entrepreneurial crimes,
“contemporary criminal entrepreneurs ‘learn’ the techniques and rationalisations of their
conduct directly from Adam Smith”. An example of augmenting scarcity is Agricultural Ad-
justment Administration that urged farmers to destroy excessive crops or reduce production
during the recession to boost prices (The US Congress, 1933). Fite (1962) stated that farmers
had different ideas about the deal and accepted reducing production out of desperation.
In the following subsections, first, we provide a review of relevant concepts of classical
and neoclassical principles (i.e. the ones we used in this study), and also some concerns
expressed by behavioural scientists.
3.3.2.1 Microeconomics and macroeconomics
Microeconomics deals with the micro-level of economy concerning individuals’ economic
behaviours such as decisions regarding consumption, pricing, and wages. However, macroe-
conomics concerns issues at an aggregate level, such as unemployment and inflation. Gov-
ernments mostly employ some means (i.e. macroeconomic policies) through taxation, con-
trolling interest rates, and public spending.
The ideas employed from microeconomics in this study is the market’s equilibrium for
wages; this is depicted in Figure 3.5. In this figure, the dot-dashed blue line is the curve as-
sociated with the new demand that we will use in our example. As shown in Figure 3.5, the
equilibrium happens when supply curve intersects demand curve (i.e. for a given price quan-
tity demanded equals the quantity supplied). To have a sense of the market’s equilibrium,
we use an example of ice cream prices. The curve suggests that the company increases the
prices to increase their profits; however, more prices means less purchasing power (i.e. less
demand). The equilibrium is the prices where the quantity of demand equals the quantity of
supply (e.g. the number of customers equals the number of ice creams produced). As noted
before, the dot-dashed blue line indicates the new demand curve after a decrease in demand
(e.g. demand curve for ice creams in winter). This decrease causes a new equilibrium (the
green line) with lower prices because of the extra supply (see Mankiw, 2017, Part II, for more
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explanations). We should point out that this is a simplified version of market mechanisms.
For instance, we only consider the price in this curve and not profits. However, a company










Figure 3.5: The market’s equilibrium.
Another economic concept we used in this study concerns the Gross Domestic Income/
Product (GDI/GDP). This subject is important for measuring in the context of macroeco-
nomics. As stated earlier, macroeconomy concerns the economy as a whole. GDI/GDP
estimates the output of the economy in a given period of time. Furthermore, it can be used
to estimate government revenue by income taxes.11
These concepts are utilised primarily in Chapter 5, which investigates apprenticeship as
a means for controlling the unemployment of youth. Furthermore, we use a refined version
of market equilibrium in that chapter for modelling the dynamics in wages. We also measure
the contribution of apprenticeship programmes to the GDI. This helps us to identify the
macro impact of programmes on the country’s economy and also the improvement of the
government’s expected income.
3.3.2.2 Behavioural economics
Behavioural economics compounds the impact of other aspects influencing decision-making,
such as cognition, psychological characteristics, and culture. Gintis (2009) states, in general,
11One should note that more GDP does not always mean more governmental revenues because of the role
of factors such as tax rate.
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that in behavioural decision-making, rationality is not equal to selfishness. Otherwise, so-
ciopaths, who are the most selfish would be considered as rational beings. Agreeing upon
such ideas (e.g. agents are not always selfish) points to a need for a reassessment of eco-
nomics theories (e.g. profit maximising agents). First, we investigate some of the lab studies
that contradict classical and neoclassical economic theories. Then we state some of the so-
lutions provided by behavioural economists that we have used in this study.
Utilising sociopsychology findings regarding cognitive dissonance (see Section 3.4.2),
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) proposed a model to show why workers in hazardous industries
(e.g. a PhD holder working in a nuclear plant) believed their work is safe. In other words,
well educated employees in a nuclear site denied the hazards to themselves. However, in
their model there exists a crucial assumption that states “beliefs once chosen persist over
time”. Although this assumption contradicts some lab studies about cognitive dissonance
(i.e. changes in beliefs; see Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Izuma et al., 2010; van Veen et al.,
2009, for some examples), their study promotes a more sophisticated economic model of the
world by letting agents have different understandings. In other words, they brought earlier
models closer to real-world instances by considering different classes of agents where a class
of them accepts to work in a hazardous situation.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) stated that a reason for the puzzling outcome in financial mar-
kets is because of investors’ myopia. In other words, although the investors are aware of the
long-term profit of their investments, they may sell some stocks for a short-term decrease in
prices.12 This myopia contradicts investors’ use of a discount factor for a long-term horizon.
Instances where biases impact cognitive decision-making were studied by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). These studies indicated that people
use heuristics that introduce predictable errors due to matters such as inconsistent preferences
based on the appearance of the offers. This phenomenon is known as the framing effect,
where, for example, a person prefers to buy a $5 item with a 20% discount ($5 × 0.8 =
$4) rather than buy the same item from another retailer who sells it for $3, but has a 33%
surcharge for credit cards (again $3 × 1.33 = $4)13(see Rieger et al., 2016, for a recent
survey).
Another instance that contradicts the economists’ expectations relates to lab studies of
the Ultimatum game (see Section 3.2.4 and Figure 3.3). Most lab studies indicate that offers
are usually between 40% and 50% of granted money and also half of the offers below 20%
12This change in plan is interesting in stock markets because the inventors know that some changes are
short-term and seasonal (i.e. will not impact the long-term profit).
13The results were formalised in the latter study as prospect theory, that states that psychological loss
aversion is not linear; hence, expected small losses are ignored when dealing with a big gain (e.g. lotteries).
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are rejected. These contradict the combination of selfishness and utility maximisation (in
terms of money) of players based on which a) the proposer (Patrick in the example of Sec-
tion 3.2.4) should make small offers, and b) the responder (Robin in the example of Section
3.2.4) should accept any offer (Debove et al., 2016). Other scholars also studied the impor-
tance of fairness. For instance, J. S. Adams (1965) and J. S. Adams and Freedman (1976)
investigated the impact of fair distribution of income on people’s behaviour (e.g. their ef-
forts in the company). They indicated that agents modify their efforts in the company based
on their perception of fairness of the company. For instance, van Dijke et al. (2019) stated
how distributive and procedural justice (i.e. fair dispute resolution) incentivise an agent to
voluntarily pay taxes.
Several researchers used behavioural economics to build agent-based models (e.g. see
Bonein et al., 2016; Hashimzade et al., 2014; Šperka & Spišák, 2013). We use concepts of
behavioural economics in all the chapters. However, in particular, we will investigate the
impact of fairness on society members’ behaviour and some concepts of prospect theory in
Chapters 6 and 7. The concept of the agent’s myopic decisions is considered in Chapters
4–7.
3.4 Psychological and sociopsychological aspects
As stated earlier, this thesis concerns agent modelling of the social interaction of traders.
Here we investigate some psychological aspects of humans which can be incorporated into
an agent model, such as the impact of personality on decision-making and the impact of
society on their psychology (i.e. sociopsychological aspects).
3.4.1 Impact of personality
As stated in the BDI cognitive architecture in Section 3.2.2, an aspect of agents is their beliefs
about actions. The ambitious idea is that attributing people’s behaviour to their personalities
might be as old as human culture. However, we know that Plato (429?–347 BC) in his repub-
lic (Plato, 1991, written around 380 BC) emphasised the importance of four cardinal virtues
(i.e. wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice) to distinguish three classes of inhabitants
along with their associated tasks, namely the producers, the auxiliaries (army men), and the
guardians (rulers) (see Frede, 2017, for more discussion about Plato’s ethics).
In an influential work, Jung (1976, first published in German in 1921) suggested person-
ality types are a means of identifying people’s general attitudes, as well as attitudes about
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life, using the concept of function types. Jung (1976) mostly focused on describing personal-
ities and their impacts on a person’s behaviour, and Myers (1962) inspired by Jung provided
a manual to identify personality types. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) not only
provides a manual to identify personality types, but it also contributes to the classification
by considering the impact of auxiliary functions. Before publishing the manual, Katharine
Briggs published several papers, for instance, “Meet Yourself”, that provides an outline of
Jung’s personality types (see Geyer, 1995, for a history of the formation of the MBTI).
Jung (1976) believed a person directs libido (i.e. psychic energy) or general interests con-
sciously based on his/her general attitudes. General attitudes indicate this aspect of person-
ality by classifying agents into two groups, namely people who direct their psychic energy
to the outer world (i.e. are Extraverted) or direct it to the inner world (i.e. are Introverted).14
Jung (1976) also emphasised the importance of psychological functions that an agent uses
in his/her cognitive processes. However, in Jung (1976), he mainly concentrated on domi-
nant functions (i.e. functions employed consciously), but MBTI also considers the impact of
auxiliary functions (i.e. functions employed unconsciously).
Since its introduction, MBTI has been widely used in different studies, such as decision-
making (Hough & Ogilvie, 2005; Hunt et al., 1989; Su-li & Ke-fan, 2010), learning and
teaching contexts (S. E. Cooper & Miller, 1991; Radwan, 2014), and team formation (Farhangian
et al., 2014, 2015c; L. Zhang & Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, the reliability and validity of
the MBTI is shown by scholars in different domains (Capraro & Capraro, 2002; Randall et
al., 2017; Thompson & Borrello, 1986). However, one should note that the MBTI is not the
only framework for personality classification. Some other methods to classify the person-
alities and cultural dimensions include the five-factor model or Big 5 (McCrae & T. Costa,
1987), the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) (Gough, 2000), and organisational cul-
tures (Hofstede et al., 1990). Furthermore, a class of studies is devoted to finding the cor-
relations between different classification schemes’ dimensions. In this thesis, we choose to
use the MBTI method of personality classification for its popularity in academic use (An-
drejczuk et al., 2018; Farhangian et al., 2016, 2015a; Salvit & Sklar, 2011). However, we
benefit from the findings of Big 5 and CPI when required.
In this study, we employ the MBTI method to model agents’ cognition, and also the way
that they apply weights to the different beliefs. We will investigate in more detail about
personality in Chapters 6 and 7 when we propose our extension of the BDI cognitive archi-
tecture.
14Jung (1976) believed that the unconscious compensates for the conscious’ shortcomings. Here he indi-
cated unconscious attempts to clarify the other side of the world to a person (e.g. outer world for introverts).
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3.4.2 Sociopsychological concepts
Aristotle believed that the human being is a political animal who needs a state and “he who
by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above human-
ity” (Aristotle, 1999, p. 5). From his belief, we can infer that he believed that society and
people have mutual impacts on each other. Some of these mutual influences are easy to
understand (e.g. winning the elections by more votes). However, others need more detailed
studies (e.g. why social discrimination has negative impacts or why a significant number sup-
ported Trump and not the other candidates (Pettigrew, 2017)). The latter issue concerns the
sociopsychological aspect of humanity (i.e. how society impacts our thoughts, feelings, and
behaviours). What follows includes some examples of these social influences on psychology.
In a study on the impact of society on psychological positions and judgments, Bandura et
al. (1961) indicated that children imitate aggressive models of adults when they are exposed
to such behaviours. Afterwards, Milgram (1965) studied the situation where A asks B to
hurt C (using an electric shock). The findings were shocking; although most subjects were
against hurting a person, many of them obeyed the authority or were even eager to administer
the extremest hurts. The results indicated a significant divergence from the prediction of sur-
veyed people. An explanation for such a behaviour is that person B transfers responsibilities
to authority. Haney et al. (1973) aimed to identify whether reported brutality of guards was
a consequence of their personality or the prison’s situations. They divided some volunteers
with stable personalities into two groups, namely mocked guards and mocked prisoners. The
mocked prisoners were treated like criminals from the time they were arrested. The mocked
guards were also allowed to use any non-violent measures (e.g. push-ups) to maintain the or-
der. The study was stopped in just six days because of the abusive behaviour of the mocked
guards over the mocked prisoners.15
Overall, as tested by different scholars, and also exemplified by the examples provided
above, the impact of society and situations goes beyond a quick change in moods (e.g. de-
liberative torturing in Bandura et al.’s (1961) study). Furthermore, Thibaut et al. (1974)
indicated that procedural justice (i.e. fair dispute resolution procedures) impacts the incen-
tives of people about the long-term association with a social group. In other words, the fairer
dispute resolutions of a group are, the more its members plan for long-term association with
it. Furthermore, Tyler (1997) stated that the internalisation of obligations of a group by mem-
bers took place because they found the rules legitimate. However, as Tyler (1997) indicated
in his study, people follow the rules only under certain conditions (i.e. only when they are
convinced about the legitimacy of the rules).
15The video and more discussions are available at https://www.prisonexp.org/slide-1.htm.
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Another class of studies concerned changes in agents’ behaviour through their choices.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) tested the cognitive dissonance by paying some people to
misguide another person about a tedious task (i.e. telling the person that a task was interesting
when in fact it was boring) and after that, they asked them what their real feeling about the
tasks was. The results indicated that the members of the group that were paid one-dollar to
lie to new participants — say that task was interesting — increased the attractiveness of the
task for themselves (i.e. they rated the task to be more interesting than the control group).16
Because of cognitive dissonance, it is hard for a person to keep two inconsistent attitudes
together. For instance, in the previous test, it was hard for participants to admit to themselves
that they were cheap liars (i.e. they misguided others for just a dollar), so they changed their
attitude about the attractiveness of the test. However, when the participants were paid more,
they did not feel cheap and might have felt shrewd (i.e. they did not experience cognitive
dissonance). Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) experiment was repeated by different scholars
(Chapanis & Chapanis, 1964; J. Cooper, 2007; Egan et al., 2007; Shultz & Lepper, 1996).
As suggested by Aronson and Aronson (2007), this simple theory — cognitive dissonance
— has extensive applications. The findings of cognitive dissonance are applied to explain
behaviours or change them in different fields. For instance, they impacted J. S. Adams’s
(1965) theory for payment (Miner, 2005, Chapter 9), they were used for water and energy
conservation (Dickerson et al., 1992; Kantola et al., 1984), and it was also employed to
explain irrational behaviours of investors (Chang et al., 2016).
In Chapters 4, 6, and 7 of this thesis, we use some of these ideas in the forms of self-
justification and change in beliefs. In particular, in Chapters 6 and 7, we investigate the
influential characteristics that are controllable by a commander (e.g. legitimacy of rules).
3.5 Summary and relevance
As already stated, this study uses agent-based social simulation to model two historical long-
distance trading societies. Given the subject, we model the mutual impact of economic and
social concerns on agents’ behaviour. For this purpose, we use institutions to model eco-
16They divided the participants into three groups: control (i.e. unpaid), one-dollar (this group was paid
one-dollar), and twenty-dollars (this group was paid twenty-dollars). They asked the paid groups to lie to a
girl that the test was fun (i.e. they paid them to lie). Then they asked the participants the question about the
attractiveness of the test. The notable part is that two participants told the girl that the test was boring, but they
were paid to say otherwise (both were paid one-dollar). Three participants did not accept the offer (two from
the twenty dollars group, and one from the group that was paid one-dollar). A participant felt guilty and asked
for the girl’s phone number to explain he was asked to lie to her (he was paid one-dollar).
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Table 3.1: The stated concepts and technologies and the chapters they are used
Concepts and technologies
Chapters
4 5 6 7
ABSS 3 3 3 3
Social institutions 3 3 3 3
Fuzzy sets 3 3
Game theory 3





Behavioural economics 3 3 3 3
nomic and social devised constraints. We also make use of the evidence from psychological
and sociopsychological studies to model the impact of external societal factors on an agent’s
behaviour. We also utilise a folk-sociological model to distinguish agents’ meta-roles that
relate to their power over the system and the influence of the system on them.
To model the impact of psychological and sociopsychological aspects on an agent’s de-
cision, we propose a refined version of the BDI cognitive architecture. Furthermore, in the
BDI cognitive architecture, we will use fuzzy sets to reflect the influence of the ambiguity of
meaning on an agent’s cognition. We also employ some concepts of behavioural economics
in agents’ decision-making processes to bring them closer to real-world instances. Table 3.1
provides an overview of the concepts employed in this thesis, along with their associated
chapters. Note that we elaborate the relevant concepts in the appropriate chapter. After stat-
ing the relevant concepts and technologies, in Chapter 4, we model the contractual schemes
of these societies to answer the first research question.
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4
Impact of the contractual schemes and
environmental circumstances on the success
of societies
4.1 Introduction
In a collaborative and distributed environment, international companies face information
opacity that often leads to information asymmetry. Nowadays, international companies try
to overcome this problem by using real-time information infrastructures. Challenges associ-
ated with such a class of problem are commonly referred to as the “principal-agent problem”
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). This problem concerns two parties engaged in a deal where
an agent (e.g. mercantile agent) is expected to pursue his principal’s (master’s/director’s)
benefits. The agent’s decisions and actions are hard to monitor. Particularly in long-distance
trades, issues such as power delegation to agents (e.g. access to company resources) and ab-
sence of transparency (e.g. justifications for spendings) are inevitable. Such phenomena are
incentives for an agent’s use of company resources for his own self-interests. Henceforth,
we refer to any selfish behaviour that imposes some costs to the principal as cheating. Fur-
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thermore, in this chapter, the term agent refers to mercantile agents and the model that we
construct concentrates on their behaviour.
Note that agents are valuable organisational resources because their gradual skill im-
provement leads to a company’s increased profitability. On the other hand, retaining skilled
agents who cheat imposes costs on the organisation. We study these effects by modelling
some aspects of the British East India company (EIC) and Armenian merchants of New-
Julfa (Julfa). These societies were long-distance traders that pursued their benefits by dele-
gating some rights to agents in remote places. What makes the comparison of both systems
appealing is their evident co-existence in the Indian subcontinent, with the EIC managers
identifying the Julfa traders as superior. As a result, the EIC granted Julfans the same privi-
leges as British merchants in order to “alter and invert the ancient course of their trade to and
from Europe” (Ferrier, 1973, p. 50). This chapter, along with the following chapters, aims to
unlock some of the secrets of this ancient course. In this chapter, we consider environmental
circumstances in terms of the societal mortality rate. Also, the contractual scheme consists
of the following characteristics:
• Hiring scheme: This aspect indicates whether or not the organisation considers hiring
an agent from outside of the known agents (i.e. closedness versus openness of society).
• Firing scheme: This aspect indicates directors’ sources of suspicions and also how the
disputes against suspected agents were settled (adjudication processes).
• Payment scheme: The payment scheme concerns the revenue of both the organisation
and the agent.
• Penalties: It indicates the punishment for a revealed fraud.
We employ agent-based simulation to study the two long-distance trading societies. Note
that in this chapter, we use a relatively simple game theory approach for agents’ decision-
making. Based on the game and agents’ conformity, we form four different scenarios. The
outcomes of these scenarios are measured using four metrics. These metrics include sustain-
ability, rule conformance (e.g. percentage of cheaters and experience of cheaters), profitabil-
ity, and societal skill level.
First, we describe the simulation model for a base scenario (i.e. scenario 1), then for each
succeeding scenario we clarify how the base model is modified. The rest of this chapter is
organised as follows. Section 4.2 takes a comparative look at the EIC and Julfa. Section
4.3 states how these systems are modelled and the reasons behind the chosen parameters.
Section 4.4 presents and describes the simulation results. Finally, Section 4.5 sums up the
findings and proposes future directions.
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4.2 Review of systems
In this section, we provide an overview of the two historical long-distance trading societies,
and then we compare them with respect to five characteristics of the EIC and Julfa. The
characteristics are listed below:
1. Societal mortality rate: The mortality rate helps us to simulate the demography of the
EIC and Julfa and answer a crucial question about the capability of the EIC to create a
closed society of traders.
2. Closedness of society: This indicates the nature of the system in attracting a workforce
(open versus closed).
3. Adjudication processes: This aims to decrease errors associated with punishing the
innocents. We call the process of going through evidence and decision-making regard-
ing suspicious behaviours the “adjudication processes”.
4. Payment scheme: This characteristic indicates companies’ payment schemes in terms
of fixed salary versus profit-sharing.
5. Punishment: This deters agents from cheating by imposing some costs on them.
The East India Company (EIC): The EIC was formed in 1600 based on the monopoly
of trade between Asia and Britain, granted by Queen Elizabeth I, and was active until the
mid-19th century (Seth, 2012). One of the first problems that the EIC faced concerned
finding experienced agents to perform long-distance trades.1 Therefore they used an open
workforce scheme for subsequent years, where any worker from Britain was allowed to join.
Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Julfans): Julfans were originally from Old-Julfa
in Armenia. They had inheritance rules that created strong family bonds (Herzig, 1991).
They also used informal institutions to control society. These kinds of social bonds and
sharing the same background were some of the reasons behind having a closed workforce
society in Julfa.
Note that both societies hired males as agents (therefore we focus on men in societies).
What follows states the differences in characteristics for the EIC and Julfa.
Societal mortality rate: An issue that the European chartered companies faced in Asia
was a decrease in the life expectancy of agents. An EIC’s employee on average worked not
even past his 30s — i.e. 15 years of service time (see Section 2.3.2.2). On the other hand,
1For instance, a record belonging to 1619 indicates that the company’s search for two eligible merchants
led to only one choice of a merchant who had lived in Spain for several years (Chaudhuri, 1965).
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there are no discussions about such a problem for the Julfans, neither in their correspondence
nor in historical contexts. On the contrary, we see a persistent demographic for the residents
of New-Julfa they had a low mortality rate.
Closedness of society: As mentioned earlier, the EIC had an open scheme of hiring. The
company used contracts, signed bonds, and references obtained from others to ensure the
agents’ trustworthiness. On the other hand, Julfans was a closed society of traders sharing
the same background (i.e. being from old-Julfa) and city of residence (i.e. New-Julfa). They
had and used their own dialect that was different from other Armenians living in Iran. Note
that in a closed society, a child observes and learns system characteristics such as monitoring
strength before being hired as an agent, given that fired agents were not exiled after pun-
ishment (i.e. they just could not trade). The Julfans had several monitoring means, such as
correspondence between traders who had information on agents’ trustworthiness and prices
in trading nodes (see Chapter 2 for more information). Also, they could collect information
using their main church archives or informally during meetings in local churches (Aslanian,
2007). Finally, in Julfa, an agent had to hand over everything he had with him upon his re-
turn, including his personal luggage and clothing, which made it difficult for him to hide his
illegal revenue from his master (henceforth, director) (Herzig, 1991). The strong social rela-
tionships convince us to assume that non-cheaters in Julfa put in their efforts to sustain the
order inside their society. The intuition for such efforts has already been stated by Socrates
in his court defence (The Apology of Socrates by Plato, 2008, was originally written about
399 BC):
“[...] Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? [...] Do
not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil? [...] And is
there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with
him?” (Plato, 2008)
Adjudication processes: Another difference between these two societies concerns the
methods they used to handle suspicious behaviours. The closedness of Julfan society and
permissions granted by Persian Kings to establish their own institutions were some reasons
for having local courts and rules. They also had autonomy outside of Iran and established
churches of their own in their frequently visited cities (Aslanian, 2007). Moreover, they
had two kinds of institutions for resolving disputes, namely the assembly of merchants and
portable courts. In Julfa, adjudication processes were rigorous and they effectively identified
cheaters. However, in the EIC, directors felt that a large number of cheaters were present
in the system, despite limited reports from trading settlements (Chaudhuri, 1965). The EIC
directors used a performance-based means for identifying cheaters and skipped adjudication
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processes (Hejeebu, 2005).2 This introduces the likelihood of punishing an honest agent for
his bad performance. Also, it introduced a surprising firing pattern (i.e. more experienced
merchants were fired in higher positions despite their higher revenue).3
Payment scheme: Some relaxations of the EIC monopoly between 1660 and 1700 that
followed from the English Civil War (1642–1651) persuaded the EIC directors to pay low
nominal salaries4 and grant agents the privilege of private trade (the right of trade in the intra-
Asian market, Erikson, 2014). As a result, the EIC agents sought other sources to increase
their revenue and counted on private trade as their real salary (Hejeebu, 1998). In Julfa, on
the other hand, directors used commenda contracts (an open-ended contract with substantial
profit-sharing of about 30% in Julfa, Herzig, 1991). A popular form of commnda contracts is
bi-lateral contracts, where agents can also invest their capital in the same trade. In essence,
the EIC traders were salaried and had the opportunity to perform private trade. In Julfa,
commenda contracts as a profit-sharing scheme were used.
Table 4.1: System specification based on EIC and Julfa societies
Characteristics EIC Julfa
Nature of the workforce Open Closed
Payment design Private trade Commenda
Mortality rate High Low
Adjudication chance No Yes
Punishment Dismissal + unutilised bond Paying costs + interest by agent or extended fam-
ily or they were excluded from trade
Punishment: The EIC discouraged employees from cheating by asking them to provide
a signed bond of at least £500 (Hejeebu, 2005) and punished cheaters by dismissing them
in case of suspicion. However, in Julfa, one of the frequently used ways of punishment was
asking a cheater, or his core or extended family, to pay back the incurred costs and cumulative
interests. If they refused to pay, they would be boycotted by traders. This evidence suggests
that these consequences of cheating were harsh (a merchant writes to his brother: “I would
rather chuse [sic] to dye [sic], than for them to [blot my] name out of the list,” Aslanian,
2007, pp. 248–249).
2“We cannot pass by the extravagant price of the raw silk at Casimbazar [sic] and the exceeding badness of
the taffetys [sic] from thence. Therefore we may let our servants see that we can distinguish betwixt [sic] them
who serve us faithfully and well and those who only pretend to do so, we do dismiss the said Hugh Barker from
our service.” (See, E/3/106 letter to Bengal 23 Jan 1735, para. 138, as cited in Hejeebu, 2005, p. 514)
3Around £1000 (see Hejeebu, 2005, Table 1-3).
4£5 to £40 versus £50 in Britain.
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As stated earlier, these two societies had differences in the nature of workforce societies,
payments, mortality rates, adjudication processes and monitoring, and punishment (see Table
4.1 for differences). In the next section, we model the effects of the differing characteristics
of these systems on their success, using an agent-based simulation.
4.3 Simulation model of two systems
Following the earlier description of differences between the two trader societies, here we
present a model for investigating the impact of the aforementioned characteristics on so-
cietal success. For this purpose, we first state the assumptions, and then we present the
procedures employed for simulating these societies. Finally, we state the reasons for the
chosen simulation parameters.
4.3.1 Model assumptions
To model the EIC and Julfa, and systematically investigate the impact of the aforementioned
parameters, we use a game theory scheme. As stated in Chapter 3, there are games with
different properties; what we use here is a non-cooperative, asymmetric, sequential, and
imperfect information game (see Section 3.2.4 for a definition of these).
One of the characteristics associated with the principal-agent problem concerns the costs
of self-interested actions of an agent for the principal. The agents can make profits by cheat-
ing, and the directors define punishments to control it. Such games are non-cooperative
games (i.e. players do not have common strategies). The game is also asymmetric because
directors and agents have different strategies (here we only present a game for agents who
play with “nature” — i.e. there is no strategic decision in directors’ actions). This is a non-
zero-sum game because punishments such as firing would not compensate for the losses of
the company. The game is sequential, and agents are the ones who perform the first action. In
addition, when there is no adjudication, the game is an imperfect information game because
agents are not sure about the consequences of their honest actions.
Figure 4.1 presents the base game (i.e. scenario 1) that agents play. In this game, agents
have two potential actions (i.e. to cheat or to be honest). On the other side, because of an
inherent lack of transparency due to long-distances, the director cannot identify the actions
and may suspect an agent’s action incorrectly. In Figure 4.1, “C” and “NC” indicate cheat
and not cheat, respectively. Furthermore, the directors’ suspicions are indicated by verti-
cal labels, and the agent’s actual action is indicated horizontally. The left table indicates
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punishments and rewards associated with each state (i.e. an agent’s action and the director’s
response), and the right table indicates the probabilities of the director’s response to actions
learnt by an agent over time.
(a) Utility for actions (b) Actions’ probability
Director’s Suspicion Director’s Suspicion








l C cpc 1− cpc
NC 0 α× FI NC ppnc 1− ppnc
Figure 4.1: Game that potential cheaters play (the base scenario)
Agents decide on their actions based on parameters, which include cheating income (CI),
future income (FI), discount rate (α), and punishment (P). Moreover, the effectiveness of
institutions has an effect on their decision-making. In other words, the probability associated
with each situation (system state) affects the agent’s behaviour. Therefore agents estimate
the probability of getting fired in different situations. These probabilities are listed below for
an agent:
• Probability of getting punished for cheating (pc);
• Probability of getting punished for bad performance when he cheated (ppc);
• Probability of getting punished for either bad performance or cheating when he cheated
(cpc);
• Probability of getting punished for bad performance when he did not cheat (ppnc);
The cpc stated above is the complement of the probability of an agent not getting fired based
on a) his bad performance and b) his action being identified as cheating. This statement is
mathematically expressed as follows:
cpc = 1− ((1− pc)× (1− ppc)) (4.1)
Figure 4.1 shows how agents decide on their actual actions based on the consequences
of those actions and their estimations regarding the director’s suspicion (i.e. the director’s
actions). Note that sometimes although agents did not cheat, the director may still think they
cheated based on their bad performance. Figure 4.1a shows the utility obtained (punishment
or reward) of each state (e.g. an agent cheats and the director identifies the action). Figure
4.1b shows an agent’s estimation of the probability of each state, given his action.
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To test the impact of different punishment schemes, agents’ perceptions of the conse-
quences of cheating, and their conformity to the simulation output, we have employed four
different simulation scenarios. The first and the third simulation scenarios test the impact
of punishment schemes by attributing them to either the type of contract used or employing
adjudication processes. The second scenario extends Scenario 1 by assuming that the pun-
ishments beyond firing are only enforceable by courts. The last scenario extends Scenario 1
to model the impact of conformity. These scenarios are listed below:
Scenario 1) Contract-based punishment: This is the base scenario stated above. In this
scenario, we attributed the punishment to the contracts. In other words, when
commenda contracts are used, the cheaters should pay cheating income along
with the interest.
Scenario 2) Only dismissed for bad performance: Here Scenario 1 changes so that suspected
cheaters are only expelled when there is no evidence (i.e. suspects do not pay
back their income of cheating).
Scenario 3) Court-based punishment: In this scenario, we change Scenario 1 by assuming
that the type of punishment is related to using courts. In other words, when
there are no adjudication processes, commenda contracts have a punishment
like that of the EIC (i.e. signed bonds).
Scenario 4) Conformity: In this scenario, we extend Scenario 1 by assuming that a part of
society (impressionable agents) consider cheating in their utility function when
they observe a certain number of cheaters.
The difference between Scenarios 1 and 2 lies in the consequences of performance-based
punishments (in Scenario 2 suspected cheaters only lose their job). In Scenario 3, the pun-
ishments (e.g. fines) of Scenario 1 are decided by the courts (i.e. punishment is not attributed
to the payment scheme). In Scenario 4, we extend Scenario 1 by considering morally impres-
sionable agents (conformity). In other words, these agents justify their actions if the number
of observed cheaters exceeds a certain threshold.
4.3.2 Algorithms
Here we present a model that investigates the effects of the stated characteristics in Section
4.2 on societal success. To do so, we assume that some agents play a game with incomplete
information, wherein they decide to cheat (Myerson, 1982). The rest of the society are
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those who would not cheat at all. Moreover, directors aim to maximise profits by employing
different payment, punishment, and firing schemes.
Algorithm 4.1: Managerial level decisions (directors)
1 Identify and fire cheaters based on observations
/* Observations is a function of agents’ cheating level and chance of
identification (see Table 4.3, last row) */
2 if there is no adjudication process then
3 Measure performance of agents, based on their experience and update their record using discount
factor
4 Fire worst performers with higher access to company resources, i.e. junior merchants, senior
merchants, or council members (more than 12 years experience).
5 end
6 if workfoce society is open then
7 Hire people so the population is stable
8 else




∀AgentsDirectorCapital in the hands of agents
12 ROR← CurrentCapital / OldCapital
13 OldCapital← CurrentCapital
14 Redistribute capital
/* It takes place based on the number of new recruits, fired, and deceased
agents. First, directors allocate 100 units to each new recruit, then
the remainder of accumulated capital is distributed among other
merchants, considering their current access to the company’s capital ---
the current access of an agent is defined as the amount of capital or
resources currently allocated to the agent, see Algorithm 4.2 */
We assume that these trader societies are managed by a director entity (an abstraction for
all decision-making entities in a society). The steps performed by a director are indicated in
Algorithm 4.1. This algorithm shows how the managerial level of a system works. The firing
of cheaters takes place as a function of the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms (line
1). Monitoring depends on available information on agents’ behaviour that is a function of
an employee’s loyalty to the company. We assume that closedness of the workforce society
increases loyalty and information transparency due to the social bonds and informal and
formal measures of information exchange. Another firing scheme is associated with the lack
of an adjudication process (e.g. in the case of EIC), and agents are expelled based on their
performance (lines 2–5). Then we consider directors who have different hiring schemes.
In an open society, agents are hired to stabilise the population of traders, and in a closed
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society, all agents aged fifteen years are hired (lines 6–10). The total capital in the society
is the sum of the capital available to all agents (line 11). The Rate of Return (ROR) is the
ratio of current capital to old capital (line 12). The director updates his old capital for the
next run (line 13) and redistributes the capital from fired and deceased agents to recruits
and experienced agents. The allocated capital to new recruits is 100 units, and the rest is
distributed to experienced agents, based on their current access to the director’s resources
(line 14).
Algorithm 4.2 represents a brief overview of the operational details of an agent in the
society (agent A). Agent A grows 1 year older, and based on the mortality rate associated with
his age, he may die with a certain probability, and also he stops working, if he is fired. In a
closed society a fired agent continues his presence in the system but cannot trade any more.
This assumption was inspired by Julfa institutions (i.e. they did not exile cheaters from the
society). We employ it to prevent a closed society from artificially becoming extinct (line
1). Some agents quit the company for a healthier life back home when they face a high
mortality rate (lines 2–4). The rest of the algorithm is applicable for all working agents (line
5 indicates this concept). Agent A’s skill (s) linearly improves during the first ten years until
he reaches his maximum attainable skill (line 6). In a closed system, agent A reproduces
another agent (male child) while he is aged between 21 to 55 with a certain probability until
he either has the maximum possible number of children or he dies (lines 7–16). Each new
born agent has totally new random values for parameters (i.e. an offspring will not inherit a
bad reputation, a bad skill, or a cheating tendency).
We set the cheating costs imposed on the system at zero (line 17). A potential cheater
decides to cheat based on this utility function (lines 18–32). Agent A estimates his expected
utility based on a) the form of the contract, b) the considered time horizon, and c) the cumu-
lative capital in subsequent iterations. To take account of future income, agent A considers
no revenue at the moment (I(0)). He also takes account of his capital and the director’s
capital using dummy variables (i.e. Mcap and cap, line 19). Then he calculates his expected
income at time t, based on the assessed average income (aai), plus the average attainable
income for skill (aais) multiplied by his degree of skill (s) for the considered time horizon
(lines 20–25). Agent A considers the near future in this calculation — in our simulation it
is 6 years. Then agent A calculates the net present value of his expected utility, using his
discount factor (line 26).
Cheating is considered as a random manipulation (RM ) of what are considered to be the
details of trade (e.g. purchasing other items) with a linear correlation to its visibility. The
randomness represents random opportunities for price manipulation. The magnitude of the
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Algorithm 4.2: An agent’s operational details
1 Increase Age by 1 year, die randomly considering mortality rate for age, and get fired based on the
director’s policy.
2 if workforce society is open and mortality rate is high then
3 leave work with 40% chance × associated mortality rate according to age
4 end
5 if age >= 15 and not fired then
6 if age ∈ [16, 25] then increase skill (s) by 10% of maximum attainable skill
7 if workfoce society is closed then
8 if (21 ≤ Age ≤ 55) then
9 if the number of children < maximum then
10 if rand() ≤ ReproductionChance then
11 Create a new person with age← 0 and random parameters





17 Cheating cost← 0
18 if potential cheater then
/* Calculate expected utility, based on director’s and agent’s
capital, using Cap and Mcap as dummy variables; */
19 cap(0)←Mycapital, I(0)← 0, for commenda Mcap(0)← DirectorCapital otherwise
Mcap(0)← 0, and t← 1.
20 while t ≤ 6 do
21 I(t)← (aai+ aais× s)× [0.3×Mcap (t− 1) + cap (t− 1)]
22 cap(t)← cap(t− 1) + I(t− 1)
23 Mcap(t)← (aai+ aais× s)× 0.7×Mcap (t− 1)
24 t← t+ 1
25 end




27 Consider a random manipulation (RM), CI ← RM for commenda and CI ← G(< RM)
for others.
28 Learn pc, ppc, ppnc, and effectiveness of bond (eb).
29 if






33 if Commenda then
34 total← ((Rand(aai) +Rand(aais)× s)× DirectorCapital) − CheatingCost
35 DirectorCapital← 0.7× total
36 My capital← 0.3× total + RM
37 else
38 DirectorCapital← DirectorCapital +((Rand(aai) +Rand(aais)× s)× DirectorCapital)
− CheatingCost
39 Mycapital←Mycapital +((Rand(aai) +Rand(aais)× s)×Mycapital) + CI
40 end
41 end
42 if leaning is considered then
43 if the number of observed cheaters > threshold and agent is impressionable then
44 Convert to potential cheater
45 end
46 end
correlation reflects the degree to which the unwanted manipulation is correlated with the ease
of its identification. In commenda contracts, a cheater’s profit is as much as the manipula-
tion, because the agent buys and sells items. A salaried agent’s profit of cheating is in the
form of accepting a gift from other parties to change the orders5 (line 27). Afterwards, agent
A updates his estimations of the probabilities of different states, based on his observations, a
priori knowledge, and the effectiveness of bonds — if he is salaried — (line 28). Consecu-
tively, agent A may decide to cheat based on expected utility (lines 29–31). Agent A updates
his capital as well as his director’s capital (lines 33–41). Note that the increase in the direc-
tor’s capital directly affects the director’s profits that is a function of the payment scheme
and the cheating costs incurred because of agent A. For commenda contracts, the director’s
profits decrease by 30% due to the profit-sharing. Finally, in scenarios where some agents
are impressionable (i.e. some agents may turn into potential cheaters), if agent A observes a
certain number of cheaters in his connections, he also considers cheating (lines 42–46).
4.3.3 Simulation parameters
In this section, we state the parameters employed in our simulations. A simulation run is
initialised with a predefined population with different ages and random a priori knowledge of
5The most frequent reported forms of cheating in the EIC were embezzlement, reselling an agent’s items,
and accepting gifts — e.g. choosing the best gift giver (Marshall, 1976).
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Table 4.2: Punishment, reward, and learning for the base scenario
Parameter Learning means Note
Future revenue Asking other agents
Chance of being punished as a cheater Observation Discount past parameters
Chance of getting fired for bad performance Observation Discount past parameters
Chance for cheating Observation Discount past performance
Effectiveness of bond Observation Bayesian
Punishment in commenda Contract Revealed cheating + Interest
associated probabilities for each state. The age structure of the initial population is defined in
a way that it reflects the associated mortality rate. To do so, we fitted an exponential function
on data as suggested by Frol’kis (1982). Then based on: a) the population of a given year,
b) the percentage of deceased agents, and c) the assumption that the societal population
did not have any trend recently (i.e. increasing or decreasing), the number of agents in the
subsequent years is identified. The results of this procedure are depicted in Figure 4.2. In
this figure, the x-axis indicates the age and the y-axis indicates the number of agents. The
blue lines are associated with high mortality rates and the orange lines indicate low mortality
rates. Also, Equation 4.2 shows the fitted exponential functions.
MortalityRate(age, rate) =
0.0736× e(0.01035×age), if rate = High0.0033× e(0.0478×age), if rate = Low (4.2)
For each iteration, which equals a year, agents update their assessments of the effective-
ness of different institutions — for instance, the probabilities of a cheater or non-cheater
being fired. The main parameters that an agent learns are shown in Table 4.2. The following
states the parameters that were fixed in our simulation and the reasons for choosing these
numbers.
Weighting factor: Agents weight past estimation using 0.3 weight due to the one year
lag and the obsolescence of past information. The only exception for this learning method
relates to not-executed bonds. We know of no bonds that were paid upon the fault (con-
fiscated) in the EIC based on accumulated data; therefore agents increase their belief about
the ineffectiveness of these bonds with more evidence (they use a Bayesian inference for a
Bernoulli probability distribution that assesses the probability of confiscating bonds). For
all cases, agents stick with a priori knowledge, if they do not observe anything new. In the
base scenario (i.e. Scenario 1), we ascribed punishment and bonds to contract form, so: a)
in commenda contracts (e.g. Julfa), identified cheaters are punished, based on the cheating
and accumulated interests (they know it once they start the contract) and b) in other contracts
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(e.g. the EIC), cheaters are dismissed and the bond is not confiscated (they learn this paying
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Figure 4.2: Age structure for systems with a) low mortality rate and b) high mortality rate.
The population is defined, based on the approximate population of these societies. In
Julfa, approximately 800 traders (directors and agents) were active in the 17th century (Asla-
nian, 2007) and in the EIC, based on the number of factories6 and their population, the num-
ber of agents was estimated to be 500. To perform a comparative evaluation, we used 500
agents for both societies. The mortality rates, their functions, and the reproduction rates
for the two societies were obtained from various sources (Aslanian, 2007; Frol’kis, 1982;
Hejeebu, 1998; Hollingsworth, 1957).
Discount factor: This is used to calculate the net present value of money. Systems with
high mortality rates have a high discount factor because of mortality risks — in such societies
the net present value of money reaches 1% in 10 years. Moreover, in Julfa, this was estimated
based on the reported customary interest rates (α ≈ 10% → (1/1.1) ≈ 90%, Herzig, 1991)
as an indicator of the average societal discount factor.
Years: Each agent has a finite time horizon (6 years) for calculating his utility function.
This number of years is employed to parametrise our model. Note that we did not con-
sider a longer time horizon (e.g. 20 years) because of the observations made by behavioural
6For a list of these factories in India see (Robins, 2017), Map 2 (p.65).
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scientists (Kim & Zauberman, 2009; Muradoglu & Harvey, 2012; Pedneault et al., 2017).
Table 4.3: Simulation parameters
Name Description Distribution Value(s)
Weighting factor Weight of past information Constant 0.3






High mortality rate 10.4
Discount factor
Low mortality rate Normal
(µ, σ)
(0.9,0.033)
High mortality rate (0.63, 0.12)
Years Agent’s myopia Constant 6
Revenue Basic income for trades Uniform (0.05, 0.1)
Skill-based revenue Linear function of skill Uniform (0, 0.1)
Potential cheater rate Chance of being a potential cheater Constant 0.5
Proportion to fire
Fired per run for bad performance (no ad-
judication process)
Constant 0.008




By agents with direct link Uniform (0, a)
By directors in a closed society Beta (1, 5, 0, a)
By directors in an open society, discounted
by 1% for employees’ disloyalty
Uniform (0, a)
Revenue: Based on the approximated ROR associated with the EIC during 1710–1745,
revenue rate (i.e. ROR) on average increases 9.74%.7 In our model, we also assume that a
minimum revenue can be made by trade because of monopoly privileges. Therefore in our
model the revenue rate is uniformly distributed in (0.05, 0.1). Additionally, to model the
impact of skill on the profits made in the society, we consider a skill-based revenue with a
maximum of 0.1 that depends on the situation — it is random — and the agent’s skill level
(i.e. lower skills make lower profits). In other words, it has a continuous uniform distribution
in (0, 0.1).
Potential cheater rate: We assumed that the chance for an agent to be opportunistic is
the same as that of being honest (i.e. 50-50).
Proportion to fire: This indicates the proportion of fired agents per run for their bad
performance. We know that about 13.2% of the EIC employees who were hired between
1700 and 1756 in Bengal were dismissed (i.e. about 0.003 per annum, see Section 2.3.2.1).
In our model, we considered it a little bit higher (i.e. 0.008 per annum) to take account of a
slightly higher number of fired agents in other settlements and the impact of missing data.
7A detailed table is provided in (Chaudhuri, 1978), Table A.26 (p.440).
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Skill: An agent has a maximum attainability for skill. We assume that an agent has at
least an average attainability that makes him interested in trading. The maximum attainability
for an agent is uniformly distributed in (0.5, 1).
Chances of identifying cheaters: The agents identify their friends’ cheating (i.e. con-
nected agents) randomly. Note that the more manipulation there is, the more visible it is.
For this purpose, we assumed that the probability that a friend identifies a% manipulation
is uniformly distributed in (0, a/100). In a closed society (e.g. Julfa), agents collaborate
in monitoring and report each other’s behaviours. Also, the directors have other means
(e.g. checking an agent’s luggage and other agents’ reported prices) to verify the reports.
For these reasons, we assumed that the directors identify manipulations better and, we use
the beta distribution8 for this purpose. In an open society (e.g. the EIC), directors have weak
monitoring means and the agents are not as loyal to the system as closed societies. Also, we
know that in the EIC during 100 years between 2% and 4% of employees were prosecuted
in courts (i.e. about 0.0004 of agents per year, see Section 2.3.2.1). For these reasons, we
assumed that a cheating behaviour is rarely identified by directors (i.e. we used a coefficient
of 1% for this purpose).
To operationalise our model, we assumed that each agent starts with 100 units of money
from the director’s capital and 10 units of money of his own capital for local trades. Also, we
assumed that an agent has approximately 20 random connections with other agents that he
can observe and learn from (inspired from Dunbar’s number, see Carron et al., 2016; Zhou et
al., 2005). Therefore a new employee creates around 20 random connections to other agents
in the system — the connection is lost once a person leaves the society. Finally, the bonds
are 50 units of money for agents with one to five years of experience, 100 for agents with six
to eight years of experience, and 150 for more experienced agents (inspired from stepwise
bound with a significant amount of the EIC; see Hejeebu, 2005).
4.4 Simulation results
We conducted experiments with sixteen simulated societies by varying four characteristics.
However, in this section, we describe simulation results for ten societies out of sixteen sim-
ulated societies. We only report two societies with high mortality rates (i.e. the EIC and its
8A beta distribution is a flexible continuous probability distribution to model events in a finite interval (see
S. M. Ross, 2010, pp. 218–219). Beta(α, β, c, d) indicates the beta distribution with parameters α and β in
the interval (c, d). Note that when the two parameters are 1 (i.e. α = β = 1), the distribution transforms to the
Uniform distribution in (c, d).
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closed counterpart), and skipped the others, because we already know that a higher discount
factor — because of a high mortality rate — decreases directors’ profits by increasing the
opportunistic behaviours of the agents (Baker & Miceli, 2005; Mastrobuoni & Rivers, 2016).
We employed these examples with a high mortality rate to a) represent the EIC better and b)
test whether the EIC was able to form a closed society of traders. This helps us to identify a
crucial factor impacting these two societies’ sustainability. We state this result at the end of
this section.
We have utilised NetLogo to perform our simulation (Wilensky, 1999). We also used
30 different runs to simulate each system and then averaged their results. Moreover, we
assume each iteration reflects a year. The number of iterations in this simulation is bounded
to 200 — both systems used these institutions and lasted for around 150-200 years.9 We
gradually change characteristics of EIC to get closer to Julfa to examine their effects on
the success of these societies. Based on these combinations, we study the success of these
systems using four metrics, namely sustainability, reducing the percentage of the cheaters,
improving the skill of people, and making more profits. It is worth mentioning that we did
not add punishment compensations when calculating societal revenue (i.e. ROR), because
we are concerned with trade income. Also, such consequences have adjudication costs and
the probability of losing in court — note that adding such factors makes the simulation
more complicated. Table 4.4 shows characteristics for the ten simulated societies and the
real societies they represent (given in parenthesis). Note that we did not explicitly include
punishment in Table 4.4 and considered its impact by varying scenarios.
In Table 4.4, the configurations (i.e. societies) are identified by two letters associated with
characteristics, namely LM, Co, Cl, and Ad that represent Low Mortality rate, using Comm-
enda contracts, Closedness of societies, and having Adjudication processes, respectively.
We used a Boolean index to indicate whether such an attribute is included (i.e. 1) or not
(i.e. 0). Likewise, in Table 4.4, a tick indicates that the society includes that attribute, and a
cross indicates the society does not include that attribute. In the following sections, we state
results associated with simulation scenarios. Note that the model representing Julfa has a
value of 1 (tick in Table 4.4) for all the four characteristics, and the one representing the EIC
has a value of 0 (cross in Table 4.4) for the same characteristics. The models in the middle
are stereotype societies with varying characteristics.
Impact of characteristics on societal sustainability: As stated earlier, we have con-
ducted the closed counterpart of the EIC to test whether they were able to use a closed
9The EIC legalised local trades for agents in the late 17th and early 18th, and Julfans were active for less
than 200 years.
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Low mortality rate 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Commenda 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Closed 7 3 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
Adjudication 7 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
society hiring scheme (e.g. family and relatives of directors). For this purpose, we consid-
ered a closed community of traders with the same mortality rate as the EIC. Furthermore, to
have a stable population, we had to assume that a trader has around 21 babies with 70%
probability of having a child per year. This indicates that, given the high mortality rate,
any attempts to hire from a closed society could be the biggest obstacle to sustainability of
trade.
In the next subsection, we present the simulation results associated with the base Scenario
(Scenario 1).
4.4.1 Scenario 1: Contract-based punishment
This scenario is the base game presented in Figure 4.1. The following represents the utility
function of a cheating associated with the societies lacking adjudication:
U(Cheat) = cpc× (CI − P ) + (1− cpc)× (CI + α× FI) (4.3)
The utility function for an honest action in both societies is as follows:
U(Honest) = (1− ppnc)× α× FI (4.4)
A potential cheater decides to cheat when U(Cheat) > U(Honest). Note that having ad-
judication processes removes the probability of getting fired for bad performance; hence, in
Equations 4.1 and 4.3, the ppc and ppnc equal zero.
In the following subsection, we include the results for the impact of the societal configu-



























































































































LM0Co0Cl0Ad0 LM0Co0Cl1Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 LM1Co0Cl1Ad0
LM1Co0Cl1Ad1 LM1Co1Cl0Ad0 LM1Co1Cl0Ad1 LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 LM1Co1Cl1Ad1
Figure 4.3: Percentage of cheaters in a society, where the x-axis is the number of years and
the y-axis is the percentage of cheaters in a society (Scenario 1). Note that LM1Co1Cl0Ad0
and LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 are both zero — in (a) and (f) they are overlapped.
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4.4.1.1 The impact of societal configuration on rule conformance
Now we state the results of simulation runs for Scenario 1, which are given in Figure 4.3.
The goal of this subsection is to compare the cheating behaviours among different societies
during 200 iterations (years). The x-axis of this figure represents the number of years since
the system’s establishment and the y-axis indicates the percentage of cheaters in the society
(Figures 4.3a-4.3f). In these graphs, horizontal pairs group the simulated societies based on
having (right) and not having (left) a characteristic (i.e. lines are repeated in each pair of
characteristics). Furthermore, the EIC and Julfa are highlighted with thicker lines (green and
red, respectively).
Percentage of cheaters: As can be seen, having adjudication processes (Figures 4.3a-
4.3b) deters agents from cheating (i.e. societies with Ad0 has a lower number of cheaters
than their Ad1 counterparts). Closedness of society (Figures 4.3c-4.3d) does not control
agents’ inclination towards cheating significantly. This indicates that in societies with lower
payments and mild punishments, agents take the risk of cheating (i.e. Co0). However, it
should be emphasised that this number is cumulative (i.e. cheaters remain in closed systems).
As can be seen, there are fewer cheaters in systems run by commenda contracts (Figure 4.3f)
than salaried agents (Figure 4.3e). This indicates the impact of this profit-sharing on agents’
behaviour.
What follows presents the Kendall statistical test10 to measure the impact of the character-
istics on agents’ inclinations towards cheating. Note that as stated earlier, a higher discount
factor — caused by a higher mortality rate — increases the agents’ opportunistic behaviour
in the society. Consequently, we only used data of low mortality rates in the statistical tests:
• The impact of commenda contracts on agents’ inclination towards cheating is statis-
tically significant, negative, and moderate (τ = −0.59). This indicates that a combi-
nation of profit-sharing mechanisms (e.g. 30% sharing) and stronger punishments for
more serious cheating deters agents from cheating.
• The correlation between closedness of the society and the prevalence of cheating is
negative and weak (τ ≈ −0.13 and p-value ≈ 0). This indicates that the closedness
of the society — a better monitoring — weakly hampers agents’ inclination towards
cheating.
• The correlation between agents’ inclination towards cheating and having adjudication
10We did not use the Spearman test because of the presence of ties caused by 0/1 characteristics. We also
did not use the Pearson test because of the trend in the observation and different variances (i.e. they are not
homogenous and normal).
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processes is positive (τ ≈ 0.37 and p-value ≈ 0). Note that not having adjudication
processes means performance-based firing. Consequently, this correlation11 shows that
performance-based firing moderately deters agents from cheating.
To summarise, the commenda contract — which includes significant profit-sharing — and
closedness of society deterred agents from cheating. Note that a counter-intuitive finding is
adjudication processes’ failure to deter agents from cheating (described more in Section 4.5).
Experience of cheaters: After stating the impact of characteristics on agents’ inclination
towards cheating, we state the trend of cheating behaviour based on the agent’s experience.
Figures 4.4a to 4.4e present boxplots for the percentage of cheaters that are present in soci-
eties who had experience of less than four years, between four and six years, between seven
and nine years, between ten and twelve years, and more than or equal to thirteen years, re-
spectively. Figure 4.4f presents the boxplot for the percentage of agents who were fired for
cheating (independent of experience). In these plots, a diamond represents the average of
simulation results and the red dots are outliers.
As can be seen, in closed societies (Cl1) stronger monitoring mechanisms help the soci-
ety to identify and fire most of the cheaters. Also, in the open counterpart of Julfa (i.e. LM1
Co1Cl0Ad1), an increase in experience decreases the inclination towards cheating because
of an increase in expected profit (see Figure 4.4a versus Figure 4.4b-4.4e) — as can be seen
in Figure 4.4f, almost none of the cheaters were fired (see LM1Co1Cl0Ad1). This result
indicates the importance of bilateral commenda contracts that increase the profits of agents
more than the nominal share (30% in this model) by providing the opportunity for invest-
ments of accumulated profits. Another interesting result belongs to Julfa without commenda
contracts (Co0) using an open society (Clo0) — i.e. society LM1Co0Cl0Ad1. As can be seen
in Figures 4.4a and 4.4e, accumulation of experience has a negative impact on agents’ in-
clination towards cheating. This also emphasises the importance of profit-sharing contracts
disregarding monitoring strength. This increase in the number of experienced agents who
are inclined towards cheating provides some insights for us to understand why the EIC used
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































f) Fired for cheating







































Figure 4.4: Boxplot of percentage of cheaters with respect to experience (a-e) and fired
agents (f). In boxplots a-e, the y-axis represents the percentage of cheaters. In boxplot f, the































































































Figure 4.5: The boxplot of the obtained ROR of simulation results for different system set-
tings (Scenario 1).
4.4.1.2 The impact of societal configuration on the profits made by directors
In this subsection, we study the impact of the system’s characteristics on the directors’ ROR
(see Figure 4.5). As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the simulated Julfa (LM1Co1Cl1Ad1) has
a better ROR than the simulated EIC (LM0Co0Cl0Ad0). In addition, for societies with
a low mortality rate (LM1), there are higher RORs in societies with commenda contracts
(Co1) or in a closed society (Cl1) than in the other societies (Co0Cl0). In the following, we
use a Kendall statistical test to measure the correlation between the characteristics and the
directors’ ROR.
• The correlation between employing commenda contracts and the ROR is positive and
weak (τ ≈ 0.06 and p-value < 0.004). This correlation indicates that the combination
of profit-sharing as proposed in commenda contracts (30% profit-sharing) and punish-
ments based on the seriousness of cheating have a weak and positive impact on the
directors’ ROR.
11For the strength of coefficients we have used Dancey and Reidy’s (2017, p. 182, Figure 6.7) interpreta-
tions. Also, see Akoglu (2018, Table 1) for other metrics. For absolute values of correlation, zero and one are
none and perfect correlations, respectively. Also, the intervals for weak, moderate, and strong correlations are
(0, 0.3), (0.4, 0.6), and (0.7, 0.9), respectively.
80
• The closedness of the society has a positive, weak, and statistically significant corre-
lation with the ROR (τ ≈ 0.13 and p-value ≈ 0). This indicates that closedness of
the society weakly improves the ROR through better monitoring and therefore reduces
agents’ inclinations towards cheating.
• The correlation between the ROR and having adjudication processes is weak and neg-
ative (τ ≈ −0.08) and is statistically significant (p-value ≈ 0.0001). In other words,
given the assumptions of this scenario, we note that having adjudication processes
weakly decreases profitability by keeping non-cheaters with a low performance in the
system.
As stated above, two out of the three characteristics had a positive impact on the directors’
ROR (closedness of society and using commenda contracts). The obtained correlation asso-
ciated with using adjudication processes was weak. Furthermore, it can be seen that if the
EIC were to become a closed system, it would have a slightly higher ROR (See Figure 4.5
LM0Co0Cl0Ad0 versus LM0Co0Cl1Ad0).
Finally, overall, using commenda contracts has a positive impact on the societal ROR. In
other words, this sharing scheme pays itself back by deterring agents from cheating. On the
other hand, a combination of closedness and a low mortality rate (all societies identified by
LM1 and Cl1) improves profitability. The EIC’s policy, disregarding the impact of mortality
rate, is not a superior policy. In other words, society LM1Co0Cl0Ad0 (i.e. the simulated
EIC with a low mortality rate) only outperforms society LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 (i.e. Julfa without
commenda contracts with adjudication processes).
In the next subsection, we discuss the impact of characteristics on societal skill level.
4.4.1.3 The impact of societal configurations on societal skill level
Figure 4.6 presents the societal skill level for different configurations. As can be seen, the
societal skill of the simulated EIC is relatively the same as Julfa (the agents attained about
75% of a full skill level). Overall, not using adjudication processes helps the society to
improve their skills (i.e. all societies with Ad0). This is intuitive because lacking adjudica-
tion processes leads to the removal of low-skilled agents (they are suspected of cheating).
Below, using a Kendall statistical test, we examine the correlation between the considered
characteristics and the societal skill level.
• Employing commenda contracts has a weak, positive, and statistically significant cor-






























































































Figure 4.6: The boxplot of the societal skill associated with different system settings (Sce-
nario 1).
agents have a lower inclination towards cheating, and lacking adjudication processes
increases the societal skill level by filtering out low-skilled agents.
• The correlation between the closedness of the society and the societal skill of agents
is negative and weak (τ ≈ −0.1), and is statistically significant (p-value ≈ 0). This is
because in closed societies a high number of low-skilled agents are hired for the hiring
scheme used.
• The combinations of societal skills (average of skill levels of a society) and using ad-
judication processes have a moderate, negative, and statistically significant correlation
(τ ≈ −0.35 and p-value ≈ 0). This correlation indicates that performance-based fir-
ing has a moderate positive impact on filtering out low-skilled agents. Note that we can
infer that some of (if not a majority of) the fired agents, based on the low performance,
were not the worst cheaters, but they had lower skills than their peers.
Overall, only using commenda contracts had a positive impact on the societal skill level.
However, this can be because of performance-based firing.
Finally, the worst societal skill level belongs to society LM1Co0Cl1Ad1 (i.e. the Julfa
without commenda contracts), where no profits are shared, low-skilled agents are introduced
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into the system, and only cheaters are fired. In such a system, low-skilled agents remain
as long as they do not cheat. The best societal skill belongs to LM1Co0Cl0Ad0, which
is the simulated EIC with a low mortality rate. Other societies with a high societal skill
level are societies that use a profit-sharing contract and lack adjudication processes (Co1
and Ad0). These results suggest that Julfa’s characteristics considered here do not improve
a societal skill level. In the next subsection, we model a situation under which cheaters are
only expelled if a performance-based metric is used.
4.4.2 Scenario 2: Only dismissed for bad performance
This scenario is a revised version of the game associated with the base scenario (Equation
4.3). The new game is presented in Figure 4.7. Here the potential cheater considers two
distinguished punishments based on the source of the director’s suspicion. If the director uses
performance-based metrics to identify a cheater (with the probability of ppc), he only fires the
agent (i.e. there is no additional punishments). However, if there is some evidence regarding
the agent’s cheating (with the probability of pc), he gets fired and is punished by having
to pay additional penalties decided by contracts. Note that in the base scenario, the agent
assumed that when the director suspected him for his low performance, the director could
collect evidence (i.e. an agent’s cheating would have been revealed). What follows presents
the game considered by a potential cheater in societies lacking adjudication processes:
(a)Punishment and Rewards (b)Actions’ probability
Director’s Suspicion Director’s Suspicion








l C pc | ppc 1− cpc
NC 0 α× FI NC ppnc 1− ppnc
Figure 4.7: The game that potential cheaters play (Scenario 2). In the top left cells, “|”
separates sources of the director’s suspicion. The left arguments refer to when the director
has some evidence and those on the right refer to when the director suspects the agent just
for his bad performance.
U(Cheat) = (pc× (CI − P )) + (ppc× CI) + ((1− cpc)× (CI + α× FI)) (4.5)
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The utility function for an honest action is the same as before:
U(Honest) = (1− ppnc)× α× FI (4.6)
Similar to Scenario 1, a potential cheater decides to cheat when U(Cheat) > U(Honest),
and having the adjudication processes sets the ppc and ppnc to zero in Equations 4.1 and 4.3,
respectively.
4.4.2.1 The impact of societal configurations on rule conformance
In this subsection, we describe the simulation results for Scenario 2 shown in Figure 4.8. The
x-axis of this figure represents the number of simulation iterations and the y-axis indicates
the percentage of cheaters (Figure 4.8a-4.8f). This scenario also shows that adjudication
processes (Figure 4.8a-4.8b) have a negative impact on agents’ inclinations towards cheat-
ing (i.e. Ad0 has a lower percentage of cheaters than their Ad1 counterparts). And societies
LM1Co0Cl0Ad0 and LM1Co0Cl1Ad0 had a change in their percentage of cheaters in com-
parison with Scenario 1. Note that most of the patterns observed by this scenario have no or
slight changes in comparison with Scenario 1. Below, we present the results of the Kendall
statistical test, emphasising what have been stated:
• The impact of commenda contracts on agents’ inclination towards cheating is the same
as Scenario 1 (−0.59 and p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between closedness of the society and the percentage of cheaters is
almost the same as Scenario 1 (τ ≈ −0.14 and p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between the percentage of cheaters and having adjudication processes
is positive and the same as Scenario 1 (τ ≈ 0.37 and p-value ≈ 0).
As stated above, the correlations between the percentage of cheaters and the system’s
characteristics is almost the same as Scenario 1. In the next subsection, we state the results
associated with the director’s profit based on this scenario. Note that the patterns for the
results associated with the experience of cheaters were almost the same as Scenario 1; hence,
we do not report them here.
4.4.2.2 The impact of societal configuration on the profits made by directors
The patterns of the ROR associated with this scenario were almost the same as Scenario 1
(see Figure 4.5); hence, we did not include its visualisation. Below, we report the results



























































































































LM0Co0Cl0Ad0 LM0Co0Cl1Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 LM1Co0Cl1Ad0
LM1Co0Cl1Ad1 LM1Co1Cl0Ad0 LM1Co1Cl0Ad1 LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 LM1Co1Cl1Ad1
Figure 4.8: Percentage of cheaters in a society, where the x-axis is the number of years and
the y-axis is the percentage of cheaters in a society (Scenario 2).
85
• The correlation between the ROR and employing commenda contracts is almost the
same as that of Scenario 1 (τ = 0.14 and p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between the ROR and closedness of society is the same as what was
obtained for Scenario 1 (τ ≈ 0.14 and p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between the ROR and having adjudication processes is similar to Sce-
nario 1 (τ ≈ −0.08 and p-value ≈ 0).
As stated above, similar to Scenario 1, closedness of society and using commenda con-
tracts had positive correlations with the profitability of the system. Furthermore, the correla-
tion between having adjudication processes and the ROR was negative (as that of Scenario
1). In the next subsection, we describe the results associated with the impact of this scenario
on the societal skill level.





























































































Figure 4.9: The boxplot of the societal skill level associated with the simulation for different
system settings (Scenario 2).
Figure 4.9 presents the societal skill level associated with different configurations. As
can be seen in this figure, the societal skill level of the simulated EIC is almost the same
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as Julfa (75). Overall, not having adjudication processes helps the society to improve their
skills (i.e. all societies with Ad0 outperform their Ad1 counterparts). This is intuitive, be-
cause lacking adjudication processes leads to the removal of agents with lower skills — they
used performance-based firing that filters out lower skilled agents. What follows reports re-
sults associated with a performed Kendall statistical test to examine the correlation between
considered characteristics and the societal skill level.
• Employing commenda contracts has a statistically insignificant, weak, and negative
correlation with the societal skill level (τ ≈ −0.02 and p-value > 0.2). This means
we cannot be sure that this correlation is not a random observation.
• The correlation between closedness of the society and the societal skill of agents is
similar to Scenario 1 (τ ≈ −0.11 with p-value ≈ 0).
• The societal skill level and having adjudication processes has almost the same corre-
lation as Scenario 1 (τ ≈ −0.37 with p-value ≈ 0).
The correlations between both closedness of society and having adjudication processes, and
the societal skill were the same as Scenario 1. However, the correlation between employing
commenda contracts and the societal skill level was statistically insignificant and negative,
which means it might be a random observation. In this scenario, the worst and the best
societal skill levels are associated with LM1Co0Cl1Ad1 (Julfa without commenda contracts)
and LM1Co0Cl1Ad0 (the EIC with a low mortality rate in a closed society), respectively.
The next subsection presents another revision of Scenario 1 wherein the type of punish-
ments is decided by courts instead of by the type of contracts.
4.4.3 Scenario 3: Court-based punishment
This scenario is another revision of the base game (Scenario 1). Here we attribute types of
punishments to employing adjudication processes. In other words, a society lacking adjudi-
cation processes uses punishments similar to those of the EIC (i.e. signed bonds and firing)
and its agents use the utility function of Equation 4.3. Note that in Scenario 1, if a society had
adjudication processes and no commenda contracts, its punishment was similar to those of
the EIC (signed bonds); however, in this scenario, the same society has punishments similar
to those of Julfa (paying back cheating income in addition to interest). The next subsection



























































































































LM0Co0Cl0Ad0 LM0Co0Cl1Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad0 LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 LM1Co0Cl1Ad0
LM1Co0Cl1Ad1 LM1Co1Cl0Ad0 LM1Co1Cl0Ad1 LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 LM1Co1Cl1Ad1
Figure 4.10: Percentage of cheaters in a society, where the x-axis is the number of years and
the y-axis is the percentage of cheaters in a society (Scenario 3).
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4.4.3.1 The impact of societal configuration on rule conformance
In this subsection, we state the results of simulation runs for Scenario 3, indicated in Figure
4.10. As can be seen, the change in the punishment had a substantial impact on society
LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 (i.e. the EIC with an adjudication process and a low mortality rate). Note
that this change in pattern that indicates the deterrent impact of signed bonds also indicates
the reason the EIC asked for a signed bond and skipped adjudication processes. The bonds —
although they were not confiscated — had a substantial value that prevented some potential
cheaters from cheating for a while (i.e. until they had learnt about its uselessness). On the
other hand, the firing itself is a preventive punishment for commenda contracts, such that the
patterns associated with LM1Co1Cl0Ad0 and LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 (i.e. simulated Julfa with no
adjudication processes disregarding closedness of society) did not change. In what follows,
we present the results of the Kendall statistical test to assess the influence of the considered
characteristics on agents’ inclinations towards cheating:
• The impact of using commenda contracts on the agents’ inclination towards cheating
is similar to Scenarios 1 and 2 (i.e. −0.58 with a p-value < 0.0001).
• The correlation between closedness of society and the prevalence of cheating has de-
creased compared to Scenarios 1 and 2 (τ ≈ −0.18 and p-value < 0.0001).
• The correlation between agents’ inclination towards cheating and having adjudica-
tion processes is positive and similar to Scenarios 1 and 2 (τ ≈ 0.36 and p-value <
0.0001).
As stated above, the correlations are relatively similar to those of Scenarios 1 and 2, except
for a decrease in the correlation between closedness of society and the percentage of cheaters.
Overall, punishments employed by the EIC and Julfa seem to be properly devised based on
their payment schemes.
After stating the impact of the system’s characteristics on agents’ inclination towards
cheating, we only report the trend of cheating behaviour associated with LM1Co0Cl0Ad1
(i.e. the only society with a change in the cheating pattern) for Scenarios 1 and 3. Figure
4.11 represents the boxplot of the experience of cheaters. As can be seen, Scenario 3 has
a lower percentage of cheaters with a low experience (less than three years) compared to
Scenario 1. However, an increase in the experience of agents, increases agents’ inclination
towards cheating for Scenario 3 compared to Scenario 1. Note that in Scenario 3, agents
know that directors are not able to identify their cheating easily (i.e. the society is open),
they are not fired for their bad performance, and the company does not ask for signed bonds.
























Figure 4.11: Boxplot of the percentage of cheaters in LM1Co0Cl0Ad1 for Scenarios 1 and 3
with respect to the experience.
4.4.3.2 The impact of societal configuration on the profits made by directors
In this subsection, we do not provide a visualisation of the directors’ ROR because the pat-
terns did not change compared to Scenario 1 (see Figure 4.5).12 Below, we report values
associated with the Kendall statistical test to measure the correlation between the character-
istics and the ROR.
• The correlation between employing commenda contracts and the ROR is also similar
to Scenarios 1 and 2 (τ ≈ 0.16 with a p-value < 0.0001).
• The correlation between the closedness of the society and the ROR is also similar to
Scenarios 1 and 2 (τ ≈ 0.14 and p-value < 0.0001).
• The correlation between the ROR and having adjudication processes is weak and neg-
ative (τ ≈ −0.04). Also, this correlation is on the edge of significance (p-value ≈
0.06). In other words, statistically speaking, we are not very confident about the im-
pact of using adjudication processes on directors’ ROR.
In general, this scenario, similar to Scenario 1, indicated a positive correlation between
both closedness of society and commenda contracts with directors’ profits. However, this
12Note that there was a decrease in profitability of the LM1Co0Cl0Ad1, but it was still much better than
the EIC.
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time, the significance of correlation between using adjudication processes and the ROR was
weaker.
4.4.3.3 The impact of societal configurations on the societal skill level
In this subsection, we do not provide any visualisations; however, a brief description of
Kendall statistical tests is presented below:
• The correlation between using commenda contracts and the societal skill level is sta-
tistically insignificant, weak, and negative (τ ≈ −0.03 and p-value > 0.15). This
indicates that commenda contracts, coupled with stricter punishment, improve the so-
cietal skill (i.e. Scenarios 1 and 2).
• The correlation between closedness of the society and the societal skill level is weak
and on the edge of significance (τ ≈ −0.04 with p-value ≈ 0.06). This value increases
in comparison with Scenarios 1 and 2.
• The societal skill level of agents and having adjudication processes have the same
correlation as Scenarios 1 and 2 (τ ≈ −0.42 with p-value < 0.0001).
As can be seen, under this scenario, all three characteristics have a negative impact on the
societal skill of the system. However, the only statistically reliable result is firing, based on
the performance. In the next section, we briefly explore another extension of Scenario 1.
4.4.4 Scenario 4: Conformity
In this scenario, we extend Scenario 1 by considering agents’ conformity — they consider
cheating based on the number of cheaters observed. For this purpose, we assume that agents
are divided into three subgroups with the same size (Tyran & Feld, 2002, points to the emer-
gence of such a phenomenon in real-world scenarios). One group always follow the rules,
the second group is potential cheaters, and members of the third group turn into poten-
tial cheaters, if they observe a number of cheaters more than a threshold (Algorithm 4.2
lines 39-43). This threshold is randomly generated for each agent separately. Note that for
this scenario, we only report the percentage of cheaters (i.e. agents cheated) and potential
cheaters (agents consider cheating in their utility function). We do not consider the rest of
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Figure 4.12: Percentage of cheaters in a society, where the x-axis is the number of years and
the y-axis is the percentage of cheaters in a society (Scenario 4).
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4.4.4.1 The impact of societal configuration on the percentage of cheaters
Figure 4.12 shows the percentage of cheaters for different configurations. As can be seen,
the societies without commenda contracts have a change in the patterns in comparison to
Scenario 1 (i.e. two closed societies have an increasing trend in cheating, namely LM1Co0
Cl1Ad0 and LM1Co0Cl1Ad1). In these two societies, the cheaters remain in the society
after getting fired, and some agents consider cheating as an acceptable behaviour because of
the availability of the high percentage of cheaters (i.e. agents consider cheating if they think
their behaviour is not acceptable). When a society has adjudication processes, the agents
cheat sooner, because they assume there is a lower probability of punishment (i.e. they are
not punished for bad performance). What follows presents the correlations between the
inclination towards cheating and different characteristics:
• The impact of commenda contracts on the agents’ inclinations towards cheating is
similar to those of Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (i.e. −0.58 with a p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between closedness of the society and the popularity of cheating is
almost similar to those of Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (i.e. τ ≈ −0.09 with p-value ≈ 0).
• The correlation between the inclination towards cheating and having adjudication pro-
cesses is the same as Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (τ ≈ 0.37 and p- ≈ 0).
Note that this similarity of correlations was predictable because in this scenario, the
agents conform to the behaviour observed. This act based on the prevalence of cheating
may increase the number of cheaters, but it would not influence the correlations. In the
next subsection, we assess the impact of the conformity on changes in the agent’s policy
(i.e. considering cheating as a potential policy).
4.4.4.2 The percentage of potential cheaters
Changes in the agent’s behaviour, considering conformity (justifying cheating based on pop-
ularity), is presented in Figure 4.13. In this figure the straight green line indicates 33%
(i.e. the expected minimum of potential cheaters). As can be seen, in all societies, except
for LM1Co1Cl0Ad0 and LM1Co1Cl1Ad0 (i.e. the EIC with commenda contracts and a low
mortality rate and Julfa without adjudication processes), some agents changed their policy
to be a potential cheater (the percentage of potential cheaters is greater than 33%). Note that
as shown in Figure 4.12, in some societies (all societies with Co1) the actual percentage of
cheaters is lower than the percentage of potential cheaters — about 10% versus more than
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Figure 4.13: Percentage of potential cheaters in a society, where the x-axis is the number of
years and the y-axis is the percentage of potential cheaters in a society (Scenario 4).
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the cheaters’ policy increased — by turning into the potential cheaters. More specifically,
in societies LM1Co0Cl1Ad0 and LM1Co0ClAd1, the ratios of potential cheaters increased
to 60% and 55%, respectively. This indicates the negative impact of not sharing profits in
a closed society on agents’ policies (i.e. they consider cheating in their policy). In the next
section, we provide a discussion about the findings of this chapter based on the studied sce-
narios.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter has built a model to simulate the impact of contractual schemes and environ-
mental circumstances on the success of a society. Also, it sheds light on what happened in
the two historical long-distance trading societies, namely the EIC and Julfa, along with other
hypothetical societies created based on their characteristics. The simulation revised Greif’s
(1993) model13 by considering an additional punishment and by using an incomplete infor-
mation game. This study aimed to investigate the effects of some characteristics of the EIC
and Julfa on their success.
Before further discussion, we wish to point out the relevance of the results associated
with our representations of the EIC and Julfa with the real societies. Because of the lack
of quantitative data, we rely on comparative information provided by merchants who visited
both societies. Below, we provide an overview of our simulation results that reflects relevant
historical observations:
• Sustainability: Our simulation model reproduced a demographically sustainable closed
society for Julfa as was observed by historians (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Also, for the
EIC, our model pointed to the concern that convinced company owners to use an open
scheme for hiring agents (it was impossible to establish a closed society for them).
• Rule conformity: A common belief among historians and directors of the EIC con-
cerns a prevalence of cheating (for instance, see Chapter 2, footnote 30). Furthermore,
evidence concerning dishonest behaviour in Julfa is limited (Aslanian, 2007). The
simulation results demonstrate the same situation. In other words, we observe a sig-
nificant difference between the percentage of cheaters in the EIC and Julfa, with a
higher prevalence of cheating in the EIC.
• Profitability: Our simulation was successful in reproducing the average ROR obtained
by the EIC (i.e. around 10%) despite cheating prevalence (see, Chaudhuri, 1978, Table
13Greif’s (1993) model concentrated on profit-sharing as the main reason for deterring agents from cheating.
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A.26, p. 440). Although the simulation results show a lower volatility in the directors’
ROR, this can be caused by reasons other than agents’ cheating (e.g. changes in the
quantity of demand in Britain). The results for Julfan’s directors’ profits are slightly
more than that of the EIC. Although we do not have precise information for the ROR
in Julfa, we know that the Julfans continued their policy for more than one century,
despite being aware of the EIC’s contracts (i.e. they did not find their approach to be
less profitable).
Note that the two historical long-distance trading societies were examples of societies
facing the principal-agent problem. In other words, in both of them, the principal (master/di-
rector) delegated power to an agent. Also, the agent had the potential to make profits by
pursuing self-interest in lieu of his mater’s interests. What follows states the general results
obtained, given the considered characteristics (including hypothetical societies).
Mortality rate: To stabilise the population in the society LM0Co0Cl1Ad0 (closed coun-
terpart of the EIC with the same mortality rate), we used trial and error observed that increas-
ing the maximum number of agents from 1.4 to 10.4 stabilises the population (i.e. around
21 children with 70% probability of having one child per year). These numbers show why
the EIC could not afford to incorporate a closed system, especially if we consider the as-
sumption’s severity (i.e. having 21 children in 30 years while agents are working in a foreign
continent). These numbers also emphasise that the Julfans had a low mortality rate (with
high mortality rate they could not sustain a closed society).
Commenda contracts: The results suggest that it is rational to share a significant amount
of profit to control the cheating behaviour of agents. This finding is emphasised by the pos-
itive correlation between commenda contracts and the ROR for all considered scenarios —
the marginal difference in the values of ROR convinces us that at least it controls the cheaters
without any additional costs. Furthermore, different scenarios for punishment indicate that a
combination of sharing profits and depriving the cheaters from future collaborations deters
agents from cheating.
Closedness of society: The most significant impact of closedness of society was on the
identification of cheaters. In other words, a system lacking satisfactory rewards eventually
faces a large number of cheaters, even with a strong monitoring means. Even though agents
in such societies may know they would be identified, they take the risk of cheating and try
their luck.
Adjudication processes: Another result of this study showed a negative and strong cor-
relation between using adjudication processes and societal skill level. This finding, coupled
with marginal differences between the skills of the agents in different societies, calls for a
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future study on the characteristics which caused the noticeable differences in skills that even
convinced the EIC directors to grant Julfans privileges the same as British agents, as quoted
in the introduction. A counter-intuitive result of this simulation is related to the deterrent
impact of not using adjudication processes on agents’ inclination towards cheating. This
outcome should be examined further using other methods.
Using Scenario 4, we assessed the impact of system characteristics on a society where
part of its agents may turn into potential cheaters based on the number of cheaters observed.
This showed that the combination of closedness of society and not using commenda con-
tracts has the most impact of agents’ inclination towards becoming a potential cheater. This
emphasises the importance of commenda contracts for closed societies like Julfa.
In general, the results of simulation indicate the effect of limited information about a sys-
tem on the agent’s decision-making, as suggested by the rational choice perspective (Monroe,
2001; Simon, 1985). For instance, we observe the impact of low payment schemes on agents’
cheating in order to make fast and easy money. On the other hand, the point that profit-
sharing (performance-based payments) persuades agents to work better is a phenomenon
observed in other studies (Haubrich, 1994). Based on the results of this simulation, payment
should be a function of both agents’ access to the company’s resources and his performance.
Otherwise, good monitoring, disregarding having adjudication processes and punishment,
cannot control cheating behaviour (this is assessed in Scenarios 1-3). Moreover, in creating
a closed collaborative society, some simple parameters, such as environmental circumstances
(mortality rate) impact a closed society’s sustainability such that neglecting them leads to so-
cial failure.
Furthermore, considering the wealth of society (the idea proposed by Adam Smith),
cheaters in societies with commenda contracts do the least harm. This is because cheat-
ing with high profits (e.g. stealing the director’s money) was unpopular in societies with
commenda contracts, while a popular form of cheating in a society without commenda con-
tracts involved manipulating of organisation’s profits by accepting gifts (i.e. soft bribes; see
proportion of cheaters in Figures 4.3e, 4.8e, 4.10e, and 4.12e versus Figures 4.3f, 4.8f, 4.10f,
and 4.12f, respectively). Accepting soft bribes changes the game into a non-zero-sum game
that leads to a social loss of profits (i.e. yields marginal profits for agents in comparison to
large losses for company); however, our results and historical evidence show this was popular
among agents.
As stated earlier, there are some limitations to our current work. This simulation ne-
glected the psychological effects of fairness (e.g. using adjudication processes) that are dis-
cussed in studies such as Thibaut et al. (1974). We also assumed that the profit of local
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trades conducted by agents is the same as that which is monopolised by the company. Re-
laxing this assumption may increase the cheating rates in society. Also, the results could
not simulate a higher societal skill of Julfans in comparison to the EIC agents. In the next
three chapters, we address the effects of apprenticeship programmes and the impact of the
fairness of institutions on agents’ behaviour. In particular, the next chapter studies the impact
of apprenticeship programmes and vocational schools on the success of society.
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5
Impact of apprenticeship programmes and
vocational schools on the success of
societies
5.1 Introduction
This chapter studies apprenticeship as an important tool of skill transfer throughout human
history. We extend our study of the two historical trading societies by analysing an additional
historical case, i.e. old Britain (1300s–1600s), along with two contemporary schemes of
apprenticeship (i.e. those of modern Britain and Germany), to learn the reasons for better
performance of some societies than others. This chapter identifies important characteristics
for apprenticeship programmes based on the patterns of the investigated societies.
To clarify the subject, we wish to briefly define apprenticeship. Apprenticeship refers to
a set of activities and technical training provided by a skilled practitioner in which inexperi-
enced participants learn a profession or art (Hamilton & Hamilton, 1993). Also, as already
stated in Section 3.2.5 of Chapter 3, this institution helps a society to turn people with the
Worker meta-role into people with the Skill meta-role. Skill transfer is a time-consuming task
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in which an unskilled individual develops skills under the supervision of professionals. The
incentives for apprenticeship are diverse: sustainable development (UNESCO-UNEVOC,
2006, p.9), fighting youth unemployment (Plug & Groot, 1998), and increasing productivity
(King, 2009), to name but a few. Also, the importance of apprenticeship is identified by
historians. For instance, Riello (2009) suggests that the Indian subcontinent lost its mar-
ket share in 50 years (i.e. from the 1760s to 1810s) due to the opportunities for Europeans
to gradually attain relevant trading skills, and he attributes this as an important reason for
British economic advancement in addition to the industrial revolution.
Nowadays the importance of apprenticeship programmes is emphasised in many coun-
tries. However, there are different frameworks for apprenticeship programmes, such as work-
based training and dual systems (i.e. a combination of schools and work-based training; see
Davy & Frankenberg, 2018). Despite the relative success of programmes in terms of the
number of skilled agents and increasing profitability, some apprenticeship programmes are
accepted as more efficient. Also, there are several studies on formalising apprenticeship
programmes (Allais, 2012; Palmer, 2009).
In this chapter, we employ agent-based simulation to improve our understanding of the
mechanics that made some apprenticeship programmes such as the Julfan and the German
more efficient. To achieve this general objective, we employ intuitive numbers based on
available shreds of evidence (e.g. discussions and economic studies), and we avoid employ-
ing numbers drawn from specific industries or societies. The reasons for such an approach
are as follows:
• We face different systems from geographical and historical points of view;
• Specific numbers for one industry are also influenced by locally specific factors such
as exports and imports of products, the mortality rate, and immigration or emigration
rates associated with that industry, and the time and society in which it is located.
Beyond historical societies, other studies conducted in Britain and Switzerland empha-
sise the importance of apprenticeship programmes in the modern context (Fuller & Unwin,
2003; Müehlemann et al., 2009). It has been noted that Germany has a successful appren-
ticeship programme where companies invest in training apprentices (Büchel, 2002; Franz &
Soskice, 1994). This programme has worked well enough so that it has limited the unem-
ployment rate for under 25-year olds to around 6.7 per cent, versus 17.3 per cent across the
EU (Jacobs, 2017). The performance of the German model convinced 18 countries to ask
for the German government to help to set up the same scheme, and German companies also
initiated their foreign apprenticeship projects (Jacobs, 2017).
In this chapter, we compare the utility of various apprenticeship societies that help trans-
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fer skills through generations. As stated in Chapters 2 and 4, Julfans had higher skills than
the EIC agents. Also, Chapter 4 indicated that this higher skills level cannot be attributed
to the Julfan’s contractual scheme. This chapter improves our knowledge about the reasons
for Julfan’s higher skill levels by investigating some important institutional characteristics
employed in various apprenticeship societies.
Note that this chapter addresses apprenticeship for two distinct types of trades with dif-
ferent incentives for training (i.e. artisans and manufactures/traders). Although Julfans were
known for their long-distance trading societies, they had artisans or worked with artisans
who produced items traded. Furthermore, we use manufacturers as a metaphor for traders
because of more contemporary studies on them.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 concisely reviews these
societies and identifies their differences. Section 5.3 describes the modelling approach used
to simulate these systems. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 present the results of the simulations for
manufacturers and artisans, respectively. Finally, Section 5.6 discusses the findings of this
chapter and provides future directions.
5.2 A review of five systems
In this section, we proceed towards modelling apprenticeship programmes. What follows
provides an overview of apprenticeship programmes in five different societies, namely Julfa,
Germany, old Britain, the EIC, and modern Britain. Then we compare these systems with
respect to six characteristics. These characteristics which are identified, based on the simi-
larity of patterns in historical and contemporary apprenticeship programmes and verified by
related studies, are listed as follows:
1. Trade types: The type of trade helps us to identify important characteristics of training
societies. We choose two trades based on the historical cases associated with relatively
simple tasks.1 These trades can be categorised into two types:
• Artisans: These are trades that can be done individually using body parts skill-
fully.
• Manufacturers: These are any trade (e.g. production systems or long-distance
trades) for which some skilled agents are hired to perform tasks for masters.
These skills concern handling complexities of systems and using machinery in-
stead of body parts.
1We believe that other trades (e.g. the service sectors) can be modelled using concepts of this simulation
by selecting relevant characteristics from two given trade types.
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2. Access hurdles: These hurdles take place in the form of asking for prepayments for
training (e.g. premiums) in this chapter we refer to them as prepayment.
3. Guilds and unions: These institutions have a restrictive influence on systems by lim-
iting the number of skilled agents by using different means (i.e. limiting the number of
apprentices or authorised skilled agents).
4. Trainer type: The types of trainers have some impact on the quality of the programme.
We address two types of trainers:
• Companies: The company trains an apprentice as a potential employee.
• Contractors: Independent contractors perceive the training apprentices as a
source of income.
5. Schools: Utilisation of schools (e.g. high schools) is a means of transferring knowl-
edge and academic skills (e.g. analysing).
6. Openness: Openness of the society is a characteristic that facilitates leaving the com-
munity in the middle of the programme to work in other communities with high de-
mand.
5.2.1 Societies’ background
In what follows, we describe the characteristics of the five societies, and how these societies
possess the characteristics mentioned above.
Old Britain: In the old British apprenticeship system (AD 1300s-1600s) guilds were in
effect that limited skilled agents from joining the workforce society and made apprentices
pay premium costs for training (Wallis, 2008). Also, bigger cities (e.g. London) hosted
recruits from smaller towns who frequently left the system once they had adequate skills to
work on their town.
Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa): Armenian merchants of New-Julfa were
originally from old Julfa in Armenia. They re-established a trader society in New-Julfa (near
Isfahan, Iran) after their forced displacement in the early 17th century. Due to their compli-
cated inheritance rules that created tight bonds within extended families (Herzig, 1991), they
formed a closed society that was run by strong social norms instead of formal rules. Based
on the historical data, these traders are known to have had a “merchant school” (Aslanian,
2007, p.171) around the 1680s. A more general apprenticeship system was active in Julfa
and Persia (old Iran) to transfer skills in society, wherein skilled agents employed the labour
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of apprentices and trained them instead of paying high wages. In Julfa, apprenticeship pro-
grammes took place informally by family members or relatives who hired or recommended
trained apprentices.
The EIC: During roughly the same period (AD 1500s-1800s), a parallel system was
active in Britain. The British contemporary counterpart of Julfa (i.e. the British East India
Company (EIC, AD 1500s-1800s)) had a totally different perspective about managing the
society. The EIC hired inexperienced apprentices, asked them to provide signed bonds, and
sent them for trading to India to be trained by fellow merchants on a voluntary basis. The
incentives of trainers for good training is questionable for reasons such as time spent on a
task without any provisioned profit (i.e. they trained for immediate income).
Modern Britain: In the contemporary era, Britain has used a different scheme for ap-
prenticeship programmes. A survey of this system around 2001 referred to the method as
a “Training Market” (Ryan & Unwin, 2001). During this time the government employed
contractors and a subsidy-based system to compensate the training costs incurred. For pay-
ing contractors, the government used a weighting system to rank and pay contractors based
on the skill requirement of the society, the trainer’s performance (i.e. how many apprentices
were trained and how successful they were in finding a job), and the difficulty-level of the
target skill.
Germany: The other contemporary apprenticeship system which is studied extensively
is the German dual apprenticeship system (Franz & Soskice, 1994). These programmes
combine teaching technical knowledge in public schools coupled with work-based training
provided by certified trainers (i.e. companies). In these programmes, the government invests
in providing public schools, and work-based training is provided by companies or individu-
als. Next, we state the characteristics of these systems in detail. In the following sections,
we describe the characteristics of the system mentioned at the beginning of the section.
5.2.2 Characteristics and institutions
This section provides an overview of the aforementioned societies with respect to the char-
acteristics stated earlier, namely trade type, access hurdles, workforce restriction (i.e. guilds
and unions), trainer type, schools, and the openness of society.
5.2.2.1 Trade type
First we divide systems into two sub-systems based on the trade, similar to the German ap-
prenticeship programme, by using distinct terms. In the contemporary German apprentice-
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ship programmes, two different terms “Handwerk” (meaning crafts) and “Industrie” (mean-
ing industry) are employed to distinguish different systems. We use ‘artisans’ and ‘manu-
facturers’ to separate these two systems. These trades have different requirements for skills,
and trainers have distinct incentives for training.
Artisan: An artisan, such as a wood-carver or a hairdresser, trains a potential competitor
but can employ trainee services during apprenticeship. For these reasons, in some societies,
artisans consider those services insufficient for compensating for the costs, and ask for some
payments from apprentices. In addition, some artisans use guilds as a means of restricting
trained agents from getting into the system to guarantee the stability of wages in the future.
These trades do not require complicated skills for analysis, computations, etc. that are pro-
vided by school-based training, and the artisans are the only ones who are eligible to train
others (i.e. contractors cannot replace the artisans).
Manufacturer: Alternatively, a trader’s or manufacturer’s trainee does not compete with
apprenticeship providers, unlike a trained artisan. For instance, setting up a factory or start-
ing long-distance trades require a large amount of capital when compared to a salon or to
buying tools and working at home. Therefore a trained apprentice is a potential employee
(not a competitor as in the case of an artisan). The fact that companies have future benefits in
training apprentices is a reason for companies to train agents without asking agents for pre-
payment. These benefits include negotiating for paying slightly less wages than community
norms, hiring the best-trained agents, and providing training in some specific skills required
for that particular company.
Furthermore, the companies do not have any incentives for limiting the number of trained
skilled agents; hence they do not need to have any guilds. However, there are some societies
that limit the number of trainees to benefit apprentices (e.g. avoiding a significant drop in
wages or losing incentives for participating in apprenticeship programmes), a phenomenon
we study later. Note that these trades require complex knowledge and skills that may require
school-based training. Furthermore, these skills can also be transferred by employing third-
party trainers (i.e. contractors).
Based on the aforementioned arguments, we assume that it is in the vested interest of
manufacturers to put in their best efforts to train apprentices that may potentially work for
them. This logic shows itself in efforts put forward to transfer all skills to the apprentices. On
the other hand, in the artisan training domain, the disinclination to train artisans is observed
by Chardin in Persia:
“There it is indeed that Knowledge must be stolen; for the Master thinking on the
Profit he may reap by his ’Prentice [sic], more than on teaching him his Trade,
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doth [sic] not trouble himself much with him, but employs him only in those
things that relate to his Profit.” (Chardin, 1720, Chapter XVII, p. 261)
To model these systems we divide our model system into the trade types, artisans and
manufacturers. Then we choose the most influential characteristics for each society, based
on the above-mentioned statements. These characteristics are as follows (Tables 5.1 and 5.2








– Openness of society.
Table 5.1: System specification based on different societies for manufacturers












School Yes No No Yes No
Openness of so-
ciety
No Yes Yes No No
∗In the EIC, employees trained other agents as a responsibility, so they did not have any provisioned
profits in good training and only faced costs of spending more time.




Old Britain The EIC Germany
Modern
Britain
Access hurdles No Yes Yes No Yes
Workforce
restrictions
No Yes Yes No Yes
Openness of so-
ciety
No Yes Yes No No
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5.2.2.2 Access hurdles (for artisans only)
Based on the historical evidence of some systems, we note that some societies had entry
conditions for apprentices by asking them for premiums to compensate for training costs and
as a bond to guarantee reliable behaviour on the part of apprentices.
However, Chardin’s (1720)’s travelogue shows no evidence of such requirements in Julfa
and more generally, in Persia (i.e. old Iran). Instead, trainers paid wages to the apprentices
based on their age and skill, and both parties could freely terminate the programme. An
example was a contract involving a family of three agents in Julfa, where agents were paid a
lesser extent than was the norm, i.e. it imposed some costs on the father who was the trainer
of his two sons.2 In contrast, in old Britain, some rules prohibited masters from paying
apprentices during some periods, and it was a norm to ask apprentices to compensate training
costs by paying a premium upfront (Wallis, 2008). This rule (i.e. asking for a premium)
could have been an effect of guild power in old Britain. The significant result of asking
for a premium was on limiting participants’ access to apprenticeship programmes from less-
prosperous individuals.
In the EIC, the masters at the headquarters asked employees for a bond signed by two
insurers and paid their employees a lower wage than labourers. Furthermore, like other com-
panies in Britain, they only fired agents for bad behaviour3 (Hejeebu, 2005). In more recent
instances (i.e. German apprenticeship programmes and modern apprenticeship programmes
in Britain), sometimes there is a payment for eligible apprentices, and there is no evidence
of asking for payments from young apprentices4 (Franz & Soskice, 1994; Ryan & Unwin,
2001). In this chapter, the effect of asking for a premium is abstractly considered in two
ways:
• Asking for prepayments in the form of a premium limits the number of participants
who can afford to pay the costs for an apprenticeship. Therefore only agents from
upper-class families can participate in programmes (the top three deciles).
• These payments are considered as imposed costs by agents in their decision-making
about the profitability of programmes.
2A father and his two sons entered into a commenda contract (wherein profits are shared between the agent
and the principal) and asked for 25% share of the profit (instead of 33%) and part of the profit went to the sons
(Herzig, 1991).
3They fired agents, not for bad performance, but because they suspected them of cheating. Moreover, the
agents had privileges such as private trades and tax exemption inside India, and some of the effects of these
items were studied in Chapter 4.
4In contemporary British apprenticeship programmes, there is an age restriction for subsidising partici-
pants.
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5.2.2.3 Workforce restriction (for artisans only)
Here we investigate the impact of two general types of labour market intermediation, namely
craft guilds and unions. The craft guilds are associations formed by artisans to follow and
secure their mutual benefits (Epstein, 1998; Lis & Soly, 2019). The unions are formed by
employees to regulate employers’ behaviour (Autor, 2008). These two associations have
several impacts on the labour market and some of them are stated here.
One of the prominent effects of guilds is restricting skilled people from practising their
abilities by having exclusive legal privileges for performing that specific action (Ogilvie,
2014). For instance, in old Britain, this power over the market was a way to restrict trained
people from being “freemen” and had adverse effects on trainees finishing apprenticeships
(Wallis, 2008).5 However, based on Chardin’s observations, no evidence of guilds is avail-
able for most skills in Iran (including Julfa):
“Whoever is about to set up a Shop in any Trade, goes to the Head of the Trade,
gives his Name and Place of Abode to be set down in the Register, and pays
some small Fee for it. The Head never enquires of what Country the Tradesman
is, nor who was his Master, nor whether he understands his Trade. The Trades
likewise have no Restrictions, to hinder one from incroaching [sic] upon another.
A Tinker makes Silver Basons [sic], if they are bespoke; every one undertakes
what he pleases, and they never Sue one another upon that account.” (Chardin,
1720, Chapter XVII, p. 260)
Due to the liberalisation of the workforce market in Germany, guilds no longer exist.
However, in Britain, the effect of guilds is still present in forms of either guilds themselves
or livery companies,6 especially in the form of creating a lot of unnecessary bureaucracy or
difficult exams for skilled people before letting them into the market.
Unions are a means of introducing another kind of restriction in workforce societies.
Some unions attempt to regulate wages in a competitive labour market wherein agents are
employees of other companies (e.g. in a manufacturer’s society)7. For instance, Johnston
5Epstein (1998) suggested that the craft guilds sustained skilled labours by providing apprenticeship; how-
ever, historical evidence indicates that they sometimes had a negative impact (Wallis, 2008).
6For instance, see Gwyther (1992) for a report on the power of livery companies in London and Thomas et
al. (2013) for a study about guilds in the UK. An example of a guild’s website is https://www.wsd.org
.uk.
7Note that “[u]nions have historically solved collective action problems among atomistic workers by or-
ganizing collective bargaining, sanctioning employers for misconduct, and regulating employers’ hiring and
dismissal policies” (Autor, 2008).
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and Hancké (2009) stated how unionised societies that were active under the European mon-
etary union, could negotiate for excessive wage increases when there was a loss of employ-
ment. Therefore the difference between unions and guilds was inherited from their incen-
tives. Guilds are established in favour of trade profitability, while unions defend the profits
of employees at some costs for trades. Therefore a guild’s policy is to control the number
of skilled agents who can work in the system (i.e. some skilled agents are not permitted to
work). However, unions attempt to protect and improve their members interests by means
such as stabilising wages. This attempt has consequences such as controlling the number of
unemployed agents by regulating the number of apprentices.
5.2.2.4 Trainer type (for manufacturers only)
Based on the analysis of the literature on these systems, we find that some systems had certain
types of trainers in apprenticeship programmes (contractors or potential employers). In Julfa,
masters (the ones who were the primary owners of the trade) were the ones who trained and
monitored the performance of agents. Their simultaneous training and evaluation helped
them to identify talented and trustworthy apprentices, especially if masters wanted to hire
them. On the other hand, in old Britain, once apprenticeship programmes began, the training
could be terminated if apprentices were untrustworthy.
In Germany, the nature of apprenticeship programmes is more complicated. Apprentices
learn technical knowledge (henceforth academic skills) in public schools (henceforth educa-
tion/school) and they are assessed there. At the same time, there is also work-based training
that takes place by certified companies or craftsmen. After finishing the process, apprentices
gain a qualification. The qualification is strongly controlled for an agent to be eligible to
practise a profession. In Germany, some freedom in the programme design lets companies
give training in some specific skills needed for employees to work in these companies, along
with more general skills. This makes participation in such programmes more attractive for
both large and small companies (Franz & Soskice, 1994). Finally, in the modern British
programmes, a cost-efficient scheme was designed for training. They subsidised technical
trainers, who mostly employed contractors, in addition to some public trainers, based on a
scoring scheme that consists of the following:
• the skill requirement,
• the complexity of the skill training,
• the number of trainees combined in a ratio with the ones who find a job.
Moreover, work-based training took place in a company willing to provide a work envi-
ronment for trainers (mostly small companies). This method created some issues such as
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tendencies to sacrifice quality of teaching for quantity (since they are paid for quantity) and
trainers were inclined towards simpler skills that are easy to teach. In this work, we dis-
tinguish between training provided by contractors (the ones involved in the modern British
programme) and non-contractors (i.e. companies as future potential employers). It should
be noted that the contemporary British apprenticeship system officially uses contractors for
training apprentices. Furthermore, in the EIC the training was done by more experienced
agents at the destination. The method employed in the EIC worked as in modern Britain,
because there was no motivation for trainers to train their apprentices well.
5.2.2.5 Schools (for manufacturers only)
An important attribute of systems is associated with their emphasis on the use of schools
(e.g. high school and colleges) for academic skills and training purposes. Schools’ impact on
system performance is twofold. On the one hand, they are a source of declarative knowledge
(i.e. facts, information, and descriptive knowledge) transfer. This knowledge can be obtained
by studying in schools much more easily than in work-based situations. The importance of
knowledge is observed in some historical cases, as well as modern instances. For example,
Julfans not only provided a pamphlet containing trade information (e.g.routes and conversion
of units), but also had a specialised school for training recruits (see Chapter 2).
In the literature, there are arguments about the impact of declarative knowledge on the
improvement of learning skills. For instance, Ahlum-Heath and Di Vesta (1986) investigated
the impacts of “know-what” (i.e. knowledge) on gaining skills associated with solving com-
plex problems by asking some participants to verbalise why they perform certain actions.
Their observations suggest that controlled verbalisation accelerates the gaining of problem-
solving skills. Some studies suggest that improvements in declarative tactical knowledge
facilitate skills transfer8 (Anderson, 1982; Williams & Davids, 1995).
In addition, a school attendee obtains some skills through education (academic skills).
For instance, in Julfa a trader should have basic skills in arithmetic and formal writing be-
fore he was considered for employment (Aslanian, 2007). In modern contexts, these skills
are essentially more extensive. One of the reasons schools are more efficient in transfer-
ring academic skills is the time and effort invested by experts to design an appropriate and
comprehensive educational system. Therefore in designing courses students’ and the indus-
try’s diverse capabilities and requirements are considered, and the training is concentrated
on developing skills that could be transferred to other contexts.
8Declarative tactical knowledge is a combination of information about rules, tasks, objectives of the game,
etc. which is overall knowing what to do (Américo et al., 2017).
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The importance of different degrees of the aforementioned skills on performance in vari-
ous fields are stated in Stasz and Brewer (1999, Chapter 3, pp. 15-36). They suggest compa-
nies that face more frequent changes in their production processes need agents with technical
skills obtained in schools. Such issues, along with limited availability of time and resources
at hand in a work-based training environment, call for an independent structure to form and
enhance academic skills. This point was neglected in old Britain, the EIC, and the appren-
ticeship system employed in Britain in 2001, i.e. the schools were not a compulsory part of
programmes.
5.2.2.6 Openness versus closedness (for artisans and manufacturers)
Another important attribute of apprenticeship systems concerns the ratio of apprentices that
leave the system to work in other communities. This attribute is affected by three character-
istics:
• Probability of finding a job with better payments in other places which motivates some
agents to leave programmes sooner to work in other communities;
• Reputation for having high skills so that agents can work in other places with higher
payments;
• Reputation of programmes that attracts apprentices from other communities.
Henceforth, we call societies providing such opportunities as open for training. These
societies train agents that may leave the community to work elsewhere. Some cities in old
Britain were open for training (e.g. London (Wallis, 2008)), but Julfa was a totally closed
system, where apprentices were only employed within their society. Due to the availability
of apprenticeship programmes in Germany and Britain (in most cities) and its availability to
their own residents, they are considered to be closed (i.e. the trained apprentices stay in the
same community for some years).
However, another definition of openness is the availability of agents from other com-
munities (e.g. countries) to work for lower wages than the norm in the community under
study (i.e. openness for working). Openness for working is considered as a scenario in our
modelling. To summarise, when a society trains apprentices who may leave, it is open for
training. Furthermore, when companies of a society have the opportunity to find trained
agents from other communities, it is open for work. Henceforth, by openness we mean that
the system is open for training (unless stated otherwise).
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show selected characteristics based on the trade type and specifications
of various societies considered in this work. Note that the availability of these characteristics
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is considered to be neither good or bad, but we consider them with respect to their impact on
the decisions made by trainers and apprentices.
Summarising the characteristics associated with the systems, first, we have divided ap-
prenticeship programmes based on the trade type (i.e. artisans versus manufacturers) for a
better understanding of the societies’ characteristics. Then the openness of the society has
been considered for both trade types. For complicated industries such as manufacturers,
we have addressed the impact of two other characteristics: the use of schools in imparting
knowledge and academic skills and, trainer type that can be a trainer contractor or a company
that trains potential employees. For apprenticeship programmes in an artisan trade, we have
investigated the impact of an access hurdles (i.e. asking for prepayment such as a premium)
and the restrictive influence of guilds by limiting the number of authorised skilled agents.
5.3 Simulation model of two types of traders
Following the description of apprenticeship characteristics, in this section, we present an
integrated model for investigating the impact of the six characteristics of the aforementioned
societies on their success in training apprentices. This model is a general representation
of an apprenticeship system that is built, based on numbers inspired by available evidence,
discussions, or empirical figures (e.g. the Pareto principal). In this simulation, we consider
two types of agents (i.e. trainers and apprentices) and two types of trades (i.e. manufacturers
and artisans). Apprentices are agents who participate in the programme to attain skills, while
trainers are agents who participate for diverse motivations.
The motivations of trainers to participate in the programme are based on the trade and
their type. In a manufacturing trade where apprentices are potential employees, the com-
pany (i.e. potential employer) trains for future profits, earned by the skills of trained agents.
However, in the same trade, the contractors train an apprentice for income from the train-
ing. Therefore the former (i.e. company) has a motivation for good training, but a contractor
wants to reduce the costs of training by modifying the quality of training. On the other
hand, artisans train the agents for their income during the programme and sometimes based
on community pressure. Before continuing with the model description, let us state some
assumptions we made for representatives of the different apprenticeship systems.
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5.3.1 Model assumptions
There are some assumptions in this model that should be clarified before further descriptions
of simulation. These assumptions include system characteristics that impact the expected
profits of trainers and apprentices. Therefore we cover the following:
• parameters that are considered in connection with the calculation of expected profits;
• the importance of schools and their impact on different manufacturing companies;
• the attainability of work-based and academic skills that represent separate aptitudes
which are independent of each other;
• utility functions employed in this chapter;
• reasons for changes in wages.
In this model, both apprentices and trainers calculate their expected profits over a finite hori-
zon by taking into account a discount factor (α) for anticipated income. A finite horizon
reflects the myopic decision-making of agents caused by workforce turnover observed in
countries such as Germany (Franz & Soskice, 1994). For manufacturers, as formerly dis-
cussed, we consider two skills to be obtained (i.e. school-based and work-based skills) that
are essential for a good performance for employees in companies. To model the effects of
skills on the outcome of companies, we use the idea of Franz and Soskice (1994) in a way
that would be applicable for a discrete scenario. The output of a skilled worker (y) is given
by:
y = f(ed, swb), (5.1)
wherein ed and swb are skills obtained in school-based and work-based training, respectively.
In our work, we also use Howard Gardner’s Multiple Intelligence (MI) theory (Howard,
2011) as a framework for the two skills stated above. Gardner argues that IQ is an insuffi-
cient measurement of intelligence of an individual.9 He proposes the idea of MI that splits
the intelligence into eight or nine categories (see Howard, 2011, p. xv). He stated that indi-
viduals may be strong in certain types of intelligence and be weak in others. In this chapter,
differentiation among Logical-Mathematical, Bodily-Kinesthetic, and Linguistic intelligence
emphasises the separation of agents’ ability to acquire different aspects of skills in school-
based and work-based training.
We use the above-mentioned idea by assuming that attainability for work-based skills
and school-based skills is different per individual. Some studies suggest that motivation
9Howard (2011, p. 19) argues “intelligence tests rarely assess skill in assimilating new information or
in solving new problems. This bias toward “crystallized” rather than “fluid” knowledge can have astounding
consequences”.
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(henceforth, passion) and achievements are positively correlated (Subotnik et al., 2011). For
instance, Kusurkar et al. (2013) indicated positive correlations among autonomous motiva-
tion (i.e. motivation from within the student), study strategy, and average grades. In our
model, the effect is twofold:
• more passionate agents have a higher chance of enrolling in an apprenticeship (i.e. they
are persistent in finding a trainer);
• passion causes the apprentice to practise more, and hence, gain skills faster than non-
persistent ones.
Some evidence from the German apprenticeship system in the 1980s suggests that some sec-
tors faced deficiencies in the availability of apprenticeship vacancies (Franz & Soskice, 1994,
see Table 2).10 These deficiencies show the importance of being persistent and passionate
(e.g. accept to wait for a while) to get into an apprenticeship system.
To model these systems, we consider the following characteristics: attainability, moti-
vation, training policy, and the trainer’s ability to transfer skills (investigated further when
simulation parameters are described). We model these characteristics from 0 to 1, where 0
represents not having the attribute and 1 represents full possession of this attribute.
In our model, the degree of acquired work-based skills falls into three categories that
are denoted by discrete numbers (these parameters represent weights for Swb in Equation
5.1). These discrete numbers reflect classifications of skilled agents, based on the predefined
thresholds (e.g. shopfitter and cabinet maker) as follows:
• Excellent (E) which is denoted by a value of 2, wherein the acquired work-based skill
is more than or equal to 0.75. These agents are the ones whose skill acquisitions are in
the upper half of the required skill range (i.e. from 0.75 to 1),
• Adequate (AD) which is denoted by a value of 1, wherein the acquired work-based
skill is more than or equal to 0.5 but less than 0.75. These are the agents whose skill
acquisitions are in the lower half of the required skill range,
• Inadequate which is denoted by a value of 0, wherein the acquired work-based skill is
less than 0.5.
For academic skills, we use two categories by employing Boolean numbers. This classifi-
cation again reflects the scenarios, such as having or not a high-school diploma and is as
follows:
10Note that being passionate can also be reflected in choices among different programmes in real-world
situations, i.e. agents choose the programmes that are more interesting for them. However, a low birth rate in
societies with an ever-growing demand for skilled workforce can harm the overall performance of the society.
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• Academic (A) which is denoted by a value of 1, wherein the apprentice’s acquired
academic skill is more than or equal to 0.5. This skill is important to analyse the
complexities of the system and to adapt to the associated complexities.
• non-academic (N) which is denoted by a value of 0, wherein the apprentice’s acquired
academic skill is less than 0.5. Lacking this skill is not costly for small companies that
have routine procedures.
Overall, we have six combinations of academic and work-based skills such that two of them
have no benefits for employers. Those two are agent types with inadequate work-based
skills (irrespective of whether or not they have adequate academic skills). In the model, we
consider two kinds of companies for manufacturers, namely large and small:
• large companies/traders: These are the leaders in the manufacturing/trading area (e.g. elec-
trical technicians for maintenance sectors in a car manufacturing company such as
BMW or General Motors and large trading families in Julfa). They have complicated
production systems or trade in valuable items, and their employees need some level of
education to understand and handle those complexities (see Section 2.2.4).
• Small companies/traders: These are companies, such as household wiring and small
shops which are engaged with less complicated technologies and invest less in infras-
tructure and tools or do trades which are not engaged in luxurious and international
trades that need complex computations (e.g. a lot of conversion to compare prices in
different countries).
To compute the total amount of income generated in a society by employing apprentices
trained by a system, we model certain utility functions. What follows are utility functions to
abstractly model income generated by a manufacturing system that hires apprentices (large
and small companies). Items produced by large companies have an income function which
is given by:
UManufacturers(large) = (aMB × swb) + (bMB × swb × ed) (5.2)
where ed represents academic skills and can be 0 or 1. Values for ed which are 0 or 1
indicate not having or having academic skills, respectively. Furthermore, swb can have one
of the values 0, 1, 2 for inadequate, adequate, and excellent work-based skills, respectively.
There are two parts to the right side of the equation. The first part shows the role of a work-
based skill in developing a product. The second part shows how academic skills, combined
with work-based skills, can improve the value of the item manufactured in a company or
decrease the wastage produced by agents. As will be described in the simulation parameters
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section (see Table 5.3), the higher ratio of bMB to aMB emphasises the value of school-based
skills for large manufacturing companies. This shows the importance of investments made
by these companies to use complicated machinery that can only be utilised by employing
educated and skilled agents, and the lack of academic skills that increases wastage of items
and hence, reduces the company’s productivity.
Now we describe the utility functions for small companies. The small-company utility
function in the manufacturing section is defined as:
UManufacturers(Small) = (aMS×swb)+(bMS×ed×Boolean(swb))+(cMS×Boolean(swb))
(5.3)
where Boolean(swb) presents the binary function and is 0 for inadequate work-based skills
and 1 for adequate or excellent work-based skills. There are three parts to the right-hand side
of this equation. The first part of this equation shows that having more work-based skills
(swb) improves item values to a limited extent (aMS). For small companies with limitations
such as having simple machinery, using low or medium quality raw materials, or having
limited capital to be engaged in luxury trades, the improvement of the income for possessing
more skilled agents (i.e. aMS) is small. The second part shows that the combination of
academic and work-based skills can offer a certain value in these companies that for the
same reasons as before are also small. The third part (cMS × Boolean(swb)) shows that
finding an agent who can work with simple machinery can contribute to some profit margins
(cMS shows this coefficient). Note that for small companies, due to the simplicity of the
manufacturing process, this part should have a significant share in profit margins.
As stated earlier, artisans’ academic educations do not influence the quality of the final
product directly. This assumption is a direct result of the fact that the focus of such skills
is on how one can utilise his body parts (e.g. hands) skilfully. Therefore an artisan does not
need academic skills, and the utility functions are defined as:
UArtisans(large) = (aAB × swb), (5.4)
for large companies, and:
UArtisans(Small) = (aAS × swb) + (bAS ×Boolean(swb)) (5.5)
for small companies. In these equations, swb is 0, 1, 2 for inadequate, adequate, and excellent
work-based skills, respectively. Moreover, Boolean(swb) is 0 for inadequate work-based
skills and 1 for adequate or excellent work-based skills. The utility function for large com-
panies shows the impact of a high degree of skills on the quality of final products when they
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have a complicated nature (e.g. tapestries). In contrast, high skills cannot improve the qual-
ity of less complicated items (e.g. dyed cotton) significantly. Note that as stated earlier, for
artisans, the size of the company does not reflect the market share, but it indicates the im-
portance of investments (e.g. purchasing high quality raw materials) on their future income.
Therefore we have a higher number of small companies that produce ordinary items and a
small number of large companies that produce luxurious items.
Another assumption of this model is related to wages and factors that influence them. One
of the main assumptions stated in the field of labour economics concerns the correlations
between demand and supply in the market (Borjas, 1999). These statements suggest that
there is a correlation between labour supply, demand, and wages, such that an excessive
supply of the labour force initiates a drop in wages and vice versa, and there is a tendency
for the labour market to reach an equilibrium in the long run (see Section 3.3.2.1 for market
equilibrium). On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence for stickiness of wages that
suggests that wages are not adjusted quickly based on labour market behaviour for various
reasons (see Blinder & Choi, 1990; Kahn, 1997). This issue (i.e. stickiness of wages) and
its influence is addressed in our model by considering a threshold (stickiness threshold) for
excess supply and demand below which there is no effect on the wages.
5.3.2 Algorithms
The simulation model is split into three executive procedures. The first procedure is executed
with the societal level set-up, including the creation of an appropriate society as artisans or a
manufacturing society. The second procedure covers the decision-making of trainer agents.
The third algorithm describes the procedure of individual apprentices. In each run, these
procedures are executed in sequence. Note that all loops run once per iteration.
Algorithm 5.1 presents the steps of the societal level of the simulation. We assume that
in each iteration of the simulation (which is one year), 1000 new agents are introduced into
the apprentice system with random characteristics, and the ones who do not find a trainer
leave the society at once (line 1).
Then we divide the system based on the trade type. If the trade deals with artisans, a
trainer can accept a new apprentice once the recruited agent’s training has been completed
(i.e. once every three years). The number of years reflects apprenticeship programmes dura-
tion in modern and some historical contexts.11 In each iteration, a fraction (R%) of skilled
11In the German and British instances, programmes duration is three years. In the EIC, after five years, the
agents were promoted to factors (i.e. merchants). Note that in the EIC case, apprenticeship programmes were
not full-time because the agents already had some tasks to do.
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Algorithm 5.1: Societal level set-up
/* AP and Waited will be used in the Apprentice’s algorithm. */
1 Create 1000 new agents with random motivation, attainability, and academic skill per run (AP and
Waited← 0)
/* R indicates the demand for new artisans by community members. P-, is a
general indicator of probability. For instance, P-Excess-Supply
indicates probability of excess supply. Wi stands for wage associated
with skill i. Stickiness threshold indicates the impact of stickiness
of wages; */
2 if Artisan then
3 Demandi ← R% of number of artisans possessing skill i
4 if Guild then
5 P-Excess-Supply← 0
6 else
/* Wages are between their minimum and maximum levels. Also, they
are more than wages for lower skill levels. */
7 Update P-Excess-Supply
8 if SupplyExcellent ≥ DemandExcellent + StickinessThresholdshold then
WExcellent ← max{WExcellent − 1,WmaxAdequate + 1}
9 if SupplyAdequate ≥ DemandAdequate + StickinessThresholdshold then
WAdequate ← max{WAdequate − 1,WmaxAdequate}
10 end
11 if Demandi ≥ Supplyi + StickinessThresholdshold then
Wi ← min{Wi + 1,Wmaxi }, i ∈ {Adequate, Excellent}
12 Update probability of finding job for each skill
/* The probability is 1, if there is a deficiency in the labour market
for a skill. If there is a surplus supply of skills, the
probability is calculated by dividing supply by demand of the
company for that skill. Also, agents use a weighting factor for
combining historical data with current information. */
13 else
/* The manufacturers are addressed here. */
14 Demand for skilled agents← number of companies that did not participate in training
apprentices and find it profitable to search from the workforce market.
15 Update probability of staying, finding job for each skill, and the number of agents hired based on
training
16 if Demandi ≥ Supplyi + StickinessThresholdshold then Wi ← min{Wi + 1,Wmaxi },
∀skill
17 if Supplyi ≥ Demandi + StickinessThresholdshold then Wi ← max{Wi − 1,Wmaxi−1 + 1}
18 end
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/* Nij and V alueij indicate the number and value of items produced by
companies with size i (i.e. large or small) that possess agents with
skill j (we use associated cell number, e.g. the excellent and academic
skill cell number is 5), respectively. */
20 Update overall profit (GDI) of the society based on demand, supply, and value of products that are




∀j Nij × V alueij
agents are required to replace deceased or retired individuals (lines 2-3).
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the guild prevents an excess supply of skilled agents
(lines 4-5). If there is no guild and the surplus supply of skilled agents exceeds its supply in
addition to the stickiness threshold, the wages for that particular skill decrease by 1 (lines 6-
10). In contrast, if the demand for a skill exceeds its supply and the stickiness threshold, the
wages increase by 1 (lines 11). Finally, the probability of finding a job will be updated in the
society, based on the number of unemployed agents, demand for each skill, and weighting
information (line 12).
On the other hand, when the system deals with manufacturers (i.e. an apprentice is trained
to be potentially hired by the company), the demand and procedures for skilled agents are
relatively different (line 14). In a society where contractors train agents, demand represents
the number of companies that find it more profitable to wait and hire employees from the
existing apprenticeship society where the employees have already acquired skills, rather than
hiring just academically educated agents and training them during work (line 15).
Afterwards, wages associated with skill i (wi) are updated, based on the excess supply or
demand, and we assume only large numbers of supply or demand can increase or decrease the
wages in society (i.e. deviations of around 30% of potential demand) (lines 16-17). Finally,
the outcome of the whole apprenticeship programme is decided, based on the degree of skill
possessed by hired apprentices (i.e. supply) and the size of the company that hired them
(i.e. demand by small or large companies) and their impact on the value of produced items.
These two parameters (i.e. skill of apprentices and type of companies) are utilised to calculate
the value of produced items by these skilled agents in the form of the Gross Domestic Income
as presented in Table 5.3 (i.e. GDI (line 20 )).
Algorithm 5.2 represents the trainers’ decision-making. Note that as mentioned before,
artisans and manufacturers societies have different incentives for training; hence, they are ad-
dressed separately in this algorithm. If some premium is paid by apprentices, it will be taken
into account (lines 1). Then the trainers are divided, based on the nature of the skill (i.e. arti-
sans (lines 2-7) or manufacturers (lines 8-16)). For artisans, the decision to participate in an
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Algorithm 5.2: Trainer’s algorithm
/* Maximise your profit based on your attribute */
1 if Apprentice pays Premium then Premium = paid premium else Premium = 0
/* α is a discount factor. y indicates years, for employers/trainees it is
6 and for artisans/contractors it is 3 (i.e. their training horizon).
*/
/* g and b indicate good and bad quality of training, respectively. */
/* 'labour'is the value of simple tasks performed by apprentices. */
2 if Artisan then
3 ExpectedProfitOfGoodTraining =∑3
y=1(labour× αy)− (P-Excess-Supplyg × (lost-profit(Excess-Supply)))
4 ExpectedProfitOfBadTraining =∑3
y=1(labour× αy)− (P-Excess-Supplyb × (lost-profit(Excess-Supply)))
5 ExpectedProfitOfTraining =
premium + max{ProfitOfBadTraining,ProfitOfGoodTraining}
6 ExpectedProfitOfNotTraining = 0
7 else
/* The manufacturers are addressed here. */
8 if Apprentice is a Potential Employee then
/* PStay indicates probability of staying at the company and f(ed, swb)
indicates functions associated with academic and school-based
skills (ed) and work-based (Swb), e.g. Probability (Finding(s1, s2))
is the probability of finding an educated agent with excellent
work-based skills. */
/* wi indicates wages for skill i, wherein i indicates different
skills (e.g. excellent work-based and academic skills) */
9 Profit of Training← PStay ×
∑6
y←1(profit(f(ed, swb))(y)× αy − costs of training
10 profit of Not Training← max {}
11 else
/* Contractor */
/* psi and Costi (i ∈ {g, b}) indicate probability of finding a job and
the costs of good or bad quality of training, respectively. */
12 ExpectedProfitOfGoodTraining← psg × Subsidy +
∑6
y←1(Subsidy × αy)− Costg
13 ExpectedprofitOfBadTraining← psb × Subsidy +
∑6





18 if (ExpectedProfitOfTraining) > (ExpectedProfitOfNotTraining) then




21 Do not train
22 end
/* Find best apprentices */
23 if Trainer = company then
24 if the trainer trained an apprentice and at least one apprentice remains then
25 Hire the best apprentice
26 else
27 if already hired an Educated Agent then do not hire, or else hire one agent from waiting
pool of apprentices that optimises trainer utility
28 end
29 end
apprenticeship is based on three factors, namely:
• income from labour work during the apprenticeship programme;
• costs incurred by wages decrease due to the excess supply in the workforce market;
• premiums paid by apprentices.
Based on these factors, an artisan calculates the expected income of good training, bad train-
ing, and abstaining from training (lines 3-6). On the other hand, manufacturers have a differ-
ent kind of motivation for training apprentices. They first decide what actions to take (i.e. do
not train or provide good or bad training). We divide trainers into two subsets, namely poten-
tial employers and contractors. Potential employers are trainers who hire from their trained
pool, while contractors provide just the training (i.e. they do not hire). Quality of training
has a direct impact on potential employers’ future income, so they make decisions based on:
• the probability of finding a skilled person from already trained agents (Probability
(Finding Skill));
• the costs of hiring educated agents and then training them during work;
• the profits of providing good training to an agent.
The profit of good training is decided, based on the probability of an apprentice staying until
the end of apprenticeship programmes (lines 8-10). Furthermore, contractors only consider
incomes from subsidies in two ways: a) a subsidy paid, based on the number of apprentices
trained and b) a subsidy paid based on the trained agents who found a job. Contractors can
decrease costs by slightly reducing the quality of training (e.g. hiring low-quality tutors)
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(lines 12-15). Then based on their calculated profits, trainers decide how to train (lines 18-
21). Finally, companies who trained agents will hire the best one (if anyone is left) or they
hire academically-educated agents to train them during work (lines 23-29).
Algorithm 5.3 provides an overview of how agents decide about their attendance in an
apprentice programme. First, agents who can afford the programme will update their costs; if
there is no premium, then everyone can afford to participate (lines 1-4). Then agents check to
see if it is profitable to attend an apprenticeship programme or if it is better to start working
in the labour market directly as unskilled labourers (line 5). The rest of the algorithm is
about apprentices who attend the programme. Note that if the number of apprentices who
find attending the programme profitable exceeds the maximum capacity, the apprenticeship
system chooses the ones who are more passionate (i.e. motivated) with a higher chance (line
6).
Then the system checks to find eligible agents (i.e. agents who decided to continue with
the programme and who have not completed their apprenticeship period (AP), and then up-
dates their APs (lines 7-8). The eligible agents first increase their apprenticeship experience
and set their speed of learning(s) to 1 (line 9). Then the speed of transferring skills to an
agent is updated based on the company’s size, its training policy, and the apprentice’s pas-
sion, and whether or not attending school is compulsory (lines 10-12). An example of such
a procedure for a contractor who has a policy of ‘good’ training in a society without com-
pulsory schools for a passionate apprentice (who did not attend school this year) with a
work-based attainability of x can be calculated as s = (ssmall × sNoKnowledge × spassion ×
work-BasedAttainability)/3 = (0.85× 0.9× 1× x)/3 = 0.255× x (for employed factors
see Table 5.3).
Furthermore, the availability of schools introduces the possibility of having more edu-
cated agents — unavailability of school reduces this opportunity to agents who pursued the
education voluntarily (with a totally random chance — 50% — per run) (lines 13-19). When
the society is open, each agent may leave the system with a probability of 10%12 (line 20).
Moreover, an apprentice may find it more profitable to leave the apprenticeship due to the
reductions in demand for skilled labour (lines 21), and with a probability of 20%, 50%, or
80% (which is varied in the experiments) the agent checks to see if it is more profitable to
leave sooner and use their current skill in their employment (lines 22).
It is essential to emphasise that agents estimate their provisioned skills optimistically
and assume they can attain skills faster than before (10% faster).13 Finally, at the end of
12Wallis (2008, see p. 840) provided such level of decline in perusing programme for old Britain.
13For instance, Grossman and Owens (2012) indicates that participants felt they are unlucky and their score
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their training, apprentices search for a job and at most wait for two years (i.e. at most while
should be higher by about 10%.
Algorithm 5.3: Apprentice’s algorithm
/* Note that based on the societal level set-up AP and Waited have an
initial value of 0 for new agents. */
1 if did not attend apprenticeship then
/* check affordability, no premium means no hurdle */
2 if Premium should be paid then if family class = High then affordable?← yes &
prem← PaidPremium
3 else affordable?← yes & prem← 0
4 end
/* Agents search for a place and decide whether to attend or not. */
/* WSkill and WEstimatedSkill denotes wage for acquired and estimated work-based
and school-based skills. */









6 if Number of agents with (Profitable = yes) > capacity then Choose appropriate number of agents
with higher scores.
/* The system associates scores to each agent. These scores are generated
based on their passion. Then it chooses agents with higher scores. */
/* Henceforth, only apprenticeship attendees are considered. */
7 if “Apprenticeship period” (AP) ≤ 3 & not an ‘unsuccessful apprentice” then
8 AP ← AP + 1
/* Training speed (s) may decrease (e.g. for trainer's policy). */
/* 'work-based'and 'academic'skills increase based on attainability and
trainer’s skill and policy. */
9 s← 1
10 if Trainer 6= LargeCompany then s← s× 0.85
11 if Trainer’sPolicy 6= GoodTraining then s← s× 0.9
12 if Passion ≤ 0.5 then s← s× 0.9
13 if School then
14 Work-BasedSkill← ((Work-BasedAttainability/3)× s)+ Work-BasedSkill
15 AcademicSkill← ((AcademicAttainability/3)× s)+ AcademicSkill
16 else
/* #random 1 means generating random float in (0, 1) interval. */
17 Work-BasedSkill← ((Work-BasedAttainability/3)× 0.9× s)+ Work-BasedSkill




20 if Open & #random 1 ≤ 0.1 then leave
21 if (
∑6




/* c is defined as percentage who check profitability of leaving the
programme (20%, 50%, or 80%) */
22 if #random 1 < C &
(
∑6
y←1(pFindingJob ×WSkill)× αy) <
∑6
y←3+AP (pFindingJob ×WEstimatedSkill)× αy)
then Search for job
23 else
24 if (Do not have a job & successful apprentice) or search for job then
25 Compete to find a job to fulfill demands based on skill (i.e. join the waiting pool)
26 if #random 1 < 0.5× Waited then Leave else Waited←Waited + 1
27 end
28 end
0.5×waited < 1)14 and when they cannot find any jobs, they leave the waiting list to pursue
other labourer jobs afterwards (lines 24-28).
5.3.3 Simulation parameters
In this section, we state the important parameters used (see Table 5.3) in this simulation
and the reasons for choosing the values presented. Note that for both apprenticeship trades
(i.e. artisans and manufacturers) we used 300 iterations as a representative for the most dura-
tion that we knew lasted in different societies (old Britain’s apprenticeship programmes was
active between 1500 to 1800).
The number of potential apprentices: The simulation creates 1000 new agents per
iteration. This number shows the birth rate in a society that introduces new persons who
potentially can attend the apprenticeship programme.
Attainability: In our simulation model, we assume that the degree to which agents can
acquire different types of skills (i.e. work-based and school-based) are not similar and we
call those degrees attainabilities. Apprentices should have a minimum attainability level for
a work-based skill to be qualified to enrol in an apprenticeship programme. Therefore we as-
sume that agents have the ability to acquire the minimum required work-based skills if they
14Worthen (2002) stated that the Workforce Development committee recommended that enrolling every
two years for plumbers’ apprenticeship programme is inefficient because “[high school graduates] won’t wait
around 2 years.”
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Table 5.3: The simulation parameters
No. Name Comment Distribution\parameter Values





For academic (0, 1)
3 Passion To learn the skill Uniform (0, 1)




E aAB = 10
aAS = 1.5, bAS = 10
20 : 13





aMB = 5, bMB = 10






6 Speed of training
Large : Small companies
Constant
1 : 0.85
Good : Bad training 1 : 0.9
School : No school 1 : 0.9




Not passionate (< 0.5) 0.9
8 Academic skills
School Constant 1
No school Probability per run 0.5
9 Initial wages (artisans)∗
E Adapted, based 11
AD on situation 7
10 Initial wages (manufacturers)∗
A E 10
A AD Adapted, based 8







not impact the wages
12 Discount factor (α) All agents Normal (µ, σ) (0.9, 0.033)
13
Years
(considered for calculating profit)
Constant - 6
14 Maximum waiting time (years) To search for jobs Constant 2





∗ Note that A and N indicates having and not having academic skills, respectively. Also, E and AD indicates
possessing excellent and adequate work-based skills, respectively.
∗∗We check the impact of this parameter on simulation in Scenario A of manufacturers (see Table 5.7).
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put sufficient effort into apprenticeship programmes (i.e. 0.5) for a work-based skill. There-
fore the work-based attainability for qualified agents has a continuous uniform distribution
in the interval (0.5, 1)).
However, the attainability of academic skills is independent of work-based skills and has
a continuous uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1). The minimum attainability of 0 re-
flects the fact that agents may not have any interests or intelligence for school-based training,
but they attend that programme because it is a compulsory part of the programme. Note that
we employed continuous parameters for attainability to facilitate gradual increments of them
in the simulation.
Passion: In the simulation model, each agent has a passion to learn the new skill. This
number is randomly generated from the (0, 1) interval.
The number of companies: One of the parameters that impacts demand in the labour
market is ratio of companies. We assumed the ratio of small companies to large companies in
a society to be 4 : 1, inspired by the Pareto principle. This ratio complies with infrastructure
to residential building companies presented by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment (2017).15 Furthermore, Geerolf (2017) indicates that under certain production
functions and assumptions that are not very restrictive, the Pareto Principle is upheld.16 In
our study, we only use the rate as an indicator for the ratio of large to small companies, not
a representation of their market share.17
Utility function — artisans: As stated earlier, different trading societies have different
utility functions. Overall, two points impact these utilities, namely the size of the company
(i.e. large or small) and the trade type (i.e. artisan or manufacturing). Overall, a large com-
pany has a high potential to make profits for the investments made on providing advanced
production processes or buying high-quality raw materials. In an artisan-trading society, the
large and small companies are metaphors for budget spent on raw materials by an artisan
when producing an item based on their target market (i.e. part of the community is more
prosperous and hence, can afford more luxurious items). This phenomenon is also consid-
ered in the form of the proportion of demands in a society (i.e. the percentage of prosperous
15Estimated based on figures in New Zealand see Figure 3-8, (pp. 9-12).
16Overall, the Pareto principle expresses Vilfredo Pareto’s statement who experimentally observed the ratio
of persons with an income more than x can be modelled as Cx−α, wherein C and α are constants (Arnold,
2015, p. 1). This dominance of some companies over market is known as the 80/20 rule by economists,
exhibiting phenomena that around 80% of values are produced by 20% of society. This behaviour is also
expressed as “probability of measuring a particular value of some quantity varies inversely as a power of that
value” (Newman, 2005).
17Some studies such as Brynjolfsson et al. (2011), suggest revisions on 20% market share (i.e. long tail
phenomenon) but these revisions are questioned in other empirical studies (Zhong & Michahelles, 2013).
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families in a community is limited; hence, the demand for items provided by high-skilled
agents is less). Attempts of low-skilled agents for producing decorative items lead to more
wastage costs due to their limited ability to perform complicated tasks. On the other hand,
high-skilled agents cannot benefit from their skills to perform advanced tasks when their
target market includes average families who cannot afford expensive items. The values of
items are calculated based on Equations 5.4 and 5.5, and the parameters presented in Table
5.3. For instance, the value of an item produced by an agent with adequate skills (s = 1) in
a small company is obtained as aAS × 1 + bAS × 1 = 1.5 + 10 = 11.5 using Equation 5.5.
Utility function — manufacturers: In a manufacturing society, the advanced produc-
tion process means more frequent changes in the process. The academic skills are required
to handle these frequent changes in equipment and help the employees to predict some what-
if scenarios by utilising their information and analysing skills obtained in schools (Stasz &
Brewer, 1999). Note that having low work-based skills or not having school-based skills
lead to a significant loss in large companies for producing scrapped items and opportunity
loss, despite remarkable depreciation costs. Furthermore, small companies utilising sim-
ple production processes can benefit from work-based and school-based skills obtained by
agents to a limited extent. The values are obtained based on Equations 5.2 and 5.3, and the
parameters presented in Table 5.3. For instance, the value of an item produced by an agent
with adequate and academic skills (s = 1 and ed = 1) in a large company is obtained as
aMB × 1 + bMB × 1× 1 = 5 + 10 = 15, using Equation 5.2.
Furthermore, as stated earlier, in some manufacturing apprenticeship schemes, some
Contractors were employed to train agents. We assume that contractor processes are similar
to that of small companies (i.e. they do not invest in providing resources for an advanced
learning environment). Furthermore, note that we know that in the modern apprenticeship
in Britain mostly small companies were interested in providing work-based training. This
implies it is not profitable for large companies to invest in training apprentices. Both small
companies and contractors use simple procedures; therefore we have assumed that the max-
imum transferred skill (to an apprentice) is limited to 85%. The lower chance of training
highly skilled agents is a consequence of the company’s limited resources (i.e. trainer’s skills
and available tools) that decreases the quality of training.
Speed of training and learning: As stated in the algorithms, training and learning
speeds are modified, based on the quality of training and the agent’s characteristics. We
assumed that the lack of the following worsens speed of learning and the speed of the train-
ing, and reduces these by 10%:
• Passion (e.g. practising beyond the necessary);
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• Good training (i.e. putting all efforts towards transferring skills to apprentices);
• Declarative knowledge (i.e. providing guidelines and required rules by experts before
starting work-based training).
We have considered small numbers (i.e. 10% reduction) to study the impact of the afore-
mentioned parameters on the speed of learning. The reasons for this small reduction are as
follows:
• If the deviation is significant, especially for the passion and quality of training, then it
can be recognised by third parties such as the government, unions, and the trainer, and
they will interfere to rectify the system.
• Knowledge exclusion by not having attended school can be compensated by provid-
ing some guidance during work-based training, but it is time-consuming. This time-
consumption slightly decreases the overall quality of training by decreasing the avail-
able time for work-based training.
• If small numbers indicate significant impacts, increasing them would not show any-
thing new.
Academic skills: Another important attribute of the apprenticeship programmes for
manufacturing societies is the engagement of schools. If systems lack formal schools as
a compulsory part of programmes, each apprentice with the probability of 50% gains aca-
demic skills per iteration. This percentage reflects arbitrary decisions on attending schools
voluntarily made by agents per run, based on their perception about their academic skills and
value of such skills.
As mentioned before, in manufacturing societies, contractors are paid for training ap-
prentices. However, training costs for artisans and manufacturing companies are a concern
that should be addressed. Based on arguments provided by Franz and Soskice (1994) and
Wallis (2008), there are two reasons artisan-trainers accept apprentices despite the apparent
costs:
1. There are benefits of manual labour provided by the apprentices, at the beginning of
apprenticeship along with additional profits associated with their services for acquired
skill during their apprenticeship. Wallis (2008) proposes some necessary tasks that are
useful in the workplace such as delivery, cleaning, and shop watching that could be
done by apprentices and suggests that youth in old Britain might have gained some
other useful skills, i.e. work-related or general chores, by training provided by their
parents.
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2. Franz and Soskice (1994) mention an additional reason for artisans to accept appren-
tices. They note there are reasons net costs of training are negligible or negative (i.e. it
can be profitable considering the aforementioned incomes). Also, if there exist small
costs, especially in small towns, being from the same social circles and knowing the
parents of an applicant puts some pressures on artisans to accept applicants. Overall,
social circles and friends and family put pressures on artisans to accept these marginal
costs to create a good reputation.
In our model, we considered a small proportion of costs for manufacturers in addition to
negotiation privileges for them (i.e. they pay lower wages than the norm of society for that
particular skill). For those artisans who accept apprentices, the motivation for training ap-
prentices is to create a good reputation in addition to utilising apprentice services that also
result in some marginal profits.
Initial wages — artisans and manufacturers: Another crucial element for having a
stable system is paid wages and expected profits of apprenticeship programmes. Former
studies indicated that if these numbers are not chosen correctly, the system fails.18 Note that
these numbers are chosen, based on the following conditions, by considering utility functions
of companies (to avoid making a system unprofitable and eventually fail). Two requirements
of agents’ wages that we considered are:
• The wages for a high level of skills should be more than a lower level of skills (e.g. an
educated agent with excellent work-based skills is paid more than his uneducated
counterparts).
• The wages cannot exceed the price of the item produced using the same skill for both
large and small companies (i.e. companies need to have enough income to pay wages).
The openness of the system in terms of being open for training worsens the programme com-
pletion ratio. Some may join the apprenticeship system, but may exit earlier to work where
a low level of skills is required.19 Another impact of the openness of the system is addressed
in one scenario of manufacturers where some skilled agents from other communities may
join the system to work for companies (which will be stated in the next section).
Stickiness threshold: This number shows the excessive labour supply or demand for
skilled agents beyond which wages in the labour markets change. In other words, wages
do not adjust to the market equilibrium for values below this number. For example, if 100
18Franz and Soskice analytically indicated the importance of these costs and their trade-off — see (Franz &
Soskice, 1994), Section 3.1, (pp. 16-17).
19A 15% decrease in leaving programmes is observed for cases where the number of cities in which that
particular skill could be utilised was limited to 3 (see Wallis, 2008, p. 844).
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agents are employed and 29 agents are unemployed in a society, the wages do not change. In
our model, we have considered 30 as the stickiness threshold; however, we test the impact of
other values on the model in one of the manufacturing scenarios (Scenario A, Table 5.7).
Discount factor and number of years: Another parameter that impacts trainers and
apprentices’ expected profits of the programme is their discount factor and provisioned hori-
zon. The agents use a discount factor to calculate the net present value of future income in a
finite horizon (6 years). The number of years reflects the high workforce turnover observed
in Germany, the high mortality rate in the EIC, and overall, the time inconsistency of ex-
pectation observed in studies such as Ainslie (2015). For a discount factor for money, we
used evidence available from Julfa (Herzig, 1991). Herzig (1991) suggested that the interest
rate norm in Julfa was around 10% per annum. This number suggests how Julfans mentally
discounted the value of money.
Another important factor of apprenticeship programmes is their duration. The number
of years in apprenticeship programmes is inspired by modern programmes (i.e. 3 years)
to make results more applicable. However, this assumption does not comply with some
historical cases such as old Britain and Persia, but is essential in modern contexts where
there are minimum age constraints to enter programmes and the availability of alternative
programmes with three years duration.
Maximum waiting time: After completing the programme, agents will search for jobs
and will not stay unemployed for more than two years (i.e. they will stay in the system for
at most two years), and the chance of leaving the waiting pool in the first and second years
(if they are unemployed) is 0.5 and 1, respectively. These figures are employed to reflect
concerns, such as living cost requirements and family pressures (see also footnote 14).
However, in manufacturing systems run by companies, some of the trained apprentices
are hired by companies. If manufacturers train some agents, they hire the qualified agent who
possesses the highest degree of skill (i.e. they do not hire agents from the labour market). The
reasons for such a decision are listed below:
• Pressures imposed by society and unions that expect companies to hire their appren-
tices if they need some skilled agents.
• The employees of a company also expect the company to hire one of the trainees
because of the friendship bonds formed during the programme.
• The company has a vested interest in hiring its own apprentices, because they attain
specific skills that are important for the company, and they are familiar with specific
procedures inside the company that are not known to outsiders.
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In addition, estimations of probabilities in the system are based on globally known infor-
mation about the number of hired agents, agents’ skills, the number of trainers, and trainers’
current policy to decide about participating in apprenticeship programmes, and the quality
of training. For the number of hired agents and number of traders, we know that currently,
countries have official reports on their skills shortages, and unemployment rates, etc. that are
indicators for agents to decide the next iterations. In older contexts, for lower population per
community, rumours and observed shortages are means that agents can use for an estimation
about those figures.
Weight of past information: Furthermore, we parametrise agents’ learning and their
behaviours as follows. The agents’ skills and the trainers’ current policy are numbers that
can be assessed by asking former trainers and references in both contemporary and histor-
ical instances. Apprentices discount past information using a weight of 30% for past and
a weight of 70% for recent information. This reflects the importance of recent information
for apprentices, because they do not monitor the system for a long time. On the other hand,
companies use a 50% weight for recent information and past information. Note that compa-
nies keep a better track of past information than apprentices, because companies are active
in the system for a longer time than apprentices. Therefore we used a different weighting for
companies to abstractly reflect their experiential differences that stem from their long term
activity in the system.
Trainers estimate the impacts of changing their training policy from good to bad, or
hiring from already educated people, based on known parameters. In other words, they
assume if they change their policy from good quality to bad quality training, the chances
for agents to obtain high skills decreases by 10%. For hiring already educated agents, large
companies assume that an agent has a 45% chance of having excellent skills, 45% of having
adequate skills, and 10% of having inadequate skills after training. This assumption is based
on predicted low motivation for learning new skills by already hired agents on their obtained
skills.
Therefore a manufacturer predicts a hired agent obtains adequate and excellent skills with
a probability of 0.5×0.9 = 0.45, wherein 0.5 is estimated, based on the agents’ attainability
that is continuously and uniformly distributed in (0.5,1) and the thresholds for different levels
of skill, i.e. 0.5 and 0.75.20 Also, 0.9 indicates reductions in the speed of learning because
of a lack of motivation. Furthermore, inadequate skills are obtained with the probability of
20Note that the probability of X , where x1 < X < x2, which follows a uniform distribution in (a, b), is
calculated as (x2 − x1)/(b− a) (see Equation 5.6). Here it is calculated as (0.75− 0.5)/(1− 0.5) = 0.5 and
(1− 0.75)/(1− 0.5) = 0.5, for probabilities of adequate and high work-based skills, respectively.
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0.1 (i.e. 1− aforementioned skills).
In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we provide results of this simulation for manufacturers and
artisans, respectively. We have utilised NetLogo to perform our simulation (Wilensky, 1999).
We also used 30 different runs for each system and then averaged their results. Moreover,
we assume each iteration reflects a year.
5.4 Results of apprenticeship for manufacturers
In this section, we describe the results of the simulation for manufacturers, considering eight
different combinations of three characteristics (indicated in Table 5.1), namely:
• Engagement of schools;
• Openness of the system (for training);
• Trainer type (i.e. companies or contractors)
Table 5.4 indicates characteristics for the eight simulated societies and societies they rep-
resent. The set-ups (i.e. societies) are identified by a prefix (M.) that represents the trade
type of manufacturing. Additionally, each society can be identified by the first letter of the
characteristics, namely S, O, C that are representatives of compulsory school, openness of
the system, and company trader, respectively. We used a Boolean index to indicate whether
such an attribute is included (i.e. 1) or not (i.e. 0). Likewise, in this table a tick indicates
that the society includes that attribute, and a cross indicates the society does not include that
attribute.




















































































School 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Open 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
Company 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Moreover, we assumed 20%, 50%, or 80% of agents (in different experiments) might
check for job opportunities during their apprenticeship, and may leave the programme if
they find checking for the job more profitable. These numbers (i.e. 20, 50, 80) are chosen
to cover representative values in a continuum of values from 0% to 100% to see if they
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have a significant impact on the outcome of the system. In simulation, we considered three
scenarios, namely:
Scenario A) Training a sufficient number of agents, i.e. unions impose pressures to limit the
number of agents to the labour demand;
Scenario B) No union in effect, i.e. the number of apprentices attending programmes can be
significantly more than the provisioned demand;
Scenario C) Openness for working, i.e. the community attracts and accepts agents from
other communities for reasons such as having a better economy or facing skill
shortage.
The unions are the means to try to defend workers’ interests such as guilds in an artisan’s
society with different means. The impact of unions is studied under Scenario A for manufac-
turers, where unions or the government regulates the number of companies that are eligible
to train apprentices. Moreover, the only case where manufacturers put up some barriers was
that of the EIC where the headquarters asked for signing bonds by two insurers. This impact
is not studied in our model, because those bonds could have been signed by totally unknown
people (see Hejeebu, 2005, footnote 43).
Note that the threshold used for the stickiness of wages is considered to be 30. Re-
sults regarding the impact of changing stickiness thresholds associated with labour supply
and demand on different systems performance are studied in Scenario A. Furthermore, for
simplicity, we use academic and non-academic as shorthand for having and not having the
school-based skill, respectively. For work-based skills, we use excellent and adequate and
will not explicitly mention work-based skills anymore.
What follows presents the aforementioned scenarios. The first scenario is the base sce-
nario (inspired from the German apprenticeship programmes), and then, we systematically
explore how more liberal scenarios impact apprenticeship programmes. The aim of this sys-
tematic exploration is to identify the extent to which workforce liberalisation impacts the
market in terms of apprenticeship programmes.
5.4.1 Scenario A for manufacturers: Train to satisfy the labour market
demand
In Scenario A of apprenticeship programmes, societies invest in training to minimise the
number of unemployed agents. This scheme addresses two issues raised by the excessive
training of apprentices, namely:
1. exorbitant rates of unemployment for that particular skill that is a concern for unions;
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2. training costs imposed on the system due to the investment of public services, such as
schools, and payments to contractors.
To address these issues, we assume each contractor has a capacity to train 12 apprentices
per year (i.e. they train 20% more apprentices than what the labour market needs to address
the openness of the society), and when companies initiate training, small companies will
not participate in training (i.e. the system starts by training 100 apprentices). They may add
to the system when there is some vacant capacity for training, e.g. some large companies
are not interested in participating. Note that at most, 6 small companies can participate in
training in the next iterations when all large companies accept apprentices to reduce the risks
of skill shortages.21 The capacity for contractors is defined to reflect government boundaries
on paying subsidies to limit the total number of trained agents. Training by larger companies
and limitation are a reflection of the following:
• the higher tendency for agents to be trained by companies with a better reputation;
• government intervention to enhance the reputation of the apprenticeship system (e.g. the
German government let certain certified companies train apprentices that limits the
number of companies that participated in the programme (Ryan & Unwin, 2001)).
As can be seen in Table 5.5 and based on the Pareto principle, the maximum number of
apprentices per run can be calculated as 10 × 12 = 120 for systems run by contractors and
(20× 5) + (6× 1) = 106 for systems run by large and small companies.
Table 5.5: The additional simulation parameters for Scenario A
Name Comment Distribution Values
Number of contractors Constant 10
Number of companies Large:Small Constant 20:80
Capacity for training
Large companies 5
Small companies Constant 1
Contractors 12
Maximum number of apprentices
Companies Capacity × maximum 106
Contractors number of participants 120
Probability of leaving the system∗ When system is open (per run) Constant 0.1
∗Stated in footnote 12.
The capacity for manufacturers is obtained based on their expectations from the system
and trade-offs between costs and benefits. In a system benefiting from school training, it
21We know in German apprenticeship programmes, only eligible companies could participate in training
that indicates some interventions to control training an excessive number of apprentices (Franz & Soskice,
1994). This number can be optimised for a real-world scenario.
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is expected that half of the students obtain enough academic skills based on a continuous
uniform distribution of the academic attainability of students. The chances of obtaining
excellent work-based skills is 50%, considering the distribution of agents’ attainability and
the required degree of skill. In other words, an agent needs to obtain 0.75 of skill, while the
attainability has a continuous uniform distribution in the range (0.5, 1), which means half
of the trainees have the chance to obtain excellent skills. Note that when x follows U(a, b),
i.e. x follows a continuous uniform distribution in (a, b), we have from S. M. Ross (2010,
p. 195):
P (x ≥ c) =

0 c ≤ a
b− c
b− a
a < c ≤ b
1 b < c
(5.6)
Wherein P (x) is the probability of x. Therefore we have:




Due to the fact that academic and work-based skill attainability are independent, a ran-
dom agent with a chance of 25% can have academic and excellent work-based skills al-
together, i.e. he has 50% chance of obtaining academic skills, and considering the former
probability, we have 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25. Therefore on average, having four apprentices leads
to having one desirable trainee if that one is passionate and finishes the programme. This
part is calculated, based on the geometric random variable expected value. This distribution
is appropriate to calculate the probability of one success for any trial of games or experi-
ments, such that each trial has a Boolean-value outcome such as tossing a coin. Let p be the
probability of success and the number of required successes is one; then the expected value





and in our model it equals 1/0.25 = 4. However, there is a chance that having four appren-
tices would not lead to having a desirable agent. Some reasons are apprentices leaving the
programme before completion or a company’s inability to find an apprentice who has the
best skills with a chance of (1 − 0.25)4 ≈ 0.32. This probability is calculated based on the
attributes of geometric probability distribution and its formula for the number of runs (x)
being more than n (S. M. Ross, 2010, p. 156):
P (x > n) =
∞∑
i=n+1
P{X = i} =
∞∑
i=n+1
p(1− p)i−1 = (1− p)n. (5.9)
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On the other hand, for requirements and costs associated with training, the manufactur-
ers cannot accept many apprentices, so five apprentices are considered to be the maximum
capacity for apprenticeship programmes.
The capacity of small companies is defined based on their small budget and workshop
space. However, since there is not much difference among incomes obtained by different
skills, and the risks only concern the probability of the apprentice leaving the programme or
training an apprentice with an attainability lower than 0.6 — then in this case, the risks of
(i.e. probability for) not finding an ideal agent is around the same number for small and large
companies. The chance for small companies is (0.6 − 0.1)/(1 − 0.5) = 0.2, and for large
companies, it can be calculated as 0.755 ≈ 0.24. Note that we increased large companies’
maximum capacity to five.
The capacity of contractors is calculated using a simple approach. For contractors, most
training costs are covered by the government, and to cover the rest of the costs, it is enough
that some of their apprentices find jobs. In the current scenario, this capacity is defined to
avoid significant differences between the overall capacity of systems run by contractors and
companies (see Table 5.5). However, due to the lower quality of training for contractors that
is a consequence of their limited investments, we assumed that the government and unions
let them have slightly more capacity (i.e. maximum of 120 versus 106). Note that either the
government had to accept this increase in capacity or grant significant subsidies to trainers
to establish much more complicated processes that were not affordable for small companies.
Table 5.6 presents observed programme completion and the Gross Domestic Income
(GDI) produced by apprenticeship programmes for each type of society (see Table 5.4) based
on different tendencies for apprentices to check for jobs before finishing the programme. To
study the success of each apprentice system, we first analyse the percentage of attendees who
finished apprenticeship programmes. The result based on this metric is suggested by Ryan
and Unwin (2001) as an indicator for the efficacy of the German apprenticeship programmes
against its British counterpart.
5.4.1.1 Impact on programme completion
As can be seen in Table 5.6, the four top successful systems using this metric (for all prob-
abilities of checking for a job — 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8) are systems M.S0O0C1, M.S1O0C1,
M.S1O0C0, andM.S0O0C0 where the systems are closed (O0). Moreover, when more agents
are looking for a job during training, the completion rate decreases drastically. We used non-
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Table 5.6: Programme completion ratio and the GDI for different set-ups considering Sce-
nario A (mean ± standard deviation)
















0.2 65.7 ± 5.9 77.6 ± 5.4 39.4 ± 3.6 44.6± 3.5
0.5 45.9 ± 4.1 52.4 ± 4.2 27.9 ± 2.5 32.0 ± 2.7
0.8 29.5 ± 2.6 31.1 ± 2.2 18.1 ± 1.7 21.6 ± 1.8
GDI
0.2 724 ± 64 888 ± 56 379 ± 35 361 ± 57
0.5 554 ± 50 670 ± 49 279 ± 26 269 ± 34
0.8 379 ± 35 372 ± 36 179 ± 18 204 ± 21













0.2 72.4 ± 4.7 77.5 ± 3.7 43.4 ± 2.6 46.3 ± 2.6
0.5 45.8 ±2.7 49.5 ± 2.1 28.3 ± 1.7 32.5 ± 1.5
0.8 24.9 ± 1.5 25.6 ± 1.4 16.4 ± 0.9 20.9 ± 1.2
GDI
0.2 1215 ± 58 1264 ± 45 740 ± 34 830 ± 33
0.5 907 ± 35 973 ± 29 554 ± 25 672 ± 25
0.8 599 ± 31 627 ± 26 361 ± 21 494 ± 25
parametric tests22 to investigate the impact of the percentage of agents who checked for a
job during their programme on the programme completion ratio. The test indicates that an
increase in job-seeking behaviour significantly decreases the percentage of agents who fin-
ished the programme. Based on these test results, we can conclude that a given society having
some rules or norms that persuade agents to finish the programme will improve programme
completion. For simplicity henceforth, we mainly present and describe results related to the
case of 20% agents checking job opportunities.
Now we state in detail the results of the percentage of agents who finished the programme
for each of the eight simulated societies. As can be seen in Figure 5.1 (a-f), the systems (with
0.2 probability of checking for a job) producing the highest completion ratio are societies
M.S0O0C1 and M.S1O0C1 where the systems are closed (i.e. O0) and companies train the
apprentices (i.e. C1). Moreover, M.S0O1C0 and M.S1O1C0 are systems with the least num-
22We employed Kruskal-Wallis and Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests as post-hoc analysis due to the non-
homogeneity of variances that was identified by the Fligner-Killeen test.
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ber of apprentices who finished the programme (see Figure 5.1, c). This result emphasises
the adverse effect of the combination of openness (i.e. O0) and contractor trainers (i.e. C0)
on the decisions made by trainers about finishing the programme.
Now let us focus on the systems similar to the German apprenticeship programme and
Julfa which is system M.S1O0C1. It can be observed that this system is working well as
anticipated, with 77.5% completing the apprenticeship. Moreover, the result is consistent
with observations for the German system.23 However, this consistency stems from some
other factors in the German system (i.e. the requirement to complete the programme to earn
a qualification) which is considered in this model as the probability of checking for jobs (see
the second column of Table 5.6).
We know that in countries such as Britain, such a rule was not in effect and one can even
assume that contractors may encourage trainees to search for a job during the programme to
earn their subsidies faster. Therefore such societies are highly likely to behave worse (see
Table 5.6 results associated with a higher probability of checking for jobs). Furthermore,
in cases where tendencies to leave the programme are high (e.g. 80% of apprentices check
for jobs), the absence of academic education encourages trainees to stay until the end of the
apprenticeship programme. This phenomenon can be seen in societies which lack compul-
sory schools that are identified by S0 (M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C0, andM.S0O1C1),
versus societies with compulsory schools that are identified by S1 (M.S1O0C0, M.S1O0C1,
M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1C1) that is caused by slower training, which causes concerns about
inadequate skills at the end of the programme and which convinces apprentices to terminate
the programme sooner.
We also conducted a Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistical test to identify the impact of the
studied characteristics on finishing the programme. The test indicates the importance of:
• the closedness of society (i.e. the combination of closed systems identified by O0
(M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S1O0C0, and M.S1O0C1) outperforms the combination
of open systems identified by O1 (M.S0O1C0, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1
C1);
• the engagement of schools (i.e. systems with compulsory schools identified by S1
(M.S1O0C0, M.S1O0C1, M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1C1) outperforms systems without
compulsory schools identified by S0 (M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C0, and M.S0
O1C1);
• training by companies — societies identified by C1 (M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O0
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Figure 5.1: Programme completion ratio for different set-ups (a-f).
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C1, and M.S1O1C1) — results in better performance than training by contractors —
systems identified by C0 (M.S0O0C0, M.S0O1C0, M.S1O0C0, and M.S1O1C0).
The aforementioned factors increase the percentage of agents who finished the programme
(p < 0.01 for all tests) when 20% of agents were looking for a job during the programme.
Finally, when more agents check for jobs during an apprenticeship (i.e. 50% and 80%), the
impact of the engagement of schools in apprenticeship programmes on programme comple-
tion changes from positive to negative with p < 0.01 (i.e. decreases completion rate). This
change is predictable, considering the combination of two factors, namely:
• faster work-based skill development in societies that benefit from schools;
• tendencies for agents who acquired some levels of skills (e.g. adequate work-based
skills) to look for jobs.
5.4.1.2 Impact on the GDI
Another method to measure the success of apprenticeship programmes is using the Gross
Domestic Income (GDI) of the society, based on items manufactured by hired apprentices
(see Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2). First, we compare the correlation between programme com-
pletion and the GDI based on the numbers presented in Table 5.6. The outcome of Spearman
tests for different societies shows more than weak positive correlations between the GDI and
the percentage of agents who finished the programme (i.e. the values of correlation are 0.83
for 20% and 0.44 for both the cases where 50% and 80% of the agents who checked for jobs
(p < 0.01)). These indicate that an increase in the tendency for checking for jobs, decreases
the average effectiveness of remaining apprentices who completed programmes; hence, the
correlation between the GDI and completion ratio decreases.
However, a moderate correlation with the higher percentage of agents who look for a job
(for 50% and 80%) is an indicator of the inappropriateness of the utilised metric by Ryan and
Unwin (2001) (i.e. under certain circumstances, an increase in the GDI has not accompanied
an increase in the percentage of agents who have finished the programme, e.g. see Table 5.6,
M.S0O1C0 versus M.S0O1C1). Using a non-parametric test to investigate the impact of the
percentage of agents who checked for a job during apprenticeship indicates that an increase
in job-seeking behaviour significantly decreases the GDI. Based on these test results, again,
the importance of having some rules or norms for persuading agents to finish the programme
is emphasised. As stated earlier, for simplicity, henceforth, we only present and describe
results related to the case of 20% of agents checking for job opportunities.
As can be seen, societies M.S1O0C0 and M.S1O0C1 have a higher GDI (see Table 5.6)
than other systems wherein compulsory schools are engaged in the programme (identified
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by S1), and these societies are closed (O0). Now switching to Figure 5.2, we can see that
changes in other characteristics of apprenticeship programmes when companies are respon-
sible for training apprentices (identified by C1) vary the GDI drastically — i.e. the GDIs
of systems M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O1C1 are much lower than M.S1O0C1 (see Fig-
ure 5.2). The best performance of the system is obtained by society M.S1O0C1, the best
replicate of Julfa and Germany. This increase in performance is a result of the engagement
of schools (S1), training by companies as potential employers (C1), and fewer tendencies
to leave the system during the programme (O0). However, when the assumption of using
school or closedness of a system is relaxed, the performance decreases drastically (i.e. sys-
tems M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1, and M.S1O1C1). Figure 5.2 shows that:
• systems M.S1O0C0 and M.S1O0C1 have the highest GDI;
• systems M.S0O1C1 and M.S0O1C0 (the EIC) have the lowest GDI;
• systems M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1C1 perform similarly.
The Kruskal–Wallis and Pairwise Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistical tests indicate that the GDI
of all societies is statistically different (p < 0.01 for all tests) when 20% of agents are looking
for a job during the apprenticeship programme.
To have a better analysis, we also conducted a Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistical test to
identify the impact of studied characteristics on the GDI of the societies. The test indicates
the importance of:
• the closedness of society (i.e. a combination of closed systems identified byO0 (M.S0O0C0,
M.S0O0C1, M.S1O0C0, and M.S1O0C1) outperforms the combination of open sys-
tems identified by O1 (M.S0O1C0, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1C1));
• engagement of schools (i.e. systems with compulsory schools identified by S1 (M.S1O0C0,
M.S1O0C1,M.S1O1C0, andM.S1O1C1) outperform contrasting systems (M.S0O0C0,
M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C0, and M.S0O1C1) altogether);
• being trained by companies (i.e. systems identified by C1 (M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1,
M.S1O0C1, and M.S1O1C1) perform better than systems identified by C0 (M.S0O0
C0, M.S0O1C0, M.S1O0C0, and M.S1O1C0) as a whole, wherein contractors train
agents).
The above-mentioned characteristics significantly increase the GDI of the society (p < 0.01
for all tests), regardless of the percentage of agents who look for a job during the apprentice-































































Figure 5.2: Boxplot of the GDI acquired by apprentices programmes under different set-ups;
the red dots present outliers and a diamond indicates the mean.
5.4.1.3 Impact of excess supply and demand — stickiness threshold
The stickiness threshold is the threshold at which excess demand/supply causes changes in
wages. We vary the stickiness threshold for demand/supply to examine its impact on different
simulation results, namely:
• profitability (GDI);
• the programme completion ratio;
• wages.
To do so, we systematically varied the initial number of the stickiness threshold for stickiness
of wages (i.e. 30 surplus/shortages skills in labour market) by:
• using an extreme point (i.e. 1);
• halving it (15);
• doubling it (60).
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As can be seen in Table 5.7, for different combinations of set-ups and stickiness thresh-
olds, these changes do not significantly change the percentage of agents who finished the
programme nor the GDI. Furthermore, these stickiness thresholds have various impacts on
Table 5.7: The GDI and the programme completion ratio for different set-ups with respect
to the stickiness threshold associated with the market tolerance towards excess demand and
supply (mean ± standard deviation).













1 65.8 ± 5.9 77.6 ± 5.6 39.3 ± 3.5 44.7 ± 3.8
15 65.9 ± 5.6 77.9 ± 5.8 39.4± 3.7 44.5± 3.6
30 65.7 ± 5.9 77.6 ± 5.4 39.4 ± 3.6 44.6± 3.5
60 65.2 ± 5.9 76.6 ± 6.2 39.4 ± 3.6 44.6 ± 3.7
GDI
1 725 ± 66 885 ± 59 380 ± 35 372 ± 58
15 725 ± 62 896 ± 60 380 ± 37 357 ± 55
30 724 ± 64 888 ± 56 379 ± 35 361 ± 57
60 735 ± 68 898 ± 68 380 ± 36 374 ± 74
Part 2 (Societies M.S1O0C0–M.S1O1C1)








1 72.1 ± 4.8 77.6 ± 3.5 43.4 ± 2.9 46.2 ± 2.3
15 72.3 ± 4.6 77.4 ± 3.3 43.5± 2.6 46.3± 2.4
30 72.4 ± 4.7 77.5 ± 3.7 43.4 ± 2.6 46.3 ± 2.6
60 71.7 ± 4.3 76.9 ± 3.6 43.4± 2.8 46.3 ± 2.3
GDI
1 1209 ± 58 1265 ± 41 740 ± 37 830 ± 30
15 1213 ± 55 1265 ± 41 741 ± 35 829 ± 32
30 1215 ± 58 1264 ± 45 740 ± 34 830 ± 33
60 1205 ± 52 1297 ± 48 742 ± 37 831 ± 31
wages (Table 5.8). As predicted, an increase in a stickiness threshold leads to a decrease in
wages for some societies (e.g. M.S0O0C1 when the stickiness threshold is 60). The only
system that faces no changes in wages is M.S0O1C0, which possesses the least number of
skilled agents in the system (see Table 5.9).
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Table 5.8: Wages for different set-ups with respect to the stickiness threshold associated with
the market tolerance towards excess demand and supply (mean ± standard deviation).












0.1, 15, 30 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
60 4.0 ± 0.1 3.9 ± 0.0 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic
and excellent
0.1, 15 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
30 8.9 ± 0.4 8.8 ± 0.6 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
60 6.3 ± 0.2 5.7 ± 0.1 8.9 ± 0.4 8.7 ± 0.7
Wage academic
and adequate
0.1, 15, 30 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
60 10.4 ± 0.2 9.7 ± 0.1 11.0 ± 0.2 10.9 ± 0.2
Wage academic
and excellent
0.1, 15, 30 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
60 12.6 ± 0.2 11.7 ± 0.1 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
Part 2 (Societies M.S1O0C0–M.S1O1C1)







0.1, 15, 30 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
60 3.8 ± 0.0 3.7 ± 0.0 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic
and excellent
0.1, 15, 30 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
60 5.4 ± 0.1 5.4 ± 0.1 8.9 ± 0.5 8.8 ± 0.5
Wage academic
and adequate
0.1, 15 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
30 10.6 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.3 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
60 9.2 ± 0.1 9.2 ± 0.1 10.9 ± 0.3 10.4 ± 0.4
Wage academic
and excellent
0.1, 15 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
30 13.0 ± 0.2 12.9 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
60 11.4 ± 0.1 11.1 ± 0.1 13.0 ± 0.2 12.5 ± 0.4
5.4.1.4 Impact on wages and the number of skilled agents
We investigated the impact of apprenticeship programmes on two other parameters, namely:
• workforce society wage stabilisation;
• number of skilled agents (different types of skilled agents shown in Table 5.9).
Table 5.9 shows the total number of skilled agents, including the apprentices who are still
attending apprenticeship programmes. As can be seen, the number of educated agents with
excellent skills has the highest value in M.S1O0C1 (61.1), and that is more than the to-
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tal number of skilled agents in societies M.S0O1C0 and M.S0O1C1. Overall, societies
with compulsory schools that are identified by S1 (M.S1O0C0, M.S1O0C1, M.S1O1C0, and
M.S1O1C1) outperform other systems in developing skilled agents (combination of work-
based and academic skills, see Total Skilled shown in Table 5.9), which indicates the impor-
tance of the engagement of schools in the apprenticeship programme (three of them benefited
from schools).
The only counterexample is society M.S0O0C1, where companies provide training, and
the system is closed, which is better compared to societies M.S1O0C1 and M.S1O1C1 that
have open societies (i.e. O1). System M.S0O1C0 (the EIC) has more poorly skilled agents
in comparison with society M.S1O0C1 (Julfa), considering all combinations of work-based
and academic skills as stated by Fryer (1698) (as we quoted in the introduction).
Table 5.9: Statistics for work-based and academic skills attained under different set-ups when
20% of agents check for jobs (mean ± standard deviation)










Non-academic and adequate 68.4 ± 6.1 67.2 ± 4.3 45.7 ± 4.0 34.9 ± 5.7
Non-academic and excellent 4.3 ± 0.4 26.8 ± 1.1 2.8 ± 0.3 12.6 ± 2.1
Academic and adequate 3.8 ± 0.4 6.9 ± 0.6 2.5 ± 0.3 3.4 ± 0.6
Academic and excellent 0.4 ± 0.4 16.2 ± 0.5 0.2 ± 0.1 1.8 ± 0.6
Total Skilled 76.9 ± 6.1 117.1 ± 4.5 51.2 ± 4.0 52.7 ± 6.1






Non-academic and adequate 45.5 ± 3.3 51.0 ± 2.9 32.7 ± 2.2 41.3 ± 2.4
Non-academic and excellent 12.5 ± 1.0 21.6 ± 1.3 8.2 ± 0.6 15.3 ± 1.0
Academic and adequate 36.8 ±1.9 32.3 ± 1.5 25.3 ± 1.2 24.6 ± 1.3
Academic and excellent 0.4 ± 1.9 61.1 ± 13.4 8.5 ± 0.9 16.0 ± 1.9
Total Skilled 95.2 ± 4.4 166.0 ± 13.9 74.7 ±2.7 97.2 ± 3.5
Figure 5.3 depicts the number of skilled agents in four different categories, namely those:
• educated with excellent skills (academic and excellent);


































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.3: Boxplot of the number of skilled agents considering various skill types for ap-
prenticeship programmes under different set-ups; the red dots represent outliers and a dia-
mond indicates the mean.
• without academic skills who acquired excellent work-based skills (non-academic and
excellent);
• without academic skills who acquired adequate work-based skills (non-academic and
adequate).
The vertical axis indicates the number of holders of a particular skill, and the horizontal
axis represents the set-up type. As can be seen, society M.S1O0C1 (i.e. Julfa) has a signifi-
cant advantage over other societies in terms of the number of agents with academic skills
and significant work-based skills. As expected, the number of educated agents will in-
crease if attending school is compulsory as a part of apprenticeship programmes (see two top
charts of Figure 5.3 which indicate the number of educated agents — societies M.S1O0C0,
M.S1O0C1,M.S1O1C0, andM.S1O1C1, which are societies with compulsory schooling and
are identified by S1, versus M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C0, and M.S0O1C1 societies,
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wherein attending school is not a compulsory part of apprenticeship programmes and they
are identified by S0).
On the other hand, a decrease in the degree of skill (e.g. see agents without academic
skills that have adequate work-based skills versus educated agents with excellent skills)
changes the pattern in favour of societies M.S0O0C0 and M.S0O0C1. This is intuitive,
i.e. when systems are more efficient in training agents, the number of low-skilled agents
reduces, because they attain skills faster than their counterparts in lower ranked societies.
Therefore given a fixed number of members, when the number of members of one subset
increases, the other subsets have a lower number of members.
We also conducted a Spearman correlation statistical test to assess the impact of the
number of skilled agents on the GDI. This test indicates a strong and positive correlation
(i.e. 0.96) between the number of skilled agents and the GDI (p < 0.01). Moreover, it is good
to point out that in M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O0C1, and M.S1O1C1, small companies
may choose to participate in programmes if they face costs in hiring already skilled agents.
Furthermore, systems with a higher quality of training have more skilled agents who have
already finished their programme or are attending apprenticeship programmes. InM.S1O0C1
the presence of an excessive number of skilled agents (i.e. more than 100 which is the total
number of companies; see Table 5.5 for the number of companies and apprentices, and Table
5.9 for the total number of skilled agents) is caused by three factors:
• some agents who attend apprenticeship programmes have gained some skill levels in
earlier years because of the high quality of training (note that although they may or
may not search for jobs, they already have skills);
• the accumulation of already skilled agents who are not hired;
• some small companies started training agents because they found it profitable to train
agents who have lower skills to maximise their utility function. This causes the system
to meet the maximum capacity of training (note that participating in training is limited
to some certified companies, but highly skilled agents will not compensate their wage
increment by working in small companies; see Table 5.3 and Equation 5.3 for the
utility function of small companies).
These factors increase the number of skilled agents and the deviations associated with this
number; see Table 5.9, M.S1O0C1.
Finally, we answer one question raised by Ryan and Unwin (2001) about the incentives
for companies in Britain that first insist on having apprenticeship programmes and then not
participating in training agents or only small companies participating in apprenticeship pro-
grammes to train candidates. The answer is threefold:
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• Neglecting schools in apprenticeship programmes causes a significant drop in prof-
its (especially for large companies), so they prefer to train academically educated
agents, as can be seen in Table 5.6 — society M.S0O0C1 (the replica of society
M.S1O0C1 without compulsory school) faces a 30% drop in the GDI in comparison
with M.S1O1C0 (i.e. 888/1264 ≈ 70%).
• Companies may assume that even a malfunctioning training system has an impact on
regulating wages (i.e. from the labour market point of view, contractors supply some
skilled agents and help the system to balance the wages), despite the fact that under
this scenario it does not have such an influence (see Table 5.10).
• A lack of skilled agents provides justifications to convince the government to grant
them permission to hire from other societies (this phenomenon is studied under Sce-
nario C). As can be seen in Table 5.10, the educated agents’ wages are slightly different
(i.e. between 1% and 4% less) when the system is closed (O0) and schools are com-
pulsory (S1) in apprenticeship programmes (Societies M.S1O0C0 and M.S1O0C1).
Table 5.10: Statistics for wages considering different set-ups (mean ± standard deviation)










Wage non-academic and adequate 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic and excellent 8.9 ± 0.4 8.8 ± 0.6 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
Wage academic and adequate 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
Wage academic and excellent 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2






Wage non-academic and adequate 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic and excellent 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
Wage academic and adequate 10.6 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.3 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
Wage academic and excellent 13.0 ± 0.2 12.9 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
After studying the base model, we systematically change the model’s assumptions. In the
next scenario, we liberalise the training market by letting all trainers participate in training
apprentices. This exploration of more training liberalisation helps us to test the influence of
market-oriented liberalisation ideas on apprenticeship programmes performance.
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5.4.2 Scenario B for manufacturers: Training with maximum capacity,
and no unions
The difference between Scenario B and Scenario A is about relaxing regulations, considering
the restrictions on the number of trainers that controls the number of apprentices attending
the programme (i.e. unions). Hence this number can be significantly more than the provi-
sioned demand. In this scheme of the apprenticeship programme, societies invest in training
so that the amount of unsatisfied demand is minimised. This scheme addresses two issues
raised by the skills shortage in a society, namely: a) high wages and b) costs incurred to the
system due to the lack of skilled agents needed by companies.
Therefore we assume that each contractor can train 20 apprentices per year, and when
companies train, all small companies can choose to participate in training, and the system
starts by training 180 apprentices (see Table 5.11 for more detail). These numbers (i.e. 180
and 200) represent no tendency to control the capacity of training for companies by limiting
participants to certified companies and the tendency of trainers to increase their capacity
to make the most profits. Note that in Scenario A, most cases faced skill shortages and
relaxing the maximum capacity can help the society to tackle that issue. Table 5.12 presents
the percentage of agents who finished the programme and the contribution of apprenticeship
programmes in improving Gross Domestic Income (GDI) for each society (henceforth, we
simply use GDI). Note that we only report the numbers for the same stickiness threshold as
before (i.e. 30).
Table 5.11: The additional simulation parameters for Scenario B
Name Comment Distribution Values
Number of contractors Constant 10
Number of companies Large:Small Constant 20:80
Capacity
Large companies 5
Small companies Constant 1
Contractors 20
Maximum number of apprentices
Companies Capacity × maximum 180
Contractors number of participants∗ 200
Probability of leaving the system when system is open (per run) Constant 0.1
∗ For companies, it can be calculated as (20× 5) + (80× 1) = 180, and for contractors, it can be calculated
as (10× 20) = 200
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5.4.2.1 Impact on programme completion
As can be seen in Table 5.12, successful systems using this metric are the same as in Sce-
nario A — closed systems identified by O0 (i.e. M.S0O0C1, M.S1O0C1, M.S1O0C0, and
M.S0O0C0 are the top four societies). There is a significant change in the percentage of
agents who finished the programme for closed societies wherein companies train appren-
tices. Other systems that are run by companies (i.e. open systems that are identified by O1)
are faced with a slight reduction in completion (see M.S0O1C1 and M.S1O1C1). On the
other hand, the programme completion for systems run by contractors (i.e. systems that are
identified byC0) changes slightly. Some of them improved (seeM.S1O0C0 andM.S1O1C0),
and one was worse-off (see society M.S0O0C0).
Figure 5.4 depicts the completion rates of M.S0O0C1 and M.S1O0C1 over time for Sce-
narios A and B. As can be seen, there is a significant variation in terms of the programme
























Setup M.S0O0C1.A M.S0O0C1.B M.S1O0C1.A M.S1O0C1.B
Figure 5.4: The programme completion ratio for M.S0O0C1 and M.S1O0C1 considering
Scenarios A and B.
small, so we employed statistical tests to ensure these changes are a consequence of hav-
ing more apprentices. For this, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test to identify the impact
of more apprentices in the system, considering different set-ups. This test indicates that a
location shift can be identified in the system (i.e. the medians are not equal, and they shifted
positively and were enhanced, or shifted negatively and declined). To ensure this shift is not
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an impact of set-ups, we conducted pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test
with a Bonferroni adjustment that indicated:
• statistically significant location shifts for societiesM.S0O0C1,M.S1O0C0,M.S1O0C1,
and M.S1O1C1 (i.e. almost all closed societies except for M.S0O0C0 with p < 0.01);
• a less significant location shift for M.S0O1C1 (0.01 < p < 0.05) that indicates all
companies had a negative shift in the completion rate;
• no significant shift for the rest of the socieities (i.e. M.S0O0C0, M.S0O1C0, and
M.S1O1C0, for all p-value = 1).
Table 5.12: The GDI and programme completion for different set-ups considering Scenarios
A and B (mean ± standard deviation)












A 65.7 ± 5.9 77.6 ± 5.4 39.4 ± 3.6 44.6± 3.5
B 63.5 ± 5.8 35.4 ± 14.5 39.4 ± 3.4 44.1 ± 3.8
GDI
A 724 ± 64 888 ± 56 379 ± 35 361 ± 57
B 1054 ± 93 498 ± 214 712 ± 62 427 ± 145








A 72.4 ± 4.7 77.5 ± 3.7 43.4 ± 2.6 46.3 ± 2.6
B 72.8 ± 4.4 31.5 ± 15.9 43.5 ± 2.4 43.3 ± 3.0
GDI
A 1215 ± 58 1264 ± 45 740 ± 34 830 ± 33
B 1502 ± 41 613 ± 299 1199 ± 50 1126 ± 96
5.4.2.2 Impact on the GDI
Then we investigated the impact of Scenario B on the success of apprenticeship programmes
considering the GDI of the society based on items manufactured by hired apprentices by
comparing Scenario B with Scenario A. As can be seen in Table 5.12, the changes in the
GDIs of the societies are significant. We conducted the Kruskal-Wallis test and then made
pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test to assess the impact of this scenario
on the system’s performance.
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The test’s results suggest there is a significant change in the GDIs for all societies dur-
ing these runs (for all of them p < 0.01). While the GDIs for societies M.S0O0C1 and
M.S1O0C1 worsened (i.e. closed societies wherein companies trained apprentices), the rest
of the societies (i.e. open societies or societies wherein contractors trained apprentices) im-
proved their GDIs. This indicates the adverse effect of the new policy for closed societies
wherein companies train apprentices, who are identified by O0 and C1, respectively. Note
that in both M.S0O0C1 and M.S1O0C1, the GDI decreased to less than 60% of the former
scenario, and deviations increased drastically. Figure 5.5 compares the GDI of the societies

































































Figure 5.5: Boxplot of the GDI acquired by apprenticeship programmes under different set-
ups for scenarios A (the boxes with a diamond on the right) and B (the boxes with a diamond
on the left). Red dots present outliers, and a diamond indicates the mean.
5.4.2.3 Impact on wages and the number of skilled agents
We examined the impact of Scenario B on the number of skilled agents and wages in the
society. As can be seen in Table 5.13, the tendency to train more agents increases the number
of skilled agents in all societies, except for M.S0O0C1. However, this increase is more
evident for societies where contractors train apprentices who are identified by C0 (i.e. the
number of total skilled agents for M.S0O0C0, M.S0O1C0, M.S1O0C0, and M.S1O1C0 is
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higher than societies M.S0O0C1, M.S0O1C1, and M.S1O0C1). Only M.S0O1C0 performs
worse than M.S1O1C1 in terms of increasing the number of skilled agents, which implies a
lower impact of the excessive number of skilled agents on contractors’ performance.
Based on the number of skilled agents and the GDI associated with societies (see Tables
5.12 and 5.13), one can conclude that hiring more highly skilled agents in a society does not
necessarily mean a better GDI. This result is intuitive if we keep in mind that high-skilled
agents are paid more and cannot increase small companies’ profitability significantly, and
part of this number of skilled agents represents overqualified agents from former iterations.
This phenomenon is worsened when programmes quality is high (e.g. M.S1O0C0 versus
M.S1O0C1) and small companies can hire some lower skilled agents. Moreover, in some
societies, even training a high number of agents cannot guarantee the availability of enough
skilled agents for companies (i.e. M.S0O1C1 and M.S0O1C0, which is the society similar
to the EIC). It is an indication of the low quality of these societies and the requirement
of significant investment to train apprentices, i.e. even though systems are allowed to train
between 1.8 to 2 times the number of required skills, the total number of skilled agents in
the systems M.S0O1C0 and M.S0O1C1 (including the ones who still attend the programme)
is sometimes less than 100, which is the number of companies in the system.
Note that this increase in the potential number of apprentices decreased the total number
of skilled agents for some societies, so that society M.S0O0C1 faced a shortage of skilled
agents that was caused by fluctuations in training apprentices due to an excessive number of
skilled agents in some iterations and a shortage in others. These exhibit much higher standard
deviations (23.3 versus 4.5, for Scenarios B and A, respectively). The main reason for these
fluctuations is reactions of apprentices and companies to the system — at first, demand for
trained apprentices by companies who are not hired by trainers decreases. Then for decreas-
ing the chances of finding a job, some agents find it unprofitable to attend the programme,
and some companies assume they can find agents, so they do not accept apprentices.
The aforementioned decisions indicate their impacts on the system in three years —
the length of the apprenticeship. Based on this shortage, the probabilities will be updated.
Some trainers and apprentices find the programmes profitable, and again, in some years, the
first step will be reiterated (see Figure 5.4). Overall, this phenomenon is a consequence of
decisions made by all parties based on local information. This myopia in human decisions is
observed by other studies. For instance, Farmer (1997) discusses the phenomenon in supply
chains and business schools. He states that in the final years of the 1960s, academics in the
US believed that purchasing was not a strategic act and had a myopic attitude towards the
practice. After a while, through a change in attitude triggered by the efforts of a minority
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of academics, purchasing was considered as a strategic activity rather than an administrative
one. Without doubt, that belief shows the presence of occasional myopia in academia to
avoid complexities in their decision-making.
Table 5.13: Statistics for work-based and academic skills attained under different set-ups
considering Scenarios A and B (mean ± standard deviation)











A 68.4 ± 6.1 67.2 ± 4.3 45.7 ± 4.0 34.9 ± 5.7
B 119.4 ± 11.0 47.7 ± 21.1 76.2 ± 6.4 41.1 ± 14.1
Non-academic and excellent
A 4.3 ± 0.4 26.8 ± 1.1 2.8 ± 0.3 12.6 ± 2.1
B 8.8 ± 0.9 21.9 ± 9.6 4.8 ± 0.4 14.7 ± 5.1
Academic and adequate
A 3.8 ± 0.4 6.9 ± 0.6 2.5 ± 0.3 3.4 ± 0.6
B 6.4 ± 0.6 5.0 ± 2.2 4.2 ± 0.4 4.1 ± 1.3
Academic and excellent
A 0.4 ± 0.4 16.2 ± 0.5 0.2 ± 0.1 1.8 ± 0.6
B 0.5 ± 0.3 22.2 ± 1.3 0.3 ± 0.1 2.1 ± 1.1
Total Skilled
A 76.9 ± 6.1 117.1 ± 4.5 51.2 ± 4.0 52.7 ± 6.1
B 135.1 ± 11.1 96.8 ± 23.3 85.5 ± 6.4 62.0 ± 15.1







A 45.5 ± 3.3 51.0 ± 2.9 32.7 ± 2.2 41.3 ± 2.4
B 79.9 ± 5.2 33.2 ± 17.0 54.7 ± 3.3 60.8 ± 5.2
Non-academic and excellent
A 12.5 ± 1.0 21.6 ± 1.3 8.2 ± 0.6 15.3 ± 1.0
B 21.8 ± 1.2 16.5 ± 9.1 13.7 ± 0.9 22.3 ± 2.1
Academic and adequate
A 36.8 ±1.9 32.3 ± 1.5 25.3 ± 1.2 24.6 ± 1.3
B 78.7 ± 5.0 24.1 ± 11.6 42.1 ± 1.8 36.6 ± 3.0
Academic and excellent
A 0.4 ± 1.9 61.1 ± 13.4 8.5 ± 0.9 16.0 ± 1.9
B 25.2 ± 2.7 97.5 ± 8.4 14.2 ± 1.3 23.7 ± 3.5
Total Skilled
A 95.2 ± 4.4 166.0 ± 13.9 74.7 ± 2.7 97.2 ± 3.5
B 205.6 ± 7.8 171.3 ± 24.0 124.7 ± 4.1 143.4 ± 7.3
As can be seen in Table 5.14, only M.S0O0C0 and M.S1O0C0 had a significant de-
crease in wages. Based on the considered stickiness threshold (i.e. 30) for wages (see Table
5.3 and Section 5.3.1 for a discussion), it is intuitive that societies M.S0O0C0, M.S1O0C0,
M.S1O0C1, and M.S1O1C1 (i.e. societies with more than 130 skilled agents, which is the
number of companies, 100, along with the stickiness threshold, 30) have a significant change
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in wages. Therefore we state intuitions to explain the lack of such a phenomenon in societies
M.S1O0C1 and M.S1O1C1.
First, note that these numbers include apprentices attending the programme. Therefore
based on the higher number of agents with academic and excellent skills inM.S1O0C1, and
the decrease in completion rate (see Tables 5.12 and 5.13), most agents who have low skills
leave the programme at earlier stages, i.e. before they gain high skills. This phenomenon
increases the excessive number of skilled agents for skills for which an excessive number of
them was already present in Scenario A. The issue with this increase stems from the inability
of these agents to increase the income of small companies unless they have a wage equal
to 12 or less (the income of small companies when they produce items using these skills is
14; see Table 5.3). Thus most demand by small companies targets skilled agents without
academic education for whom the system does not successfully provide.
The aforementioned phenomenon leads to a strict lower-bound for wages for academic
and excellent skills (these agents expect more wages than their uneducated counterparts).
This phenomenon, coupled with the fact that an increase in the number of agents causes large
companies to stop accepting apprentices in the following periods, causes wages to stick near
the upper limit (i.e. 13, see Table 5.3) rather than the lower bound (i.e. 12, Wage academic
and adequate +1, as indicated in Algorithm 5.1 and Table 5.14). In society M.S1O1C1, an
increment in the number of skilled agents is more homogeneous and is due to the openness
of the society and the participation of all companies in training apprentices. The unemployed
agents are likewise uniformly distributed across their different degrees of skills. This uniform
distribution for societyM.S1O1C1 and the behaviour of companies and apprentices in society
M.S1O0C1 prevent wages from decreaseing to lower limits. Moreover, a better distribution
of more skilled agents (i.e. agents with skills better than non-academic and adequate), cou-
pled with lower wages for skilled agents, improved the GDI of society M.S1O0C0, despite
the lower number of agents with academic and excellent skills. In other words, due to the
lower wages, it was rational for small companies to hire more skilled agents.
5.4.3 Scenario C for manufacturers: Openness for working (the impact
of the influx of workers from other communities)
This interpretation of openness for Scenario C considers systems that cope with immigration
rather than emigration, i.e. some skilled agents move into the community to work instead
of leaving apprenticeship programmes to work in other communities. Therefore in these
systems, immigrants are not aware of a wage norm (e.g. they moved due to unfortunate
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Table 5.14: Statistics for wages considering different set-ups for Scenarios A and B (mean
± standard deviation)
Part 1 (Societies M.S0O0C0–M.S0O1C1)
Setup Scenario M.S0O0C0 M.S0O0C1 M.S0O1C0 M.S0O1C1
Wage non-academic
and adequate
A 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
B 2.0 ± 0.2 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic
and excellent
A 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.8 ± 0.6 8.9 ± 0.4
B 6.8 ± 0.4 8.5 ± 0.6 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
Wage academic
and adequate
A 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
B 10.8 ± 0.3 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
Wage academic
and excellent
A 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
B 12.8 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
Part 2 (Societies M.S1O0C0–M.S1O1C1)
Setup Scenario M.S1O0C0 M.S1O0C1 M.S1O1C0 M.S1O1C1
Wage non-academic
and adequate
A 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
B 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic
and excellent
A 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
B 6.1 ± 0.1 8.7 ± 0.5 8.9 ± 0.5 8.9 ± 0.4
Wage academic
and adequate
A 10.6 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.3 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2
B 7.2 ± 0.2 10.8 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.3 11.0 ± 0.2
Wage academic
and excellent
A 13.0 ± 0.2 12.9 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
B 11.3 ± 0.1 12.9 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2
situations in their home country). Some studies indicate that the presence of both legal and
illegal immigrants in a society triggers tendencies in companies to hire them and pay them
lower wages (see McCollum & Findlay, 2015; Ruhs & Anderson, 2010).
We address the impact of this tendency by considering some negotiation advantages for
companies that can hire from other communities. We assume that in negotiation, large com-
panies can pay average wages for all combinations of non-academic and excellent, aca-
demic and excellent, and academic and adequate to immigrants because they have doubts
about the excellence of agents’ work-based skills but are sure about their academic skills.
Most parameters for this model are the same as Scenario A (see Table 5.15), except for
the probability of leaving the society that was excluded there. Based on what has just been
stated, we do not consider instances where apprentices may leave the society to work in other
communities that were included in former scenarios (i.e. open societies that are identified by
O1, which encompass societies M.S0O1C0, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O1C0, and M.S1O1C1).
For these societies, we considered two factors, namely flexibility of immigrants and large
companies’ uncertainties about immigrants’ work-based skills. Therefore we assume that
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and have doubts about their work-based skills being adequate or excellent with the same
chance (they assume that based on the agents’ work experience, they at least have adequate
skills, hence having inadequate skills is ruled out).
Table 5.15: The additional simulation parameters for Scenario C
Name Comment Distribution Values
Number of contractors Constant 10
Number of companies Large:Small Constant 20:80
Capacity
Large companies 5
Small companies Constant 1
Contractors 12
Maximum number of apprentices
Companies Capacity × maximum 106
Contractors number of participants 120
5.4.3.1 Impact on programme completion and the GDI
As can be seen in Table 5.16, the differences between the programme completion ratios for
Scenarios A and C is less than 2%, and the systems in which contractors train apprentices are
more sensitive to openness (i.e. societies that are identified by C0). Note that only societies
M.S0O0C0 and M.S1O0C0 faced a drop in completion where contractors train apprentices.
To study the GDI, note that the presented figures indicate the GDI produced by apprentice-
ship programmes, i.e. the GDI of agents who are hired from other societies is not included in
these figures. The only system in which the associated GDI improved is society M.S0O0C0,
which possessed too many low-skilled agents (i.e. agents with non-academic and adequate
skills). The reason behind the aforementioned change is that large companies’ demand de-
creases in the system for skilled agents by hiring from other societies (note that the values
of items produced by agents without academic skills were 10 and 12 for small companies,
versus 5 and 10 for large companies, respectively (see Table 5.3)). Overall, a significant
drop in the GDI produced by apprentices in the society is evident (see Figure 5.6). Large
companies partly cause this by hiring from other places, rather than training or hiring trained
apprentices, and that leads to the following:
• large companies not preferring to participate in programmes in societies M.S1O1C0
and M.S0O1C0, which leads to a drop in the number of skilled agents;
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• demand for agents with academic skills from the apprenticeship pool diminishes;
• the presence of unemployed agents with academic skills in the societyM.S1O0C0 (see
Table 5.17).
The ratio of agents with academic skills to the total number of skilled agents increases
significantly (i.e. even though small companies train, the ratio of agents with academic and
excellent skills increases from around 36% to around 45% (see Table 5.17)).
Finally, it should be noted that the only system where its GDI was improved wasM.S0O0
C0, which is similar to modern Britain, and some studies point out the openness of Britain
around the same years when this scheme of apprenticeship programme was utilised (see Mc-
Collum & Findlay, 2015). The opportunity of hiring from other societies and consideration
about the costs of free academic training for all apprentices by the government may be some
of the reasons for not employing the German scheme in Britain.
Table 5.16: The GDI and programme completion ratio for different set-ups considering Sce-











A 65.7 ± 5.9 77.6 ± 5.4 72.4 ± 4.7 77.5 ± 3.7
C 64.3 ± 9.5 77.2 ± 12.8 70.9 ± 9.4 76.5 ± 9.8
GDI
A 724 ± 64 888 ± 56 1215 ± 58 1264 ± 45
C 786 ± 115 513 ± 84 926 ± 119 600 ± 96
5.4.3.2 Impact on wages and the number of skilled agents
To study the number of skilled agents we should emphasise that:
• this number indicates the total number of skilled agents, including the ones who attend
the programme;
• unemployed skilled agents for one or two years stay in the skilled pool, so this in-
creases the number of agents, and this does not essentially mean that a system works
better.
The increase in the number of skilled agents may imply that some of the skilled agents are
redundant; hence they cannot participate in productive jobs. Overall, the number of skilled
agents decreased in all societies, except M.S1O0C0. However, the percentage of skilled









































Figure 5.6: Boxplot of the GDI acquired by apprentice programmes under different set-ups
for Scenarios A (the boxes with a diamond on the right) and C (the boxes with a diamond on
the left). The red dots present outliers, and a diamond indicates the mean.
and part of it is caused by less demand for skilled agents in general. Less demand for skilled
agents increases the proportion of agents with academic and excellent skills in M.S0O0C1
and M.S1O0C1 (societies in which companies train agents). Therefore the indicators, mea-
sured by the ratio AcademicAndExcellent/TotalSkilled, show an increase from 14% and
36% to 16% and 45% for societies M.S0O0C1 and M.S1O0C1, respectively.
However, this increase in the share of academic and skilled agents is coupled with a lower
number of total skilled agents. This overall decrease in the number of skilled agents indicates
a decrease in the number of trained apprentices in the society, which implies a lower tendency
for large companies to accept apprentices. Moreover, less demand for skilled agents leads
to more fluctuations in programme completion (it almost doubles the standard deviation; see
Table 5.16). Based on the results, this increase mostly impacts agents with more attainability
because they are the ones who are prone to the least demand in the labour market (i.e. only
the number of agents with Academic and excellent skills increased).
As can be seen in Table 5.18, only M.S0O0C0and M.S1O0C0 had a significant decrease
in wages. Based on the considered stickiness threshold (i.e. 30) for wages that was stated
in Section 5.3.1, it is intuitive that societies M.S0O0C0, M.S1O0C1, and M.S1O0C0 would
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Table 5.17: Statistics for work-based and academic skills attained under different set-ups
considering Scenarios A and C, for societies M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1, M.S1O0C0, and










A 68.4 ± 6.1 67.2 ± 4.3 45.5 ± 3.3 51.0 ± 2.9
C 67.0 ± 9.7 40.2 ± 6.2 44.7 ± 5.5 29.7 ± 4.2
Non-academic and excellent
A 4.3 ± 0.4 26.8 ± 1.1 12.5 ± 1.0 21.6 ± 1.3
C 4.2 ± 0.6 15.9 ± 2.2 12.3 ± 1.6 12.6 ± 1.7
Academic and adequate
A 3.8 ± 0.4 6.9 ± 0.6 36.8 ±1.9 32.3 ± 1.5
C 3.8 ± 0.6 4.2 ± 0.7 36.1 ± 4.4 19.2 ± 2.7
Academic and excellent
A 0.4 ± 0.4 16.2 ± 0.5 0.4 ± 1.9 61.1 ± 13.4
C 0.3 ± 0.3 11.1 ± 1.3 14.8 ± 2.1 49.4 ± 5.4
Total Skilled
A 76.9 ± 6.1 117.1 ± 4.5 95.2 ± 4.4 166.0 ± 13.9
C 75.3 ± 9.7 71.4 ± 6.7 107.9 ± 7.5 110.9 ± 7.5
have some changes in wages. This expectation is based on both the total number of skilled
agents and the number of skilled agents per skill (e.g. agents with academic and adequate
skills). As can be seen, in M.S0O0C0 the wages for agents with academic skills or excellent
skills decreased. This phenomenon is caused by factors such as:
• the availability of enough skilled agents;
• the participation of most small companies in the programme, so they do not put that
much demand into the labour market;
• most of the large companies hired agents with academic skills from other societies
(there is less demand for agents with academic skills).
For society M.S1O0C1, the average wage for all skills is near maximum. The increase
in the standard deviation of wages indicates that wages decreased more than the former case
(i.e. Scenario A and note that this number cannot be more than its upper bound). Further-
more, in society M.S1O0C0, the largest wage difference is associated with agents possessing
academic and excellent skills (the difference in the average wages equals 2). This higher
difference indicates the availability of demand for this skill during some iterations that per-
suaded some agents with more attainability for both academic and work-based skills to com-
plete the programme.
However, results suggest that once apprentices finished the programme, the labour market
had already fulfilled that demand (see the higher average number of agents with academic
159
and excellent skills in Table 5.17 for society M.S1O0C0). Therefore overall, sometimes
demand for highly skilled agents persuades agents to finish the programme, but this demand
is a consequence of a shortage of low-skilled agents. Furthermore, more demand for low-
skilled agents and less participation by large companies causes a lower number of agents to
attend an apprenticeship and finish the programme in Scenario C in comparison to Scenario
A (see Table 5.17). Finally, less demand for skilled agents and less motivation to attend the
programme cause the system to have higher wages than the initial wages (see Tables 5.18
and 5.3).










Wage non-academic and adequate
A 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
C 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1 4.0 ± 0.1
Wage non-academic and excellent
A 8.9 ± 0.4 8.8 ± 0.6 8.9 ± 0.4 8.9 ± 0.4
C 6.3 ± 0.3 8.9 ± 0.7 8.8 ± 0.7 8.9 ± 0.7
Wage academic and adequate
A 11.0 ± 0.2 11.0 ± 0.2 10.6 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.3
C 10.1 ± 0.3 10.9 ± 0.4 9.9 ± 0.2 10.9 ± 0.4
Wage academic and excellent
A 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 13.0 ± 0.2 12.9 ± 0.3
C 12.1 ± 0.3 12.9 ± 0.4 11.9 ± 0.3 12.9 ± 0.4
5.5 Results of apprenticeships for artisans
The specific parameters for apprenticeships by artisans is presented in Table 5.19. As can
be seen, artisans have limited training capacity (i.e. they accept only one new apprentice per
run). Moreover, for the model to be more realistic, we assumed only some artisans accept
apprentices and those who accept them will do so once in three years. The number of trainers
considered for the system is for each run, and we considered a trainer as a representative for a
group of three possible trainers (i.e. 100 artisans accept participants in each run). The agents
already training decide based on the behaviour of similar training agents (i.e. if a similar
agent decides not to train, they reduce the quality of training).
What have been stated earlier (i.e. participation by a limited number of artisans), impacts
apprentices’ decisions by assuming a 10% chance of being a trainer in the system in the near
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future;24 hence, they have an income that is the same as the paid costs in the future. The
agents assume they can be trainers after finishing the programme in three years (because
the chance is not high, they do not consider conditional probabilities). The demand in these
systems is a function of the following phenomena:
• Formerly active agents retire, pass away, or move to other communities. This indi-
cates the requirement of skilled agents observed or provisioned in some societies. For
instance, Neumark et al. (2013) warned that some states in the US will face skill short-
ages in the near future due to the retirement of “baby boom cohort”;
• Population growth introduces new demands for the skill. This is a consequence of new
demand for services introduced by a new person. In most countries, net population
growth is positive; hence, all else unchanged, more skilled agents are required to work
in the same sector.25
Note that based on the assumption that all agents would not participate in the training,
and the ones who do train participate once in three years,26 the demand can be a significant
share of the number of trainers (we assumed that R in Algorithm 5.1 is 60%). The impact of
asking for a premium (i.e. prepayments by apprentices) is twofold: a) it imposes some initial
costs that are considered by apprentices to calculate the profits of attending the programme
and b) the imposed costs limit the share of the society that can afford to attend the appren-
ticeship to families with higher incomes (around 30% of the society).27 Furthermore, for
stickiness of wages (stated in Section 5.3.1), we modified the threshold employed for manu-
facturer societies, considering the new proportion of the demand (i.e. 60%), to decrease the
considered number (i.e. we used 18 instead of 30).
For modelling apprenticeship programmes with respect to artisans, we chose three char-
acteristics, namely:
24It is based on the evidence that suggests that “masters’ experience of training did matter. Masters were
able to charge higher premiums with each apprentice they took, with the fourth apprentice paying over 20 per
cent more than the first” (Minns & Wallis, 2011, p. 12). From the importance of training experience, we can
infer that a recently trained person could hardly recruit apprentices.
25Around 20 countries face shrinking populations (Wikipedia contributors, 2019).
26It is based on the apprenticeship period in modern instances, namely modern Britain and German appren-
ticeships.
27It is based on the evidence of 1700s England that indicates it took about two years of saving for a farmer
to provide the required premium for an apprenticeship in low prestigious industries, such as the metal and
footwear industries — £53.6 versus £10 (see Minns & Wallis, 2012, Table 2). Also, the more prestigious skills
and professions that were not hired by a company asked for higher premiums that were mostly affordable by
“sons of professionals and gentlemen”(Minns & Wallis, 2011, 2013). On average, these premiums were five
times more than that of the metal and footwear industries (Minns & Wallis, 2011, 2013).
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Table 5.19: The simulation parameters for artisans
Name Description Distribution Values
Number of trainer artisans Constant 100
Capacity
Small companies Constant 1
Large companies 1
Probability of leaving the system When system is open (per run) Constant 0.1
• asking for a premium;
• the degree of openness for candidates of other communities seeking to join apprentice-
ship programmes;
• benefiting from guilds as a mediator to hedge already skilled artisans’ benefits (see
Table 5.20).
Table 5.20 presents characteristics for the eight simulated societies and societies they
represent. The set-ups (i.e. societies) are identified by a prefix (A.) as a representative for
the trade type of artisans. In addition, each society can be identified by the first letter of
the characteristics, namely P, O, and G that are representatives of the characteristics listed
above. We used a Boolean index to indicate whether such an attribute was included (i.e. 1)
or not (i.e. 0). Likewise, in this table a tick indicates the society includes that attribute, and a
cross indicates the society does not include that attribute.
Table 5.21 represents an overview of the results. As can be seen, we do not consider
academic skills for artisans (the activities are concerned with making or doing things by
hand), and skills are divided into Adequate and Excellent. To obtain the GDI, we employed
the values in Table 5.3. Simulation started with wages equal to 7 and 11 for agents with
adequate and excellent skills, respectively. The following paragraphs investigate the impact
of the society’s characteristics on the agents’ behaviour.




























































































Premium 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Open 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
Guilds 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
1 Note that in old Britain both closed and open societies were presented.
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Table 5.21: Results for the apprenticeship programmes of artisans’ societies









Wage adequate 3±1.5 9.0±0.2 9.9 ± 0.3 9.9±0.3
Wage excellent 4.9±1.6 11.8±0.1 12.0±0.1 12.7±0.1
Number of adequate 65.7 ± 3.8 63.5 ± 2.7 54.8 ± 2.0 54.0 ± 2.3
Number of excellent 30.0 ± 1.3 30.2 ± 1.5 20.7 ± 1.3 23.2 ± 1.1
Total skilled 95.7 ± 4.0 93.7 ± 3.1 75.5 ± 2.4 77.2 ± 2.5
Programme completion (%) 70.6 ± 3.4 70.9 ± 2.0 59.3 ± 1.4 58.5 ± 1.2
GDI 797 ± 28 782 ± 18 767 ± 22 677 ± 19







Wage adequate 4.0 ± 1.0 8.5 ± 0.2 9.9 ± 0.3 9.9 ± 0.4
Wage excellent 6.1 ± 1.0 11.6 ± 0.1 12.0 ± 0.1 12.3± 0.2
Number of adequate 62.6 ± 2.9 63.2 ± 1.9 54.6 ± 1.5 54.1 ± 1.5
Number of excellent 26.3 ± 2.6 29.3 ± 1.6 20.2 ± 1.5 21.4 ± 1.6
Total skilled 88.9 ± 3.9 92.5 ± 2.5 74.8 ± 2.1 75.5 ± 2.2
Programme completion (%) 71.2 ± 2.2 70.4 ± 2.1 59.1 ± 1.4 58.4 ± 1.3
GDI 769 ± 26 782 ± 16 765 ± 15 721 ± 12
5.5.1 Impact on programme completion
Figure 5.7 indicates the tendency of agents towards completing the programme with respect
to different set-ups. In these graphs, each horizontal pair groups simulated societies, based on
having (right) and not having (left) that characteristic (i.e. the same line appears in each pair
of characteristics). Furthermore, the societies of interest are highlighted with thicker lines.
As can be seen in Table 5.21, when there is no guild (indicated byG0), the overall completion
rate increases. The results comply with Wallis’s (2008) claim about the impact of guilds on
apprenticeships (see A.P0O0G0, A.P0O1G0, A.P1O0G0, and A.P1O1G0 versus A.P0O0G1,
A.P0O1G1, A.P1O0G1, and A.P1O1G1). He claims that “apprenticeship[s] thrived despite,
not because of the guilds, therefore we should be more aware of the distinction between the
two institutions” (Wallis, 2008).
The only counter example for the negative impact of guilds is societies where apprentices
do not pay any premium, and programmes take place in a closed society. This outcome is
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Figure 5.7: Programme completion ratio (vertical axis) in each iteration (horizontal axis),
considering different system characteristics.
and no one leaves the society during or after finishing the programme, trainers will not train
well to control the workforce supply, and some apprentices may leave the programme due to
limited probabilities associated with finding a job.
Just as with the manufacturers’ case, openness decreases the completion rate. The highest
164
completion rate is associated with A.P1O0G0, wherein the society is closed, agents pay a
premium, and there is no guild that limits agents who join the labour market. Variations are
not impacted by paying premiums, except for A.P0O0G0 versus A.P1O0G0 (i.e. two closed
societies without guilds, with a difference in paying premiums) where we see that paying
premiums had some impact on decreasing fluctuations.
Finally, the percentage of agents who finished the programme is more than the numbers
suggested by Wallis (2008)28 which can be caused by factors such as deceased agents. Note
that in one instance Wallis (2008) mentioned that the reason for leaving the programme was
that 14.6% of apprentices died, and 1.1 per cent wed and left the programme for paid jobs
(i.e. 15.7 in total). This number justifies differences between the completion rate obtained
by simulation (i.e. 58.4%) and the around 40% completion rate observed in old Britain.
5.5.2 Impact on the GDI
The next step is measuring the success of these programmes in increasing the GDI of so-
ciety. As can be seen in Figure 5.8, paying a premium has some impact on decreasing the
system’s GDI by limiting the number of participants; hence, the value of items produced by
them (A.P0O0G0 and A.P0O1G0 outperform their counterparts’ GDIs, i.e. A.P1O0G0 and
A.P1O1G0). The only case that faced an increase in the GDI once managers asked for pre-
mium is A.P1O1G1, where the system was open and had some guilds, i.e. a representative of
old Britain. This phenomenon indicates the importance of premiums in convincing artisans
to train well.
Having a guild only improves society A.P1O0G1’s GDI, where the system is closed and
some premium is paid. Note that paying premiums decreases a society’s performance by
limiting access to the apprenticeship programme for part of the society, and the closedness of
the society causes trainers to feel trained apprentices threaten their future income if no guild
is available. Overall, closed societies (identified by O0) produce better GDIs for training
apprentices who will serve the society (see A.P0O0G0, A.P0O0G1, and A.P1O0G1 versus
A.P0O1G0, A.P0O1G1, and A.P1O1G1, respectively).
The only instance where openness slightly improves the system performance isA.P1O1G0,
which is caused by a combination of low access to apprenticeship programmes (i.e. paying a
premium) combined with a lack of guilds. Finally, for both open and closed societies, when
there are free programmes and no guilds system in terms of GDI, they outperform other
cases (i.e. A.P0O1G0 outperforms A.P0O1G1, A.P1O1G0, and A.P1O1G1 and A.P0O0G0



































































Figure 5.8: Boxplot of the GDI acquired by apprentice programmes under different set-ups
in an artisan society; red dots present outliers and a diamond indicates the mean.
5.5.3 Impact on wages and the number of skilled agents
Figure 5.9 presents numbers of excellent (left) and adequate (right) skilled agents in the
society. As can be seen in Figure 5.9 and Table 5.21, asking for premiums (indicated by
P1) decreases the number of skilled agents in the system by limiting the number of partic-
ipants (A.P1O0G0, A.P1O0G1, A.P1O1G0, and A.P1O1G1 versus A.P0O0G0, A.P0O0G1,
A.P0O1G0, and A.P0O1G1). This impact is caused by limiting the potential number of
participants, and hence there is a decrease in the degree of motivation in apprentices. On
the other hand, the openness of the system (indicated by O1) causes a remarkable drop in
the number of skilled agents in the system (see A.P0O1G0, A.P0O1G1, A.P1O1G0, and
A.P1O1G1 versus A.P0O0G0, A.P0O0G1, A.P1O0G0, and A.P1O0G1). This drop is pre-
dictable, keeping in mind that some apprentices leave the system to work in other societies.
To assess the impact of the guilds (indicated by G1), we compare societies A.P0O0G1,
A.P0O1G1,A.P1O0G1, andA.P1O1G1 withA.P0O0G0,A.P0O1G0,A.P1O0G0, andA.P1O1
G0. As depicted in Figure 5.9, the number of excellent skilled agents increases when there
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are some guilds in the system. This slight increase was predictable, given the fact that com-
panies have less fear of training some potential competitors. However, the number of agents
possessing adequate skill decreases in almost all societies run by guilds. The only excep-
tion is A.P1O0G1 where agents should already pay a premium, so the presence of guilds

































































































































Figure 5.9: Boxplot of skill acquired by apprentice programmes under different set-ups in an
artisan society; red dots present outliers and a diamond indicates the mean.
To study other influences of these characteristics, we measure wages paid in each society.
Figure 5.10 presents wages associated with excellent (left) and adequate (right) skilled agents
in the society. As can be seen, when there is no guild (identified by G0), wages decrease
to some extent (see wages in A.P0O0G1, A.P0O1G1, A.P1O0G1, and A.P1O1G1 versus
A.P0O0G0, A.P0O1G0, A.P1O0G0, and A.P1O1G0). The openness of the system (identified
byO1) increases wages in the societies for the formerly stated reasons. Asking for a premium
(identified by P1) has different impacts on wages. It limits the increase in wages in some
societies (A.P0O0G1 and A.P0O1G1 versus A.P1O0G1 and A.P1O1G1) but fails to do so in
other societies (see A.P0O0G0 and A.P0O1G0 versus A.P1O0G0 and A.P1O1G0).
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Another interesting observation regards the combination of closedness and the lack of
guilds that reduces the wages dramatically. Moreover, not asking for premiums causes
more drops in wages. This phenomenon was the reason for what was observed by Chardin
(Chardin, 1720), i.e. masters were reluctant to train their apprentices. The masters’ tendency
for training will be less if they have to pay wages (as observed in Persia by Chardin). One
of the essential tools of masters in such societies is the flexibility of the apprenticeship’s
duration. This flexibility helps masters to compensate the costs incurred to them by asking
apprentices to assist them in their day-to-day tasks and reducing the speed of training to



































































































































Figure 5.10: Boxplot of wages associated with different degrees of skill under different set-
ups in an artisan society; red dots present outliers and a diamond indicates the mean.
As can be seen in Figure 5.10, societiesA.P0O0G0 andA.P1O0G0 have a significant shift
in means in comparison with medians (i.e. their means are placed outside the box). To study
the reason for such shifts, Figure 5.11 presents the line plot for these two societies. Based
on the figure, we can conclude that the outliers (i.e. observations outside the first and third































Figure 5.11: The plot of changes in wages associated with different degrees of skill for
selected societies of an artisan society
time and after more than 50 iterations (i.e. years) wages reach a more stable value (i.e. the
value represented by the median in Figure 5.10).
5.6 Summary, discussion, and outlook
This chapter has investigated the key characteristics of apprenticeship programmes by con-
sidering both historical and contemporary cases in several countries. The main aim of the
simulation has been to identify the impact of institutional mechanisms and social charac-
teristics on the success of these programmes in increasing the number of skilled agents and
improving societal level profits (i.e. the GDI). To perform this modelling, we considered two
trade types, namely artisans and manufacturers.
Differentiating these two trade types is essential, as their motivations for accepting ap-
prentices were diverse. Artisans trained potential employees and may have felt threatened
by their apprentices, as they were potential competitors. However, the manufacturers train
future employees for themselves. For each of the aforementioned trade types, we system-
atically changed the key characteristics to assess their impacts on societies’ performances.
Furthermore, we considered different scenarios for manufacturers because of the more com-
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plicated characteristics of those societies.
For the manufacturers (as stated in Section 5.4), we considered three other characteristics,
the openness of the society, the utilisation of schools in training apprentices, and the trainer
type. The impact of the openness of the society is twofold and is addressed by two different
scenarios:
• some agents may leave the system during training to find a job in other communities
(Scenarios A and B of manufacturers);
• some agents may immigrate from other communities to work in the community under
study because of issues in their communities (Scenario C of manufacturers).
We systematically mapped these characteristics into societal stereotypes which capture
intrinsic separate real-world societies. These characteristics included the role of schools,
one of the differences between the EIC and Julfan traders. The importance of schools is
also emphasised in modern contexts by differentiating between German and British cases.
The schools facilitate transferring academic skills such as mathematics and what-if scenario
analysis. These skills help agents to handle more complicated tasks and also to be more able
to handle changes in trade. The trainers for manufacturers have two types: contractors who
are paid for training agents, and companies who train potential employees for themselves.
These two factors, i.e. employing schools and trainer types were considered for all scenarios
associated with manufacturers.
The other trades type that has been addressed in this chapter is artisans. In both his-
torical and contemporary contexts, we can see some societies that use guilds as a mediator
to regulate the workforce market. Such restrictions remove threats of an excessive supply
of agents for artisans who already practise the profession. The openness of the society is
another characteristic that impacts the workforce supply. In other words, agents may leave
the system for better opportunities in other communities when the system is open; hence,
less workforce supply is available for the future. Finally, in old Britain, trainers asked for
some pre-payments to compensate for the costs of training. Those costs reduced the number
of agents who could access the system to those from more prosperous families, and these
expenses reduced the expected profit margins of apprenticeships for agents.
As the results suggest, the success of apprenticeships should not be assessed by pro-
gramme completion, and the approach taken by Ryan and Unwin (2001) can be misleading.
For instance, when agents are trained in a closed society that lacks academic training by
manufacturers (see M.S0O0C1 in Table 5.6), the highest percentage of finishing the appren-
ticeship programme was available ( 77.6%), but this system has a lower GDI than two other
closed societies (M.S1O0C0 and M.S1O0C1 in Table 5.6) with 888 versus 1215 and 1264.
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In the M.S0O0C1 society, schools are not mandatory, which reduces the speed of learning
and profitability. Furthermore, agents trained by a company (not by contractors) also have
chances to be hired by the companies under which they are trained, and they have more
motivation to complete the programme; hence, the system is expected to have a higher com-
pletion rate. Therefore the completion rate is not a good indicator for the sustainability of
the apprenticeship programme in a society.
Simulation for manufacturers indicates the importance of different characteristics of the
society. The Scenario A of manufacturers suggests that if the government wants to intervene
in available apprenticeship programmes run by stakeholders (i.e. companies), it should be
done by introducing school-based training systems, especially for skills in domains such
as mechanical and electrical engineering where technical knowledge and analysing skills
are essential for being flexible when a company changes its procedures. These obtained
academic skills will help more prominent manufacturers improve their profits.
We assessed the impact of openness of a community (i.e. when the chances to leave
the community to work in other places are available) on the GDIs for Scenarios A and B
of manufacturers. The results emphasise the importance of some guarantees provided by
apprentices about staying in the same society after training, since the openness of systems
(i.e. leaving a system by trainees, which is indicated by O1) decreases the GDI dramati-
cally (see M.S0O1C0, M.S0O1C1, M.S1O1C0, M.S1O1C1 versus M.S0O0C0, M.S0O0C1,
M.S1O0C0, M.S1O0C1 in Figures 5.2 and 5.5). This drop of the GDI is because of the sub-
stantial decrease in either collaboration by large companies to train apprentices or the failure
of some companies to find the most appropriate agents to hire.
On the other hand, for manufacturing apprenticeships, a scheme that persuades agents
to finish the programme instead of leaving it half way for better jobs, is another way to im-
prove system performance. This can be achieved by requiring agents to earn their degree or
diploma as undertaken in the German system. It should be emphasised that when comparing
societies considering trainer type (i.e. contractors or companies), we should consider some
other factors that may motivate the government to use contractors. Contractors have direct
impacts on the unemployment rate by creating some jobs for contractors and trainers in the
system, and utilising them is a method to instantly reduce the unemployment rate. However,
the factor that demotivates the government to invest considerably in the system is the mag-
nitude of public expenditure for training more agents as a consequence of paid subsidies to
contractors.
We assessed three scenarios for apprenticeship systems in a manufacturer society to ob-
tain more insights into the system. The scenarios were as follows:
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Scenario A) training to satisfy the labour market demand (i.e. 100 to 120 apprentices per
run);
Scenario B) training more than demand by relaxing unions’ considerations (from 180 to 200
apprentices per run);
Scenario C) openness for skilled agents from other countries to join and work in the society.
Systems run by contractors (indicated by C0) benefited more from increasing the number
of apprentices to a level more than was required (see M.S0O0C0, M.S0O1C0, M.S1O0C0,
and M.S1O1C0 in Figure 5.5 Scenario B). There are two reasons for this. First, the system
could satisfy more demand. Second, the availability of skilled agents would not impact
trainers’ motivations for training. Note that manufacturers’ objectives of training are to fulfil
their demand, but contractors train in order to make more immediate profit.
However, an additional factor for manufacturers’ apprenticeship that should be taken
into account is associated with Scenario B. Scenario B has more public expenditures for the
apprenticeship programme compared to Scenario A. Finally, the results of Scenario C shed
some light on the potential reasons large companies in Britain asked for an apprenticeship
programme but would not participate in it (Ryan & Unwin, 2001). If we assume that some
skilled agents with lower expectations from outside the country are available (as suggested
by McCollum and Findlay (2015)), the main intention of large companies is to stabilise the
wages so they do not have to pay so much to hire skilled agents.
Assessing the apprenticeship for artisans reveals that a lack of guilds and prepayments
for the programme increases the system’s GDI significantly (see A.P0O0G0 and A.P0O1G0
in Figure 5.8). The negative impact of prepayments is through limiting the number of poten-
tial participants and dissuading them from participation by decreasing the profit of appren-
ticeship. Guilds, as a means of controlling workforce supply, make the system biased for
trainers’ benefits and fail the self-regulatory behaviour of the system by unilaterally increas-
ing the risks associated with newly trained apprentices finding a job. Therefore on the one
hand, trainers will train without considering the number of unemployed skilled agents, and
on the other hand, this increase cannot reduce wages to modify demands for highly skilled
agents.
Finally, there are some other important characteristics of systems that are observed in
historical and contemporary cases. These phenomena are studied by considering artisan
societies. The results suggest that if some premium is asked from the participants, by limiting
the number of potential attendees, the degree of skill will decrease. This phenomenon was
evident in old Britain where agents had to pay some premium.29
29In the EIC, agents should have asked two guarantors to sign a bond, which it was not collected uppon the
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Moreover, even though guilds may improve the number of skilled agents, they also reduce
the system’s GDI in all cases, except one. That case is a closed society where agents were
asked to pay a premium. These results suggest the efficacy of the Julfan and the German
apprenticeship systems in comparison to the British system for both artisans (A.P0O0G0)
and manufacturers (M.S1O0C1) under certain conditions.
We wish to acknowledge some of the limitations of this chapter. These include not ex-
ploring parameters in a continuous range, but only considering a systematic set of discrete
values (e.g. for motivation, and bad training), especially in cases where it is predictable
that a further decrease in parameter values reduces system performance (e.g. when consid-
ering outputs such as the GDI and the number of skilled agents). Furthermore, while more
complex functions for the impact of these parameters and letting agents decide about the
optimum numbers would have made the system more thorough, it would have increased the
complexity of the system and made it more case dependent (thereby limiting the generalisa-
tion of results). This work also did not address the effect of the export and import of items
produced. Considering these possibilities can increase or decrease the demand for items and
encourage apprentices, as well as trainers, to change their behaviours based on other markets
or prices of rival products.
Another issue that should be considered in the future is addressing wage differences
among highly skilled agents, low-skilled agents, and labourers, in particular societies that
decrease tendencies to attend the apprenticeship programme. This phenomenon is not con-
sidered in this chapter because certain parameter values may lead to immediate failure (no
participation, which means the apprenticeship programme is failing) of the simulation. How-
ever, we should emphasise that policy-makers should consider the aforementioned factors
before making any attempt to design an apprenticeship programme. Other parameters not
considered are modelling more than one skill and the limited populations that indicate the
agent’s preferences to attend more profitable programmes, companies’ bankruptcy because
of a lack of skilled agents, consideration of the mortality of apprentices, and economic de-
pression, to name a few. While we believe we have considered the essential aspects of the
system, these nuances can be explored in the future, especially if exploring specific cases.
Moreover, considering obligations for companies to accept apprentices or studying the
best ways for reforming an already working system is another potential extension of this
model that can help developing societies (see Allais’s (2012) study on South Africa and
Palmer’s (2009) study on Ghana). Nevertheless, based on this chapter, we know that for
manufacturers, based on their needs, we can consider two situations:
fault (Hejeebu, 2005, see footnote 43).
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1. When companies themselves need the skilled agents in the future. If that is the case,
system characteristics are similar to one of four manufacturing societies (M.S0O0C1,
M.S0O1C1, M.S1O0C1, and M.S1O1C1);
2. If companies do not need the apprentices they had trained, the system performance
would be worse than that of manufacturing societiesM.S0O0C0,M.S0O1C0,M.S1O0C0,
and M.S1O1C0, since companies only want to reduce their costs and hence decrease
the programme’s quality as much as possible.
Given this, the government interventions should focus on providing academic training
required by manufacturers in schools and finding some ways to persuade participants to
finish the programme. For instance, Brockmann and Laurie (2016) recently conducted a
comparative case study between two British apprenticeship systems, engineering and motor
vehicle maintenance (MVM), which support the results of this simulation. Their results sug-
gested that the engineering apprenticeship programme, known internationally for its quality,
benefited from more motivated trainees with better education backgrounds. Finally, they
suggested that even for MVM apprentices who want to be skilled workers, the programme
should provide a comprehensive educational opportunity.
In the next chapter, we provide a mental architecture model by taking account of the
impact of agents’ roles on their decisions. We also consider the impact of the apprenticeship
programme on recruits’ skills and decision-making procedures.
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“Mind, in its use, is not static, but constantly developing.”
Gödel
6
Dynamics in the agent’s cognition
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a cognitive architecture for agents.1 This cognitive architecture helps
us to model dynamics in institutions or changes in rules and norms over time. However, these
changes take place in two ways. The first one concerns failed institutional norms, as opposed
to the working rules (i.e. laws that are enforced). This kind of change concerns the informal
changes such as skipping formal laws. The second way of change is a formal revision of
rules. For this purpose, we investigate the impact of system characteristics on agents’ beliefs
about the system and consequently their actions.
The chapter extends a mental architecture to model dynamics in an agent’s cognition and
the dynamics in institutions followed by that. To model the impact of societal meta-roles
on decisions, we use and modify a folk-sociological meta-role model for a rule-making and
rule-following context. Note that by rule-making we mean establishment of institutions by
certain members of the society and by rule-following we mean following those institutions
by a whole society. Then we state studies regarding the impact of personality on humans’
1We consider the agent as a male because of the gender of agents in the two historical long-distance
societies addressed in this study.
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decisions. Finally, we briefly state some reasons for which an agent modifies its cognition.
In developing the BDI cognitive architecture, like Gödel, we believe that minds are not
equivalent to machines and “mind, in its use, is not static, but constantly developing” (Gödel
in Wang 1974, p. 325, as cited in Copeland & Shagrirand, 2015, p. 2). One of the realisa-
tions of the development of mind is that having an exact simulation of it is impossible. The
other aspect of such a development is dynamics of the mind which we prefer to use, because
first, this development of ideas does not always mean a progress (e.g. lenient beliefs towards
deceptions), and second, other aspects of human cognition also change over time (e.g. per-
sonality). In other words, a goal of this chapter is to refine the belief-desire-intention (BDI)
cognitive architecture (Bratman et al., 1988) — see Section 3.2.2 for an overview — to ad-
dress this aspect of agents.
After presenting the concepts required for this extension, we also briefly investigate the
two long-distance trading societies (i.e. the EIC and Julfa), and we state how this model
can be utilised for those societies using evidence from empirical studies. Also, we provide
information on how the model can be operationalised. This chapter develops a conceptual
model and we use it in the next chapter to simulate the two historical long-distance trading
societies.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 investigates the relevant con-
cepts to our extension of the BDI cognitive architecture. Section 6.3 states the proposed
architecture for agents’ decision-making. Section 6.4 uses the two historical long distance
trading societies to indicate how this architecture can be fitted to real-world scenarios. Sec-
tion 6.5 provides detailed information of modules and their interaction. Section 6.6 states
how we use the model to operationalise the agent’s decision-making processes for the histor-
ical long-distance trading societies. Finally, Section 6.7 provides a summary of the chapter
along with some discussions on how the presented architecture can be modified and extended
to include other examples.
6.2 Cognitive architecture concepts
This section covers an agent’s cognitive aspects to modify the BDI cognitive architecture
(Bratman et al., 1988). A simplified version of this architecture is presented in Figure 6.1.
Beliefs are an agent’s information about the world. Desires are what an agent would like
to do. Intentions indicate an agent’s decisions that it commits to do. Plans coordinate the
intentions of an agent. Note that as indicated in Figure 6.1, the environment impacts an
agent’s beliefs-desires-intentions through its perception of external events. Also, an agent’s
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plans impact and are impacted by its beliefs-desires-intentions. An agent acts based on its















Figure 6.1: The BDI cognitive architecture (it is also presented in Section 3.2.2).
In what follows, we provide the necessary background for our extension of the BDI cog-
nitive architecture. This extension considers the impact of psychological circumstances and
the agent’s meta-role on its actions. In Section 6.2.1, we describe how another cognitive
model considers the influence of the different components of an agent’s beliefs (e.g. inter-
nal beliefs and beliefs regarding social norms) on its decisions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
In Section 6.2.2, we describe another method for identifying agents in a society, that is,
categorising them regarding their meta-roles in that society (Purvis et al., 2014). Next, in
Section 6.2.3 we state how agents are distinguished regarding their personality differences
(Jung, 1976; Myers et al., 1998). Finally, in Section 6.2.4, we provide an overview of how
an agent changes its beliefs for different reasons. These concepts will be used in Section 6.3
to modify the BDI cognitive architecture.
6.2.1 Theory of planned behaviour
The theory of planned behaviour was initially developed as the Theory of Reasoned Action
(TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Ajzen (1985, 1991) introduced
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) by refining the TRA. Similar to the BDI cogni-
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tive architecture, the TPB assumes that an agent’s behaviour is impacted by its beliefs and
information (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Note that experiments indicate that the correlation
between the expressed intentions and actual behaviour is about 0.6 (i.e. the actions mostly
but not necessarily conform with the intentions, Ajzen, 2011; Hale et al., 2002). The rea-
sons for not having a perfect correlation include changes in beliefs between two experiences,
past behaviours (i.e. habits), moral obligations, and changes in beliefs after responding to
questions (Hale et al., 2002).
A difference between the TPB and the BDI cognitive architecture is that the TPB cate-
gorises an agent’s beliefs into three subcategories, namely ‘behavioural beliefs’, ‘normative
beliefs’, and ‘control beliefs’, along with a determinant factor called ‘actual control’ that
blocks the execution of intention.
We describe these three beliefs using two examples. As the first example, assume that
we want to buy a four-wheel drive (4WD) vehicle. For making such a decision, we consider
4WD vehicle benefits, such as its ability to drive on rocky roads (behavioural beliefs). We
also consider our friends’ beliefs such as their approval of buying a 4WD vehicle (normative
belief). If we intend to purchase a 4WD vehicle, we also consider external factors such as
our budget (control beliefs). In this model, we consider the same procedure for following the
organisational rules. The next example states how an agent decides about crossing an inter-
section in violation of a red traffic light, considering his beliefs about the rule, the reaction
of others to his violation of the rule, and external punishments imposed by the system. The
agent (we call him Alex) faces three distinctive components of beliefs as follows:
• The agent has his own belief about the action, regardless of other people’s judgements
and punishments. This belief works even if no one is around (behavioural beliefs).
Instances of such beliefs of Alex include B.1, all rules must be followed and B.2, this
rule is because of the new mayor’s non-sensical policies.
• Alex also considers other people’s expectations about not crossing the red light (nor-
mative beliefs). These expectations impose costs on him if he breaks the rule. These
costs include instances, such as rebukes, scolds, and reprimands (we call them sanc-
tions). Alex has different decisions under different situations, such as N.1, when no
one is around, and N.2, when there are some of his neighbours all waiting for the light
to turn green.
• Alex also considers the written rule that prohibits crossing the red traffic light under
any circumstances (control beliefs). This indicates strict restrictions imposed on him.
Note that the rule needs some official monitoring and reporting procedures to work.
Instances of relevant situations to this include C.1, there are no police and C.2, there
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is a traffic control camera that recently took a photo of Alex’s father’s vehicle when he
tried to run the red light, and he was subsequently fined.
Now let us assume that Alex is driving his vehicle and is in a hurry to catch a flight.
There is no vehicle in the intersection (i.e. running the red light does not cause an accident).
The chances of Alex crossing the red traffic light under combinations of the circumstances
mentioned above are different. For instance, the combination of B.2, N.1, and C.1 leads to
crossing the red traffic light, while the combination of B.1, N.2, and C.2 provides all the
reasons for not crossing the red traffic light. Finally, Fishbein and Ajzen (2011) introduce
an additional control called the ‘actual control’. To have a better understanding of an actual
control, consider the situation where Alex is not the driver and deals with the combination
of B.2, N.1, and C.1. Although Alex decides to break the rule, he cannot.
After stating the impact of beliefs on decisions, we investigate some aspects that lead to
changes in those beliefs for an agent. The next subsection provides a brief description of this
aspect of the interaction between the agent and the system.
6.2.2 Agent meta-roles
To model agents’ roles and their interactions, we use CKSW meta-roles presented by Purvis
et al. (2014). However, since this chapter concerns the rule-making and rule-following con-
text, we reinterpret those roles for the rule-following context (see Section 3.2.5 for original
CKSW specifications). Our interpretations are as follows:
• Commander (C): They are agents with ultimate power over an organisation. In this
context, they are the agents who are permitted to make or revise rules.
• Knowledge (K): They are agents who gather, keep, and transmit information. In this
context, these are agents who monitor and report the suspicious activities of others
(i.e. they know-what).
• Skills (S): they are agents who have the ability to turn knowledge into action (they
know how to do things). In this context, they may interpret the rules and judge agents’
activities.
• Worker (W): They are agents who perform basic jobs that do not need specialist skills.
Figure 6.2 depicts how the aforementioned meta-roles interact in an organisation. Com-
mander agents (e.g. a board of directors) decide about the rules regarding issues such as
trades. They declare those rules to all other agents. An agent’s behaviour is monitored


































Figure 6.2: Agents’ meta-roles and their relations adapted for rule-following context.
actions. Furthermore, based on agents’ behaviour, Knowledge agents may suggest some
revisions of rules to the Commander agents. Skill agents who also need some elements of
Knowledge (i.e. they need some knowledge besides skills and are labelled SK), interpret
the rules and available evidence to punish the violators. Commander agents may express
objections to some of those interpretations with respect to their powers.
Figure 6.3 depicts how an agent gets promoted and its meta-role changes. In this figure,
the blue roles might not be a part of the organisation (e.g. judges versus human resource
managers). A clerk of an organisation may get promoted to higher ranks after some years
having demonstrated competence for such a promotion (Worker gets promoted to Knowl-
edge). In certain organisations, if the manager has the relevant education and skills, he can
be promoted to a higher position. In these positions, they are responsible for interpreting the
situation and deciding about who to fire or hire (i.e. Knowledge gets promoted to SK). Under
certain conditions an agent can get promoted as a director (SK or Knowledge gets promoted
to Commander).
Note that in our model, we consider two roles for an agent as follows:
• Formal role: this role is defined based on the agent’s position in an organisation and
was stated in earlier paragraphs (i.e. CKSW meta-roles).
• Informal (internalised) roles: these roles are unofficially and voluntarily performed
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Figure 6.3: Transition of formal meta-roles and internalising informal meta-roles in an or-
ganisation (adapted for rule-following context). The circles indicate internalised roles and
roles that an agent really performs, and the size of the fonts presents a combination of the
importance of the roles for the agent and its ability to perform them (bigger fonts indicate
more involvement in such a role). The arrows indicate the possible transitions in society.
The informal roles are voluntarily added to an agent’s formal roles, as a favour to the society
or organisation. Henceforth, we call the process of adding such informal roles to the formal
roles as the role internalisation. In Figure 6.3, the combination of informal and formal roles
is indicated in the circles placed near the agents. The font sizes of initials inside these circles
indicate the involvement in such a role. The involvement is influenced by the ability of an
agent to perform a role, as well as the importance of performing such roles by an agent.
For instance, some Worker agents may internalise more responsibilities in a company.
They may monitor other agents or they have a charismatic personality and informally estab-
lish rules (i.e. norms) which are executed by the help of other agents (see internalised roles of
W1). The other instance concerns Knowledge agents who would not find the rules sensible
and are inclined to interpret them while monitoring agents (the addition of Skill to the roles
for K2). Some Knowledge agents might avoid reporting suspicious behaviours or have less
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ability to monitor, because they do not have a continuous relationship with employees (small
K for K1).
Also, SK agents might perform some tasks that are not relevant to their formal role. For
instance, they may define a local rule and enforce that (SK1 ) or perform some clerical tasks in
their spare time to help the society (SK2 ). Another instance is commanders who establish the
rules, but they do not feel they have any obligation to follow them. This instance is available
in some countries as parliamentary immunity. In an organisation, this can be the case for a
sole owner (or main shareholder) of an organisation who tends to overlook the rules (i.e. does
not follow them).
This subsection stated the foundations of important elements that influence an agent’s
decision-making and cognition. The next subsection states the impact of personality of an
agent on its behaviour.
6.2.3 Impact of personality
In laboratory studies, differences among behaviours of different participants are observed
when they are asked to perform the same simple tasks. One of the reasons for such a differ-
ence is attributed to differences in personalities. These differences in behaviour convince us
about taking account of the impact of personality on human’s decision-making. We model
the complexity associated with agents’ decision-making with respect to their personalities to
identify their behaviour under the same situation. This aspect of people should be taken into
the account because of its impact on aspects, such as an agent’s learning methods and the
way he weights societal expectations versus its internal beliefs.
Jung (1976, first published in 1921 in German language) presented eight different person-
ality types, including Extraverted-Sensation (ES), Introverted-Sensation (IS), Extraverted-
iNtuition (EN), Introverted-iNtuition (IN), Extraverted-Thinking (ET), Introverted-Thinking
(IT), Extraverted-Feeling (EF), and Introverted-Feeling (IF). In his categorisation he used
the notion of general attitudes (i.e. Introversion or Extraversion) and dominant functions.
He stated that one directs one’s interests towards the inner/outer world based on one’s gen-
eral attitudes and one uses a function more frequently (dominant function) to process one’s
collected information.
Myers et al. (1998, the first instance of it was published in 1944) extended types proposed
by Jung to include the auxiliary functions that help one to balance one’s general attitudes
(i.e. Introversion-Extraversion). For this purpose, they included another determinant aspect
called Judging-Perceiving. The personality aspects presented by Myers et al. (see 1998, P. 6)
and their explanations are as follows:
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• Introverted versus Extraverted: This aspect of personality indicates where energy is
oriented, or attitudes come from. While Extraverts mostly concentrate on the outer
world (i.e. people and objects), Introverts focus on their inner world (e.g. past experi-
ences).
• Sensing versus iNtuitive: This dichotomy differentiates agents based on their Perceiv-
ing methods (Jung called these functions, irrational functions). A Sensing person pays
more attention to collected information by his/her five senses and is more concerned
about the facts. An iNtuitive person pays more attention to the patterns and interre-
lationships to identify the possibilities. For instance, the perception of an apple by a
Sensing person might be ‘juicy’, while an iNtuitive person might perceive it as ‘how
to keep the doctor away’ (Myers et al., 1998, p. 24).
• Feeling versus Thinking: This aspect indicates how an agent makes decisions and
judges (Jung called these functions, rational functions). Thinking agents use their
logical processes and being impersonal, while Feeling agents make decisions based on
personal and social values. In both Jung’s and Myers et al.’s (1998) work, Feeling and
Thinking do not reflect being emotional and intelligent, respectively.
• Judging versus Perceiving: This indicates how fast a person wants to reach a conclu-
sion and ‘achieve closure’. Also, “one of the most overlooked characteristics of the
J-P [(Judging-Perceiving)] dichotomy is that it describes the orientation to the outer or
extraverted world for every type” (Myers et al., 1998, p. 26). In other words, a Judg-
ing person employs his/her Judging aspect of the personality (i.e. Thinking-Feeling
that are rational functions) to collect information from the outer world and reaches the
conclusion faster. However, a Perceiving person uses his/her perception (i.e.Sensing-
iNtuitive that are irrational functions) to observe and collect data from the outer world.
Note that Myers et al. (1998) introduced this aspect, not Jung (1976).
As shown in Figure 6.4, each aspect (e.g. Introverted versus Extraverted) is an extreme
point. Most people are not totally on one side, but they possess more of a certain aspect. For
instance, considering the Introverted-Extraverted aspect, a person with less than a 0.5 Ex-
traverted aspect, is considered to be Introverted (indicated by the blue line in Figure 6.4). To
model this, we assume that each person has a proportion of one side of an aspect (Extraverted
in the example), and the complement shows his/her share of the other side (Introverted in the
example). More precisely, when a person is 0.1 Extraverted, it means that he/she is 0.9 Intro-
verted (casually regarded as introverted). For simplicity of modelling, Extraverted means
the decided proportion of the associated aspect and the Introverted aspect is measured by
















































Figure 6.4: A continuous representation of personality aspects.
Another method used for the same purpose, i.e. to classify personalities, is called the
Big Five personality factors (Goldberg, 1990). The aspects (which are called traits by the
designers) are measured by the model and its revised versions are listed below (Costa &
McCrae, 2008; Judge et al., 1999; McCrae & Costa, 2004):
• Agreeableness: This trait measures the tendency to be cooperative or likeable.
• Conscientiousness (or dependability): This trait indicates the extent to which an agent
is achievement-oriented, dependable, and organised.
• Extraversion (or surgency): Indicates how far an agent is socially-oriented, ambitious,
and active.
• Openness (or culture, intellect): Shows an agent’s openness to experience and being
unconventional.
• Neuroticism (or emotional instability): Refers to the inability of an agent to adjust to
positive psychological states or the inability to be emotionally stable.
Note that some studies link the MBTI and the Big Five personality traits. Different
studies provide the relationships presented in Table 6.1 among the factors of these metrics
(Furnham, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1989; Tobacyk et al., 2008). We disregard weak correla-
tions among traits and types for Big Five versus MBTI in our work and only consider strong
correlations in our modelling. Note that some weak correlations, even between individual
Big Five traits, have been observed (van der Linden et al., 2010).
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∗ Conscientiousness might be weakly correlated with Thinking and Sensing aspects of
personality (Furnham, 1996).
∗∗ Openness might be weakly correlated to Feeling and Perceiving aspects of personality
(Furnham, 1996; Tobacyk et al., 2008).
In this thesis, we use the MBTI because it is easier to link it to discussions by a well-
known psychologist (i.e. Carl G. Jung). Furthermore, as shown in Table 6.1, we can link
the MBTI’s aspects with their counterparts from traits of the Big Five anyway. Having
stated personalities differences, we need to investigate the impact of other aspects of human
cognition on behaviour. In the next subsection, we describe the impact of the outer world on
changes in an agent’s behaviour.
6.2.4 Cognitive dissonance and self-justification
One of the important aspects of humans is the observed dynamics (i.e. changes) in their cog-
nitions. In our model, we address the impact of changes in internal beliefs on an agent’s
behaviour. For agents, these changes are formed through thinking and reasoning by them-
selves or based on the external factors. George Bernard Shaw expresses this idea in the
following ironic terms:
“TANNER. Yes, because to be treated as a boy was to be taken on the old footing.
I had become a new person; and those who knew the old person laughed at me.
The only man who behaved sensibly was my tailor: he took my measure anew
every time he saw me, whilst all the rest went on with their old measurements
and expected them to fit me.” (Shaw, 1903, Act I, P. 37)
Aronson and Aronson (2007) stated how people are reinterpreting their internal beliefs
as a means to justify their actions and to resolve cognitive dissonance. Overall, cognitive
dissonance is defined as tensions formed by conflicts between different cognitions, such as
inconsistent ideas and attitudes (for instance, one likes to smoke and loathes to get cancer).
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These tensions lead to creating some justification for taking one action (quit smoking or
continuing). Such justifications aim to harmonise their internal beliefs to overcome the psy-
chological tensions of keeping contradictory ideas. For instance, dissonance of keeping two
inconsistent internal beliefs like smoking kills and I like smoking, may lead to questioning
the validity of the first belief. In practice, the reasons for such a phenomenon, parameters
impacting it, and methods employed by agents to overcome this phenomenon are vast. Two
methods of resolving cognitive dissonance are a) changing the cognition and b) adding a new
cognition.
Changing the cognition is exemplified by Tagliacozzo (1979) by showing how smokers
who were aware of the harms ranked their smoking habit milder than their counterparts.
Also, Freedman (1965) stated how children who did not play with a desirable toy in order to
avoid mild punishment had a lower tendency to play with the same toy in the future (i.e. they
reduced the desirability of that toy). This aspect of cognitive dissonance is linked with stud-
ies on self-determination theory and intrinsic motivations (Deci & Ryan, 2010; Vansteenkiste
et al., 2012). Changing the cognition concerns an agent’s behaviour when it is contingent
on some situations. For instance, in the Iraq war, President Bush accepted altered docu-
ments about Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction, the non-existence
of which was proved later. To overcome the dissonance, they altered the US mission from
fighting against mass destruction weapons to liberating the country (Aronson & Aronson,
2007, pp. 214–216).
This idea is employed by several researchers in different fields (Antoniou et al., 2012;
Chabrak & Craig, 2013; Hinojosa et al., 2016; Perlovsky, 2013). In our study, we consider
fairness as a source of cognitive dissonance. This idea was first used by J. S. Adams and
Rosenbaum (1962) who attributed workers’ productivity to cognitive dissonance.
In the case of a long-distance trading society, the utilisation of this idea is two-fold. Be-
fore further descriptions, note that one of agents’ intentions is to maximise their revenue;
however, cheating is in contrast with being a decent person. In this situation, agents face
cognitive dissonance when they want to increase their revenue through cheating. What fol-
lows describes how we implemented the aforementioned ideas in our model:
• Agents change their internal beliefs about the rule to control the costs incurred to them
by organisational decisions.
• Agents change their internal beliefs about the rule to resolve the cognitive dissonance
in the aftermath of an action.
The latter part has another side as well (i.e. an agent may feel guilty). As stated in
Section 3.4.2 in Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) experiment, some participants felt guilty.
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In Section 7.3.2, we consider such impacts on the change of internal beliefs. Keeping all
these cases in mind, the next section provides our cognitive architecture for an agent.
6.3 Cognitive architecture
This section states how we model the aforementioned influences on an agent’s behaviour.
Our extended version of the BDI cognitive architecture is depicted in Figure 6.5 (it includes
a decision-making module). What follows describes different modules and their connections
with one another. As can be seen, there are two separate blocks, namely a left block called
‘Events’ and a right block called ‘Cognitive architecture’. The Events block represents the
events from an outside environment. The Cognitive architecture block represents an agent’s
cognitive decision-making components. Note that when an action is performed by an agent,
it will be an event for agents in the next iteration. For instance, an agent cheating in time
t will be an action learnt by associated agents for the next period (t + 1). What follows
describes the modules of cognitive architecture.
• Roles: An agent has a set of roles in society that indicates how a given rule impacts it
(e.g. it should be monitored or enforced by the agent). Those roles impact the beliefs of
an agent, based on the social circles and its involvement in implementing them. Note
that roles include both internalised and associated roles with respect to its position.
• Beliefs: To model beliefs, we are inspired by Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2011) idea of
different belief components. We consider three different punitive components, based
on the agent’s internal acceptance of the rule (internal belief), its perception of societal
support for the rule (perceived norms), and its belief about the purpose of the rule
(rule-understanding). Furthermore, an agent has other beliefs (e.g. its cognition of
parameters). What follows describes the three components of an agent’s beliefs, as
stated in Section 6.2.1. These three components comprise:
– Internal beliefs: This component indicates an agent’s belief about what the rule
must be. Breaking this imposes mental costs on an agent, whether or not oth-
ers observe the action (it is inspired by behavioural beliefs described in Section
6.2.1).
– The perceived norms: This component indicates an agent’s perception of soci-
etal support for the rule — for instance, an agent’s perception of possible sanc-
tions for not following organisational rules. Breaking these perceived norms im-
poses costs on an agent when other agents identify the violation (it is inspired














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































– Rule-understanding: This component represents the rule as an agent under-
stands it. This may differ from the real intention of the rule-maker. This is
enforced by agents who have the duty of monitoring, reporting, and punishing
the violators. This component has the most rigid punishments, such as dismissal,
repaying the costs, and jailing. For executing this component, the system needs
some official reports about the agents’ behaviour (it is inspired from control be-
liefs stated in Section 6.2.1).
• Desires: Agents have different desires with respect to the environment, their person-
alities, and the context. For instance, while most people are concerned with their rep-
utation, sociopaths do not have such concerns. Other desires are stated by Ajzen and
Fishbein (2005) as actual control — strong desires that control an agent’s intentions,
such as addictions and habitual activities — that moderate an agent’s intentions.
• Personality: We use the MBTI’s classification to distinguish agents’ personalities.
As indicated in the cognitive architecture, personality impacts different aspects of an
agent, such as its learning method and the way it weights its beliefs. We state the
impacts of this aspect on decisions and learning in Section 6.5.2.
• Skills and capabilities: Some determinants of an agent’s behaviour and the impacts
of such behaviours are its skills and capabilities. In each context (here rule-following),
certain skills are required for acceptable performance. However, there are other skills
that help the company to have extra performance enhancement — we refer to such
skills as capabilities.
• Decision: An agent’s decision about the final action is formed in this module (coloured
in grey). The decision process includes normalising all former inputs based on the
items, such as learnt parameters, personality, and roles, which results in an action.
This action can be a modification of beliefs and roles or only performing a task. We
expand this module in Section 6.3.1.
The next subsection goes through the decision module in more detail, along with an expan-
sion of the module.
6.3.1 Decision module
Figure 6.6 presents the decision process (grey module in Figure 6.5) for an agent in more
detail. The left blocks in Figure 6.6 indicate all the former modules that are external to the
decision module. We wish to remind the readers that the three components of beliefs have
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different enforcement means. Consequently, an agent’s decision is influenced by the social
punishments and organisational punishments, along with the monitoring strength associated
with them. What follows states the impact of the modules depicted in Figure 6.6 on an
agent’s decisions.
• Monitoring: This block indicates an agent’s belief about the chances of being pun-
ished by each component for a given violation. Note that the internal belief component
does not need external monitoring mechanisms to work.
• Punishments/rewards: As stated earlier, the punishments/rewards associated with
internal beliefs and perceived norms depend on the agent’s beliefs. However, the rules
have more clear consequences than social norms in terms of punishment and rewards.
• Modifiers: As stated earlier, an agent may decide about modifying its internal beliefs,
role, and beliefs about the system for reasons such as cognitive dissonance and new
information. The Modifier block indicates such decisions.
• Learning: This block indicates an agent’s interpretation of its observations, sugges-
tions, and past information. Furthermore, the agent can increase its skills (including
general skills) by observation or by practising over time.
• Intentions and actions decisions: This block coordinates the decisions with cognitive
or organisational consequences in terms of performing modifications or turning an
intention into an action. Note that as stated earlier, since agents intend to improve their
revenue, they consider cheating as a potential decision. Using the Learning block, the
agent decides whether or not to cheat.
To have a better understanding of the way these modules work, we briefly describe them.
First, an agent takes account of the consequences of an action with respect to monitoring and
punishment/rewards. It also learns and updates its learning of the system’s characteristics
with respect to its observations, collected data, and experience. Then given the agent’s in-
tention, it assesses and revises its cognition to take an action. If the agent decides to modify
the beliefs and roles, it uses the modifier for doing so. The agent also improves its cognition
about system characteristics by employing a learning procedure to improve and modify its
understanding.
After presenting a model of an agent’s cognition and decision-making, we are ready to
exemplify this model with the two historical long-distance trading societies. The next section






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.4 Study of the two cases regarding the proposed method
To provide a detailed description of operationalising our model, we use the example of the
two historical long-distance trading societies. Here we present an overview of those cases,
namely the British East India Company (EIC) and Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa).
In this overview, we provide the relevant historical information of the two societies. Sec-
tion 6.4.1 provides the relevant background that helps our modelling of the two historical
societies. Section 6.4.2 states the organisational structure and meta-roles of both societies.
Finally, Section 6.4.3 states fairness as a factor that afflicts mercantile agents with cognitive
dissonance.
6.4.1 Overview of cases
Julfans and the EIC were both merchants engaged in long-distance trading. However, they
had different payment schemes, responsibility delegations, apprenticeship models, and dif-
ferent environmental circumstances (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). Furthermore, we know
that agents’ behaviours in these two societies, in terms of following or breaking the rule was
significantly distinct. Despite these differences, they had the same expectations and rules
regarding agents’ behaviours. For instance, in both societies, organisations expected em-
ployees to trade for the company not others (including the employee himself). Furthermore,
expectations regarding social/friendship bonds are social norms that all agents face, regard-
less of the company they work in. In this section, we state the societal characteristics we
choose to model, and the way we intend to operationalise our model.
Environment: We know that a place that both societies traded in was India; however,
they had different mortality rates. This difference in the impact of environmental circum-
stances increased the mortality rate for the EIC agents in a way that, on average, an agent
died before he was 35 years old (see Hejeebu, 1998, p. 101). On the other hand, Aslanian
(2007) provides no evidence of such a situation in Julfa.2 Such differences convince us to
consider the impact of environmental circumstances in this model.
Institutional characteristics: Another difference between the two societies was their
payment schemes and the way the system was managed. In Julfa mercantile agents had a
share of profits, while the EIC paid their employees fixed wages. Furthermore, in Julfa,
2Some reasons include the following: they were immune to some diseases for historical relations among
Indians, Persians (Iranians), Arabs, and Armenians through trading routes. Also, Iran, Armenia, and India
were ruled by the same people, such as Sassanid (224–651 AD), Chengiz Khan (1206–1227 AD), and Timurid
(1370–1501 AD).
192
agents had the chance to establish their own business when they had enough capital (Asla-
nian, 2007). In contrast to Julfa, the EIC agents could not establish a new company as a
consequence of the monopoly of trade granted to the EIC by the Crown. Furthermore, both
societies had two kinds of rules for controlling the mercantile agent’s behaviours. One rule
concerned following the orders of boards and managers and not using company resources for
self-interests. Another rule prohibited employees from trades, except for the company (such
trades were called private trade in the EIC and were eventually permitted after a while).
Finally, another difference in the institutional characteristics of these societies concerns
whether they employed courts. In Julfa they had two kinds of courts for resolving disputes,
while in the EIC the courts were not efficient, and mostly the agents were fired based on their
bad performance, not for breaking rules.
Apprenticeship: As stated in Chapter 5, Julfa had organised apprenticeship programmes.
However, in the EIC, for reasons such as the high mortality rate, we see a gradual shift from
hiring skilled agents to hiring inexperienced agents who learned to trade in India with the
help of more experienced agents. Such a difference impacts agents’ skill levels.
Agent’s mobility: Another important difference between the two societies concerns
whether or not agents resided in a place for a long time. In the EIC, after some years, the
company established settlements called factories (i.e. warehouses) where agents stayed in
order to perform the trade. On the other hand, Julfans had some nodes where agents stayed
temporarily. A long stay in a place introduces concerns, such as creating a closer friend-
ship circle inside the organisation and establishing stronger relationships with local traders.
Friendship among agents causes them to be more tolerant towards one another’s actions. For
instance, Argyle and Henderson (1984)3 identified several ‘rules of friendship’ that indicate
expectations, such as keeping secrets and defending each other. In the next subsection, we
describe the society’s structure and the social dynamics of both societies.
6.4.2 Society’s structure and social dynamics
This subsection presents an overview of the changes in roles (e.g. an agent gets promoted)
and rules (e.g. commanders permit the agents to do what was prohibited) over time in the
EIC and Julfa (with more focus on the EIC). Figure 6.7 presents how different sectors were
correlated in the EIC and Julfa. The impact of the roles highlighted in red (i.e. governors and
judges) are not addressed in our model. The agents highlighted in dark-blue (i.e. mercantile
agents and managers) are the main concern of our model. We also consider limited impacts
3The participants were from Britain, Italy, Japan, and Hong Kong.
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Figure 6.7: A scheme of a system for the EIC and Julfa.
Now we describe each level and their impacts in more detail. The top level shows how
governors’ policies impacted both societies. For instance, the main reason for the decline of
Julfa was because of the threats and chaos introduced into the system by Nadir Shah Afshar
(a Persian king, see Herzig, 1991, pp. 106–108). Also, the British governors dissolved the
EIC (see Hejeebu, 2016, pp. 44–46).
The next level indicates company directors and their roles. In the EIC, directors did not
work as agents; hence, they were remote from their employees’ perception of the rules, the
norms formed in India, and their internal beliefs. Also, we know that after the English Civil
War (1642–1651), some managers were promoted to directors (see Erikson, 2014, p. 63). In
our model, we consider the impact of directors on the system by modelling this phenomenon
(i.e. some managers get promoted as directors). However, in Julfa, the directors were family
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members who had already worked as agents and managers in the company (i.e. they were
mercantile agents in their youth). Such a characteristic makes Julfa more agile for revising
ill-advised rules.
The third level concerns both managers and judges. In both societies, managers (i.e. the
ones who monitor and report) were chosen from the senior agents. A task of managers
concerns monitoring mercantile agents to make sure they follow the director’s orders. Also,
judges’ verdicts are based on the provided reports and evidence. Note that judges are agents
who are formally allowed to interpret the rules. However, all members of society might
informally interpret the rules when they monitor (stated in Section 6.6.2).
The next level concerns mercantile agents. In both societies, directors expected these
agents to collaborate in monitoring each other’s behaviour. Note that this collaboration was
a voluntary task and was an informal role rather than a formal one (see Section 6.4.3).
The lower box indicates new agents who can potentially work in the company. If the
company has an apprenticeship programme, they train the agents at a cost. Otherwise, the
box represents unskilled agents waiting for employment. In the next subsection, we state the
fairness of the institutions and why we believe Julfa was much fairer than the EIC.
6.4.3 Fairness of the institutions and cognitive dissonance
Concerns related to fairness are sources of cognitive dissonance and such an idea initiated
J. S. Adams and Rosenbaum’s (1962) study on fairness. For this reason, this subsection
presents different aspects of fairness in more detail. Overall, there are three well-known
aspects for fairness of institutions, namely distributive, procedural, and interactional justice
(see Greenberg, 1990; Tankebe, 2009, for more infromation). What follows concisely dis-
cusses each aspect.
Distributive justice states that rewards should be fairly shared. In other words, profits
should be proportional to the investment of individuals (e.g. skills and education, J. S. Adams,
1965; J. S. Adams & Freedman, 1976). J. S. Adams’s (1965) theory included a concept be-
sides distributive justice called relative deprivation/gratification that is a consequence of
breaching the fairness. Stouffer et al. (1949, see p. 1270) introduced relative deprivation
to explain phenomena such as the existence of more complaints in a department with more
promotions of others. Also, Akerlof (1982) utilised relative gratification to model a situation
where people put forth more effort in situations that promotions are not a factor, because
they were rewarded more than the norm.
The two other aspects are procedural and interactional justice. We describe them to-
gether because of their tight correlations (Bies, 2005; Cropanzano et al., 2002). Procedural
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justice concerns a fair method for resolving disputes (Thibaut et al., 1974; Tyler, 1989). In-
teractional justice concerns how the procedures are framed through some explanations. For
instance, Bies and Shapiro (1987) indicated that justifications of improper actions or provid-
ing clarifications for the procedures increase societal approval of a procedure.
The impact of different aspects of fairness has already been studied by various researchers
(Colquitt et al., 2005; Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; Donner et al., 2015; Dukhanin et al., 2018;
Virtanen & Elovainio, 2018). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) showed that procedural justice in-
creases public law obedience and cooperation with the police. Also, J. S. Adams (1965)
stated that underpaid or overpaid persons alter their input (e.g. efforts) to make the system
fairer for themselves.
In this thesis, we address the impact of two factors on the agent’s decisions. This has
been studied vastly by different scholars. For instance, Schweitzer and Gibson (2008) dis-
cusses that an agent’s judgment about the fairness of the system leads to decisions that are not
economically rational (e.g. punishing others with some costs). They also note that if some
explanations persuade people about the unfairness of the societies, the agents tend to perform
more unethical behaviours. Other studies also point to such behaviours (uneconomic or un-
ethical) as a reaction to the unfairness of the system. For example, Pillutla and Murnighan
(1996) report rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game. In another study, Greenberg
(1993) designed a game in which participants had access to company resources from which
they could take their wages. The game was designed such that subjects believed the experi-
menter did not know how much they really took. The results suggest that underpaid subjects
took more than they were allowed to (i.e. they stole). Furthermore, the amount of stolen
money was decreased when some evidence convinced the subjects about the experimenter
having more accurate information. We model two impacts of fairness on an agent’s decisions
that are listed below:
• Changing the internal belief of an agent towards the violation. In other words, when
an agent thinks the organisation is unfair, it softens its beliefs towards violations. On
the other hand, when an agent feels the system is fair (or extremely fair), it strengthens
its beliefs about the same action. This aspect is observed in studies such as Skarlicki
et al. (1999) and Akerlof (1982).
• Internalising monitoring roles (i.e. monitoring and reporting violations voluntarily).
As stated earlier, an agent has an official role (e.g. mercantile agent) that it is asked
to perform by the organisation. However, it may add more voluntary roles internally,
such as monitoring and reporting (i.e. by self-determination). Studies such as Sunshine
and Tyler (2003) observe this aspect.
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Table 6.2 indicates what happened in the two historical trading societies and why we believe
that Julfa was much fairer than the EIC.
Table 6.2: A comparison of three different types of fairness for the EIC and Julfa.
Type of fairness EIC Julfa Comment
Distributive 7 3 The payment scheme in Julfa consists of sharing profits with agents,
while in the EIC they had fixed payments.
Procedural 7 3 In Julfa, the agents’ relationships had a negligible impact on the courts’
decisions. However, in the EIC, the agents with a certain status, such as
connections with headquarters, had some opportunity to break the law.
Furthermore, performance-based punishments in the EIC which were not
based on any rule violation evidence, lowered the trust of the agents in
the fairness of the law enforcement.
Interactional 3 3 Some letters∗ in the EIC point to some attempts by directors to justify
their decisions.
∗For instance, they justified firing Hugh Barker with 25 years of experience arguing: “[w]e may let our
servants see that we can distinguish betwixt [sic] them who serve us faithfully and well and those who only
pretend to do so [emphasis added].” (E/3/106 letter to Bengal 23 Jan 1735, para. 138, as cited in Hejeebu,
2005, p. 514).
After describing the fairness of these societies, in the next section, we describe the model
for investigating the two long-distance trading societies, along with some explanations re-
garding the model’s modules and their interactions.
6.5 Interaction and specifications of model modules
In this section, we describe the specifications of certain modules of the proposed architecture
in Figure 6.5, with respect to the context of the two historical long-distance trading societies.
To be more precise, Section 6.5.1 describes modelling the different rule enforcement com-
ponents. Section 6.5.2 assesses the impact of personality, as one of the main determinants
on different aspects of cognition.
6.5.1 Different components of rule enforcement
In our model, we assume that a rule can be violated with different seriousness levels by
which an agent faces a specific punishment. To be more precise, we consider three levels of
violations that are defined, based on the cost that the action incurs to the company’s revenue.
These three levels include minor, mild, and serious violations.
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The expected punishment also varies based on the violation of different components
of belief (i.e. rule-understanding, perceived norm, and internal belief). Now we state the
expected punishment associated with rule-understanding. The rule has clear punishments,
except for minor violations. Overall, the label for punishments and organisational adminis-
trations are as follows:
• Serious violations: The company incurs high costs for these actions, such as stealing,
embezzlement, or bribery, that involve a significant amount of money. These violations
can be easily proved when they are identified. However, there is a probability of not
identifying such actions. In the two historical societies, these violations were punished
variously. In Julfa, the violator was fired and was asked to repay the costs (e.g. unpaid
loan along with interest). In the EIC, we know in 1613, some cheaters were fired, and
their belongings were seized.
• Mild violations: These correspond to not fulfilling the organisation’s requirements for
a task an agent should or should not perform. For example, an agent should not steal an
employer’s items. However, stealing inexpensive items from a company is considered
to be a mild violation. As a punishment, agents lost the chance for future work in the
company. Aslanian (see 2007, p. 249, footnote 66) suggests that a real list in Julfa kept
the names of “blotted out” agents as dishonest. Also, examples of these violations in
the EIC include behaviours indicating not “having interests of the company at heart;”
however, the alleged actions were not punishable by courts (see Table 6.2’s footnote).
• Minor violations: These include abusing company’s permissions, such as using a
luxury place to stay during travel for work, using the organisation’s properties for
self-interest (e.g. using company’s vehicle for long-distance travels), and spending
working time for hobbies like watching sports. These actions are difficult to identify
and punish. Even when these are punished, the punishment is mild. In other words,
identifying such violation may lead only to warnings and deterrents. In Julfa, there
were correspondences indicating queries about explicit information regarding costs of
travels (Aslanian, 2007). The agents in the EIC were rebuked for spending too much
money “to secure the company’s concession”. However, the manager’s tolerance for
such actions may vary, given the situation (i.e. the manager may decide to fire the
agents under certain circumstances).
To model the rule and its associated violations, we use fuzzy numbers as presented in
Figure 6.8. Zadeh (1999) suggested the notion of Computing with Words (CW) for using
linguistic variables, such as big or small in the form of fuzzy variables in computing. In
such a computing method, an agent uses words for computing/reasoning and assigns labels
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to group all relevant points (e.g. “serious violation”). An application of CW is modelling
different understandings caused by labelling data using words. In our case, an agent attempts
to associate violations based on their costs for the company.
As stated earlier, each agent has three different beliefs about the rule (we call them belief
components). The rule-understanding indicates how an agent may face issues in understand-
ing the stated rule. The perceived norm indicates an agent’s perception of social expectation
about following the rule (i.e. agents believe what violations are considered to be minor, mild,
or serious by society). Finally, the internal belief shows how an agent assesses the serious-
ness of the violation itself. The agent uses these components to predict possible punishments
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Figure 6.8: A scheme of fuzzy numbers associated with beliefs about rule violations.
First, we describe Figure 6.8a; this figure indicates how an agent understands the rule and
the associated organisational punishments. Before providing more explanations, we describe
what the x-axis and y-axis represent in Figure 6.8. The x-axis presents the extent to which
the agent violates the rule. The y-axis indicates the agent’s belief about the possibility of
assigning a certain label to this violation. We call this possibility the membership degree of
such a violation to that label. As an example, assume that the agent violates the rule by 50%,
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and it believes the violation is mild. In Figure 6.8a the only label assigned to such a violation
is Mild with a membership degree of 1.
However, some violations may have two possible labels. These are the violations where
the agent is doubtful about the correct label (e.g. whether this violation is minor or mild).
The same issue is held for perceived norms and internal beliefs (e.g. one may have several
interpretations of a situation and cannot decide which is the correct one). Figures 6.8b and
6.8c show the perceptions associated with norms (i.e. perceived norm) and internal beliefs,
respectively. Figure 6.8d indicates the combination of all these three perceptions in one graph
to indicate that an agent can assign different labels to the same action considering its rule-
understanding, the perceived norm, and its internal belief. In other words, an agent does not
need to assume that the action would be interpreted the same by the organisation, society, and
itself. For instance, in a rule violation that potentially costs 25% of the organisation’s profit
(e.g. spending too much time chatting with colleagues, Figure 6.8d, dashed-line), the agent
has three distinct beliefs. It believes that the organisation considers this violation Minor. At
the same time, it doubts if this violation is Minor or Mild, given its internal beliefs and its
understanding of social norms (L in Figure 6.8d indicates up to what violation the agent is
sure the violation is Minor for each component of belief).
Before presenting our model, note that the impact of wealth is presented by prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated that the current
wealth influences how an agent values the outcome of a decision. We know that when the
payment scheme is not proportional to the agent’s performance, the wealth of the agent
in comparison to its access to the company resources decreases over time. Equation 6.1
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In our model, agent A employs Equation 6.1 to calculate punishment costs imposed by
an organisation for violating a rule at time t by taking action Act. The right-hand side of
this equation indicates different punishments with respect to the violation. The first (upper-
right-hand) condition of this equation concerns minor violations. It indicates that the agent
assumes it may get fired with a maximum probability of 1 (PR). The costs of getting fired
consists of two parts, namely a factor that discounts future revenue (αA), and another factor
(accesstA) that indicates the impact of welfare and wealth on the value of the function. When
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proportional wealth to access decreases (i.e.
1
accesstA
increases), the value of future revenue
in comparison to the current violation decreases (i.e. cheating becomes more tempting).
The second condition of Equation 6.1 concerns mild violations. This indicates the agent
is sure that if the organisation identifies the violations, it gets fired. The third condition
indicates that the agent also takes account of paying back the cheat revenue (ActtA) along with
paying back a fine proportional to the action. In the modelling, we assume that discounted
fine equals the current revenue of cheating.
Figure 6.9 presents a scheme of how these functions are calculated using the concept of
computing with words. For this drawing, we used 1, 0.9, and 0.5 for accesstA, α
t
A, and PR,




















Figure 6.9: A scheme of costs associated with the organisational punishments for rule viola-
tion.
Note that when an agent has doubts about the seriousness of rule-breaking labels, it uses
a linear approximation of costs associated with each label. Equation 6.2 represents the cost
of action x when the agent is not sure whether it is a minor violation or a mild violation
(Cost(x ∈ (Minor|Mild))). Therefore the agent uses the costs associated with a minor
violation (CostMinor(x)) and a mild violation (CostMild(x)), multiplied by the degree of
membership associated with these labels for such an action. To calculate this degree of
membership, an agent uses a linear function. In Equation 6.2 , L represents the point where
the agent begins to doubt whether the violation is minor or mild. M indicates the point after
which the agent is sure about the mildness of the violation (see Figure 6.8d).
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Equations 6.3 and 6.4 indicate how the mental costs associated with violating internal be-
liefs and perceived norms are calculated, respectively. These punishments are more flexible
than that of rules — they depend on the label, as well as the seriousness of the violation. As
can be seen in Equation 6.3, the costs imposed by internal beliefs (IBeliefPunishmentA)
for agent A’s violation at time t (ActtA) depends on the label (e.g. if the violation is minor
CBelief,Minor) and the seriousness of violation. Note that CBelief,Minor < CBelief,Mild <





CBelief,Minor × ActtA, if ActtA =Minor
CBelief,Mild × ActtA, if ActtA =Mild
CBelief,Serious × ActtA, if ActtA = Serious
(6.3)
We obtain Equation 6.4 similar to Equation 6.3. We use a different equation to emphasise
there is a difference between the cost associated with the perception of societal punishments
(Equation 6.4) and the mental punishment for violating the internal beliefs (Equation 6.3).





CNorm,Minor × ActtA, if ActtA =Minor
CNorm,Mild × ActtA, if ActtA =Mild
CNorm,Serious × ActtA, if ActtA = Serious
(6.4)
Figure 6.10 depicts costs associated with the agent’s perception of societal punishments
for a violation of expectations (and punishment for violating an internal belief) presented
in Figure 6.8-b. For this figure, we used 0.2, 0.4, and 0.8 for CNorm,Minor (CBelief,Minor),
CNorm,Mild (CBelief,Mild), and CNorm,Serious (CBelief,Serious), respectively. We used a similar
method to Equation 6.2 to calculate costs when the agent is not sure about the appropriate
label. Note that the violation costs for such labels (i.e. the ones that the agent is unsure about)
is non-linear.
In the next subsection, we state how we model the interaction between different blocks
and the personality of an agent. As shown in Figure 6.5, the personality of an agent interacts
with its other aspects. As a consequence, we should describe modelling an agent’s cognition
and decision-making given its personality.
6.5.2 Personality
As depicted in Figure 6.5, personality and decision modules influence each other (i.e. per-




















Figure 6.10: An example of costs associated with the perceived norm and internal belief
punishment.
module is a mediator for modifying different cognitive aspects. First, we state the way that
the Decision module impacts the agent’s personality.
The impact of the role on personality development: Note that in our simulation (Chap-
ter 7), we use the personality types of entrepreneurs to decide about the extent to which
agents on average possess each aspect of the personality type. However, we use findings that
show that agents develop their personalities to adapt to their environment (Bleidorn, 2012;
Caspi & Herbener, 1990; Roberts et al., 2006). Damian et al. (2019) conducted a study on
personality dynamics of around 1800 participants over fifty years. Their findings suggest a
reliable shift in personality for around 40% of people with unique patterns (i.e. personality
of 40% of agents changed, irrespective of their personality type). In our model, the agent’s
personality is adapted to its current role and when it is promoted to another position, its per-
sonality gradually adapts to the new role. Note that in both societies, recruits were teenagers,
and their personalities change more easily over time.
Socialising: The main difference between Introverted and Extraverted personalities con-
cerns their number of friends and connections. Therefore we consider a maximum possible
number of friends for extremely Extraverted agents (i.e. 100% Extraverted), and this number
is modified for agents based on the extent to which they are Extraverted.
Weighting perceived norms and internal beliefs: To model the impacts of personal-
ity on norm conformance, we use the result of correlations between behavioural tendencies
as measured by the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). This test was developed by
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Gough (2000) in 1951 to assess a person’s psychological aspects that are relevant to sociol-
ogy and political science (Megargee, 2009). The measured aspect of interest for us classifies
agents into the norm following/questioning groups.
Fleenor (1997) examined correlations between the CPI scales and the MBTI scores for
around 13,000 participants. The study indicated that Sensing and Judging in the MBTI
personality types were correlated to norm-favouring personalities. Therefore the iNtuitive-
Perceiving agents are the ones who question norms the most (i.e. weights their internal be-
liefs more than the perceived norms). Furthermore, Sensing-Judging agents are the ones
who favour the norms more than any other agents. This finding is intuitive, based on the
definitions presented by Myers et al. (1998) (see personality descriptions in Section 6.2.3).
They argue that Perceiving agents employ their perception to contact the outer world, and
iNtuitive agents are remote from immediate facts and focus on patterns and meanings.
Dynamics of roles and internal beliefs: As stated earlier, perceived fairness of the sys-
tem have disparate impacts on the agents’ behaviour in terms of rule-following and collabo-
ration in monitoring. This phenomenon is addressed by Buboltz Jr et al. (2003) and Skarlicki
et al. (1999), where they studied the impact of the MBTI personality types and the Big Five
personality traits on agents’ reactions to the fairness of the system. Their findings indicated
that the Thinking-Feeling (agreeableness for Big Five) aspect significantly influences agents’
behaviour. Buboltz Jr et al. (2003) indicated that Thinking agents had higher “psychologi-
cal reactance” to the fairness of the system. They also indicated that the iNtuitive-Sensing
aspect had an effect only on Thinking agents’ reactions (iNtuitive-Thinking (NT) persons
reacted more than Sensing-Thinking persons (ST)). Note that we do not consider the impact
of the iNtuitive-Sensing aspect on an agent’s behaviour directly. The reason for such an ap-
proach is the results of the aforementioned study. In other words, a change in the behaviour
is not generally impacted by the iNtuitive aspect, and this difference was likely impacted
by a better identification of the unfair situation by iNtuitive persons. Therefore it is their
learning methods that indirectly have an impact on their reactions. Note that Feeling persons
make decisions based on items, such as affiliation and keeping harmony (i.e. they weight
their relationships more than fairness).
Skarlicki et al. (1999) measured the impact of perceived fairness on “organizational re-
taliatory behaviour”. Skarlicki et al. (1999) and other researchers (J. S. Adams & Freedman,
1976; Buboltz Jr et al., 2003), indicate that an agent deliberately changes its behaviour as
a reaction to an unjust situation. Different scholars study the impact of personality on such
decisions. Schmitt et al. (2005) and Schmitt et al. (2010) studied this effect using a detailed
questionnaire. These studies showed that the Feeling aspect of agents (i.e. 1 − Thinking)
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impacts an their decision when they are the ones who should perform an unfair action. Fur-
thermore, they identified that the iNtuitive agents perceive the justice of the system better,
which is in accordance with Buboltz Jr et al.’s (2003) findings. The way we employed these
impacts and their correlations with personality is shown when we state an agent’s decision-
making in Section 6.6.
Environment: The environment influences agents’ behaviour through the discount fac-
tor. Overall, an agent’s decision about an action is affected by mental costs, perceived social
punishment, and organisational punishments. The organisational punishments concern los-
ing future revenue, paying some costs, or both. These future-oriented punishments are dis-
counted by an agent when it computes the utility of an action using its utility function (i.e. the
function that indicates the preference of the action, given its internal, social, and organisa-
tional costs and rewards). An unpleasant environment has a negative effect on this factor.
On the other hand, as suggested by Myers et al. (1998, p. 24), Sensing personalities develop
characteristics associated with immediate experiences such as enjoying and experiencing the
present moment. Furthermore, Jung (1976) stated the following:
“As sensation is chiefly conditioned by the object, those objects that excite the
strongest sensations will be decisive for the individual’s psychology. The re-
sult is a strong sensuous tie to the object. Sensation is therefore a vital function
equipped with the strongest vital instinct. Objects are valued in so far as they
excite sensations, and, so far as lies within the power of sensation, they are fully
accepted into consciousness whether they are compatible with rational judg-
ments or not. The sole criterion of their value is the intensity of the sensation
produced by their objective qualities.” (Jung, 1976, p. 362)
Therefore the perception of environment influences Sensing types the most by providing
opportunities for them to fulfil their sensation desires, such as enjoyment, and excitement
(i.e. the discount factor of Sensing types is more impacted by environmental circumstances).
Mobility versus residency: Residency in a place and being considerate for one another
have certain impacts on the agent’s behaviour. As stated earlier, the Feeling types, weight
keeping harmony in the society more. In our model, this effort can be modelled, based on
the weights of the connections.
Learning: An agent learns, based on its cognition of meaning and patterns (e.g. my
payment is unfair compared to the others), collected facts by its Sensation (e.g. the wage is
low or high), other agents’ recommendations and its trust in their understandings and beliefs.
Also, an agent weights its collected information based on its personality. To model how agent
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A learns a system’s characteristics, we use a method inspired by Farhangian, Purvis, Purvis,
and Savarimuthu’s (2015b) work. For this purpose, we consider the following:
• The agents learn about system characteristics based on their intuition (i.e. extent to
which they are iNtuitive) and recommendations from friends.
• The more Extraverted an agent is, the more it weights the outer world’s information.
• The more iNtuitive an agent is, the more it can learn about the system’s characteristics
by itself.
• The stronger the friendship’s bond is (i.e. link weights), the more an agent weights the
trustworthiness of the recommendations.
• The more Sensing an agent is, the more it weights the current situations and informa-
tion.
Table 6.3 summarises the impact of personality on different aspects of cognition. In the
next section, we model how an agent’s beliefs and personality impact its decisions. Also, we
state how an agent decides to revise its beliefs, given its intentions and actions. Furthermore,
we provide some formulae to incorporate the impact of personality on an agent’s different
aspects, such as the decision-making process and learning, as stated here.
6.6 Operationalising the decision module
As stated earlier, personality impacts an agent’s behaviour through the decision module.
Now we state how our model is inspired by the aforementioned statements to operationalise
the decision module.
6.6.1 Utility function
Agent A takes an action (Act) that maximises its utility function presented in Equation 6.5
(UtilityA(Act)). The utility function has four parts. The first part indicates the revenue that
agent A earns for such an action (Revenue(Act)). The second part shows how the agent is
mentally punished for such an action. This part includes the punishment that stems from the
internal beliefs towards the action (IBeliefPunishmentA(Act)) and the weight associated




























































































































































































































































































































































































































The third term shows the agent’s perception of the punishment by its connections in
the form of sanctions. Agent A estimates this, based on its perception of punishment for
such an action (NormPunishmentA(Act)). Unlike the internal beliefs, this punishment is
moderated, based on agent A’s estimation of the connections’ monitoring strength (Norm








. Finally, agent A
takes account of organisational punishment regarding violation (RulePunishment(Act)).
Agent A moderates the impact of organisational punishment, based on its estimation of or-
ganisational monitoring (RuleMonitoringA(Act)). The next subsection states how agent A
estimates monitoring strength associated with rules and norms.
6.6.2 Perception of norms and monitoring strengths
The perception of norms differs from that of the rule by the vagueness of punishments asso-
ciated with norms. To model an agent’s perception of norms, we should note that a person
expresses his/her beliefs, based on the weight he/she allocates to people’s expectations. To
consider this effect, we consider the impact of personality on an agent’s norm conformance
(i.e. expectations with undefined consequences). The following shows how an agent updates















Equation 6.6 shows how agent A collects its associated agents’ expressions, and updates
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. The agent as-
sociates some weights with the recent information (i.e. Weight). Furthermore, the agent
averages the recommended scores by its connections with whom it has strong relationships
(i.e. the associated wiA ≥ 0.5). From those connections, it takes account of the ones who
have at least the same experience as itself; we call the subset of such members from CA
(i.e. the whole connections of A) as CA,N . Also, KA and KA,N indicate the number of
members of CA and CA,N , respectively. This procedure states that an agent would not ask
for less experienced agents’ recommendations because of the feeling that it knows better.
Furthermore, an agent does not criticise people’s expectations unless it knows the audi-
ence well (i.e. the ones who have a higher wiA). In addition, agent A assumes that the
rest of the connections (i.e. KA − KA,N ) expect the same of it as it has already realised(
PerceivedExpectationt−1i
)
. Then the agent associates the rest of the weights (i.e. 1 −
Weight) with its past perception about expectations (i.e. PerceivedExpectationt−1A ).
Now we state how other agents express their beliefs to agent A. Agent i does it through a
weighting of its perception of social expectations (PerceivedExpectationi) and its beliefs
(InternalExpectationi). Equation 6.7 shows how weighting the outer world impacts an
agent’s expression of beliefs. As stated earlier, the personality of agent i (a friend of agentA)
impacts its expression of its beliefs about the outer world’s expectations. ExpressedNormti
indicates agent i’s expression of what people do and what they should do at time t. As stated
earlier, the iNtuitive and Perceiving aspect of an agent decreases weights given to other
people’s expectations; hence, agent i straightforwardly expresses its own beliefs and expec-
tations at that time (i.e. InternalExpectationti, second line of Equation 6.7). The third line
shows the opposite — i.e. how personality of agent i impacts its expression of ideas, based









1− iNtuitivei + Perceivingi
2
)) (6.7)
6.6.2.1 Learning the monitoring strength
The agent learns how the system works, based on observation. AgentA learns the strength of
the organisational monitoring of the system at time t, based on its observation using Equation
6.9. Before describing Equation 6.9, let us explain what the agent learns. Agent A assumes
the probability of getting fired for cheating follows a continuous uniform probability distribu-
tion in an unknown interval, given the severity of a violation (Act). Equation 6.8 shows the
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cumulative density function of rule monitoring (RuleMonitoringA). RuleMonitoringA





0, if Act ≤ atA
Act− atA
btA − atA
, if atA ≤ Act ≤ btA
1, if Act ≥ btA
(6.8)
As can be seen in Equation 6.8, the agent assumes the action is tolerated to some ex-
tent (Act ≤ atA, the first condition). Furthermore, while the action is somewhat tolerable
(i.e. atA ≤ Act ≤ btA, the second condition), the probability of getting fired increases lin-
early, based on the severity of such an action. Finally, violations are not tolerated beyond a
certain threshold, and will be punished unequivocally (i.e. Act ≥ btA, the third condition).
Equation 6.9 shows how agent A updates its overall estimation of these intervals at
time t (i.e. atA and b
t
A) to calculate probabilities of getting fired regarding the violation
(i.e. RuleMonitoringA(Act)). For this purpose, the agent weights its recent estimation
and past calculations for each interval (e.g. LatA and a
t−1
A , respectively).
atA = Weight× LatA + (1−Weight)× at−1A ,
btA = Weight× LbtA + (1−Weight)× bt−1A
(6.9)
Now we state how agent A estimates the beginning and end of the interval (i.e. LatA and
LbtA, respectively), using Equations 6.10 and 6.11, respectively. Before explaining formulae,
we state the reason for considering different conditions. In the learning process, an agent
may face one of the situations depicted in Figure 6.11, when it observes a violation. Figure
6.11A indicates a case that there is an obvious boundary between punished and not punished
violators. In this case, the agent can easily guess the tolerance. However, in Figure 6.11B
the agent faces a mixed situation. In other words, some violations are tolerated that are more
severe than the punished ones (indicated by a circle in figure). In Figure 6.11C and 6.11D
all the violators are either not punished or punished, respectively. Now we state an intuitive
estimation for parameters based on these phenomena, in addition to observing no violation.
First, we describe the right-hand side of Equation 6.10. The first condition indicates that
when agent A is not aware of any violations of the rule at time t (i.e. V tA = 0), it randomly
decreases the society’s tolerance intervals (the random number is generated in (0, R)). We
use #Rnd(R) to indicate the random number generator (in Chapter 7, we state the initial
values).




0             1 0             1
C D
0             1 0             1
Figure 6.11: An example of different observed punishment regarding violations. The dots are
violations — the green dots are punished violators and the red dots are unpunished violators.
The thick vertical lines distinguish new cases. The horizontal line indicates the severity of
the violation.
LatA =
at−1A × (1−#Rnd(R)), if V tA = 0
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PV tA > 0 and





NP tA > 0 and
PV tA > 0 and




A × (1 + #Rnd(R)),
MaxNP tA
 , if V tA > PV tA and PV tA = 0
(6.10)
The rest of the conditions in Equation 6.10 represent when the agent is aware of some
rule violations. The second condition indicates when all the violators who agent A is aware
of, are punished (V tA = PV
t
A). Here the agent assumes that either the minimum tolerance
of the society (atA ) does not change, or it is slightly lower than the minimum of punished
violations (MinPV tA) .
The third condition concerns when agent A is aware of some unpunished violations
(i.e. NP tA = (V
t
A − PV tA) and is more than 0). In this case, it also takes account of the
additional information about unpunished violators. Now we state when the maximum value
of unpunished violations (MaxNP tA) is less than the minimum value of punished viola-
tions (MinPV tA). First, agent A assumes that societal tolerance is more than the maximum
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value of unpunished violations (MaxNP tA) and less than the minimum value of punished
violations (MinPV tA), and it takes account of the maximum value of these two. However,
this value is acceptable if it does not exceed the minimum value of punished violations
(MinPV tA).
The fourth condition represents when agent A faces a complicated phenomenon (see
Figure 6.11B). It is aware of unpunished violators with a worse behaviour than punished
agents (MaxNP tA ≥ MinPV tA). Therefore the agent simply believes that the punished
violators are determinants for the minimum value of tolerance (i.e. some of the unpunished
agents were luckier).
The last condition represents when none of the violators are punished. Agent A assumes
that it underestimated society’s tolerance and increases its former estimation, taking account
of unpunished violators (MaxNP tA).
Equation 6.11 indicates how agent A identifies the interval in which violations are defi-
nitely punished. Agent A assumes that some violations are not tolerated, if it is not aware of








Agent A assumes its connections consider rules of friendship when they monitor or impose
sanctions on him. Equation 6.12 indicates how agent A computes the strength of sanctions
imposed (NormMonitoringA). We only address the impact of the connections who iden-
tify an agent’s violation of a norm. The right-hand side of this equation indicates agent A
assumes the strength of friendship with agent i (WiA) impacts agent i’s enforcement of or-






6.6.3 Learning societal characteristics and environmental circumstances
Equation 6.13 indicates how parameter P (the score of fairness and environment) is learnt by
agent A. In this Equation, P tA indicates the score that agent A associates with parameter P
at time t. The rest of the equation contains two terms (given in lines 2 and 3-5, respectively).
The first term indicates how the agent weights its collected information from the outer word.
AgentA gathers scores of parameter P from its set of friends {CA}. A recommendation from
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friend i about parameter p (pi) would be normalised, based on the values associated with that
friend (WiA), and then it is averaged, based on the number of friends (k). However, agent A
weights beliefs of the outer word differently, based on its extraversion (ExtraversionA). On
the other hand, the degree of being iNtuitive causes agent A to weight current information
less, in accordance with the degree to which it is iNtuitiveA, knowing that iNtuitive agents




















f(iNtuitiveA, P )(RandNormal(PS, a× (1− iNtuitiveA))+
(1− f(iNtuitiveA, P ))× P t−1A
)
(6.13)
The second term of Equation 6.13 (lines 3 to 5) indicates how agent A is impacted by




), and being remote from the current
situations (iNtuitiveA). To model this part, we consider the complement of impacts of




, and the Sensing aspect of











. This kind of modelling shows how an agent relies on its own abilities.
However, a Sensing agent has fewer chances to identify the patterns, and it has already used
its chances for collecting data by sensing the outer world. To model such a phenomenon,
we assume that agent A learns the patterns and possibilities with some errors. To model this
error, we used a normal probability distribution with a mean of the real value of the system’s
parameter (µ = PS). The standard deviation of this learning (σ = a× (1−NA)) is impacted
by two factors, namely a maximum standard deviation (a), and the agent’s attention to the
pattern (1 − iNtuitiveA). We use (1 − iNtuitiveA) to indicate that iNtuitive agents pay
more attention to such patterns and possibilities (i.e. they have less deviation in learning).
Furthermore, the agents have different concerns about the environment and fairness. In
Equation 6.13, f(iNtuitiveA, P ) models this concern. Sensing agents tend to live in the
current moment; hence, they weight their understanding of the environment (P = Env)
more (i.e. f(iNtuitiveA, Env) = 1 − iNtuitiveA) and weight older information about
the environment (P t−1A ) less. On the other hand, as indicated by Buboltz Jr et al. (2003),
iNtuitive-Thinking agents were more sensitive to the fairness (P = fair) of the system
than their Sensing-Thinking counterparts. The availability of such difference among the
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Thinking personality convinces us that iNtuitive agents pay more attention to such patterns
(i.e. f(iNtuitiveA, fair) = iNtuitiveA). Note that besides Buboltz Jr et al.’s (2003) study,
we know that iNtuitive agents are more future-oriented than sensing agents. Also, the fair-
ness of the system influences the future of an agent more than its current status.
6.6.4 Decision-making factors
As stated earlier, the combination of the system’s characteristics and an agent’s personality
impacts its beliefs about the system and its rules. We also stated that the reason why agents
modify their internal beliefs is to resolve the dissonance. Those statements, along with the
evidence of the impacts of the fairness of the system on an agent’s behaviour, and the fact
that in a trading context agents intend to maximise their profit, convince us to argue that any
hurdle for an agent to cheat introduces cognitive dissonance on the part of an agent and
should be resolved. What follows states how agents measure this dissonance.
6.6.4.1 Cognitive dissonance
In our model, cognitive dissonance is measured as the cost for tensions occurring in the mind
of an agent when the system possesses certain characteristics (e.g. unfair institutions). These
characteristics influence an agent’s behaviour through its perception and its personality. We
use Equation 6.14 to measure dissonance regarding fairness of the system for agents based
on their personalities. This dissonance is used to moderate the internal beliefs towards ac-
tions of an agent in the system. The dissonance felt by agent A due to the fairness of the
system at time t is indicated by Dissonance(Fairness)tA. Costs/rewards for perceived fair-
ness of the system (FairnesstA) are weighted, based on the Thinking aspect of the agent
(ThinkingA). Costs/rewards regarding harmonising the society are weighted, based on the




. On the one hand, an agent considers some
rewards (e.g. feeling good about being loyal) regarding the relative strength of the connec-
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impact of the perceived fairness of the system on them.
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Dissonance(Fairness)tA =

















As suggested by J. S. Adams (1965), Tyler (1989), and Greenberg (1990, 1993), this dis-
sonance influences agents’ internal beliefs about the actions and their cooperation in mon-
itoring others’ behaviours. Some of these effects have been stated earlier, and changes in
internal beliefs will be stated further in Chapter 7.
6.6.4.2 Conformity
Another behaviour of agents stated by Aronson and Aronson (2007, p. 185) is enhancing
values associated with an action based on the behaviour of others. This has been studied
by Tyran and Feld (2002); they identified that a reason for following a law with mild pun-
ishments after a referendum is the expectation of support for it by the society and the idea
that the majority will follow that law. Therefore we implement such an idea for agents’ ob-
servations. We consider a threshold for an agent whereby the agent decides to modify its
behaviour. When the agent observes that a greater proportion of agents than its threshold are
performing a particular forbidden action, it decreases its mental costs for doing it.
6.6.4.3 Perception of the future
Another factor that impacts agents’ behaviour is the perception of the environment. We know
this factor arises from the Sensing aspect of agent A the most; hence, we modify the thresh-
olds of agent A based on its Sensing aspect (1− iNtuitiveA). An agent discounts its future
revenue/punishment based on its tolerance towards the environment. Agent A modifies its
discount factor over time (i.e. it is not a fixed number). This modification occurs based
on its sensitivity towards the environment (TolerableEnvironmentA) that is calculated as
follows:
TolerableEnvironmentA = Random Uniform(0, 1)× (1− iNtuitiveA) (6.15)
6.6.4.4 Impact on monitoring (role)
Collaboration in the monitoring of norms and rules incurs some costs to an agent. Conse-
quently, friendship and an organisation’s characteristics influence the incentives for informal
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(e.g. boycotting) or formal (e.g. reporting) collaboration in rule enforcement. As stated ear-
lier, fairness and relationships convince some agents to internalise some other roles. This
internalisation forms in two stages as follows:
1. Internalising the monitoring role (i.e. Knowledge agents or K): An agent may decide
to return company favours by improving the procedural justice by collaborating in
identifying suspicious acts (see Section 6.4.3).
2. Interpretation (internalised role of skill agents S): An agent who officially or unoffi-
cially (as stated earlier) collaborates in monitoring has its own perception of the fair-
ness of rules and situations; hence, it may overlook some actions.
We use a combination of the above in the model. Equation 6.16 shows the tolerance for
unofficial monitoring agents. Note that the agent reports the violations to its direct manager.
The agent tolerates rule-breakers’ violations concerning its relationships with them and also
the system characteristics. As stated earlier, the Thinking aspect of the agent’s personality
increases its reactions to the unfair treatment of itself. However, the Feeling aspect of the
agent decreases its inclination to treat others unfairly. Furthermore, the Feeling aspect of
personality takes account of the weight of friends in the group who the agent is associated
with and the weight of the connection (i.e. relationship) with the manager.
ToleranceA=MercantileAgent =









First, we state the aspects of tolerance that are impacted by the agent’s beliefs. As stated
earlier, the Sensing aspect of personality (1− iNtuitive) is impacted the most by immediate
joys perceived from the environment (EnvironmentA) that is reflected in the first term of
the model. The second term shows how an agent directly includes the costs or benefits of
the system’s fairness in its calculations. As stated earlier, the Thinking aspect is directly
impacted by the perceived justice and fairness (fairnessA) in the system. Furthermore,
Feeling agents consider fairness when their actions impact others. The fairness of the system
is a good way of measuring this impact as stated by Sunshine and Tyler (2003). To reflect
the impact of the Feeling aspect of agent A (1 − ThinkingA), we should also consider the
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the impact of the importance of group members on the associated weight with the perceived






Equation 6.17 shows the tolerance of agent A who officially monitors others (i.e. it is
a manager). These agents only consider the impact of the environment and their actions
on others. As before, the Sensing aspect (1 − iNtuitiveA) is impacted by the perceived
environment (EnvironmentA). However, note that a manager is not from the same group of
mercantile agents, and they do not monitor managers. As noted by Schmitt et al. (2005), the
Feeling aspect of personality (1−ThinkingA) causes an agent to consider the consequences
of its actions on others. Note that the manager’s responsibilities include constant monitoring
of the mercantile agents. Furthermore, the directors are remote (i.e. they do not impact
workplace harmony). Consequently, it considers only the impact of the fairness of the system
on mercantile agents (i.e. he considers fairnessA).
6.6.5 The impact of the private trade on negotiation
The combination of an agent’s behaviour and skill impacts organisational profitability; more
skilled agents can increase the organisational profitability. Breaking organisational rules has
two potential impacts on organisational profitability. One of these influences is the direct
cost for the organisation based on the agents’ behaviour. Another important cost is the in-
direct expenses incurred due to the formed “social exchange relationships”. Cropanzano
and Mitchell (2005) divide exchange into two subcategories, namely transactions and rela-
tionships. In this context, relationships refer to interpersonal-attachments, not transactions
between two groups. Note that it is dangerous when relationships and transactions are mixed.
A rule established to control this phenomenon in the EIC and Julfa was the prohibition of
private trade. Private trade raises concerns regarding becoming friends with local traders that
leads to sacrificing company profits. This happens through either only trading with friends
(i.e. not searching for the best offers) or not negotiating well. In our model, we assume that
agents will break this rule (prohibition of private trade), if they face intolerable dissonance
costs for unfair organisational institutions. The intuition for this includes a) lack of moral
concerns (i.e. internal costs) for breaking the rule and b) challenges for monitoring such a
violation. To summarise, the private trade can impact the agent’s behaviour (consciously or
unconsciously) in two steps. First, the agent either consciously uses its trade for the company
as a way of gift exchange and making friends with local traders, or this ongoing relationship
strengthens the agent’s social relationships with them. Then it uses this social relationship
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in its private trade (economic exchanges). This has been observed in bell boys’ behaviour
(“in order to maximize their tips, bell boys can compromise the interests of their employer”,
Seth, 2018, p. 171).
To model the impact of the steps mentioned above on an agent’s behaviour, we also
consider the impact of two characteristics of the system. An agent who has the right to
perform private trade negotiates less for the master. However, in a payment scheme that
shares the profit, the agent compromises less, because it would also lose its share of the profit.
Furthermore, if an agent resides in a place, some friendships and expectations of local traders
gradually form — the agent’s response to such an expectation is based on its personality.
Finally, we know that when the board of directors permitted the agents to perform private
trade in the EIC, they also decided to significantly decrease the agents’ wages. This decision
of the board of directors was because private trade creates enough incentives for agents to
apply for the job. This kind of issue impacts both friendships with locals and negotiations for
its master. Equations 6.20 and 6.18 indicate how we model the impact of the stated concerns
for agent A.
Equation 6.18 shows the impact of connections with local traders on agent A’s negotia-
tion. This impact is moderated in two steps, as shown by the two terms in the equation. The
first part indicates how agent A compromises its negotiation for its social bonds with local
traders. Using f(Fairness, Private,WA,locals), the agent takes account of its profits (i.e. its
share of profit Fairness), the margin of profits (this decreases after legalising private trade
(Private)), and the strength of its relationship with local traders (WA,locals). These concerns
are modified, based on the agent’s personality and the weight it places on the expectations
of others. The second term indicates how the agent’s personality motivates it to ignore all
social concerns and negotiate well (NegotiationA). The sum of the two terms determines













Equation 6.19 indicates how agent A decides about its negotiation (NegotiationA). If
it performs private trade, it negotiates for PNegotiationA amount. However, if it does not
perform private trade, it negotiates with its full strength (second term of Equation 6.19).
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NegotiationA =
PNegotiationA, if he is engaged in private trade;1, otherwise, (6.19)
PNegotiationA indicates agent A’s negotiation strength when it performs private trade.
The first term of Equation 6.20 indicates that the agent negotiates to some extent. The extent
to which the agent negotiates is determined by the payment scheme (determined by system
Fairness) and whether or not the private trade is legal. Note that profit-sharing increases the
agent’s incentives to negotiate — i.e. ConstantNegotiation(Fairness, Private) is higher
in a fair organisation. Furthermore, granting permissions for private trade and decreasing
wages changes the main source of agents’ revenue for local trades. The second part shows
how an agent changes its negotiation power based on its vested interests in trade.
PNegotiationA =
ConstantNegotiation(Fairness, Private)+
RandomUniform(0, 1− ConstantNegotiation(Fairness, Private))
(6.20)
In the next section, we provide a summary of what has been stated in this chapter. We also
provide an overview on other aspects of the model that have not been stated in the previous
sections.
6.7 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter has proposed a modification of the BDI cognitive architecture, coupled with the
CKSW meta-roles. Also, the model considers contradictions between beliefs and intentions
as a source of cognitive dissonance. To model human interpretations of seriousness of viola-
tion, we have employed fuzzy sets to map violations of a rule, along with their punishments
in the modelling. Then we have utilised the architecture to model the interactions between
different modules using the two main historical long-distance trading societies of this thesis.
The presented agent cognitive architecture can be used or be extended to model other
societies. Also, more social impacts can be addressed by considering other sociopsycholog-
ical studies or other methods of learning (e.g. reinforcement learning). Some instances of
potential extensions of this model include, considering the impact of mass communication
and social networks on a human’s decision-making and behaviours (Kissas, 2019; W. Zhang
et al., 2009). An instance of these impacts concerns media playing the role of a catalyst
for copycat crimes and suicides (Ji et al., 2014; Surette, 2012; Yang et al., 2012). Another
instance of such impacts concerns employing social media to collect information in order to
use it to impact an agents’ decisions (Berghel, 2018; Schneble et al., 2018, e.g. Cambridge
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Analytica). This impact can be modelled by taking account of changes in beliefs with ex-
posure to new information (e.g. discussions on the validity of a behaviour). Another impact
concerns context-based comparisons (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980). For instance, the context
can impact an agent’s understanding of fairness (e.g. an agent who is used to high wages con-
siders lower wages unfair, Herz & Taubinsky, 2017). Note that this understanding of fairness
and impacts of that on an agent’s behaviour can be used to model stickiness of wages used
in Chapter 5 (i.e. market resistance to reach an equilibrium).
Another important method for changing beliefs concerns persuasive arguments (Hunter,
2018). The influential elements regarding this concern include, but are not limited to, the
modes of persuasion, weighting vivid examples more than general statistical evidence, the
self-esteem of the audience, and self-biases. Aristotle suggested that argument (logos), char-
acter (êthos), and emotions (pathê) are influential components for persuasion (i.e. in models
different weights are associated with different arguments and debaters, Rapp, 2010). The
generalisation because of a vivid example is another issue that impacts the model. Note that
such an issue is observable, even though participants were told that the observed instance was
an atypical case (i.e. agents weight their own experience more than collected information,
Hamill et al., 1980; Zebregs et al., 2014). Also, the impact of self-esteem on persuasion is
another influential parameter that impacts the model (Zellner, 1970). Finally, self-bias sim-
ply suggests that one is biased when interpreting events regarding oneself (e.g. he attributes
his achievements to his capabilities and his failures to the situation, Cunningham & Turk,
2017).
The impact of such elements on changes in beliefs, along with influences such as the
impact of prejudice on a person’s behaviour, are other issues that can be modelled utilising
and extending the provided cognitive architecture. However, there exists a need to identify
these modules’ and related modules’ impacts on each other (e.g. the impact of personality
on self-biased information processing). Furthermore, this chapter has considered fairness in
a trading society as a source of cognitive dissonance; however, an extension of this work
could consider the conflicts between internal beliefs, perceived norms, and rules (e.g. moral
dilemmas). Finally, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, like Gödel, we believe that the
mind is not static; hence, an exact mechanical replica of humans’ cognition and mind is not
achievable.
The next chapter provides implementations of the two historical long-distance trading
societies using the cognitive model provided in this chapter.
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7
Simulation using the refined BDI mental
architecture
7.1 Introduction
This chapter employs our extension of the BDI mental architecture presented in Chapter 6
to explain the behaviour of agents in the two long-distance trading societies studied in this
thesis. The chapter concerns the dynamics and efficacy of institutions in the studied historical
cases.
Using this simulation, we examine the same system studied in Chapter 4, from another
point of view. This chapter aims to find out whether it is possible to gain insight into what
happened in Julfa without the need for a closed hiring scheme. This chapter also explores an
example of conflicts between norms (friendship expectations) and organisational rule. Fur-
thermore, based on what has been stated in Chapter 6, we model the monitoring conducted
unofficially by other members. This kind of modelling helps us to explore a pivotal concern
stated by Sproule-Jones (1993) that led him to classify rules in terms of rules-in-use versus
rules-in-forms. What makes this exploration interesting, lies in keeping the rules of interest
the same and changing other characteristics and institutions of the system.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 reviews the two historical
long-distance trading societies. Section 7.3 presents the simulation model for these cases
that is developed based on the architecture and descriptions presented in Chapter 6. Section
7.4 provides simulation results of this simulation. Finally, Section 7.5 provides a summary
of the chapter, along with some discussions about the results and limitations of this study.
7.2 Review of systems
In this section, we provide an overview of the two historical long-distance trading societies.
Also, we compare them with respect to the four characteristics of interest. The characteristics
are listed below:
1. Environmental circumstances: The favourable/unfavourable environment and low/high
mortality rates impact agents’ behaviour and system costs. Such impacts were dis-
cussed earlier; however, we provide an overview of them here.
2. Fairness of institutions: As stated in Chapter 6, an agent’s perception of fairness
concerns several characteristics that include distributive justice (e.g. paying based on
personal performance), procedural justice (fair dispute resolution), and a convincing
presentation of the procedures. We state such aspects for both societies.
3. Apprenticeship programme: The influence of apprenticeship programmes on in-
creasing a trader’s performance has been stated in Chapter 5. Here we use the charac-
teristics of the EIC and Julfa in connection with our investigation of this matter.
4. Mobility versus long-term residency: A difference between the EIC and Julfa con-
cerns their policy regarding mercantile agents. In the EIC, mercantile agents stayed
in places called factories (i.e. warehouses), but in Julfa they moved among different
trading places.1
In the next section, we provide an overview of the two long-distance trading societies.
7.2.1 Societies’ background
In what follows, we provide descriptions of the two historical long-distance trading societies,
and how these societies possess the characteristics of interest.
1For instance, Santiago di Barrachiel (an Armenian trader) did not return to Julfa for ten years. What makes
it interesting is the fact that this round of trading travels started only one year after his marriage (Aslanian, 2007,
p. 343).
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Armenian Merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa): Armenian merchants of New-Julfa were
originally from old Julfa in Armenia. They re-established a trader society in New-Julfa (near
Isfahan, Iran) after their forced displacement in the early 17th century. They used commenda
contracts (profit-sharing contracts) in the society and also used courts to resolve disputes.
The mercantile agents were responsible for buying and selling items and moved among dif-
ferent nodes of the trading network. The society also had apprenticeship programmes to
improve their recruits’ skill levels.
The British East India Company (EIC): During the same time, the British contempo-
raneous counterpart of Julfa (i.e. the British East India Company (EIC, AD 1600s-1850s))
had a totally different perspective on managing the society. The EIC faced a high mortality
rate for environmental circumstances in India. They hired inexperienced apprentices, asked
them to provide signed bonds, and sent them off for trading to India to be trained by fellow
merchants on a voluntary basis. They built settlements for their mercantile agents to stay in
India. Also, they paid their employees fixed wages and fired agents based on their beliefs
about their trading behaviour. Furthermore, the EIC’s trading period covers the English Civil
War (1642–1651), which had some impacts on the company (see Section 7.3.1). We did not
consider impacts such as militarisation of the EIC after the 1750s, which was a shift from
being traders to being governors, because we are only interested in studying trading aspects
of these societies.
7.2.2 Characteristics
This section provides an overview of the aforementioned societies with respect to the char-
acteristics stated earlier, namely environment, fairness, apprenticeship, and agents’ mobility.
Environment: As stated earlier, these historical long-distance trading societies had dif-
ferent mortality rates. This difference resulted in the phenomenon that on average in the
EIC an agent died before he was 35 years old (see Chapter 2 and Hejeebu, 1998, p. 101).
On the other hand, Aslanian (2007) provides no evidence for such a situation in Julfa. As
stated in Chapter 6, the impact of high mortality rates on agents’ behaviour varies, based on
the agents’ personalities. Furthermore, the main impact of this characteristic concerns the
agent’s perception of the future. Also, the cost of this mortality rate for companies concerns
some fixed costs regarding hiring and sending new agents to the settlements. In addition,
companies face costs of lost opportunity, because a dead agent cannot finish the trade.
Fairness: Another difference between the two historical long-distance trading societies
is associated with their payment schemes and adjudication processes affecting the general
perception concerning the way the organisations were managed, and even issues such as
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granting permissions for establishing another trading organisation. As stated in earlier chap-
ters, the EIC rarely employed an adjudication process and they paid low wages to their em-
ployees. However, Julfa used commenda contracts, and a mercantile agent was paid based
on his performance. They had adjudication processes to resolve disputes considering avail-
able evidence (including contracts). However, the Julfa society had certain characteristics
that questioned its complete fairness — for instance, in the Julfa society, the capital of the
family was managed by the elder brother. This rule helped the families to work like a firm;
however, other brothers were deprived of managing their capital (the rules somehow made
it irrational to ask for capital). Such a rule can lead to a partial dissatisfaction regarding the
head of a family’s decisions for other members.
Apprenticeship: As stated in Chapter 5, Julfa had organised apprenticeship programmes.
However, in the EIC, we see a gradual shift from hiring skilled agents to hiring inexperienced
agents who learn to trade in India with the help of more experienced agents. This influences
the skills of the agents in societies. Furthermore, apprentices learn about fairness of the sys-
tem during training. Also, the relationships between masters and recruits become stronger
over the training period. Section 7.3.1 states some impacts in addition to what has been
stated in Chapter 6.
Agent’s mobility: Finally, a difference in the policy of the two historical long-distance
trading societies concerns whether or not the mercantile agents stayed in a certain place to
perform trades. In the EIC, the company built its own factories and mercantile agents (not
sailors) resided there. This introduces issues such as forming an informal community inside
the company that will be run on friendship norms (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). Another
impact of residency in a node concerns friendship with local traders (i.e. sellers of the items)
that impacts an agent’s incentives for negotiation.
Table 7.1: System specifications based on the EIC and Julfa Societies
Characteristics EIC Julfa
Environment Unfavourable Favourable
Fairness of institutions Low High
Apprenticeship programme Weak Strong
Mobility Reside in company’s factories Move between trading nodes
An overview of the stated characteristics is presented in Table 7.1. In the next section,
we present an agent-based simulation to study the effects of these differences on the success
of the two long-distance trading societies and some stereotypical societies formed, based on
the characteristics presented in Table 7.1.
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7.3 Simulation model
In this section, we describe how we simulate the two historical long-distance trading soci-
eties using the refined BDI mental architecture and CKSW meta-roles presented in Chapter
6. This modelling is narrowed down to the characteristics stated in Table 7.1. For this pur-
pose, first, we state assumptions of the model. Then we explain the procedures we used
to implement this model. Finally, we state the simulation parameters and the reasons for
choosing specific values for them.
7.3.1 Model assumptions
This section states the assumptions employed for this modelling. Note that in Chapter 6, we
stated how our refined version of the BDI mental architecture can be utilised for the EIC and
Julfa. There we also covered the interactions between modules and their specifications. In
this section, we state the pivotal assumptions utilised for this simulation. These assumptions
concern the influence of several factors on agents’ behaviour and organisational profitability,
namely the apprenticeship programme, opportunities for revising certain rules, methods for
learning the norms, and the system’s characteristics. Note that some aspects of the system
impose costs on the organisation. These costs are important because we study trading soci-
eties that manage to improve their profitability even by tolerating fraud. For instance, Ali
(2008) stated that “flexible ethics” tolerate harm done by self-interested agents and even jus-
tify them.2 In such a context, we should consider the costs and profits of actions, along with
the agents’ behaviour.
Apprenticeship programme: This model considers other effects besides skill improve-
ment. The first impact concerns providing an opportunity for the agents to have a better
rule-understanding. Furthermore, the agents’ internal beliefs (their internal beliefs towards
a rule) have fewer deviations from the stated rule. The agents also have a better understand-
ing of the organisational characteristics such as fairness of institutions. Another impact of
apprenticeship programmes concerns strengthening bonds between the trainee (mercantile
agent) and the trainer (manager). Finally, one should note that the apprenticeship improves
skills of the agents at a cost for the organisation. These costs include what the company loses
for putting aside some capital for training. In societies such as Julfa, the company should
2An example of such justifications is stated by Ali and Camp (2003) when they compare the “Evangelical
capitalism” to other forms of capitalism. They state that “[Evangelical capitalism] differs from other forms of
capitalism in its unique emphasis on the proposition that the end justifies the means and that the individual is
‘free to act on his own judgment’ to achieve his/her ‘ambitions for wealth and success’ ”.
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give the trainees some capital to trade with. Note that inexperienced traders cannot make as
much profit as experienced traders (i.e. they decrease the profits significantly).
Opportunities for revising bureaucratic rules: We know that in certain societies such
as Julfa, directors (i.e. heads of families) had already been working as mercantile agents, and
they were aware of employees’ perceptions of rules and institutions. However, in the EIC
after the English Civil War (1642-1651), some mercantile agents were promoted to directors.
This led to some changes in company institutions over the years. In 1665, the agents were
granted permissions for self-interested trade (private trade) inside India for non-monopolised
items (private trade; see Davies, 2014, Note 3). Between 1667 and 1669, the permission was
extended, such that it included more items and international trade (see Erikson, 2014, p. 76).
The immediate consequence of such permissions was a reduction in imports, such that they
were about 0 between 1666 and 1668 (see Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2).3 We model the EIC’s
circumstances (i.e. once some managers have the opportunity to permit private trade). In
1698, the establishment of a new trading company (the New East India Company, Bohun,
2008) increased the number of traders. This increased the living costs and made private
trade more competitive.4 We call the consequence, that is a decrease in private trade profit
margins, market saturation.
Given historical changes in the EIC, in our simulation, we distinguish three intervals with
respect to the two limit points, namely a) granting permissions for private trade and b) the
market saturation. These intervals and limiting points, along with their definitions, are listed
below:
• Interval A: Before the time that managers had the opportunity to revise rules regarding
private trade (before 70).5
• Interval B: Between the aforementioned time and market saturation (between 70 and
3This drop could be partly caused by wars between the Dutch and British companies; however, the impact
of private traders was significant in a way that a company decided to start a trade war against them by increasing
the imports and reducing the market price of such items (Chaudhuri, 1978, pp. 285–287).
4These issues are stated in correspondence between agents in India and the EIC directors who resided in
England and are narrated by Marshal as follows:
“In 1730 the Directors complained about an ‘expensive and extravagant way of living, partic-
ularly in equipage and show’. [...] The servants [...] had ‘dancing twice a week to keep up a
social spirit’. [...] The expense of life for Europeans in Bengal became notorious. [...] By 1735
it was said that ‘no one at present from the hightest [sic] to the lowest can live conveniently on
his allowanee’ [sic].” (Marshall, 1976, p. 17)
5Note that this number is figurative and we shifted the actual year from the EIC establishment by 4 years
in this simulation (i.e. it was 66 years after establishment).
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100 time units in our simulation).
• Interval C: After the market saturation (after 100 years in this simulation).
Learning norms: In our model we assume that an agent revises his perception of norms
(i.e. social expectations) through discussions with other society members. However, when
norms are different than stated rules, agents are considerate about questioning them; hence,
only strong social bonds initiate such discussions between two agents.
Environment and mortality rates: An influence of the environment is on mortality
rates. Replacing deceased agents imposes some costs on the organisation by introducing
the requirement of dispatching new agents from the company’s homeland to the destination.
Furthermore, if the company has apprenticeship programmes, some expense is incurred to
train new agents (the formula and effect of the environment on mortality rates is presented in
Section 7.3.3). Note that the costs stated above and other similar costs impact the decisions
of managers of an organisation to choose certain policies, given their intention to increase
their profits (we do not address this aspect here).
Personality dynamics: In our simulation model, the personalities of mercantile agents
are modified gradually as time goes by such that they fit their roles (see Section 6.5.2). This
is inspired by the notion of “attraction-selection-attrition” (Schneider, 1987). This suggests
that individuals are chosen for and stay in positions such that their colleagues possess similar
personalities.
In the next subsection, we state our employed procedures to simulate these two histor-
ical long-distance trading societies, as well as other stereotype societies made by changing
system characteristics.
7.3.2 Algorithms
In this section, we state the procedures employed to use the model described in Chapter 6
to simulate the two aforementioned societies. The simulation model is split into four dis-
tinctive procedures and one sub-procedure. The first procedure models the societal level of
simulation, including creating an initial population and staffing (hiring new recruits) to create
a stable population. The second level describes procedures for mercantile agents’ decision-
making and learning the system’s parameters. The second level also includes a sub-procedure
for defining new parameters associated with hired mercantile agents. The third level cov-
ers the decision-making and learning procedure associated with managers (i.e. monitoring
agents). The last procedure is the meta-algorithm that executes the aforementioned algo-
rithms in an appropriate sequence and updates parameters required for them.
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Algorithm 7.1: Societal level set-up
/* n equals deceased and fired agents (mercantile agents and managers) in
the former iteration. */
1 The most experienced mercantile agents get promoted to a managerial role to keep the number of
managers constant.
2 Create n new agents status← new, Experiene← 0, randomly initialise personality aspects and
other parameters
3 HiringCost = n×HirePerPersonLostOpportunity
4 if There are apprenticeship progammes then
5 TrainingCost = n× TrainPerPersonLostFortune
6 else
7 TrainingCost = 0
8 end
9 OrganisationROR←(∑




Algorithm 7.1 shows how the societal level of the system is simulated. The organisation
hires and promotes agents to sustain the number of agents per role — i.e. replaces deceased
agents (lines 1-2). As stated earlier, deceased agents incur some costs for the systems. We
take into account such costs by calculating HiringCosts (line 3). Furthermore, systems that
benefit from apprenticeship programmes face the cost of training in terms of lost opportunity
(stated in Section 7.3.3) per hired agents (lines 4-8). Finally, the rate of return (ROR) for the
iteration will be calculated. In calculating the ROR, we assume an agent contributes to the
company’s ROR based on his experience (line 9).
Algorithm 7.2 shows how the parameters of newly introduced mercantile agents are
initialised. This algorithm is executed only for inexperienced agents (i.e. new recruits). If
the system has apprenticeship programmes, the hired agents have a better skill level and
a better perception of the system’s characteristics (lines 1-4). Furthermore, trained agents
have a different internal belief and rule-understanding than their untrained counterparts (lines
5-6). An untrained agent has a lower skill level and a completely random understanding
of the system’s characteristics (lines 7-10). Besides, untrained agents’ rule-understandings
and their internal beliefs about the seriousness of violations are modelled using different
variances (lines 11-12). The social norms are not learnt during training, because trainees are
not in contact with other traders. In other words, the variance of norm understanding for
both trained and untrained agents is the same (line 14). Finally, the agent updates his status
to experienced so that the system can identify him (line 15).
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Algorithm 7.2: Initialising the mercantile agent’s algorithm
1 if There are apprenticeship progammes then
2 Skill← 0.7 +RandomUniform(0, 0.3)
/* Perceived environment and fairness for trained agents. */
3 PEnvironment← RandomNormal(µ← Environment, σ ←
TrainedPerceptionDeviation)
4 Fair ← RandomNormal(µ← Fairness, σ ← TrainedPerceptionDeviation)
/* Rule-understanding and the internal belief towards rule. */
5 Rule← RandomNormal(µ← V iolationIntervals, σ ← SDTrainedRule)
6 Belief ← RandomNormal(µ← V iolationIntervals, σ ← SDTrainedBelief )
7 else
/* There are no apprenticeship programmes (e.g. training at work). */
8 Skill← RandomUniform(0, 0.5)
/* Perceived environment and fairness for inexperienced agents. */
9 PEnvironment← RandomUniform(0, 1)
10 Fair ← RandomUniform(0, 1)
/* Rule-understanding and the internal belief about rules. */
11 Rule← RandomNormal(µ← V iolationIntervals, σ ← SDUntrainedRule)
12 Belief ← RandomNormal(µ← V iolationIntervals, σ ← SDUntrainedBelief )
13 end
14 Norm← RandomNormal(µ← V iolationIntervals, σ ← SDNorm)
15 Status← Experienced
Algorithm 7.3 shows the procedures associated with mercantile agents’ cognition and
decision-making processes. Note that in this algorithm #Rnd(x) indicates a random number
generated in the interval (0, x). As stated earlier, if the status of the mercantile agent is new,
he goes through an initialisation algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 7.2, line 1). Then the algorithm
generates a random rate of profit for an iteration. This profit consists of two parts. The
first part is a general profit (GenProf) that is obtainable through trade, irrespective of the
mercantile agent’s skills. The second part is a profit that is impacted by the mercantile agent’s
skills, and the extent to which he negotiates that is obtained by Equation 6.18 (line 2). If the
payment scheme is unfair, the mercantile agent’s relative access to the company resources
increases over time. This increase is proportional to the profit he makes for the company (line
3). Then the mercantile agent updates his computation of the company shares of profit after
subtracting his wage or his share of profit (line 4). Experienced mercantile agents decide on
cheating based on a set of potential violations (lines 5-10). If the mercantile agent decides to
cheat, the company’s ROR decreases, based on the decided violation (line 11).
Furthermore, a consequence of cheating is a cognitive dissonance. To resolve this, the
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Algorithm 7.3: Mercantile agent’s algorithm
/* Upadate parameters for new recruits. */
1 if Status = New then Set agent’s parameter using Algorithm 7.2
/* ImpactedNegotiation is obtained using Equation 6.18. */
2 PotlProf ← #Rnd(GenProf) + (ImpactedNegotiation× skill ×#Rnd(ExtProf))
/* Agent’s access is modified. */
3 if Unfair then access← access× (1 + (0.3× PotlProf))
4 CompanyROR← PotlProf × (1−AgentShare)
5 if Experience > 3 then
/* Make decision on cheating using Equation 6.5. */
6 Cheat← 0
/* Viol is a set of random violations. */
7 foreach viol ∈ Viol do
8 util← Utility(viol)
9 if Util > Utility(Cheat) then Cheat← viol
10 end
11 CompanyROR← (1− Cheat)× CompanyROR
12 if Cheat > 0 then
13 if #Rnd(1) < FeelGuilty then
14 IBeliefCost← (1 + #Rnd(0.1))× IBeliefCost
15 FeelGuilty ← min{(1 + #Rnd(0.1))× FeelGuilty, 1}
16 else
17 FeelGuilty ← (1−#Rnd(0.1))× FeelGuilty
18 foreach Violation level < Cheat do
19 IBeliefCost← (1−#Rnd(0.1))× IBeliefCost





/* Internal beliefs are modified based on the fairness calculated by
Equation 6.14. */
















/* Agent justifies the violation based on the cheaters observed. */
29 if PropCheaters > JustifThresh then





31 foreach Violation level < MV iolation do




35 if Experience > 3 then
/* Updating role and making decisions on private trade. */
36 if Dissonance(Fair) < −DissonThresh then
/* Agent stops collaboration in monitoring. */















/* Agent voluntarily collaborates in monitoring. */










45 if Desperate then
46 foreach Violation level do
/* Punishment of internal beliefs decreases significantly */
47 Change the costs of internal belief violations by #Rnd(MaxSh× 3)
48 end
49 end
/* Agent (I) increases the weight of manager and friends. */
50 WIj ←WIj × (1 + #Rnd(FriendIncrease)) ∀j∈frinds
51 WIManager ←WIManager × (1 + #Rnd(ManagerIncrease))
52 if Moving to a new place then
/* Most of the former friends are replaced with new friends */
53 Replace Mob% of friends with new friends.
54 end
/* Parameters adjustment; */
55 if Not intuitive or Judging then
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/* The agent’s personality is gradually adjusted to better fit the
position. */
56 Change the relevant aspect by #RndPersAdj
57 end
58 if |PEnvironment| > TolerableEnvironment and
|1− α| > (|PEnvironment| − TolerableEnvironment)×MaxShift then
59 Modify α for #Rnd(αAdj)
60 end
/* learning; */
61 Learn system’s characteristics and norms using Equations 6.13 and 6.6, respectively. Learn
monitoring strength using Equations 6.10, 6.11, and 6.9.
62 if Experience > 3 then
/* Reporting observed violations; */
63 if K = Yes then
/* The agent reports some of the cheaters observed. */
64 Agent reports connections who impose more costs on the organisation than his tolerance
calculated by Equation 6.16.
65 end
66 end
/* Agent may die based on the Equation 7.2. */
67 Experience← Experience+ 1
68 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience+ 15) then Die
mercantile agent either feels guilty, or changes his beliefs. If he feels guilty, he increases his
mental punishment and more probably he feels guilty in the future. Otherwise, his mental
costs for the violation are reduced. Also, his internal beliefs about the seriousness of such
violations are modified, and he feels guilty with a lower probability in the future (line 12-24).
Then a mercantile agent, irrespective of his experience, faces a cognitive dissonance
based on the fairness of the system. This cognitive dissonance may incur extra costs for
him for following or breaking the rules (because of that, we used the absolute number of x,
|x|). To resolve this, the mercantile agent changes his internal beliefs to feel better about
the system and himself (lines 25-27).6 Furthermore, as a profit-maximising entity, if his
proportion of observed violations exceeds a threshold, the mental costs for violating such
internal beliefs decrease. This is only applied to costs associated with violation labels that
are less than the average of observed violations. Also, the coefficient for this reduction is
randomly generated in an interval such that its upper bound (MaxSh) decreases, based on
6When we say it changes by x, we mean 1 + x or 1− x based on the context.
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the frequency of cheating (MaxSh× PropCheaters, lines 28-34).
Furthermore, more experienced mercantile agents decide on their participation in mon-
itoring by considering cognitive dissonance incurred for their perception of fairness. They
also decide on performing private trade with respect to the perceived fairness and their friends
who perform such trades (lines 35-43). Lines 44-49 model the consequences of permitting
private trade. As stated earlier, once private trade is permitted, a drop in trade is evident
for three consecutive years (see Section 2.3.3). In our model, each mercantile agent has a
threshold by which he decides to leave the organisation (line 44). We also know that after
some years, mercantile agents in the EIC faced financial troubles. In other words, after 100
iterations (years after the company’s establishment), mercantile agents were faced with a de-
crease in wages and a drop in private trade’s revenue such that they were desperate to pay
for their living costs. As a consequence, costs associated with violating the internal beliefs
decrease (lines 45-49).
Algorithm 7.4: Manager’s algorithm
/* Parameters adjustment; */
1 if Not enough thinking or sensing then
/* Agent adjusts personality to better fit the position. */
2 Change the relevant aspect for #RndPersAdj
3 end
/* Manager reports (and eventually punishes) a number of employees who
impose more costs to the organisation than his tolerance calculated by
Equation 6.17. We call the number TolPunish. */
4 PotPunish← reported employees with violations more than TolPunish
5 if The number of members of PotPunish > MaxPunish then
/* The manager has a limit for punishing called MaxPunish. */
6 Punish MaxPunish of PotPunish with the most violation
7 else
8 Punish all PotPunish members.
9 end
/* Agent may die based on the Equation 7.2. */
10 Experience← Experience+ 1
11 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience+ 15) then Die
Also, the mercantile agent increases the weight of social bonds with his associated agents
(lines 50-51). The majority of a mobile mercantile agent’s work friends (e.g. Julfans) are re-
placed (lines 52-54). His personality is also gradually adjusted to his role (lines 55-57). If
the system has an environment more different than what a mercantile agent expects, he mod-
ifies his discount factor — a discount factor impacts an agent’s perception of the net present
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value of money (i.e. α, lines 58-60). He learns system characteristics, monitoring strength,
and social norms using Equations 6.6, 6.10, 6.11, 6.9, and 6.13 (line 61). If the mercantile
agent has enough experience and has already decided to collaborate in monitoring, he helps
the system to identify violators, based on his interpretation of a fair action (line 62-66). Fi-
nally, the mercantile agent increases his experience and dies with a probability governed by
Equation 7.2 (lines 67-68).
Algorithm 7.4 shows the procedures associated with managers (i.e. monitoring agents).
First, the personality of a manager is gradually modified, based on his role (lines 1-3). He
creates a set that consists of reported violators with unacceptable violations (i.e. he tolerates
violations to some extent, line 4). Note that the manager reports and punishes a certain
number of violators. If the number of violators exceeds a certain number, he punishes the
worst violators (lines 5-6). Otherwise, all the violators are punished (lines 7-9). Finally, his
experience and age increase, and he may die (lines 10-11).
Algorithm 7.5: Meta algorithm
/* Intialise the system starting with iteration← 0. */
/* Define a symmetric organisationsl fuzzy number for violation labels,
assign random system parameters to environment based on the
environmental characteristics. */
1 Create 500 new agents with status← new, random personality aspects, and random parameters
2 Assign appropriate roles (i.e. mercantile, managers, and directors) to created agents
3 Find MaxFriends× Extraverted number of friends
/* Call algorithms in an appropriate sequence. */
4 repeat
5 Run Algorithm 7.1
6 Run Algorithm 7.3
7 Run Algorithm 7.4
8 if iteration = 70 then
9 Update directors with NReplace of managers
10 if majority (Major) of new agents support private trade then
11 Legalise private trade and reduce Wages
12 end
13 if Private trade is legalised and iteration = 100 then Mercantile agents feel desperate for
basic living costs
14 end
15 iteration← iteration+ 1
16 until iteration = 250
Algorithm 7.5 shows how the simulation is initialised, the earlier procedures are exe-
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cuted, and the system’s characteristics are modified. In iteration 0, the system is initialised
by creating 500 new agents with random parameters (line 1). The roles are assigned to
created agents (about 2% directors, 5% managers, and the rest mercantile agents), and
they have 0 years of experience (lines 2). Finally, these agents make friends, based on
the Extraverted aspect of their personality, coupled with the maximum number of friends
(MaxFriends× Exteraverted, line 3). The rest of the algorithm is repeated until the stop
condition is met (lines 4-16).
In each iteration, the simulation begins with the societal algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 7.1,
line 5). Then the algorithm associated with the mercantile agents is run (i.e. Algorithm
7.3). Note that the Algorithm 7.2 associated with the newly recruited mercantile agents is
called Algorithm 7.3 (line 6). Finally, the manager’s decisions are made using Algorithm
7.4 (line 7). When the simulation reaches the year that managers are promoted to directors
(i.e. consequences of the English Civil War, iteration 70), a decision about permitting private
trade is made (lines 8-12).
Furthermore, 30 years after granting permission for private trade (if it happens), the mer-
cantile agents face financial issues and feel financially desperate. This phenomenon was
observed in the EIC after a decrease in wages, coupled with fewer opportunities for private
trade because of the establishment of the New East India Company. Note that for simplic-
ity, when we modelled the phenomenon, we did not consider a gradual decrease (line 13).
Finally, the simulation iteration increases by one, and the stop condition is checked (lines
15-16).
7.3.3 Simulation parameters
In this subsection, we state the important parameters employed in the simulation (see Table
7.2), along with the reasons for choosing specific values for them. Note that we used 250 iter-
ations to reflect the longevity of the EIC (it was active with some interruptions and changes in
power from 1600 to 1850). Each iteration thus models one year of activities in these systems.
In Table 7.2, column ‘Name’ indicates the name of parameters, column ‘Comment’ shows
additional information if required, column ‘Distribution’ indicates the probability distribu-
tion of these parameters, and column ‘Values’ indicates the values of parameters estimated
for the two historical long-distance trading societies. Note that these parameters can be easily
revised to reflect other societies.
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Table 7.2: Parameters associated with the model




















Perceived Norm1 Uniform (0, 0.05)
Internal belief Modifier × SDRule Constant 1.02








































Access Initial Constant 1
Minor violation punishment Probability Uniform (0, 1)

















Number of friends Maximum Constant 20
Monitoring (K) Internalised role Uniform {0, 1}4







Modifier for internal beliefs Cognitive dissonance Uniform (0, 0.05)
Modifier for mental costs Cognitive dissonance Uniform (0, 0.1)
Continued on next page
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Table 7.2 — continued from previous page






Managers in a fair system (0, 0.05)
Managers in an unfair system (0, 0.01)
Permission for private
trade
Per cent of joined managers










1 We only state the standard deviation (i.e. σ).
2 Stated in this subsection.
3 Uniform(a, b) indicates generating random real numbers with the same chance from interval (a, b).
4 Uniform{a, b} indicates generating random integers with the same chance between a and b (including
them).
Personality: The first parameter we investigate is the personality of agents. To model
these merchandising companies, we used personalities associated with entrepreneurs. A
reason for differences between personality type frequencies for various jobs is the notion of
“attraction-selection-attrition” (Schneider, 1987).
That idea initiated different studies, for instance, Zhao et al. (2010) conducted a meta-
review on entrepreneurs’ personalities (see Table 7.3). As can be seen, an Extraverted-
iNtuitive-Thinking-Judging (ENTJ) personality more probably chooses this job. However, it
does not mean this personality is the only personality who chooses the job (the correlations
are weak). The estimated personality frequencies provided by the Myers & Briggs Foun-
dation emphasises the impact of personality on job preference (this frequency belongs to a
general context; see ‘General population’ in Table 7.4).7
We use a Beta probability distribution to model this. The parameters used for Beta dis-
tribution (presented in Table 7.2)8 produce a relatively similar proportion of personality for
mercantile agents. To estimate the required parameters to generate a ratio (x) of a certain
aspect, we used the following:
I0.5(a, 1) = x =⇒ a = 1 + log(x)/log(0.5), (7.1)
where Iy(a, b) is the cumulative probability distribution function of Beta(a, b) at point y.
Modifier for personality: To model the gradual change in the relevant aspects of agents’
personalities, we considered a random change by a maximum of 2%. As stated in Chapter
7Retrieved from https://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/
my-mbti-results/how-frequent-is-my-type.htm.
8See Chapter 4, footnote 8, for more explanation.
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Table 7.3: Tendency of personalities to be entrepreneurs and the impact of them on an or-
ganisation’s performance
Big Five1 MBTI2 Intention3 Performance4
E E 0.11 0.05
O N 0.22 0.21
A F -0.09 -0.06
C J 0.18 0.19
1E: extraversion, O: openness to experience, A: agreeableness, C: conscientiousness.
2E-I: Extravert-Introvert dimensions, S-N: Sensing-iNtuitive dimensions, T-F: Thinking-Feeling dimens-
ions, J-P: Judging-Perceiving dimensions. Note that initials show the aspect used — for instance, E is the
degree to which the person has the Extravert aspect (see Figure 6.4). Note that as with their earlier
study, we assume that results of different tests are interchangeable (see Zhao & Seibert, 2006, Appendix).
3It shows the correlation between personality and the intention of the person to be an entrepreneur.
3It shows the correlation between personality and the performance of the person as an entrepreneur.
Table 7.4: Frequency of personalities




General population1 49.3 26.7 40.2 54.1
Entrepreneur2 55.5 61 54.5 59
Managers3 54.7 43 79.7 65.8
1Presented by Myers & Briggs Foundation.
2Estimated based on the entrepreneurs’ tendencies.
3Estimated based on Gentry et al. (2007).
6, an agent’s personality is modified over time. Here we consider a gradual change such that
it becomes more similar to the average personality of the agent’s colleagues. To do so, we
use two parameters, namely the extent to which the personality should be adjusted and the
maximum change based on the agent’s roles. A mercantile agent’s personality changes to
iNtuitive and Judging if he is Sensing or Perceiving (i.e. it changes towards 50%; see Figure
6.4).
Furthermore, a manager’s personality changes to be more Thinking and Sensing (see
Table 7.4). Here we consider a change in the personality of agents possessing iNtuitive
aspects of more than 55% (see Figure 6.4). However, Feeling agents’ personalities with a
score more than 60% (i.e. less than 40% Thinking, see Figure 6.4) change because of the
strong correlation.
Rule-understanding, perceived norms, and internal beliefs: We used fuzzy numbers
to model rule-understanding, perceived norms, and the internal beliefs for violations. This
238
way, we model the uncertainty about attributing labels to violations. As shown in Figure 7.1,
to define such a set of beliefs, we need 4 limiting points in addition to 0 and 1 (i.e. a, b, c
and d in Figure 7.1). We used a normal distribution to generate these points for each agent
(see Figure 7.2). As depicted in Figure 7.1, the averages used for normal number generators
for limiting points are 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively. In what follows, we investigate the
standard deviation (SD or σ) used for the normal distributions. Also, Figure 7.2 represents
different perceptions of an agent under different circumstances. For instance, a pink plot
indicates a trained agent’s internal beliefs and an green plot indicates that of an untrained
agent.
0           a                 b   c          d                     1
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Figure 7.1: An example of rule violation labels
First, we describe a trained agent’s rule-understanding. Trained agents have a better un-
derstanding than their untrained counterparts (i.e. less standard deviation), because trainers
have an opportunity to clarify the rules during training. In our simulation, this difference is
modelled by using a narrower SD (see ‘Rule-understanding’ row in Table 7.2). This differ-
ence is shown in Figure 7.2 where the blue plot shows a trained agent’s rule-understanding,
while the red plot indicates that of an untrained agent. Note that this distribution is the
same as a trained agent’s norm perception (see Table 7.2, rows ‘Perceived norm’ and ‘Rule-
understanding’).
For the perceived norms, each person thinks the society expects him to follow the rule,
albeit this perception has the same SD as the one associated with untrained agents (red plot
in Figure 7.2). In other words, because the agent is mostly in contact with his trainer during
training, his perception of norm is not corrected.
Finally, the agent’s internal beliefs form with slightly more SD than that of the rule-
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Figure 7.2: Probability density function for different perceptions, when the limiting point for
seriousness equals 0.2. Coloured horizontal lines show peaks of each distribution given their
associated colours.
agent is convinced about the rule (i.e. his internal belief) versus his understanding of the
rule. Figure 7.2 indicates such a difference. As can be seen in this figure, the internal beliefs
and rule-understandings of trained agents are almost distributed the same (pink plot versus
the blue plot). The same applies for those of untrained agents (green plot versus red plot).
Fairness: Note that as stated in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.2) and Section 7.3.1, Julfa had
fairer institutions than the EIC. We set system fairness for fair and unfair societies as 0.6 and
-0.4, respectively. Because of the following, we believe that neither of these two societies
was completely fair/unfair:
• Some evidence from the EIC, such as the availability of letters sent to the nodes for
declaring the reasons for firing agents (i.e. justifying the action), indicates some efforts
towards interactional fairness.
• Although the EIC asked for signed bonds from recruits, there is no evidence of asking
for paying those bonds upon fault (i.e. they did not ask the guarantor to pay money for
the agent’s wrongdoings).
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• In Julfa, inheritance rules (controlling power of elder family member) and power of
prominent families are reasons we did not consider the society as completely fair.
Environment and mortality rate: To model the influence of environmental circum-
stances on mortality rates, we extended Equation 4.2. This helps us to test the impact of dif-
ferent environmental circumstances and mortality rates on agents’ behaviour (in modelling
favourable and unfavourable environments).
To obtain a generalised function for varying the environmental circumstances, we used
an additional parameter called SystemEnvironment. Also, we normalised the numbers of
Table 7.2 to fall between 0 and 1.9 We also used the following assumptions to model the
impact of the new parameter:
• The environment of Julfa has a SystemEnvironment equal to 0.7 (average of favourable
environments modelled).
• The environment of the EIC has a SystemEnvironment equal to 0.3 (average of
severe environments modelled).
• In a completely unfavourable environment, most people die after they are born (i.e. 92%).
• For a completely favourable environment, in the early years, the survival rate is very
high (≈ 1), but it decreases after the age of 40.
Note that the last two assumptions indicate hypothetical situations we use to define ex-
treme points. However, in our modelling, we do not generate numbers near these extreme
points. Equation 7.2 is the function obtained using the aforementioned assumptions. Also,
to clarify the impact of the environment and age on life expectancy and the mortality rate,
we present some of these numbers in Table 7.5. Note that this equation obtains almost the












As can be seen in Table 7.5, for a given age (e.g. 20), the survival rate increases in more
favourable environments. However, the mortality rate of elders may be higher (see mortality
rates associated with 100 years). Finally, note that the function is an attempt to generalise
mortality rates associated with Julfans and EIC members and is pessimistic for the modern
world, because of substantial improvements in public health.
9To normalise x ∈ (−1, 1) we use ((x+1)/2). For instance, 0.4 and−0.4 obtains 0.7 and 0.3, respectively.
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Table 7.5: Some instances of the percentage of mortality rates and the survival rate (Mortality
rate‖survival rate).
Environment
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Age
0 92‖8 10‖90 1‖99 ≈ 0‖100 ≈ 0‖100
20 97‖0 12‖9 2‖70 1‖92 ≈ 0‖95
40 100‖0 14‖1 4‖37 2‖74 1‖82
60 100‖0 16‖0 7‖12 5‖40 4‖50
80 100‖0 18‖0 13‖1 13‖7 13‖9
100 100‖0 21‖0 24‖0 35‖0 44‖0
Perceived characteristics: Trained recruits have a better understanding of the system’s
characteristics (i.e. the system’s fairness and environment), for their experience. However,
this experience helps the agents to learn the parameters with significant deviations. Note that
during the apprenticeship, agents work in a controlled situation, where a master accepts to
train them (i.e. the environment is favourable). Also, during the apprenticeship the income
is not an issue — i.e. trainees and inexperienced agents do not expect significant wages, so
they do not have a good understanding of the system’s distributive fairness. We consider
standard deviations about 0.4 for learning the parameters. Note that an inexperienced agent
has a completely random understanding of system characteristics.
Rule and norm monitoring: As stated in Chapter 6, the agents believe the more serious
violations are more likely to be punished. Furthermore, since the agents use a linear function
to model this phenomenon, they use a Uniform probability distribution that is identified by
its lower and upper bounds. For the upper bound, they use 1 (i.e. completely violating the
rule such as stealing all the money). However, for the lower bound they are unsure about the
tolerance of peers and managers; hence, each agent uses a number between 0 and 1 (i.e. the
lower bound has a continuous Uniform probability distribution in (0,1)). For the strength
of the norm monitoring (i.e. how often agents punish each other), agents have a random
understanding. However, these parameters will be updated by learning them over time.
Thresholds: These are the numbers that reflect an agent’s tolerance of different aspects
and characteristics of the system. All these thresholds are generated in a completely random
manner except for firing. For the proportion of fired agents, we assume that a manager
would not fire all the cheaters, and at most, they would fire 30% of their employees. This
30% was inspired by checking the model and the observation that initially around 30% of
agents cheated (these numbers are presented in the next section).
Profit: In our modelling, we consider two kinds of potential profits. The first kind is
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general profit that is independent of the agent’s skills and negotiation. Another aspect of
profit is the skill-related profit that is impacted by agents’ negotiation and skills. For both
of these profits, we assume that a society can make up to 10% profit from the initial capital
(i.e. maximum of 20% in total).
Punishment moderators (i.e. access and minor violation punishment): As stated ear-
lier, the relative access to a company’s resources (the access of the agent to the allocated
company’s capital in comparison with his own capital) has an impact on the temptation of
the agent to cheat. In the model, we assume this access does not impact the temptation of
the agent (i.e. it is 1). Note that in an unfair system, no profits are shared, and this access
increases over time. On the other hand, sharing profits in a fair system moderates this access
by increasing agents’ capital as a ratio of profits made for the company. We have assumed
that sharing substantial profits (e.g. Julfa) controls this access. In the EIC, access to the com-
pany’s resources increases gradually, because the agent’s profits using company capital are
much more than what he earns, based on his limited capital. We have assumed that in an
unfair society, the agent’s access increases as 30% of profit is made by him.
Minor violation punishment: In the model, we assume the agents have doubts about
being fired for minor violations. This doubt is modelled by using uniform random numbers.
Costs of lost opportunity: To calculate these costs, we employed the values presented
in Table 7.2. Note that we moderate these numbers with respect to the budget associated with
the training. Overall, costs of training are assumed to be in the form of losing some profits
that could be made by providing the same capital to a trained agent. However, the associated
capital is limited (i.e. 5% of a recruit capital), because the training aims to emulate a trading
situation. We also assume that the capital used to budget recruits could alternatively be used
for trading by fully skilled agents. This way (i.e. considering a strict alternative), we also
model the failure of some trainees in attaining skill. Furthermore, we considered 30% lost
profit (i.e. we assumed some profits would be attained) to reflect the following:
• As stated in Chapter 5, the apprentices have some abilities that can be used by masters
at the beginning of the programme.
• The apprentices also attain some valuable skills after some training.
Costs of replacing agents also include:
• Lost profit incurred because of deceased agents (it is considered in the model by cal-
culating the ROR associated with agents who are alive).
• The cost of transporting new recruits (assumed to be 10% of the initial capital allocated
to them).
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The latter also includes the cost of mortality. Note that in societies with a lower mortality
rate, this cost is lower.
Weight of the connections: To model all the possibilities for new links, such as knowing
one another in advance, we used a random number (0,1) for new friendship links. For links
between mercantile agents and middle managers, we considered two different cases. If the
recruits are untrained, then the situation is the same as new friendship links. However, the
trained agents have stronger connections with their managers because:
• Trained agents would have closely worked with the managers for quite some time.
• The relationship should have been good enough to persuade the manager to hire the
apprentice.
The number of friends: This number is inspired by Dunbar’s number. Zhou et al. (2005)
stated that humans have preferred group sizes for different functions, such as personal advice
and sympathy groups (the persons with whom one has a stronger connection). We used the
maximum of preferred size associated with a sympathy group that is reported to vary between
12-20 (i.e. 20).
Monitoring: In the model, a recruit may voluntarily decide to participate in monitoring
— we use a random Boolean generator to represent this. However, as stated earlier, these
agents may change their decisions based on the situation.
Discount factor: Discount factor is obtained, based on the Julfan’s customary interest
rates (Herzig, 1991). The norm for the interest rate in Julfa was about 10% per annum. This
number shows how Julfans mentally calculated the net present value of money.
Skills: In Chapter 5, we stated the importance of apprenticeship programmes and their
impact on traders’ skills. In this model, we consider the system possessing apprenticeship
programme benefits from enough high-skilled agents — i.e. they can perform relatively com-
plicated calculations in negotiations, and are skilled in identifying high-quality items. How-
ever, in an organisation lacking such a programme, agents are mostly low-skilled.
Modifier for internal beliefs: We parametrise agents’ modification of internal beliefs in
a gradual manner. The agent randomly changes his internal beliefs by a maximum of 5% of
its initial point to resolve cognitive dissonance for fairness.
Modifier for mental costs: When an agent violates a rule, he randomly discounts the
costs associated with such an action by a maximum of 10% of its initial point — on average
the initial costs decreases by 5% of its initial point.
Modifier for weights of connections: For changes in weights of connections, we in-
crease the connection’s weight as a proportion of the current weight (i.e. weight× x). Now
we state the proportion of changes (i.e. x) case by case. For friendship, due to the ongoing
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interactions, the weight increases faster. We used a continuous uniform probability function
in (0, 0.2) for this purpose. To increase the weight of the connection between managers
and mercantile agents, we used a continuous uniform probability function in (0, 0.05). The
weight of connections between managers and directors increases the same in a fair sys-
tem. However, in an unfair system, because of blaming directors for using such institutions,
managers do not have an emotional attachment to them. We used a continuous uniform
probability function in (0, 0.01) to parametrise such an idea.
Permission for private trade: In this simulation, we assume that permission is granted
if more than 70% of the most experienced managers agree to such a decision — more than
or equal to 8 out of 11 of them. We used this relatively high proportion to model the impact
of their negotiation power with other directors (i.e. a strong attitude towards such a practice
should be introduced to the board of directors).
Mental costs: These costs are punishments associated with perceived norms and internal
beliefs. Overall, the agent uses an increasing function with different slopes for each serious-
ness label (i.e. costs of serious violations increases faster than mild violations). These slopes
are randomly generated from intervals defined with respect to the seriousness of the viola-
tion. In this model, we considered different intervals for these costs to indicate how an agent






Furthermore, we parametrise the agents’ learning as follows. Agents discount past infor-
mation using a weight of 30% for the past, and a weight of 70% for recent information. This
reflects the importance of recent information for agents, because they are not sure about the
stability of the system’s behaviour in the long run.
Having presented the simulation’s assumptions and parameters, in the next section, we
present and describe the simulation results.
7.4 Simulation results
In this section, we describe the simulation results considering 16 different combinations of
four characteristics, namely:
• Mobility of agents;
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• Environmental characteristics of the system;
• Apprenticeship programme;
• Fairness of the system.
We utilised NetLogo to perform our simulation (Wilensky, 1999). We also used 30 different
runs for each set-up and then averaged their results. Table 7.6 indicates the characteristics for
the 16 simulated societies and societies they represent. The set-ups (i.e. societies) are iden-
tified by the first letter of the characteristics, namely M, E, A, and F that are representatives
of the mobility of agents across trading nodes (M), favourable environmental circumstances
(E), providing an apprenticeship programme (A), and fairness of the institutions (F), respec-
tively. We used a Boolean index to indicate whether such an attribute is included (i.e. 1) or
not (i.e. 0). Likewise, in the table, a tick indicates that the society possesses such an attribute,
and a cross indicates the society does not possess such an attribute. In this table, we grad-
ually change characteristics of the EIC (M0E0A0F0) to get closer to Julfa (M1E1A1F1), to
examine their effects on the success of these societies.






















































































Mobility 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Environment1 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Apprenticeship 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
Fairness 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
1For brevity, we used environment instead of favourable environmental circumstances.
First, we state the results associated with all 16 societies; then we investigate detailed
results for the EIC and Julfa, and their relevance to historical information available about
them.
7.4.1 General simulation results
7.4.1.1 Bureaucratic rules (private trade)
As mentioned earlier, societies are classified based on characteristics possessed. As a result,
in each row of the figures (which indicates a characteristic), we have complementary clusters
divided, based on the lacking/having a characteristic; hence, each has half of the line plots
(i.e. 8). Note that the representatives for the EIC (M0E0A0F0) and Julfa (M1E1A1F1) are
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always placed in the left column and the right column, respectively. Also, we distinguish
these two societies (i.e. Julfa and the EIC) with thicker lines in the following plots. The
considered intervals in the model and their limiting points are depicted in Figure 7.3. These
points represent the iteration that permissions for private trade might be granted (70), and
the iteration that market saturation might happen for the formation of the New East India
Company and its aggregation with the EIC (100).
Erikson (2014) suggests that a reason for the longevity of the EIC in comparison to
rival companies such as the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was permitting private trade.
She suggests that private trade was a motive for the agents to collect information about
trade opportunities and that was a part of invaluable information conveyed to the directors.10
However, we should note that fair institutions such as bilateral commenda (i.e. sharing profit
along with the opportunity of investment, see Chapter 2) provide motivation, not only for
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Figure 7.3: The three intervals and limiting points associated with changes to bureaucratic
rules
Now we state the impact of the same characteristics on the tendency to perform private
trade during different intervals (A, B, and C). Figures 7.4a-7.4d and 7.5a-7.5d present how
different characteristics change the inclination towards performing private trade.
Note that after granting permission for private trade, these plots indicate the popularity
of violating prohibitions that seems harmless for the company (bureaucratic rules). In these
plots, the y-axis is the percentage of agents who performed private trade. As can be seen in
Figure 7.5, the most influential characteristics are fair institutions (Figure 7.5c versus 7.5d)
and having apprenticeship programmes (Figure 7.5a versus 7.5b). These two, especially the
combination of them (i.e. A1F1 societies), significantly reduce the number of private traders.
Now we statistically compare results presented in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. We employed
the Kendall’s test11 to identify the correlation among the characteristics and inclination to
10Erikson’s (2014) arguments are based on some correspondents and ship routes.
11We used non-parametric tests, because the non-homogeneity of variances was identified by the Fligner-
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Figure 7.5: Frequency of breaking bureaucratic rules for 16 societies, considering appren-
ticeship and fairness.
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perform the private trade. The results of these tests are as follows:12
• The mobility of the agents had a negative impact on the inclination towards private
trade, with values of τ varying between−0.08 and−0.05, that all are weak. The values
of τ associated with intervals A, B, and C are −0.08,−0.04, and −0.05. The p-values
for the aforementioned values of τ are ≈ 0.001, > 0.25 and ≈ 0.006, respectively.
Note that given these p-values, the obtained correlation for interval B is statistically
insignificant. Given this, whether or not agents reside in a node does not impact their
inclination towards private trade (regardless of other factors).
• The favourable environment has a weak negative impact on inclinations towards per-
forming private trade. The values of τ for intervals A and B are −0.04 with p-value >
0.2 that is insignificant. However, for interval C the value of τ decreases to−0.06 with
p-value ≈ 0.0002. This indicates the environment has a weak influence on the incli-
nation towards performing private trade (i.e. its combination with other characteristic
might be important).
• The presence of apprenticeship programmes in the system has a weak impact on
disinclination towards private trade. The values of τ associated with intervals A,
B, and C are −0.32,−0.34, and −0.35, respectively, and all of them are significant
(p-value < 0.0001). The numbers suggest that the disinclination towards private trade
is weakly correlated with this characteristic.
• The correlation between fairness of the system and the inclination towards performing
private trade is strongly negative (p-value < 0.0001). The values of τ for all intervals
are around −0.71. Historically, no evidence of a complete lift of prohibition of private
trade in Julfa is reported (i.e. there was not a high appetite for private trade in Julfa).
To sum up, the above statistical tests on the values depicted in Figures 7.4a-7.4d and
7.5a-7.5d point out that the most influential characteristics for disinclination towards private
trade include the fairness of the system and possessing apprenticeship programmes.
7.4.1.2 Permissions for private trade
Now we state an observation of an increase in the numbers of private traders after year 70
(see Figures 7.4 and 7.5). This is evident among societies with unfair institutions (see Figure
12For the strength of coefficients, we have used Dancey and Reidy’s (2017, p. 182, Figure 6.7); also see
Akoglu (2018, Table 1, for other metrics) interpretations. For absolute values of correlation, zero and one are
none and perfect correlations, respectively. Also, the limiting points to identify weak, moderate, and strong
correlations are 0.4 and 0.7.
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7.5c). Note that environmental circumstances in each simulation run are randomly generated
and consequently, slightly change agents’ behaviour. The proportion of simulation runs
under which private trade was permitted is presented in Table 7.7. As can be seen, fair
institutions never lead to private trade permission (see Table 7.8).





















Table 7.8: Average of percentage of runs where private trade was permitted for different










Having (1) 0.25 0.17 0.16 0
Not having (0) 0.26 0.35 0.36 0.52
As can be seen in Table 7.7, the societies with unfair institutions had different percentages
for permitting private trade. The unfair societies with the highest and the lowest chance of
granting such permissions are M0E0A0F0, that is the simulated EIC (93%), and M0E1A1F0
(3%), respectively (see Table 7.8). On average, more than 50% of times private trade was
permitted in societies possessing unfair institutions. Of those societies, agents’ mobility
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had the least impact (i.e. residing in nodes is not important). Besides, the second impact
is associated with the presence of apprenticeships; their presence decreases this probability
by 20% (i.e. 36% versus 16%, see Table 7.8). The chance of a society permitting private
trade for mobile agents is around 1.5% less than immobile agents (52.5% versus around
51%, see Table 7.8). The impact of the environment is also significant; overall, a favourable
environment decreases the chance of permitting private trade by 18% (i.e. 35% versus 17%,
see Table 7.8).
This simulation result matches the evidence from Julfa. In Julfa, managers were the
ones who eventually ran the family business. Also, mercantile agents and managers made
decisions regarding violations as juries in certain courts.13 The aforementioned situation,
combined with keeping private trade illegal,14 indicate that this rule was socially accepted.
Now we state the relevance between these findings and the implication for the prohibition
of private trade. These results indicate that fair institutions and apprenticeship programmes
deter agents from private trading. Furthermore, as shown in 7.5c, in all the societies, more
than 50% of agents were engaged in private trade, even before official permission for doing
so.
However, granting permission for private trade in unfair societies is different. Keeping
in mind that this permission is granted if more than 70% managers agree (see permissions
for private trade in Section 7.3.3), additional characteristics are also important. For instance,
societies with a favourable environment and apprenticeship programmes are less likely to
grant such permissions. Overall, fair institutions and having apprenticeship programmes
deters agents from performing private trade.
7.4.1.3 Rule violation
Certain characteristics of societies impact agents’ tendencies to violate trade rules. Figures
7.6a-7.6d and 7.7a-7.7d present the percentage of mercantile agents who violated the rules
in a year. In these plots, the y-axis represents the percentage of cheaters. As can be seen
in Figure 7.7, the most influential characteristic is fair institutions (7.7c versus 7.7d) that
reduces the number of cheaters significantly.
We also use the Kendall’s test to inspect the impact of characteristics of the system on
the percentage of rule violators (irrespective of its seriousness), and the results of the test are
stated below:
13Here, we refer to the portable courts which have been already stated in Chapter 2.
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Figure 7.7: Cheating frequency associated with 16 societies, considering apprenticeship and
fairness.
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• The agent’s mobility weakly impacts their inclination towards violating rules. The
values of τ associated with intervals A, B, and C are −0.1,−0.1, and −0.08, with
p-values, ≈ 0.0001, ≈ 0.01, and < 0.0001, respectively. Overall, these results in-
dicate that the mobility of agents is not an important characteristic of the system to
control violations.
• The favourable environment is statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001) and weakly
impacts on decreasing the tendency towards violating trade rules. The values of τ for
intervals A, B, and C are −0.21,−0.22, and −0.28. The weak correlation indicates
this characteristic has a limited impact on controlling cheating.
• The presence of apprenticeship programmes in the system increases inclination to-
wards cheating for intervals A and B. The values of τ associated with intervals A, B,
and C are 0.24, 0.2, and −0.02, respectively. The values of τ associated with intervals
A and B are statistically significant (p < 0.0001), but the one associated with interval
C is statistically insignificant (p > 0.25).15
• The societies with fair institutions have a lower percentage of cheaters (p-value <
0.0001). The values of τ for all intervals are about −0.7. Note that the simulation re-
sult is supported by empirical studies about the influence of fair institutions on “coun-
terproductive behaviour,” and “organisational citizenship behaviour” even in closely
monitored systems (see Spector & Fox, 2010). Furthermore, our simulation results
match historical reports of Julfa (i.e. Julfans did not have a great appetite for cheat-
ing).
The negative correlation between an apprenticeship and cheating seems counter-intuitive.
However, one should note that we expect that an apprenticeship improves the agent’s rule
compliance through ways such as:
• Agents who are trustworthy during training are selected for future employment.
• Any deviations of agents are corrected by deterrence during training; hence, they in-
crease their mental costs.
15We have checked the results by changing the variances for learning system characteristics to 0.1 and used
a Uniform distribution to test the impact of these parameters. For lower variance (i.e. 0.1) the pattern was
relatively the same (0.27, 0.21, and−0.04), but all correlations were statistically significant (the p-value of the
last correlation decreases to ≈ 0.02). Using continuous Uniform distribution for learning system parameters
attains 0.24, 0.17, and −0.07, all statistically significant with p < 0.0001. Furthermore, we have also checked
the impact of the deviations in rule-understanding and internal beliefs, once when the characteristics are learnt
uniformly and once when they are learnt as defined in the model. In connection with the correlations obtained
for the first instance (i.e. uniform distribution), the results were relatively the same (0.25, 0.18, and −0.06) and
all were significant for p ≈ 0.0001.
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• Costs associated with violating rules increase due to the time spent learning the skills
during an apprenticeship.
Putting aside such ideas, being skilled means making more profits; hence, there is an
increase in income for the same violation of the rule. Also, the negative impact of increases
in experience and skills on cheating has been reported in the EIC (Hejeebu, 2005). Finally,
note that in both systems, the costs associated with the perceived norms and internal beliefs
are the same (i.e. skill increases utility function associated with the cheating).
Now we wish to state the relevance of some of the findings of this simulation to previous
studies. Some lab experiments regarding common pools indicate that some people always
break the law, and some others do the right thing, even without a law. For instance, Tyran
and Feld (2002) find that for strict laws (i.e. severe sanctions and punishments) around 7%
of participants break the law and in the case of no law, around 30% do not free-ride (i.e. they
contribute to the public goods). In another study, Ledyard (1994) provides a review and
some discussion on early studies of public goods. He reports the findings that contradict the
self-interest behaviour of the whole society (e.g. contributions to the public project). Our
simulation results indicate a similar pattern. In other words, even in the worst cases, the
whole society of agents do not cheat, and in the best scenarios, some cheaters are punished.
Another important issue regarding cheating is the seriousness of violation. Figures 7.8
and 7.9 present results for this phenomenon. In these plots the y-axis indicates the average of
the seriousness of violations of cheaters. As can be seen, societies with fair institutions and
the mobility of the agents had less serious violations in the long-run. In other words, Figures
7.8a-7.8d and 7.9a-7.9d indicate relatively the same patterns with respect to the percentage
of cheaters. The correlation test also indicates the similarity of the patterns. The results of
the Kendall’s test are as follows:
• The correlation of the mobility of the agents with the seriousness of violation is weak.
The correlations associated with intervals A, B, and C are −0.14,−0.12, and −0.08,
respectively (all significant p < 0.01). Overall, these results indicate that the mobility
of the agents does not considerably control the extent of violations.
• The favourable environment has a statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) and
weak impact on decreasing the seriousness of the rule violation. The values of τ for
intervals A, B, and C are −0.13,−0.14, and −0.19, respectively.
• Societies possessing apprenticeship programmes faced more serious violations for
intervals A and B (the correlations are weak with values of τ equal 0.13 and 0.11).
However, for interval C the correlation is negative (τ is −0.05). All the correlations
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Figure 7.9: The seriousness of violations for 16 societies, considering apprenticeship and
fairness.
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• Fair institutions have a negative correlation with the seriousness of a violation in a
society with values of about−0.7 (p-value < 0.0001). Note that this simulation result
mirrors the empirical studies, pointing to the importance of fair institutions to control
cheats and vice versa.
In what follows, we state the impact of system parameters on monitoring agents’ be-
haviour and punishing violators.
7.4.1.4 Fired violators
Figures 7.10a-7.10d and 7.11a-7.11d present the percentage of the mercantile agents fired.
In these figures, the y-axis indicates the percentage of fired cheaters. As can be seen, the
most fired agents belong to society M0E1A0F1. However, finding a pattern that applies to
all societies with shared characteristics is difficult. In connection with the statistical test,
note that we are not interested in comparing the percentage of agents fired irrespective of the
impact of the percentage of cheaters. In other words, we are interested in the percentage of
cheaters who are fired, as opposed to the percentage of those fired compared to the percentage
of agents. Note that the latter percentages are misleading when we compare societies with
a high number of cheaters versus societies with a low number of cheaters. In other words,
although most of the historical information concentrates on the percentage fired, comparing
agents fired in the two societies with totally different percentages of cheaters seems to be
misleading. Because of that, we have used a partial correlation of the Kendall’s test to
remove the effect of the percentage of cheaters.16 The results of this test are listed below:
• The mobility of the agents has a weak positive correlation with firing cheaters. The
partial correlation test indicates correlations for intervals A, B, and C, with values
0.13, 0.15, and 0.22, respectively (p < 0.0001). The positive sign indicates that not
forming clusters and friendship groups might help the system to better identify viola-
tors.
• The favourable environment’s impact on firing cheaters is weak (0.03, 0.06, and
−0.03) for intervals A, B, and C, respectively). The partial correlation for interval
A is not significant (p > 0.1) and two others have a 0.05 significance level. This
indicates the environment is not an influential factor.
• Apprenticeship programmes have a statistically significant and positive impact on
firing cheaters for all intervals (P < 0.0001). The partial correlations for intervals
16“A partial correlation coefficient describes the strength of a linear relationship between two variables,
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Figure 7.10: The percentage of fired agents who violated the rule for 16 societies, consider-
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Figure 7.11: The percentage of fired agents who violated the rule for 16 societies, consider-
ing apprenticeship and fairness.
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A, B, and C are 0.3, 0.44, and 0.49, respectively. This indicates that having a bet-
ter understanding of system rules and characteristics, along with a better relationship
with managers moderately improves the collaboration of the society (those who do not
cheat) in monitoring and firing the violators.
• The correlation between the fair institutions, after removing the influence of the per-
centage of cheaters, indicates that fairness is positively correlated with the firing of
cheaters. The partial Kendall’s test shows weak correlations (0.11, 0.27, and 0.07, for
intervals A, B, and C, respectively, p < 0.0001).
7.4.1.5 System profitability
Here we investigate the profitability of these societies with respect to their characteristics.
To measure profitability, we used the rate of return (ROR) (same as in Chapter 4). This
indicator normalises the profitability of the system by removing the impact of the initial
capital. Figures 7.12 and 7.13 categorise the ROR associated with the 16 societies regarding
different system characteristics.
In Figures 7.12 and 7.13, the x-axis indicates the time line in years and the y-axis indi-
cates the ROR. The fall in the ROR, if available, is caused by granting permissions for private
trade that leads to promoting self-interest at a cost to the company (see Section 2.3.3). We
conducted the Kendall test to assess the impact of the system characteristics on the ROR.
The correlations associated with the characteristics and the aforementioned intervals are as
follows:
• The correlation between mobility of the agents and the ROR is significantly positive
(p-value < 0.0001). We obtained 0.3, 0.45, and 0.59 for values of τ associated with
intervals A, B, and C, respectively. As can be seen, the agents’ mobility improves a
system performance in different phases because of weaker friendship bonds with local
traders.
• The sign of a correlation between a favourable environment and the ROR changes
over different periods. The values of τ for intervals A, B, and C are −0.09, 0.06, and
0.11 with p-values of 0.0006, 0.09525, and less than 0.0001, respectively. However,
this correlation is weak for all of these intervals and for interval B, it is not even
statistically significant.
• As predicted, the presence of apprenticeship programmes in the system significantly
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Figure 7.13: The ROR associated with 16 societies, considering apprenticeship and fairness.
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values of τ associated with intervals A, B, and C, respectively. In comparison with
results for mobility, the value of this correlation is relatively the same.
• The correlation between the fairness of the system and the ROR is negative (p-value
< 0.0001). The values of τ (i.e. correlation) for intervals A, B, and C were −0.57,
−0.41, and −0.08. As can be seen, the market saturation weakens the τ drastically
(i.e. the savings through low payment cannot compensate the cheats’ loss). Overall,
given these simulation assumptions (significant profit-sharing), fairness alone would
not improve the profitability of a system.
To sum up, the mobility of agents and apprenticeship programmes have a positive and
weak/moderate impact on the ROR. Furthermore, as shown by Figures 7.12a-7.12d and
7.13a-7.13d, approximately all societies with unfair institutions granted permission for pri-
vate trade once they had the chance. The consequence of this decision is an immediate drop
in the ROR, because agents leave the company to pursue their own self-interests, and the
company loses revenue (i.e. its ROR drops).
We wish to point out that the same phenomenon was observed in the history of the EIC
after the English Civil War. When some managers were promoted to directors as a con-
sequence of the English Civil War, they convinced other members to grant permission for
private trade.
We state the general results in the next subsection, and we focus our investigation on the
direct comparison of the societies for which we have empirical evidence, namely Julfa and
EIC.
7.4.2 Comparing the simulated EIC and Julfa
Here we focus on the results associated with the two societies of interest to this thesis, namely
the EIC and Julfa. We also state some evidence from other societies (e.g. VOC) that had
relatively the same institutions and the reasons we believe the model helps to identify the
important institutions for a long-distance trading society.17
7.4.2.1 Bureaucratic rules (private trade)
Figure 7.14 presents the overall inclination towards private trade — or other rules without a
moral concern — in the EIC and Julfa (also shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5). As can be seen,
there is a significant difference between these two simulated societies, such that in the model

























Figure 7.14: The percentage of agents who break bureaucratic rules in the EIC and Julfa
representative of Julfa, less than 1% of agents broke bureaucratic rules. Note that for the
period after permissions for private trade (i.e. first blue line), the line shows agents’ tendency
to break rules that seem harmless to the company. The simulated difference shown in our
results in practising private trade in the EIC and Julfa is also reported in historical contexts.
For instance, Erikson (2014) stated that captains used methods such as “losing the season”
(i.e. they deliberately prolonged the process to lose the monsoons) to pursue private trade.18
Also, some managers defended mercantile agents’ private trade:
“if some tolleration [sic] for private trade be not permitted none but desperate
men will sail our ships.” (Factory Records: Miscellaneous, I, 26, 18, February
1620, as cited in Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
18For instance see the following:
“[Captains] deliberately ‘los[t] the season’ for their return voyages to Europe by moving in a
dilatory fashion from Bombay to other Asiatic ports, investing and reinvesting their ‘privilege’
”. (Furber 1948, p 280, as cited in Erikson, 2014, p. 115)
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The same kind of arguments exist about the popularity of such actions in the VOC. For
instance, J. Adams (1996) points out the following:
“Gerard Demmer [...] whose salary was set at 350 fl. (guilders) a month, sent
over 165, 000 fl. to the Netherlands in 1652, and 57, 000 in 1654. Pieter Sterthemius,
director of the Bengal factory, made 200 fl. a month, but carried 52, 000 fl. with
him at his repatriation.” (J. Adams, 1996, p. 21)
Furthermore, the VOC also granted permissions for private trade. For instance, Sgourev
and van Lent (2014) stated how flexibly and frequently private trade was permitted or pro-
hibited (see Sgourev & van Lent, 2014, Table 1). They point out the following:
“The analysis confirms that adaptation occurred as a response to declining per-
formance. However, even if the observed form of adaptation proved beneficial
to the organization, it was insufficient to prevent long-term decline.” (Sgourev
& van Lent, 2014, p. 936)
Here they argue that the VOC adapted to the duopoly (i.e. sharing trade with the EIC) by
converging their policies to the EIC. This convergence happened through adopting the same
policies (e.g. permissions for private trade). They also point it out that this permission was
not beneficial in the long-term.
However, for Julfa as Aslanian (2007) claims,19 breaking the rules in any form was rare.
He indicates a potential reason in the following letter between two brothers: “I would rather
chuse [sic] to dye [sic], than for them to [blot my] name out of the List” (Santa Catharina
logbook of Spanish and English translations, letter no. 147, folios 369-370, as cited in Asla-
nian, 2007, pp. 248–249). Note that the brother explains that being ‘blotted out’ was “the
same as if you was [sic] a dead man.”
Note that as stated in Chapter 2, in Julfa, agents could ask for permission for private
trade or even invest in the same trade. These characteristics indicate they had flexible rules
to control incentives for private trade.
As the simulation results suggest, and also based on the historical reports from the EIC,
the VOC, and Julfa, certain characteristics, such as fairness of institutions, controlled inclina-
tions towards private trading. In what follows, we compare the popularity of rule violations
and their influence on profitability (the ROR) for these two societies.























Figure 7.15: The percentage of agents who violated the merchandising rules
7.4.2.2 Rule violation
First, we investigate the impact of the differences between these societies with respect to
their agents’ inclination towards violating the rules. As can be seen in Figure 7.15, which
shows the results of our model, the EIC has more cheaters. After ten runs when the system
has more experienced agents (i.e. between ten and 250), the percentage of cheaters in Julfa
is less than four, while in the EIC it is more than nineteen. In the EIC, this inclination
increases a few years after granting permissions for private trade (around 13 years). As
stated in the former section, the reason for this shift is a combination of a reduction in wages
and less opportunity for private trade due to a high level of competition, as indicated in
the correspondence.20 Note that in our simulation, the aforementioned phenomenon only
decreases costs associated with internal beliefs (see Section 7.3.2).
Now we state the historical evidence from the chartered companies (e.g. EIC and VOC)
20Note that potential reasons for this decrease in profits of private trade include the permissions granted
to other agents (e.g. sailors and other traders) and the formation of the New East India Company and its
aggregation with the EIC. These increased the number of engaged traders in markets of intra-Asia and Asia to
the European market (see Chapter 2 for description).
268
and Julfa to evaluate the patterns suggested by our simulation results. The evidence is pre-
sented in the form of quotations from historians. The passage below belongs to the EIC:
“There were even fraudulent attempts to charge the Company [EIC] a higher
price by buying it [pepper] during the cheap season and then entering in the
books the later price which had been raised by the demand from private traders
arriving late on the coast. In fact, the Court of Directors felt so strongly about the
expenses incurred at Tellicherry [sic] under the management of Robert Adams
that they were prepared to abandon the settlement altogether unless the charges
were drastically reduced.” (Chaudhuri, 1978, p. 325)
Chaudhuri (1978) notes that the reason for the court’s decision was a downswing in the pep-
per market inside Europe. However, this argument not only suggests the cheating behaviour
and acceptance of it, but it also points to the beliefs about some coalitions. Note that an-
other point indicated here is the impact of private traders on price increases and reductions
of marginal profits that was stated earlier.21
Another instance is Carlos and Nicholas’s (1990) observations on chartered companies.
They state the same issue for the Hudson’s Bay Company (a chartered company for trade
between England and Canada) and they note that the company was aware of such issues and
reformed contracts and company structure with respect to the company’s aims. Before going
through more evidence, we wish to remind the reader that as Jones and Ville (1996) suggest,
these contracts are evidence of the existence of the issues, and not about resolving them. The
following passage is another interesting case:
“[An investigation of fraud] in the late sixteenth century estimated that about ten
per cent of the treasure that arrived in Europe never appeared in the registers.
[Furthermore, Hamilton noted that] ‘smuggled treasure has been estimated at
from 10 to 50 per cent of the registered, but there is reason to believe that it
21Other instances of fraud are changing the exported or imported items (see Sainsbury, 1922, pp. 66–67),
and plotted frauds — for example, Thomas Skinner plotted a fraud by using several ships to send pepper
for others “at company expenses” (see Sainsbury, 1922, pp. 247–248). Furthermore, minor violations with
substantial costs for the company are reported. An instance of this is as follows:
“You have to the life expressed your own vanity, folly, and riot unto those people, and wasted
so much of our estate in such a lavish manner as if we sent our ships and monies hither for you
to make shows and pagents [sic] for those people to scorn at.” (Letter Book, I 127, 27 October
1636, as cited in, Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
Here the violation was spending about £4000 to secure company benefits.
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was rather nearer the former than the latter figure.’ ” (Lorenzo Sanz, Comercio
de España con América,pp. 142–146 and Hamilton, American Treasure and the
Price Revolution in Spain Phillips, 1990, p. 88)
Finally, the letter between two Julfan brothers stated earlier, indicates that punishment was
available and severe enough to control an agent’s behaviour.
To sum-up, in Julfa, there was not much inclination towards violating trade rules. In the

















Figure 7.16: The percentage of fired agents who violated the rule for the EIC and Julfa
7.4.2.3 Monitoring
Figure 7.16 shows that fewer agents were punished in the simulated EIC, despite the presence
of a large number of cheaters (less than 1% of society are fired). Furthermore, the proportion
of fired agents in the simulated Julfa is about 2%, while on average, about 5% of society
cheated (i.e. 40% of cheaters are fired). The simulation results for the EIC match historical
evidence for the EIC and other chartered companies. Most studies on chartered companies
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point out the distrust about agents’ honesty. For instance, Chaudhuri (1965) claims the fol-
lowing:
“One of the reasons for that distrust of the factors which seems to have been
habitual with the Court of Committees was the feeling that they had no means of
arriving at the true state of affairs in the Indies unless other factors chose to give
information against the delinquent ones. Sometimes, one factor more honest
than the others would report on the behaviour Of those guilty of too flagrant
abuses [emphasis added.]” (Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 87)
To have a better understanding of the reasons for such a weak monitoring system, let
us state the attributes of its success. Jones and Ville (1996) point out three characteristics
for a successful monitoring system, namely accuracy, timeliness, and comprehensiveness.
They also identify some barriers such as “sabotaging” the system. The authors suggest the
following:
“Chartered companies may have been innovative in terms of organizational de-
sign, but [...] we do not believe that their control systems were particularly
effective [...], information was sometimes inaccurate and often out of date, a sit-
uation that got worse as companies expanded, while data transmitted was often
narrow in scope and limited in usefulness.” (Jones & Ville, 1996, p. 906)
They also point out that the organisations did not efficiently use the available information.
Some of the instances of companies that did not use the information include the Royal
African Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the VOC (Jones & Ville, 1996).
However, these issues were not observed in Julfa. First, not using data was not a concern
in Julfa. A reason is the decentralised management of agents by peripheral managers such
as other senior family members (Aslanian, 2007). Also, information was voluntarily shared
with masters and used in the system. An instance which indicates the data was meticulously
assessed can be inferred from the following22 passage:
“[Y]our letter from Livorno dated Atam 22 [May 11] reached us on Hamira 8
[November 23], and we became acquainted with your situation. [However] your
letter was without flavor or salt [Bi Namak, literally “without salt”] because it
contained no news about purchases and expenditures. The salt in a merchant’s
letter is [the news about] purchases and expenditures. When you send us your
22Note that the categories of such information and their applications have already been stated in Chapter 2.
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next letter, be sure to write about the state of purchases and expenditures both
in Livorno and Venice, so we too can be more satisfied.” (39Letter of ovdan 7,
96 (January 21, 1711) to Parons Ohannes and Petros. ASV Documenti Armeni,





































Figure 7.17: Seriousness of violation ± its standard deviation for a) Julfa and b) the EIC
We wish to mention a particular example that indicates tolerance of cheating in Julfa.
One of the few instances of violations of a trading rule in Julfa involves Matos di Panos (the
mercantile agent) and Vatan (the master) (see Aslanian, 2007, pp. 585–590). It is inferred
from the letter that it was not the first time Matos di Panos had violated the rule.23
After stating the results and evidence associated with the monitoring strength, in the next
subsection, we describe the results related to the extent of violation.
23In part of the letter Vatan says: “To this day, our merchants here who hear about what I have done [for
you] become astonished [and tell me that] no idiot has done the things that you have done for that shifty servant
[emphasis added] of yours [i.e., for Matos] Perhaps you [i.e., Matos] are not a servant of God.” (see Aslanian,
2007, p. 588)
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7.4.2.4 The seriousness of violation
Before describing the results depicted in Figure 7.17, note that the previous simulation results
suggest that Julfa had fewer violations than the EIC. Besides, the Julfans identified rare cases
of violation better and this can also be inferred through the letters. Figure 7.17 concerns the
seriousness of violations in a) Julfa and b) the EIC. The blue lines in this figure indicate
the average of the seriousness of performed violations (i.e. violations greater than zero).
Also, the green dashed-lines show an interval of one standard deviation around this average.
Note that the standard deviation is calculated based on the seriousness of all violations in
an iteration. The results depicted in Figure 7.17 (a and b) suggest that in our simulation
of Julfa, the extent of violations was more limited with lower variations in comparison to
our simulation of the EIC. This result is in agreement with historical evidence from Julfa.
As Aslanian (2007, p. 249) points out, the “cases of cheating and dishonesty are rarely
mentioned in Julfan correspondence”. Furthermore, based on the historical evidence, he
notes that blacklisting in Julfa was extended to cases such as refusing to pay the share of
taxes (Aslanian, 2007, p. 249, footnote 66). This indicates the honesty of Julfan traders that
made it possible to boycott society members for reasons other than violating trade rules.
However, the real EIC situation was much worse than that of our simulation results.
Some of the cases of violations were stated earlier, and the following case is an example
that indicates another popular cheating mechanism (i.e. embezzlement) and its extent in the
system:
“The most common practice of partial defraudment in the Indies was to enter
large sums of money in the name of fictitious Asian merchants as advance pay-
ment for goods and use the money to finance the private trade of the servants.”
(Chaudhuri, 1978, p. 466)
7.4.2.5 System profitability
Up to this point, we have stated the impacts of system characteristics on the agent’s rule-
following behaviour. Now we compare the profitability of the EIC and Julfa. Note that in
Julfa the mercantile agent has a significant share of the profit (around 30%). This share of
the profit significantly decreases the organisation’s income. Figure 7.18 presents the ROR
for the EIC (blue line) and Julfa (red line). The vertical blue dashed-lines indicate years 70
and 100 — i.e. granting permissions for private trade and market saturation, respectively.
As can be seen, at the beginning, the EIC makes more profits, despite having lower skills.
Furthermore, in our simulation, the result for Julfa are fairly stable. These (i.e. stability and
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less profits at the beginning) are caused by profit-sharing in the Julfa, along with the limited
profits of skill (see ‘Profit’ in Table 7.2). Also, it takes time for Julfa to reach the steady-
state (i.e. agents’ internal beliefs become adjusted). Note that the limited impact of skills on
profitability is due to the monopoly of trade granted to the EIC that made their profit margins
















Figure 7.18: The ROR associated with the EIC and Julfa
As can be seen in Figure 7.18, granting permissions for private trade increases the profits
of the simulated EIC (see the peak around 71). A decrease in company costs (due to reduc-
ing employees’ wages) leads to this increase in profits. However, mercantile agents leave the
organisation to trade for themselves at this time. Finally, after market saturation, the mercan-
tile agents reduce the violation costs associated with their internal beliefs; hence, they cheat
more frequently.
The market saturation phenomenon (i.e. the second blue vertical line) is a figurative pre-
sentation that indicates the importance of costs associated with internal beliefs. As can be
seen, reducing costs associated with internal beliefs by a random coefficient24 causes a sig-
24The coefficient for a decrease per iteration is at most 0.85. In other words, we generate a number between
0.85 and 1 for agents to reduce their costs per run.
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nificant drop in the EIC profits. The EIC profits decrease by around 2.5% in 13 years (the
green dashed vertical line). The horizontal green dashed-line shows the tangent line to the
EIC’s ROR before iteration 70. This highlights another instance of the importance of internal
beliefs, albeit regarding the seriousness of the violation (i.e. changes in beliefs, if a degree of
violation is minor, medium, or serious, and not the costs associated with the seriousness of
the violations). As stated earlier, we have assumed that after reducing wages, the fairness of
the system decreases (the organisation paid the mercantile agents a wage equal to unskilled
labourers which they could perceive to be unfair). This decrease in wages first increases the
company’s profits. However, a shift in the perceived fairness changes agents’ internal beliefs
about the seriousness of violations. This decreases the ROR to levels about that of before
granting such permissions. These phenomena indicate the importance of internal beliefs and
their influence on the organisation’s profits.
7.4.2.6 Perceived norms and internal beliefs concerning the seriousness of the viola-
tion
What follows presents a description of the impact of the characteristics on the societal inter-
nal beliefs and the societal perception of the norms. These results indicate the influence of
certain characteristics on societal internal beliefs following socio-psychological studies on
cognitive dissonance. These results also mirror historical evidence of the revisions of rules
through referendums and philosophical shifts.25 In the following, we state the evidence for
such changes for the EIC and Julfa. We also describe how the simulations presented the
same results.
Figure 7.19a presents the simulated Julfans’ societal perception of norms over time
(i.e. perceived norms). In this plot minor, mild, and serious are labels an agent associates
with the seriousness of violations — i.e. how unacceptable they are. In our representation of
Julfa, the mobility of agents is a hindrance to deep friendships (since they do not stay in a
place to develop strong bonds) and exchanging ideas about system norms, and on average,
agents cannot correct their perception of the system’s norms. One should note that because
Julfa was a closed society, Julfans had the opportunity to learn those norms inside the soci-
ety in advance. However, we did not include such an idea to keep our model more generic.
Furthermore, based on the societal internal beliefs in Julfa, corrections of perceived norms
25An instance of an attempt to control such shifts is a warning by B. Russell (1948, Book 3, Chapter 30,
p 828). He warns philosophers and people about “cosmic impiety” as a consequence of considering ‘truth’
controllable by humans. Russell attributes this to Fichte who he claimed removed humility from philosophy
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b) Julfa's internal beliefs
Initial versus gradual changes in the first 70 years
Gradual changes in the first 71 years
Year 71 onwardsYear 72 onwards
Figure 7.19: Changes in the a) Julfans’ societal perceived norms and b) Julfans’ societal
internal beliefs, over time. For internal beliefs, the pink lines represent the average of internal
beliefs at the first iteration, the dark-green lines represent those before iteration 70, the red
lines show iteration 72 onwards, and the blue lines show those of the last iteration.
decrease cheating.
Figure 7.19b shows the gradual changes in the simulated Julfans’ societal internal beliefs
about the seriousness of violations. As can be seen, the Julfans’ perceptions of minor and
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mild violations shift to the left (see the pink lines versus the blue lines). This shift shows,
on average, an agent in Julfa considers a violation more serious than what was originally
meant by the rule over time. Furthermore, as can be seen, the societal internal beliefs are
relatively focused around an area after some iterations. To provide a summary of this change,
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Figure 7.20: Changes in Julfans’ internal beliefs in two snapshots.
One can see how agents made their beliefs stricter after a while (see Figure 7.20 b).
The final state (i.e. following the rule strictly) had historically been reported for Julfans. For
instance, Roques states Julfans’ diligence.26 Note that although the masters paid living costs,
26Roques states:
“These people [Julfans] are shrewder than the Indian sarrafs [sic], because they do not work
alone, when it comes to evaluating their merchandise and money. More enterprising amongst
them deal with all that is there [to trade in], and do not ignore the price of any merchandise,
either from Europe or Asia, or any other place because they correspond with all others and
receive rapid information on current prices wherever they are. Thus they do not get cheated
in their purchases, and are very economical, and work unbelievably hard to trade so as not to
overpay on the merchandise. They spend very little towards their living. They are by nature
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this thrift and prudential expenditures indicates that mercantile agents gradually adapted to
the belief that their careless spending was not a minor violation of the contract. In particular,
the distinction is more clear when we compare Julfans’ behaviour with the EIC’s employees’
lavish lifestyle — the other group of merchants who were engaged in trade in the very same
place and time — and note they should have covered their own living costs.27
Now we state the changes associated with the mercantile agents in the simulated EIC.
Figures 7.21a and 7.21b indicate the gradual shift in the simulated EIC’s societal internal
beliefs and societal norms perceptions regarding the trade rule. As can be seen, the internal
beliefs and perceived norms gradually move to the right (pink lines versus green lines). In
other words, agents consider a violation less serious than what the rule originally meant.
However, after iteration 70, when some agents leave the company and new agents replace
them, the perceptions of beliefs and norms first move towards the left and get nearer to
that of iteration 0, and after ten iterations, they move towards the right for an increase in
the experience of the mercantile agents (orange lines). After iteration 100, the beliefs and
perceptions are focused on about the same point (red and blue lines). A snap shot of these
changes is provided in Figure 7.22.
Figure 7.22a indicates the patterns of changes in the simulated EIC societal perceived
norms (i.e. perceived norms by all members of the society). After granting permissions
for private trade, the cautiousness of new recruits regarding sharing their internal beliefs
reverts to the average perception of norms near the initial state (see Figure 7.22 red and
green lines). Note that perception of the norms also has lower changes compared to internal
beliefs (further stated in Section 7.5).
Figure 7.22b presents the simulated EIC societal internal beliefs associated with the four
iterations of interest, namely the first, the 70th, the 75th, and the last iterations. In this
figure orange and blue trapezoids indicate the EIC societal internal beliefs at the first and last
iterations, respectively. As can be seen, the internal belief of society gradually shifts to the
right (red and orange lines) over the first 70 iterations. However, after granting permission
for private trade, some agents leave the company to pursue their self-interests. Leaving the
company and hiring new recruits whose beliefs are more consistent with the rules (i.e. their
accustomed to living frugally [emphasis added]...” (Roques, translated by R. K. Husain, 1994,
pp. 939–40, as cited in Moosvi, 1999, pp. 268–269)
27“Where the British lived in any numbers, [... s]ocial life revolved around field sports, riding or driving out
in the evenings and a cold weather season of balls, assemblies and theatricals. [...] The scale of entertainments
was lavish in the presidency cities, above all, in Calcutta, where cultural ambitions ran high. A string of
notable painters from Zoffany [sic] to Chinnery [sic] competed for commissions there in the late eighteenth
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b) EIC's internal beliefs
Initial versus gradual changes in the first 70 years
Years between 70 and 100
Year 100 onwardsYear 101 onwards
Years between 71 and 100
Figure 7.21: Changes in the simulated EIC’s a) perceived norms and b) internal beliefs
over time. The pink lines are associated with iteration 0, the green lines indicate iterations
before 70, the orange lines are those of iterations 71-100, the red lines indicate iteration 101
onwards, and the blue lines indicate the last iteration. Note that historically, permission for
private trade was granted in the EIC.
beliefs are not changed) moves the societal internal beliefs towards the left (green lines).
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b) EIC's internal beliefs
Initial versus year 69
Year 69 versus year 75
Year 75 versus last year
Figure 7.22: Changes in the EIC’s societal perceived norms and internal beliefs concerning
four points of interest. The red lines indicate that of iteration 0, the orange lines indicate
iteration 70, the green lines depict iteration 75, and the blue lines indicate the last iteration.
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beliefs towards the right (blue lines).
The simulation results match historical evidence. For instance, we know that mercantile
agents used the company’s capital for private trades. Evidence for the popularity of corrupt
(immoral) behaviour in the EIC and its extensions is reported by Burke (1723–1792), by
some of the EIC’s directors, and by managers over time.28 These arguments also point to a
gradual change in mercantile agents’ morals. Furthermore, those letters (i.e. 1618, 1711,
and Burke comments), point out that this corruption had first been observed in the EIC
mercantile agents’ behaviour, then it had spread in the host country (i.e. India), and finally,
it had impacted the home country (i.e. England).
Figures 7.23a and 7.23b present the last societal perceived norms and internal beliefs for
the simulated EIC and Julfa. The red-edged trapezoids indicate the societal internal beliefs,
and the yellow trapezoids indicate the societal perceived norms. First, we wish to compare
the shifts, disregarding their direction for the simulated EIC and Julfa. As can be seen,
the Julfan’s societal internal beliefs shifted more than the EIC’s (see red-edged trapezoid
in Figures 7.23a versus 7.23b). The reason for such a difference lies in higher mortality
rates in the EIC. The higher mortality rate leads to replacing more experienced individuals
with inexperienced ones. Note that experience is a key element for adjusting internal beliefs
regarding system institutions. This indicates the inverse effect of short-term contracts on
knowing and adjusting internal beliefs. However, for systems with unfair institutions, such
as the EIC, it may act for the benefit of the organisation.
Another difference concerns the average of the perceived norms of the two simulated so-
cieties (see yellow trapezoid in Figures 7.23a versus 7.23b that is caused by the mobility of
28The speed of the change in the internal belief is pointed out in the early letters such as the following:
“At home men are famous for doing nothing; here they are infamous for their honest endeavours.”
(Original Correspondence, V, 595, 19 January 1618, as cited in Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 77)
Also, an EIC’s director states:
“It is a sad truth, [...] that in all parts of India where the Europeans generally come the natives
soon learn to flatter, cheat, and wreck their malice whereas in the inland countries where few
Europeans ever are, they are generally harmless and innocent and not inclined to mischief. The
difference must be from the ill examples of those who call themselves Christians.” (Despatch
Book, 10 January 1711, vol. 97, para. 83, pp. 179-80, as cited in Chaudhuri, 1978, p. 113)
Burke (1723–1792) states the following:
“all the tyranny, robbery and destruction of mankind practiced [sic] by the company in the East
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Figure 7.23: Differences between the last societal perceived norms and internal beliefs for
a) Julfa and b) the EIC. Red lines are internal belief and yellow lines are perceived norms.
agents in Julfa. Note that societal internal beliefs (i.e. expectations, shown by the red-edged
trapezoids) define the actual norm. However, mobile agents do not have strong friendship
bonds and they do not state their internal beliefs. This gap has positive and negative effects
— when societal expectations are more lenient than organisational rules, it helps the organ-
isation’s profitability. However, when society has stricter expectations (Julfa), not knowing
them may decrease organisational profitability.
Now we investigate the smaller gap between societal perceived norms and internal beliefs
(i.e. the EIC case; see Figure 7.23b). The misperceptions of norms have been observed in
some previous studies (Blanton et al., 2008; Neighbors et al., 2006). However, for a drinking
norm, the higher level of drinking behaviour on the part of students may cause them to
exaggerate their peers’ drinking norm (Neighbors et al., 2006). The previous study may
apply here as listed below:
• Students in the study overestimated the drinking norm because of the exaggeration of
older friends (i.e. they thought their own drinking behaviour was less than average).
In conformance with that norm the younger students tended to exaggerate their own
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drinking behaviour. This would have had the same impact observed in our simulation.
Note that in our model, we assumed that agents believe the society expects them to
follow the rule.
• The students in the study were biased about collecting information related to their
behaviour to justify their action and reduce their cognitive dissonance. In our model,
we did not consider such a biased information collection; however, the model can be
extended to include such a phenomenon.
The solution to overcome the misperceptions is to correct agents’ understanding of the
norm. Note that in the EIC, the directors did not have any incentives to let the agents learn
the real norm (i.e. more tolerance towards cheating). However, in Julfa, some evidence, such
as the correspondence of cousins and two brothers,29 indicates attempts at such corrections.
7.5 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter has presented a simulation model for investigating the rules of long-distance
traders and has examined the key characteristics impacting rule-following behaviour of agents
in historical cases. The main aim of the simulation has been in identifying the impacts of in-
stitutional mechanisms and social characteristics on rule-following and monitoring strength.
In addition to the two historical long-distance trading societies, we have considered other
hypothetical societies, and we measured several indices to identify different aspects that po-
tentially improve our simulation model.
To perform this modelling, we addressed four characteristics of the system, namely the
mobility of agents, the impact of environmental circumstances, apprenticeship programmes,
and the fairness of institutions. In our simulation, we systematically mapped the character-
istics mentioned above into general societies, these societies also capture basic real-world
scenarios. We also considered three time intervals, namely before the opportunity of per-
mitting private trade (iteration 70, A), after that opportunity and before market saturation
(between iterations 71 and 99, B), and during market saturation (iteration 100 onwards, C).
Note that differences between the two historical long-distance trading societies have inspired
these characteristics.
In Julfa, mercantile agents were mobile and they did not reside in a certain trading spot
for a long period. However, in the EIC, mercantile agents mostly resided in their settlements,
29The first one is the letter that stated the flavour of a letter (Aslanian, 2007, p. 182), and the second, stated
the consequences of being blacklisted (Aslanian, 2007, pp. 248–249).
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leading to forming friendship groups and possessing information rents (i.e. trade-related in-
formation of mercantile agents not provided to the principal). Furthermore, although mer-
cantile agents of Julfa and the EIC worked in India and Europe, they faced different envi-
ronmental circumstances. The evidence indicates that the Indian subcontinent climate was
not conducive to Europeans. The unfavourable environment reduced agents’ life expectancy
and impacted their ability to make future-oriented decisions.
The apprenticeship programme is a future-oriented policy that has already been sep-
arately addressed as a model for its importance (see Chapter 5). In this chapter, we have
investigated the impact of apprenticeship programmes on controlling cheating. However, we
have limited its impact to the enhancing agents’ skill, and improving their perception of the
system’s characteristics and system’s rules. The last characteristic of the system is the fair-
ness of the institutions; in our model, we have considered substantial costs for possessing fair
institutions as a consequence of sharing significant profits. Finally, in our model, cheating
is limited to manipulating profits (i.e. the cheats would not cause a negative balance). What
follows is a summary of the main findings accompanied by a discussion.
An overview of the simulation results is presented in Table 7.9. In this table, columns
indicate the aforementioned intervals (A, B, C) for each characteristic. The rows indicate the
measured output variable in our simulation. Also, a cell of this table indicates the values of
the correlation between the output variable and the characteristics for an interval.
The mobility of agents has a positive impact on all aspects of the system; however, this
impact for most cases is weak. More precisely, looking at the three columns associated
with the title ‘Mobility’, we see private trade, rule violation, seriousness of violation, and
monitoring strength are weakly impacted by this characteristic. However, not residing in
a node for long periods prevents mercantile agents from creating strong friendship bonds
with other employees, as well as local traders. This causes a moderate correlation between
mobility and system profitability.
Benefiting from a favourable environment has positive influences on the agent’s be-
haviour; however, the correlation is weak. The only exception for this is the firing of viola-
tors after market saturation (the correlation is−0.03 and the p-value = 0.05). This indicates
an increase in societal tolerance of violators in a favourable environment. Finally, it is worth
noting that a favourable environment has a weak and negative correlation with rule viola-
tion (it weakly deters employees from cheating). This can be caused by the impact of an
unfavourable environment on decreasing agents’ discount factor, which mirrors empirical












































































































































































































































































































































































































































The apprenticeship programme has a weak correlation with violating rules. Based on
these correlations, changes in signs, and the significance of correlations over time, it is ob-
vious that an apprenticeship is not successful in deterring agents from cheating. A reason
for this is an improvement in the degree of skills increases the profits made; hence, there
is more temptation to cheat. Especially, in this model, apprenticeship programmes would
not increase moral costs associated with violating the rules; however, through increasing the
skills, it increases the agents’ access to the company resources and the income obtained from
a given violation — the observation was made in the EIC firing patterns (see Section 2.3.1).
Furthermore, the absolute value of correlation between apprentice programme and perform-
ing private trade (i.e. breaking bureaucratic rules), firing violators, and system profitability
is more than 0.3. The signs and strengths of these correlations indicate that apprenticeship
programmes were almost successful in these aspects.
The fairness of the system has negative and strong correlation with all of the rule-
following aspects of the system (i.e. private trade, rule violation, and seriousness of vio-
lations). In other words, the fairness of the institutions successfully deterred agents from
violating the rules. The fairness also has a positive and weak correlations with firing the
violators. This indicates that a fair institution is more successful in preventing crime. How-
ever, the correlation between income and fairness of the system was strong and negative for
most periods (i.e. the costs exceeded savings over time). This result is in accordance with
the intuitions of the chartered companies’ directors — they believed that the costs of being
fair are more than the profits.
A result of this simulation is shown by the visualisation of the EIC and Julfa fuzzy be-
liefs. The simulation results and historical evidence suggest that the fairness of the system
influences agents’ internal beliefs. This change in internal beliefs can be extended to the
outside of the organisation through “making bad examples” or conveying the justifications
to others (i.e. the society that agents work in or come from). Note that this kind of change in
attitude is more of a moral concern than an economic issue. For instance, Ruggiero (2013)
says Adam Smith’s promotion of the idea that in an economy our actions are governed by
our self-interests is used by criminal entrepreneurs to justify their wrongdoings.
Now we state the results related to other historical trading societies that indicate the
importance of apprenticeship programmes for long-distance trading. When we compare Ge-
noese and Venetian societies, we see both of them have used commenda contracts to manage
their trades. However, a difference between the two societies concerns using apprentice-
ship programmes. In other words, while Genoese did not have apprenticeship programmes,
Venetians invested in that (see Colavizza et al., 2019). The war of Chioggia exemplifies the
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importance of investments made by Venetians. After this war, the Venetians’ trade rapidly re-
covered while Genoese trade declined. Another possible reason for Genoa’s decline could be
getting involved in factional rivalries; however, recovery of Venice after the war emphasises
the importance of such investments especially in critical times.
Now we wish to discuss some limitations of the current chapter. In our model, we were
conservative about cheating behaviour. In other words, we assumed the cheaters have perfect
information about the consequences of their behaviour for the organisational profits. We also
have not addressed the cheating behaviour of the managers, which impose high costs on the
system for their access to the resources (Ville & Jones, 1995). For this purpose, imperfect
information games with asymmetric utility functions can be employed in the future. For
such modelling, two distinctive cost functions regarding cheats should be utilised. One of
these functions should indicate agents’ perception of the costs and the other indicates the
real consequences. The imperfect information game with asymmetric utilities is a realistic
approach for strictly salaried agents who do not have any information about prices at the
destination (e.g. EIC).
In what follows, we state some simulation results that indicate the importance of other
aspects of considered societies. The simulation results indicate that, before market satu-
ration, the number of cheaters increases when the system has apprenticeship programmes.
As stated earlier, in the simulation model, an apprenticeship increases skills and improves
agents’ understanding of the rules. Making more profits because of higher skills, and a faster
increase in the agents’ access to the company resources are some reasons for these observa-
tions. Historically, in the EIC, more experienced agents tended to cheat more (see section
2.3.2.1 and Hejeebu, 2005). However, these results emphasise the importance of consider-
ing other impacts such as screening and choosing trustworthy agents (e.g. see Frantz et al.
(2015)). These considerations may improve the impact of apprenticeship programmes on
profitability. In our simulation, trustworthy agents have more mental costs regarding their
internal beliefs and consequently cheat less. Note that Machiavelli (1998) discussed the im-
pact of associating significant costs with internal beliefs on social order.30 In this model, we
30Machiavelli stated the following that indicates how internal beliefs could help a governor to bring order
into society:
“Lucius Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called Torquatus, had been accused
by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the plebs; before the day of the judgment [sic] came, Titus ...
threatening to kill him if he did not swear to drop the accusation against his father, he constrained
him to take the oath; and Marcus, having sworn through fear, dropped the accusation. So those
citizens whom the love of fatherland and its laws did not keep in Italy were kept there by an oath
that they were forced to take; and the tribune put aside the hatred he had for the father, the injury
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narrowed the apprenticeship’s impact to test the adequacy of correcting rule-understanding
during an apprenticeship; hence, we did not consider screening the agents (i.e. identifying
agents with more costs associated with their internal beliefs).
Another finding of this study was the negative impact of the mobility of agents on learn-
ing social norms (i.e. modified beliefs and expectations of the society). This issue can be
addressed by considering the impact of norm learning/enforcement (feedback) for the cor-
rection of agents’ behaviour (value aggregation) using the notion of nested-ADICO (see
Frantz et al. (2013, 2014)). To avoid adding complexities that would make it hard for us to
identify the impact of other characteristics on the system performance, we did not use the
corrections (e.g. reinforcement learning). However, the results suggest that mobile agents
need additional means for a better norm understanding. The means include the closedness
of society (e.g. Julfa), which provides the opportunity to learn the norms inside the fami-
lies, improving agents’ perceptions of norms by notifying them, and using methods such as
nested-ADICO.
There are some potential extensions to this study that we wish to point out. First, more
advanced studies such as Farhangian (2018) can be used to investigate the impact of person-
ality on team formations and recruitment in organisations. As stated earlier, the impact of
the apprenticeship on increasing the trustworthiness of agents can be included in the model.
Also, utilising other methods for norm understanding would help make the model more re-
alistic.
Furthermore, the refined BDI cognitive architecture can be used to interact with institu-
tional mechanisms designed by employing the RMDL principles (Purvis & Purvis, 2014),
which include human rights, free access to markets, democracy, and the rule of law to
investigate the influence of them on designing system mechanisms for managing a trading
society. In the following, we briefly state these four principles:
• (Human) Rights — These rights are given to all members of society and among them
is freedom of speech that guarantees the opportunity of interaction and a free exchange
of ideas.
• (Free access to) Markets — This points to the need to establish exchange markets to
facilitate a fair exchange of goods and services across society. This provides a suitable
environment for societal collective benefits.
that the son had done him, and his own honor to obey the oath he had taken. This arose from
nothing other than that religion Numa [sic] had introduced in that city.” (Machiavelli, 1998,
Section 2, p. 34)
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• Democracy — The society needs to involve all its members in decision-making (e.g. rules
established by representatives of people).
• (Rule of) Law — The society needs to have a set of clearly written rules for interactions
and regulating the society. These laws can be revised by actions of the democratically-
elected government.
Now we present some instances of interaction between these two modelling approaches
— i.e. the refined BDI for cognitive architecture and the RMDL for designing institutional
mechanisms. Human Rights, in terms of freedom of speech, help the individuals to state
their ideas better; hence, perceived norms can be corrected (i.e. they raise social awareness
about the expectations of others). Also, not identifying internal beliefs of agents — de-
priving agents from freedom of speech — causes issues such as feeling deep dissatisfaction
through cognitive dissonance (e.g. see Kassing, 2000, for observations made of employees’
dissatisfaction in the workplace). Free access to the Markets not only impacts the economic
performance of society (e.g. by removing the influence of agents’ position on their future
and certain inclusive priorities and opportunities they may have), but it also impacts agents’
cognition regarding the system. For instance, granting a monopoly, empowering guilds, and
placing other kinds of obstacles in the way of agents is conceived as an unfair action. How-
ever, in the modelling, the negative impacts should be considered — e.g. this liberalisation
may increase poverty (Winters, 2002, provided a checklist to assess the possibility of such
an impact). Democracy is a way that provides the opportunity of reflection of agents’ inter-
nal beliefs in society. Also, it helps the agents to adjust their perceptions of the majority’s
expectations — e.g. Tyran and Feld (2002) showed that the referendum improves agents’
rule-obedience. Also, the refined BDI cognitive architecture model can be used to take ac-
count of the different aspects of democracy to test the consequences of different theories,
such as ‘public choice theory’ (e.g. using game theory for making political decisions), and
to investigate concerns about the impact of voters’ preferences on predicting Senators’ be-
haviour (Griffin & Newman, 2005). Also, the interaction with a deliberative democracy is
through persuasion, given the following definition:
“[D]eliberation involves discussion in which individuals are amenable to scruti-
nizing and changing their preferences in the light of persuasion (but not manip-
ulation, deception or coercion) from other participants. Claims for and against
courses of action must be justified to others in terms they can accept.” Dryzek
and List (2002)
However, the refined BDI cognitive architecture, similar to real-world cases, also looks at
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the impact of manipulative persuasion. The impact of the rule of Law on preserving order
in society has two aspects. First, having clear rules reduces the possibility of subjective
decisions, and decreases uncertainties regarding rule-understanding in the system. Second,
the rule of law provides mechanisms for the time when the majority feel there is a need
to change the rules. This need can be addressed by changing the rules or persuading the
society of the rules’ benefits. The latter is important to avoid frequent changes in the rules
(i.e. stability). For this purpose (i.e. persuading the society instead of changing the rules), the
refined BDI cognitive architecture could be extended to include the articulation of ideas and
information considering the impact of influential figures or broadcasting media (see Rossler,




In this chapter, we provide a summary of what has been stated in the earlier chapters, along
with our contributions. We also provide some future directions as well as some limitations of
this work. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.1 states the main contributions
of this thesis. Section 8.2 states some limitations of the thesis and some future directions.
Finally, Section 8.3 provides concluding remarks for the chapter.
8.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we have developed three agent-based simulation models to identify, and sys-
tematically study, the key institutions and characteristics of two historical long-distance trad-
ing societies, namely the EIC and Julfa. We have also evaluated the successes of these trading
societies using different metrics. The thesis work has used agent-based social simulation as
an approach to develop novel models of the long-distance trading societies. Below, we list
our modelling contributions in this thesis work:
• Chapter 4 has developed a model to investigate the impact of contractual schemes and
environmental circumstances on the success of the societies by considering agents who
maximise their utility made in terms of money.
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• Chapter 5 has developed a model to investigate the impact of apprenticeship pro-
grammes and vocational schools, along with other characteristics of the system, on
the success of societies.
• Chapter 6 has refined the BDI cognitive architecture by considering the impact of
personality and different belief components. It has also used type-1 fuzzy sets to model
agents’ understandings of the seriousness of violations.
• Chapter 7 has developed a model to investigate the impact of the characteristics of
institutional mechanisms on the success of the society.
Note that in our modelling, we have also gone beyond the two historical long-distance trading
societies by a) modelling other societies, and b) mapping combinations of their characteris-
tics into some societal stereotypes. Using the societies, we confirmed our model; however,
we believe this model can represent other societies too. Also, mapping characteristics can
help users, after adjusting model parameters, to identify the best policies. In other words, by
using societal stereotypes, one can make predictions by asking what-if questions. This way,
the models can be used for other societies after estimating the value of parameters and by
adding constraints specific to the new society (e.g. estimating the discount factor for the net
present value of money or considering budget constraints). Note that, overall, these mod-
els can be used or extended for trading societies or to simulate systems in a more general
context.
8.1.1 Impact of the contractual scheme and environmental circumstances
This subsection briefly states our first contribution — the model developed in Chapter 4.
This model has addressed our first research question — i.e. “how do different contractual
schemes and differing environmental circumstances impact the success of these societies?”
We have developed a model to investigate the impact of contractual schemes (including con-
tract management schemes) and environmental circumstances, in terms of mortality rates, on
the success of the long-distance trading societies for agents who just consider utility function
in terms of money. To implement this modelling, we have extended Greif’s (1993) model by
considering the impact of the limited transparency of cheating behaviour and more contract
management characteristics than just the payment scheme employed. What follows briefly
states the addressed contract management characteristics in the first model.
First, we have investigated the impact of the preference of long-distance trading societies
for hiring recruits. The societies can have different hiring preferences; for example, a society
may prefer to hire known recruits — e.g. its agents’ relatives — and form a closed society or
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it simply hires recruits who are unknown to the company owners and forms an open society
of traders. We have also considered two distinctive payment schemes, namely bilateral com-
menda contracts — a profit-sharing contract where a significant ratio of made profit is shared
and agents have the opportunity to be a partner in trades — and fixed payment with the oppor-
tunity of private trade — i.e. conducting trades in non-monopolised items. Another important
aspect of managing contracts concerns how an agent’s behaviour is assessed. In our model,
the company may choose not to use the courts to fire cheaters or to use a performance-based
firing instead. After identifying an inappropriate behaviour (e.g. cheating), we investigated
how it was penalised. The considered penalties in our model have different varieties, includ-
ing the possibility of confiscating bonds and requiring the paying back of the illegal income
along with the accumulated interests. We also have investigated the impact of agents’ confor-
mity to potential cheaters’ policies, based on the proportion of cheaters observed. Note that
this model also showcases the impact of a combination of penalties and payment schemes
for more general contexts. We have used these models to study what happened in the two
long-distance trading societies of interest — the EIC and Julfa. Some of the findings of our
simulations are stated in the next paragraph.
First, the high mortality rate that the European chartered companies have dealt with in
Asia, made it impossible to use a closed hiring scheme — i.e. they would have needed an
extremely high birth rate to cope with this situation. Profit-sharing — i.e. using commenda
contracts — pays back itself by deterring agents from cheating (e.g. see Section 4.4.1.1 and
4.4.1.2). Having strong monitoring mechanisms — e.g. forming a closed society to moni-
tor agents better — when wages are low, in comparison with profits of cheating, does not
deter agents from cheating (e.g. see Section 4.4.1.1). If we consider the impact of con-
formity on agents’ behaviour (i.e. some agents consider cheating based on the number of
observed cheaters), closed societies lacking profit-sharing face an increase in the number of
potential offenders (see Figure 4.13). Finally, considering different consequences for con-
tractual schemes and adjudication processes employed, indicates that the best mechanisms
to deter agents from cheating in the EIC — where the company paid fixed wages — were
the performance-based firing and asking for bonds (see Sections 4.4.3.1 versus 4.4.1.1 and
4.4.2.1).
8.1.2 Apprenticeship model and vocational schools
This subsection briefly states our second contribution — the model developed in Chapter 5.
This model has addressed our second research question — i.e. “how do successful societies
maintain skill levels over time? What are the impacts of employing different mechanisms,
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including apprenticeship programmes and vocational schools, on the success of skill devel-
opment?” For this purpose, Chapter 5 has modelled training schemes, taking account of
the impact of apprenticeship programmes and vocational schools. This has essentially mod-
elled an aspect of the CKSW meta-modelling approach, that is, converting people with the
Worker meta-role into people with the Skill meta-role. In this model, we have considered
different success metrics, which include completion ratio, societal skill levels, and societal
profitability. To do this modelling, we went beyond the two historical long-distance trading
societies by including two contemporary cases (i.e. the German and British apprenticeship
programmes) and an additional historical case (old Britain). The study aimed to identify
the impact of apprenticeship programmes and societal characteristics on the success of the
society. However, this model also addresses improving skill levels in a society, which is
beneficial for other contexts. What follows states some other characteristics that have been
used in our model.
First, we have divided the systems into two trade types, namely manufacturers and ar-
tisans. These trade types have different needs — e.g. manufacturers need a high level of
analytical skills (e.g. engineers), while artisans need fine motor skills (e.g. potters). We have
also considered different trainer types to address differences in trainers’ incentives — e.g. a
training contractor may have a different incentive to train someone than a potential employer
would have. We have also addressed different recruiting schemes to cover the hiring and
training restrictions — e.g. conditions imposed by guilds and unions and the closedness of
the society — and the associated training costs. For manufacturers, who need analytical
skills for success, we also addressed the engagement of schools (i.e. vocational schools).
This concerned the impact of declarative knowledge and skills obtained in the vocational
schools on system performance. We have also used certain values for our parameters to test
the model for our considered cases, and the next paragraph states some of the findings of this
model, based on the parameters used.
The model indicates that the effectiveness of training by firms increases, if trainers want
to hire skilled apprentices (see Figures 5.2 and 5.5). Also, interventions by government
should focus on moderating the number of smaller companies who train agents to balance
the workforce market and providing vocational schools (see Figure 5.5). Guilds may have
negative impacts on societal skill level because they deprive some skilled agents from us-
ing their skills; hence, they deter potential apprentices from participating in the programme
(see Figure 5.8 and discussions of Wallis, 2008, about the impact of the guilds). Another
finding concerns the importance of the closedness of societies for the success of appren-
ticeship programmes, especially when governors aim to attract companies’ collaboration.
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This closedness has two sides — immigration and emigration. Overall, skill emigration de-
creases the completion ratio and the contribution of apprenticeship programmes to the GDI
of societies (see Figures 5.2, 5.1, 5.7, and 5.8). Also, apprenticeship programmes in open
societies that host immigrants may face some issues in completion rate and the contribution
of these programmes to the GDI (see Figures 5.6 and 5.6) — e.g. they may not need such
programmes. Note that a potential reason that bigger companies did not train in Britain is the
opportunity of finding low-wage skilled agents from other countries; for instance, McCollum
and Findlay (2015) pointed to lower wages and higher flexibility of immigrants compared to
those of local employees in Britain.
8.1.3 The impact of the characteristics of the institutional mechanisms
on an agent’s rule conformance
This subsection briefly states our third contribution — the models developed in Chapters 6
and 7. These models have addressed our third research question — i.e. “how do the char-
acteristics of institutional mechanisms (e.g. fairness) impact the success of these societies?”
For this purpose, in Chapter 6, we have extended the beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) cog-
nitive architecture by considering the impact of personality and different belief components,
such that it can interact with institutional mechanisms and the CKSW meta-role modelling
approach. We have also employed type-1 fuzzy sets to model agents’ utility functions reflect-
ing their understanding of the seriousness of a violation and its associated consequences. In
Chapter 6, we have also provided an operationalisation of our BDI cognitive architecture
based on empirical studies. In Chapter 6, the main characteristic of institutional mechanisms
that impacted agents’ decisions was fairness of institutions. Note in addition that, the pro-
posed refinement of the BDI cognitive architecture can also be employed to investigate the
interactions with institutions and meta roles from other points of view.
Chapter 7 has utilised the extended cognitive architecture of Chapter 6 to model agents’
decision-making and interactions with institutions. To build this simulation model, we have
drawn inspiration from the two historical long-distance trading societies. We have also used
different success metrics, which include societal rule conformance, societal profitability,
changes made to the rules, and system monitoring strength (firing violators). In our model,
we have also addressed the impact of the mobility of agents, which restricts the formation
of strong friendship bonds, as well as the apprenticeship programme, and environmental cir-
cumstances. In the next paragraph, we elaborate some findings of the simulation conducted,
based on the parameters’ values inspired by the two trading societies in question.
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The apprenticeship programme has a moderate correlation with improving monitoring
strength, as well as deterring agents from private trade (see Table 7.9) — i.e. they also im-
prove the loyalty of some agents. The fairness of the institutions is a pivotal aspect, when
the company concerns rule monitoring and rule conformance; however, it does not guarantee
improvements in a system’s profitability (see Table 7.9).
Using unfair institutions increases the frequency of violations. In other words, the unfair
institutions facilitate the justification of illegal behaviour and increases the seriousness of
violations (see Table 7.9). In other words, the agent underestimates his violations — e.g. he
considers stealing the company’s properties the same as reading news at work (see Figure
7.21).
What is stated above also addresses a concern that arose in Greif’s (2008) argument
against Edwards and Ogilvie (2011)1 regarding utilising adjudication processes. Greif (2008)
suggested that no adjudication processes were used in the reputation-based system of Maghr-
ibis. However, not using adjudication processes decreases the fairness of a society — i.e. it
may have negative impacts on agents’ behaviour.
8.2 Limitations and future directions
8.2.1 Limitations
Although our models explain the essential aspects of the systems, they also have some limi-
tations. These limitations are categorised into two subcategories, namely simplifications and
a lack of quantitative data.
The first subcategory (i.e. simplification) includes instances such as simplifying the ap-
prenticeship model by considering only one type of skill and not modelling agents’ prefer-
ence of some skills over others. Another instance concerns learning social norms through
information sharing or having an a priori understanding of social norms — i.e. we did not
address learning new norms by mechanisms such as reinforcement learning in Chapters 6
and 7. In our modelling of changes in institutions (Chapter 7), we did not model the im-
pacts of a country’s governors’ decisions on trading societies. This aspect is important as a
future direction, because all the issues that convinced Julfans to leave Iran happened in 25
years due to changes in governments and rulers — starting with the Afghan wars in 1722
and ending with Nadir Shah’s death in 1747. The same happened for the EIC. The EIC faced
problems because of the parliament’s interventions such as cancelling the EIC’s monopoly
1Edwards and Ogilvie (2011) had earlier published their work as a working paper.
296
and reducing their influence over the military. Most of such limitations are stated in each
chapter.
However, the second limitation subcategory (i.e. lack of quantitative data) should be ad-
dressed through lab studies. For instance, although we know that motivation has a positive
effect on learning, we do not know the coefficient (i.e. does it increase the speed of learning
by 20% or by 50%?). Another instance concerns the correlation between the fairness of the
institutions and personalities. The question is how to incorporate specific personality dimen-
sions in connection with how they change their behaviour. For instance, do all personalities
change agents’ behaviour if the institutions are unfair, or it is just those personalities who are
near one extreme of dimensions?
8.2.2 Future directions
Some future directions for this thesis work are stated here, in the same sequence of chapters.
The approach employed in the first model (i.e. considering limited information transparency)
can be used to test mathematical models developed using game theory. Note that a strength
of the agent-based modelling is providing a platform for agents who learn over time, based
on local information. However, most game theory models either overlook this uncertainty or
use expected values to calculate utility functions associated with all agents. These models,
including our model, can also be extended by considering agents’ learning biases (Mesoudi
et al., 2006; Rendell et al., 2011).
A future direction for the second model (i.e. apprenticeship programmes) concerns mod-
ifying the models to address other types of trades — e.g. service sectors such as tours — by
adjusting the value of parameters and choosing the influential aspects — e.g. added value
by vocational schools. Also, some apprenticeship programmes may be judged, based on
their trainees’ performance. However, a low level outcome may be primarily influenced by
a low-quality of trainees’ intake.
Also, the extension of the BDI cognitive architecture can be employed to interact with
institutions designed using Ostrom’s (1990, p. 90, Table 3.1) principles for “governing the
commons”. For instance, for boundaries that are unclearly defined (breaching the first prin-
ciple), we can use more variations for the fuzzy understanding of permissions granted. Also,
our method for modelling a fuzzy rule-understanding can be used to model agents’ under-
standing of graduated sanctions.2 Also, using “conflict-resolution mechanisms” (Ostrom’s
sixth principle) improves agents’ perception of fairness and impacts agents’ collaboration
2The fifth Ostrom principle states: “appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense).”
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in monitoring (Ostrom’s fourth principle).3 Another potential extension of the refined BDI
cognitive architecture is attainable if we agree there are some objective moral standards
(i.e. moral principles that are independent from social values). This helps us to consider
some embedded principles for agents disregarding their societies that can be awakened with
proper discussions.4
Now we wish to state a general extension of the earlier models, that is, considering
decision-makers’ characteristics and desires. For instance, it might be hard to convince man-
agers like those of the EIC to use fair institutions, because, as stated earlier, the EIC was
formed through a monopoly privilege. EIC managers disregarded their employees’ welfare,
and that restricted the managers from accepting the value of investing in the fairness of in-
stitutions. However, the Julfans shared the same background and sometimes were from the
same family, which made it easier for them to be fair out of altruism. Taking account of such
differences — e.g. altruism rewards in utility function for some agents or skipping certain
policies for others reflecting their prior beliefs — would make the model more general.
8.3 Concluding remarks
In this thesis, we have presented three agent-based models to simulate long-distance trading
societies. The theme of these models was inspired by the two historical long-distance trading
societies, namely the Armenian merchants of New-Julfa (Isfahan, Iran) and the British East
India Company. Comparing these two societies helped us to identify various characteristics
used in our models. We have also employed evidence from additional societies, as well as
contemporary experimental studies, to make the models generic.
The first model extended Greif’s (1993) model by considering the impacts of limited
3Ostrom’s fourth and sixth principles concern “monitoring” and “conflict-resolution mechanisms.” The
principle concerning “monitoring” states: “monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.” The principle concerning “conflict-
resolution mechanisms” states: “appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.” Also, (Ostrom, 1990, p. 94) said
that “in all of the long-enduring cases, however, active investments in monitoring and sanctioning activities are
quite apparent.”
4Note that this is a controversial matter. Some philosophers such as Shafer-Landau (2003, 2012) believe
in the existence of such principles, because denying them facilitates blaming the actions on social values —
e.g. “is human sacrifice acceptable because it is popular in a society?”. However, other philosophers, such
as Mackie (2012) and Blackburn (1999), discuss that such principles are not real, and morals equal either
subjective values or a normative understanding. Because of such unsolved debates for us, it was difficult, if not
impossible, to consider moral principles as an independent component in our model.
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information transparency and punishments beyond firing, as well as social characteristics in
terms of the closedness of society and the mortality rate.
With the second model, we looked at apprenticeship programmes with an emphasis on
societal skill and income improvement. We have used different parameters (e.g. consid-
ering different trades) that impacted training schemes (e.g. employing vocational schools).
For this model, we have also investigated contemporary apprenticeship programmes. Using
these programmes, we found that the basically considered characteristics — not so much the
exact methods — of historical societies can still be employed to model and predict the perfor-
mance of contemporary apprenticeship programmes — and this emphasises the usefulness
of “learning from history” suggested by Hegel (Little, 2017).
The third model has refined the BDI cognitive architecture such that it can interact with
CKSW meta-roles and institutional mechanisms. We have used this model to investigate the
impact of the fairness of institutions and additional institutional mechanisms on the rule-
conformity of society.
These models can be used as a package to study the impacts of different institutional
mechanisms on the success of a society. More precisely, the second model can be used to
make decisions about how to prepare new recruits by employing apprenticeship programmes
and vocational schools. The first and third models can be used to decide about organisa-
tional mechanisms and structures. More precisely, the first model addresses the impact of
the societal structure (e.g. closedness versus openness) and different types of punishments
(e.g. asking for bonds) for societal success. The third model investigates the interaction of
agents (employees) with the institutional mechanisms and system characteristics. Note that
the third model is more appropriate if the user wants to invest in the fairness of the insti-
tutional mechanisms. However, the first model is more conservative, because agents only
consider the utility function in terms of money.
Overall, although this thesis has developed models for long-distance trading societies
with an emphasis on the two historical societies, the proposed models can be used or ex-
tended to other trading societies. Also, some models (e.g. the refined BDI cognitive archi-
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Debove, S., Baumard, N., & André, J. B. (2016). Models of the evolution of fairness in the
ultimatum game: A review and classification. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(3),
245–254. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.01.001
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2010). Intrinsic motivation. In I. B. Weiner & W. E. Craighead
(Eds.), The Corsini encyclopedia of psychology (pp. 1–2). American Cancer Society.
doi: 10.1002/9780470479216.corpsy0467
Dickerson, C. A., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive disso-
nance to encourage water conservation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22(11),
841–854. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00928.x
Dignum, F., Dignum, V., & Jonker, C. M. (2009). Towards agents for policy making. In
N. David & J. S. Sichman (Eds.), Multi-agent-based simulation IX (Vol. 5269, pp.
141–153). Berlin, Germany: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-01991-3 11
Director of Public Prosecutions. (2017). Minor offences – legal guidance. In
The code for crown prosecutors. London, UK: The Crown Prosecution Service.
Retrieved 2018-11-30, from https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/
minor-offences
Donner, C., Maskaly, J., Fridell, L., & Jennings, W. G. (2015). Policing and procedural jus-
tice: a state-of-the-art review. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies
& Management, 38(1), 153–172. doi: 10.1108/pijpsm-12-2014-0129
Dryzek, J. S., & List, C. (2002). Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: A
reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science, 33(01), 1–28. doi: 10.1017/
s0007123403000012
Dubois, D., & Prade, H. (2015). The legacy of 50 years of fuzzy sets: A discussion. Fuzzy
Sets and Systems, 281, 21–31. doi: 10.1016/j.fss.2015.09.004
Dukhanin, V., Searle, A., Zwerling, A., Dowdy, D. W., Taylor, H. A., & Merritt, M. W.
(2018). Integrating social justice concerns into economic evaluation for healthcare
and public health: A systematic review. Social Science & Medicine, 198, 27–35. doi:
10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.12.012
Edwards, J., & Ogilvie, S. (2011). Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital:
The Maghribi traders reappraised. The Economic History Review, 65(2), 421–444.
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2011.00635.x
Egan, L. C., Santos, L. R., & Bloom, P. (2007). The origins of cognitive dissonance.
308
Psychological Science, 18(11), 978–983. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02012.x
Epstein, S. R. (1998, sep). Craft guilds, apprenticeship, and technological change in
preindustrial Europe. The Journal of Economic History, 58(3), 684–713. doi:
10.1017/s0022050700021124
Erikson, E. (2014). Between monopoly and free trade: the English East India Company,
1600–1757 (First ed.). Princeton, New Jersey, US: Princeton University Press. Re-
trieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wq02h
Etemadi, N. (1981). An elementary proof of the strong law of large numbers. Zeitschrift
für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Verwandte Gebiete, 55(1), 119–122. doi: 10.1007/
bf01013465
Fairfield, P. M., & Yohn, T. L. (2001). Using asset turnover and profit margin to forecast
changes in profitability. Review of Accounting Studies, 6(4), 371–385. doi: 10.1023/
A:1012430513430
Farhangian, M. M. (2018). Capturing the effect of personality on teams with agent-based
modelling (PhD Thesis, Department of Information Science, University of Otago,
Dunedin, New Zealand). Retrieved from https://ourarchive.otago.ac
.nz/handle/10523/8226
Farhangian, M. M., Purvis, M. K., Purvis, M. A., & Savarimuthu, B. T. R. (2016). Mod-
eling team formation in self-assembling software development teams: (Extended Ab-
stract). In J. Thangarajah, K. Tuyls, C. Jonker, & S. Marsella (Eds.), Proceedings
of the 2016 international conference on autonomous agents & multiagent systems
(pp. 1319–1320). Richland, South Carolina, US: International Foundation for Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=2936924.2937139
Farhangian, M. M., Purvis, M. K., Purvis, M. A., & Savarimuthu, T. B. R. (2014). Modelling
the effects of personality and temperament in small teams. In T. Balke, F. Dignum,
M. B. van Riemsdijk, & A. K. Chopra (Eds.), Coordination, organizations, institu-
tions, and norms in agent systems IX (Vol. 8386, pp. 25–41). Switzerland, Cham:
Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-14220-3 2
Farhangian, M. M., Purvis, M. K., Purvis, M. A., & Savarimuthu, T. B. R. (2015a). Agent-
based modeling of resource allocation in software projects based on personality and
skill. In F. Koch, C. Guttmann, & D. Busquets (Eds.), Advances in social computing
and multiagent systems (Vol. 541, pp. 130–146). Switzerland, Cham: Springer. doi:
10.1007/978-3-319-24804-2 9
Farhangian, M. M., Purvis, M. K., Purvis, M. A., & Savarimuthu, T. B. R. (2015b). The
309
effects of temperament and team formation mechanism on collaborative learning of
knowledge and skill in short-term projects. In F. Koch, C. Guttmann, & D. Busquets
(Eds.), Advances in social computing and multiagent systems (Vol. 541, pp. 48–65).
Switzerland, Cham: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24804-2 4
Farhangian, M. M., Purvis, M. K., Purvis, M. A., & Savarimuthu, T. B. R. (2015c). Model-
ing the effects of personality on team formation in self-assembly teams. In Q. Chen,
P. Torroni, S. Villata, J. Hsu, & A. Omicini (Eds.), PRIMA 2015: Principles and prac-
tice of multi-agent systems (Vol. 9387, pp. 538–546). Switzerland, Cham: Springer.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8 36
Farmer, D. (1997). Purchasing myopia — revisited. European Journal of Purchasing &
Supply Management, 3(1), 1–8. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-7012(96)00006-8
Ferrier, R. W. (1973). The Armenians and the east India company in Persia in the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries. The Economic History Review, 26(1), 38–62. doi:
10.2307/2594758
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. doi: 10.1037/h0041593
Finley, M. I. (1999). The ancient economy: Updated with a new foreword by Ian Morris
(First ed.). Berkeley, California, US: University of California Press.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to
theory and research (Addison-Wesley series in social psychology) (First ed.). Boston,
Massachusetts, US: Addison-Wesley.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2011). Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action
approach (First ed.). New York City, New York, US: Psychology Press Ltd. doi:
10.4324/9780203838020
Fite, G. C. (1962). Farmer opinion and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933. The Missis-
sippi Valley Historical Review, 48(4), 656–673. doi: 10.2307/1893147
Fleenor, J. W. (1997). The relationship between the MBTI and measures of personality and
performance in management groups. In C. Fitzgerald & L. K. Kirby (Eds.), Developing
leaders: Research and applications in psychological type and leadership development
(First ed., pp. 115–138). Palo Alto, California, US: Davies-Black Publishing Boston.
doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.2454.2488
Frantz, C. K., Purvis, M. K., Nowostawski, M., & Savarimuthu, B. T. R. (2013). nADICO:
A nested grammar of institutions. In G. Boella, E. Elkind, B. T. R. Savarimuthu,
F. Dignum, & M. K. Purvis (Eds.), Prima 2013: Principles and practice of multi-
agent systems (Vol. 8291, pp. 429–436). Berlin, Germany: Springer. doi: 10.1007/
310
978-3-642-44927-7 31
Frantz, C. K., Purvis, M. K., Nowostawski, M., & Savarimuthu, B. T. R. (2014). Modelling
institutions using dynamic deontics. In Coordination, organizations, institutions, and
norms in agent systems IX (Vol. 8386, pp. 211–233). Springer, Cham. doi: 10.1007/
978-3-319-14220-3 12
Frantz, C. K., Purvis, M. K., Nowostawski, M., & Savarimuthu, B. T. R. (2015). Analysing
the apprenticeship system in the Maghribi traders coalition. In F. Grimaldo & E. Nor-
ling (Eds.), Multi-agent-based simulation XV (Vol. 9002, pp. 180–196). Switzerland,
Cham: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-14627-0 13
Franz, W., & Soskice, D. W. (1994). The German apprenticeship system (Discussion Pa-
per No. 11). Konstanz, Germany: Center for International Labor Economics (CILE),
University of Konstanz. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/
92436
Frede, D. (2017). Plato’s ethics: An overview. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2017 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stan-
ford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/
entries/plato-ethics/.
Freedman, J. L. (1965). Long-term behavioral effects of cognitive dissonance. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1(2), 145–155. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(65)90042
-9
Freund, R. J., Wilson, W. J., & Mohr, D. L. (2010). Multiple regression. In Statistical
methods (Third ed., pp. 375–471). Cambridge, Massachusetts, US: Academic Press.
doi: 10.1016/b978-0-12-374970-3.00008-1
Frol’kis, V. V. (1982). Experimental life prolongation. In Aging and life-prolonging pro-
cesses: Neurohumoral regulation (First ed., pp. 306–340). New York City, New York,
US: Springer-Verlag Wien. doi: 10.1007/978-3-7091-8649-7
Fryer, J. (1698). A new account of East-India and Persia, in eight let-
ters: Being nine years travels begun 1672 and finished 1681 (First ed.).
London, England: Printed by R. Chiswell, at the Rose and crown in St.
Paul’s Church-Yard. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/
anewaccounteast00whitgoog/page/n5
Fuller, A., & Unwin, L. (2003). Creating a ‘Modern Apprenticeship’: A critique of the UK’s
multi-sector, social inclusion approach. Journal of Education and Work, 16(1), 5–25.
doi: 10.1080/1363908022000032867
Furnham, A. (1996). The Big Five versus the big four: The relationship between the Myers-
311
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and NEO-PI five factor model of personality. Personal-
ity and Individual Differences, 21(2), 303–307. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(96)00033-5
Gaastra, F. S. (1994). Private money for company trade: The role of the bills of exchange
in financing the return cargoes of the VOC. Itinerario, 18(01), 65–76. doi: 10.1017/
s0165115300022312
Gambarelli, G., & Owen, G. (2004). The coming of game theory. Theory and Decision,
56(1-2), 1–18. doi: 10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3
Garrido, J. M. (2009). Simulation output analysis. In Object oriented simulation (pp. 405–
409). Springer US. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4419-0516-1 30
Geerolf, F. (2017, September). A theory of Pareto distributions. Retrieved from https://
fgeerolf.com/pareto.pdf (Working Paper, UCLA)
Gentry, W. A., Mondore, S. P., & Cox, B. D. (2007). A study of managerial derailment
characteristics and personality preferences. Journal of Management Development,
26(9), 857–873. doi: 10.1108/02621710710819348
Georgeff, M., Pell, B., Pollack, M., Tambe, M., & Wooldridge, M. (1999). The belief-desire-
intention model of agency. In J. P. Müller, A. S. Rao, & M. P. Singh (Eds.), Intelligent
agents V: Agents theories, architectures, and languages (pp. 1–10). Heidelberg, Ger-
many: Springer-Verlag Berlin. doi: 10.1007/3-540-49057-4 1
Geyer, P. (1995). Quantifiying Jung: The origin and development of the Myers-Brigg Type
Indicator (Masters Thesis, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/
3998UnG
Ghorbani, A., Bots, P., Dignum, V., & Dijkema, G. (2013). MAIA: a framework for de-
veloping agent-based social simulations. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation, 16(2). doi: 10.18564/jasss.2166
Gilbert, N., & Troitzsch, K. (2005). Simulation for the social scientist (Second ed.). Berk-
shire, UK: Open University Press.
Gintis, H. (2009). The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral
sciences (First ed.). Princeton, New Jersey, US: Princeton University Press. Retrieved
from https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s97x
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. T., & Fehr, E. (2005). Moral sentiments and material in-
terests: Origins, evidence, and consequences. In H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. T. Boyd, &
E. Fehr (Eds.), Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of coopera-
tion in economic life (First ed., pp. 3–39). Cambridge, Massachusetts, US: MIT press.
doi: 10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0004
312
Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative “description of personality”: the Big-Five factor
structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(6), 1216–1229. doi: 10
.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1216
Gough, H. G. (2000). The California psychological inventory. In J. Watkins C. Edward &
V. L. Campbell (Eds.), Testing and assessment in counseling practice (Second ed., pp.
37–62). New Jersey, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Greenberg, J. (1990). Organizational justice: yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Journal of
Management, 16(2), 399–432. doi: 10.1177/014920639001600208
Greenberg, J. (1993). Stealing in the name of justice: Informational and interpersonal
moderators of theft reactions to underpayment inequity. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 54(1), 81–103. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1993.1004
Greif, A. (1989). Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi traders. The Journal of Economic History, 49(4), 857–882. doi: 10.1017/
s0022050700009475
Greif, A. (1993). Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The
Maghribi traders’ coalition. The American economic review, 83(3), 525–548. Re-
trieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117532
Greif, A. (2008). Contract enforcement and institutions among the Maghribi traders: Re-
futing Edwards and Ogilvie (Working Paper No. 2350). Munich, Germany: CESifo
Working Paper Series. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1153826
Griffin, J. D., & Newman, B. (2005). Are voters better represented? The Journal of Politics,
67(4), 1206–1227. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00357.x
Grossman, Z., & Owens, D. (2012). An unlucky feeling: Overconfidence and noisy
feedback. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(2), 510–524. doi:
10.1016/j.jebo.2012.08.006
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Impact of random seeds on simulation
results
In this appendix, we present some histograms to investigate the impact of random numbers
on simulation results. For this purpose, we present histograms associated with the last re-
sults of selected metrics for each chapter. In this thesis, we evaluated the simulation results
by averaging different runs, because a “goal in analysing output data from running a simu-
lation model is to make a valid statistical inference about the initial and long-term average
behaviour of the system based on the sample average from N replicate simulation runs” (Gar-
rido, 2009). Also, the law of large numbers states that the average of performing the same
experiment converges to the distribution mean (von Luxburg & Schölkopf, 2011). Different
scholars mathematically proved this theory (e.g. see Etemadi, 1981). Some studies suggest
that 30 experiments are sufficient (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1997). In this thesis work, we
use 30 simulation runs and average n (n ∈ {2, 3, ..., 30}) runs to calculate the error associ-





In plots associated with errors, we have used three guiding lines; a blue line that indicates
zero error, and two red lines that indicate ±1%. As shown in the following sections, in most
333
cases the measured error is lower than 1% for the last five runs (i.e. the law of large numbers
is held). As histograms and line plots indicate, different runs lead to distinctive results that
may help to study the worst-case scenario. However, as stated earlier, averaging these results
indicates that the impact of random numbers decreases over time.
































































































Figure A.1: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the ratio of cheaters



























































































Figure A.2: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the organisational




































































































Figure A.3: Changes in the average of organisational ROR obtained from the last iteration































































































Figure A.4: Changes in the error of the average of organisational ROR obtained from the last
iteration (see Table 4.4 for a definition of societies)
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Figure A.5: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the last completion











































































Figure A.6: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the last GDI pro-




















































































Figure A.7: Changes in the average of the last GDI produced by apprenticeship run by















































































Figure A.8: Changes in the error of average of last GDI produced by apprenticeship run by











































































Figure A.9: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the last completion












































































Figure A.10: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the last GDI






















































































Figure A.11: Changes in the average of the last GDI produced by apprenticeship run by















































































Figure A.12: Changes in the error of the average of the last GDI produced by apprenticeship
run by artisans (see Table 5.20 for a definition of societies)
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Figure A.13: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the ratio of
















































































































































Figure A.14: Histogram associated with the impact of random numbers on the organisational








































































































































































Figure A.15: Changes in the average of the organisational ROR in the last iteration of cog-

























































































































































Figure A.16: Changes in the error of the average of the last organisational ROR in the last




Here we present the sensitivity analysis of the output variables and the values of the parame-
ters of Chapter 5. The presented figures show the sensitivity of mean and standard deviation
of output variables to the parameters. For this purpose, we took 1500 random samples of
different combinations (already Aiello-Lammens & Akçakaya, 2017; Becker et al., 2018,
showed that between 500 and 1000 samples can reasonably represent the real model). The
range of parameters was defined so that they can present some real-world scenarios (e.g. we
considered a lower bound of 0.5 for agents’ discount factors). Also, we considered relation-
ships between the wages and profits as stated in other studies (Stasz & Brewer, 1999). Table
B.1 explains the parameters and variables shown in Figures B.1–B.6. Also, apprenticeships
without any contribution to the GDI after iteration 100 were considered as failed and were
removed from sensitivity analysis. The numbers of such instances for artisans, company
trainers, and contractor trainers were 80 (5.3%), 36 (2.4%), and 80 (5.3%), respectively.
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Table B.1: Parameters and variables employed in the simulation.
No. Abbreviation Explanation
1 #No ed Adeq Number of not educated/adequate
2 #Adeq Number of adequate
3 #Apprentices Number of potential apprentices
4 #Big Number of big companies
5 #Ed Adeq Number of educated/adequate
6 #Ed Exc Number of educated/excellent
7 #Exc Number of excellent
8 #Inadeq Number of inadequate
9 #No ed Exc Number of not educated/excellent
10 #Small Number of small companies
11 #Small Trainers Percentage of small companies who train
12 Ad Thresh Adequate skill threshold
13 Alpha Discount factor
14 Bad Train Spd red. Impact of bad training on speed of learning
15 Check Job Percentage of agents who check for jobs
16 Completion Completion ratio
17 Cost Good Train Cost of good training
18 Decision Horizon Decision Horizon
19 Demand rate Demand rate for artisans
20 Ed Thresh Threshold for academic skills
21 Ex Thresh Threshold for excellent skills
22 Guild? Is there a guild in effect
23 Info Apprentice Weight of recent information for apprentices
24 Info Artisan Weight of recent information for trainers
25 Init Wage Adeq Initial wage for adequate
26 Init Wage Ed Adeq Initial wage for educated/adequate
27 Init Wage Ed Exc Initial wage for educated/excellent
28 Init Wage Exc Initial wage for excellent
29 Learn Overestim Overestimation of learning speed
30 Max Waiting Maximum waiting years
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
No. Abbreviation Explanation
31 No passion Impact of low passion on learning speed
32 Open? Open society?
33 Prepay? Prepayment requirement
34 Pr Be Trainer Probability of being a trainer
35 Prof Big Adeq Profit of adequate for big companies
36 Prof Big Ed Adeq Profit of educated/adequate for big companies
37 Prof Big Ed Exc Profit of educated/excellent for big companies
38 Prof Big Exc Profit of excellent for big companies
39 Prof Small Adeq Profit of adequate for small companies
40 Prof Small Ed Adeq Profit of educated/adequate for small companies
41 Prof Small Ed Exc Profit of educated/excellent for small companies
42 Prof Small Exc Profit of excellent for small companies
43 School Speed Accel Impact of school on accelerating learning
44 School? Any school is engaged?
45 Small Spd Red. Negative impact pf small companies on skill learning
46 Stickiness Stickiness of wages
47 Train Years Number of training years
48 Wage Adeq Wage of educated agents with adequate skills
49 Wage Ed Adeq Wage of agents with adequate skills
50 Wage Ed Exc Wage of educated agents with excellent skills
51 Wage Exc Wage of agents with excellent skills
52 Wealthy (%) Percentage of wealthy families
Figures B.1 and B.2 present the correlation between average (µ) and standard deviation
(SD) of the simulation output variables with parameters/variables of artisans, respectively.
We discuss the correlations with an absolute value more than 0.3. As can be seen, µ and SD
of GDI are negatively impacted by an increase in the percentage of agents who check for
jobs. An increase in demand rate increases µ and SD of GDI. µ and SD of completion ratio
are negatively impacted by the number of training years and the percentage of agents who
check for jobs. Also, the averages (µs) of wages are positively correlated to initial wages,
profits, and demand that mirror studies in economics regarding the impact of the stickiness
of wages, company’s earnings, and demand on system dynamics. The averages (µs) of the
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Figure B.1: The sensitivity of average of output variables to changes in parameters (artisans)
number of skilled agents is negatively correlated to the thresholds and the percentage of
agents checking for jobs.




































































































































































































Figure B.2: The sensitivity of standard deviation of output variables to changes in parameters
(artisans)
Figures B.3, B.5, B.4, and B.6 present the correlation between the average (µ) and stan-
dard deviation (SD) of the simulation output variables with parameters/variables of compa-
nies and contractors, respectively. We discuss the correlations with an absolute value more
than 0.3. As can be seen, µ of the GDI is negatively impacted by an increase in the percent-
age of agents who check for jobs. Also, the engagement of schools increases µ and SD of
the GDI. Furthermore, µ and SD of completion ratio are negatively impacted by the number
of training years and the percentage of the agents who check for jobs. The averages (µs)
of wages are positively correlated to the initial wages and profits. This mirrors the studies
in economics regarding the impact of the stickiness of wages and company’s earnings on
wages. Also, initial wages for high skilled agents increases associated SD with them. The
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Figure B.3: The sensitivity of average of output variables to changes in parameters (manu-
facturers, companies)
averages (µs) of the number of skilled agents is negatively correlated to the thresholds. Also,
engagement of schools improves the educational skills of apprentices.




















































































































































































































































Figure B.4: The sensitivity of standard deviation of output variables to changes in parameters
(manufacturers, contractors)
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Figure B.5: The sensitivity of average of output variables to changes in parameters (manu-
facturers, contractors)
















































































































































































































































Figure B.6: The sensitivity of standard deviation of output variables to changes in parameters
(manufacturers, contractors)
356
